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A bstract
The thesis investigates digital divides in Greece, looking specifically at 
parameters of Internet adoption. It aims to reach beyond access and usage issues, 
placing Internet adoption within a socio-cultural and decision-making framework.
Theoretically, the thesis is structured around three perspectives. First, it draws 
upon Alfred Schutz’s ‘everyday life-world’ and argues that digital divides should be 
explored by scrutinising the interactions of individual and systemic agent(s) in an 
everyday life framework and as part of a continuum of evolution in time. To 
understand, in particular, Greece's delay in adopting the Internet, the thesis draws on 
Martin Bauer’s work on resistance to technology and argues in support of research to 
examine the driving forces behind techno-phobia and other forms of resistance. To 
complement these perspectives on socio-cultural forces, the importance of structural 
factors is recognised by drawing on the sociology of policy and regulation and pointing 
out the need to look at the role of society’s culture in policy and regulation practices. 
It thus draws on historical accounts of Greece, introducing cultural indicators that are 
critical for disentangling policy and regulation in the Greek information society.
Empirically, the thesis reveals that in Greece decision-makers appropriate 
society’s culture to serve their own professional interests, without responding to 
society’s needs for accountability and visibility, and that patronage networks, 
bureaucracy and traditionalism have provided the space for public authorities to direct 
a weak civil society. Meanwhile, ordinary people dismiss technologies and are critical 
of policy and regulation which put established everyday life cultures at risk, but also 
appropriate decision-making mechanisms which serve their individual interests. With 
profound interdependencies between decision-making and civil society in Greece, 
policy and regulation have not only failed to drive societal change but have themselves 
been influenced by the societal traits of traditionalism and techno-phobia that deter 
Internet adoption. These findings also raise implications for the European information 
society.
Methodologically, mixed and multiple data sources are employed, enabling a 
comparison and cross-validation from a complementarity and triangulation perspective 
of data collected on the complex issue of digital divides. The advantages of multiple 
source data over single methodological approaches are thus demonstrated, offering a 
potential contribution to other research in the field.
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The digital divide has been a huge concern worldwide. This thesis inquires into 
the factors shaping digital divides in Greece, a country lagging behind the rest of 
Europe and widely seen as resistant to information society developments.
The thesis examines factors that shape digital divides in Greece and are related 
to ordinary people’s everyday and resistant culture, on one hand, and to decision­
making, on the other. Although the phenomenon is often referred to as ‘the digital 
divide’, the thesis argues this phenomenon has many facets, that there are multiple 
digital divides. However, the present research does not tackle all the different digital 
divides. Rather, it examines Internet adoption in Greece and specific aspects of it such 
as Internet use, the quality of use, concerns about online risks, self-protection on the 
Internet etc. The thesis explores ordinary people’s insights into Internet adoption and 
links them to the role policy-makers and regulators play through their decision-making 
strategies to boost the information society. The thesis argues that complex 
connections between society’s culture and decision-making significantly account for 
the persistence of digital divides in Greece.
The decision to examine the role of these factors was driven by the existence of 
research that examines the drivers of digital divides lying in the societal domain as 
opposed to those related to policy and regulation, while often restricting its focus on 
economic and access factors. Besides, the case of Greece fits well into this research 
framework because the Greek information society appears as a distinctive case in the 
European region and because cultural and political trends seem to have played a 
significant part in how certain aspects of digital divides evolve in the country.
To address these research and country-specific challenges, the thesis asks: How 
do society’s culture and Internet policy and regulation influence digital divides in Greece? In 
particular, the research seeks to answer the following questions:
1. W hat are the general characteristics of the Greek information society?
2. How far does society’s culture influence digital divides in Greece?
3. How far do Internet policy and regulation influence digital divides in Greece?
4. How do society’s culture and Internet policy and regulation intersect in influencing 
digital divides in Greece?
1 0
j . 2  Digital divides: research challenges and the case o f  Greece
The phenomenon of digital divides has been strongly debated and continuously 
evolved since technology and the socio-economic, cultural and political frameworks 
where technology is formed and taken up are also evolving. The questions are what can 
this thesis offer that is new and why is it important to look at digital divides from a 
socio-cultural and decision-making perspective, and with respect to the case of Greece. 
This section illustrates the thesis’ importance by discussing its two main research 
foundations: Section 1.2.1 discusses digital divides and the research challenges in 
relation to the role of society’s culture and decision-making; Section 1.2.2 presents the 
Greek case and its importance as a case that stands on its own and distinctively in the 
broader European framework.
1.2.1 Digital divides research and challenges
The OECD reports on how digital divides are commonly measured: access lines 
and channels; mobile and Internet subscribers; broadband subscribers; availability of 
Digital Subscriber Lines (DSL); households with Internet and home computer access; 
Internet penetration by size class; Internet selling and purchasing by industry; 
telecommunication services revenue; telecommunication infrastructure investment; 
R&D expenditure; trade in ICT goods; ICT investment’s contribution to GDP 
growth; top 50 telecommunications and IT firms.1 This list shows that the Internet is a 
key technology in the information society and that economic and market indicators of 
development are emphasised. Yet what seems to be missing are indicators of how 
ordinary people negotiate the meaning, value and use of Internet technologies, as well 
as evidence of how decision-making responds accordingly. Also, in the series of OECD 
IT Outlook reports (2006,2004 & 2002a) countries with completely different socio­
economic, political and cultural characteristics are compared purely from a 
technological and market perspective.
Along these lines, from the early phase of digital divides scholars have offered 
relevant criticisms: ‘...so many “bits”, so much economic growth -  are readily 
quantifiable, thereby alleviating analysts of the need to raise qualitative questions of 
meaning and value’ (Webster, 1995: 29). These criticisms concern the lack of 
‘institutional and cultural analyses’ (Calabrese, 1999:312) and make researchers raise the 
role of other parameters, such as everyday life, in the configuration and development 
of technology: ‘everyday life changes to accommodate the various technologies 
penetrating it...or, rather, does everyday life itself induce transformations in 
technological systems and artefacts?’ (Bakarjieva, 2005: 82). Also, research points out 
implications of sociological and cultural approaches to digital divides for policy-making
’A list of the OECD indicators of information society is available at: www.oecd.org/sti/TCTindicators.
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as they can inform public policies and broaden the scope of considerations that top- 
down policies take into account (Preston, 2005). These implications concern the 
mission of policy and regulation to, besides all other areas of action, co-ordinate the 
communication process between all agents involved, such as media communicators, 
media technologies, media adopters and media content/messages, towards shrinking 
the divides.
Garnham (1999) employed Sen’s (1992 & 1999) capability approach in his media 
work and illustrated, though not directly, the importance of empirically exploring the 
role of socio-cultural and decision-making factors in digital divides. Garnham (ibid: 121) 
argues that ‘it is the real availability of opportunities and the real achievement of 
functioning that matters’. While policy and regulation are responsible for the 
technological options offered to individuals, culture determines people’s abilities2 to 
make effective use of those options (ibid). In this sense, the importance of the 
emphasis that policy and regulation place on ensuring universal access for the provision 
of equal chances to people (Burgelman, 1999:128) is restrained by people’s complex and 
multi-dimensional capabilities in particular cultural contexts.
The role of society’s culture in shaping the aspects of inclusion or exclusion and 
its implications for policy and regulation constitute a key incentive for this thesis to 
examine digital divides in a cultural framework and in connection to relevant policies 
and regulations. The thesis can benefit from examining Preston’s argument about 
policy implications and by understanding how people’s attitudes to technological 
artefacts in everyday and cultural settings are linked to the ways in which policies and 
regulations tackle issues of exclusion in the information society.
On this basis, the figure below (Figure 1-1) portrays the research framework of 
the thesis. Society’s culture is to be treated as influencing the political and regulatory 
status of affairs (Element A), with the latter responding and either sustaining or 
challenging the cultural grounds of social life (Element B). This figure does not capture 
the full complexity of relationships and instead provides a simplified picture of the aim 
to depart from economic, technological and socio-deterministic accounts of digital 
divides. Nevertheless, it illustrates the focus on ordinary people’s adoption of the 
Internet in an everyday cultural context on one hand, and on decision-makers’ 
practices and frameworks of action on the other, leaving the thesis to explore the 
potentially complex relationships between society’s culture and decision-making in the 
case of digital divides in Greece.
2 Abilities not only refer to people’s physical, mental and educational skills but also to their psychological 
conditions, life principles and attitudes when they use media technologies. This is so as to ...distinguish 
between different potential uses of the media and the uses actually made and to ask why potentialities 
available are not actualized’ (Garnham, 1999:121).
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1.2.2 D igital divides and the case o f Greece3
Digital divides in Greece is an interesting case to research. This is because the 
Greek information society appears to be lagging behind other countries in the 
European region and because Greece is widely considered resistant to information 
society developments given its quite distinctive overall cultural and political milieu. 
The thesis argues that the case of Greece can illustrate the role of society’s culture and 
decision-making in shaping digital divides, constituting a research basis for similar 
research to be conducted at the cross-national level or in other country cases. 
However, the thesis does not conduct comparative research. It positions Greece in the 
European framework, highlights the distinctiveness of the Greek case and attempts to
3 The main trends in the Greek information society, digital divides in the country and the socio-cultural 
and policy traits of the Greek context are all presented in more detail in Chapter 3.
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explain the driving forces of digital divides in the country, without examining internal 
divides within the country or in comparison with other countries in Europe.
Looking at the history of the information society in Greece, one can conclude 
that Greece has for a long time been slow in the diffusion of networking technologies 
and services. According to the OECD Outlook 1999, Forbes and ESIS-ISPO data for 
1998, Greece had 0.14 secure web servers for electronic commerce per 100,000 
inhabitants compared to the average of 2.04 in OECD countries, with only 1.1% of the 
Greek population being online and 125 per 1,000 inhabitants using PCs. In the same 
year, there were 14.3 mobile phone lines per 100 inhabitants Greece, much less than 
the EU average of 22.1 lines. Also, Greece was the EU member state with the smallest 
usage of communications systems such as PCs (12.2% in Greece and 30.8% as the EU- 
15 average), CD-ROMs (7.0% in Greece and 20.8% as the EU-15 average), modems 
(2.4% in Greece and 9.3% as the EU-15 average) and Internet connections (2.9% in 
Greece and 8.3% as the EU-15 average).
The recent history of networking technologies and services seems to 
perpetuate this trend of slowness in Greece. The 2005 national survey on the use of 
new technologies (GRNet, 2005) shows an increasing penetration of ICTs in Greece 
for the 2001-2003 period and a stagnancy of the adoption of new technologies for the 
2004-2005 period. In 2005, t i^e five-layered indicator of new technology use rose by 
only 0.3% (13.6%), whereas the share of the population not using new technologies 
dropped by 2.7% (ibid: 125). Along these lines, the latest national survey reports the 
uneven diffusion of information society indicators set by the eEurope and i2oio 
initiatives (Information Society Observatory, 2007). Likewise, European research 
shows that Internet indicators remain at particularly low levels in Greece. In the 
Eurobarometer survey of 2005 (EC, 2006), Greece had the lowest percentage of 
Internet users (24%) in the EU-25 (49%). Even Spain and Italy are closer to the EU-25 
average, with Portugal just ahead of Greece (27%).4 Although the thesis does not 
espouse the vision of a single and synchronised European information society, 
especially in the way European institutions and the EC have articulated it, these 
figures indicate that information society indicators have not developed in Greece as 
much as in other European countries.
To explain the relatively disadvantaged position of Greece, one must 
understand the forces driving the country’s information society. The following 
statement points to technological, infrastructural and economic prerequisites for the 
information society to develop and emphasises the barriers found in society’s culture 
and decision-making practices in the Greek information society:
The geographical, demographic, administrative and economic particularities ofourcountiy are clearly
illustrated at the regional level and present a challenge in view of the possibilities offered by the new
4 Internet usage in the EU-25 ranges from 85% in the Netherlands to 24% in Greece (EC, 2006: 6).
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information technologies... A technological prerequisite, i.e. state-of-the-art telecommunication 
and radio-television infrastructure, covering almost the entire country at affordable prices... A social 
and dem ocratic prerequisite, i.e. thorough information of the local population on the importance 
of modernisation and, also so as to enhance the ability to absorb new technologies...An 
organisational and functional prerequisite, i.e. seeming the local presence of trained 
"operators"... Prejudice and ignorance, resulting from  the lack o f  knowledge and 
inform ation often  cause resistance to  the introduction o f  new  technologies. This, in turn, 
leads to limited penetration and exploitation of the technology while, in addition, it obstructs 
participation in  decision-making procedures... (emphasis added) (PDGS).
As regards decision-making for the information society in Greece, the White 
Paper of 2002 stated that Greece was still ‘relatively behind in the course towards the 
emergence of the information society’, as ‘unsuitable structures, bureaucracy, 
inadequate staffing, deficient planning and lack of assessment and feedback’ (Greek 
Ministry of the Economy and Finance, 2002: 9) contribute to a static policy 
environment hindering the development of the country’s information society. From a 
European perspective, the Greek government started to liberalise and privatise the 
broadcasting and telecommunications market in the early 1990s, and 
telecommunications regulation in Greece has been marked by a long history of delays 
and inconsistencies. The 10th European Commission (EC) report on implementation of 
the EU Electronic Communications Regulatory Package (EC, 2004a) stated that five 
countries, including Greece, had not transposed the framework one year after the 
deadline. As a consequence, the Commission launched infringement proceedings for 
non-notification and proceedings were pending before the European Court of Justice 
against Belgium, Greece and Luxemburg (ibid: 9). In January 2006 the EC sent Greece 
a formal request asking for information regarding its compliance with the Court of 
Justice (CoJ) ruling of 14 April 2005 concerning the country’s failure to implement 
electronic communications liberation by the set deadline.
In terms of society’s culture, national research hints that this may be one of the 
directions to look at in order to explain digital divides. Surveys such as the 2006 survey 
by the National Statistical Service of Greece (ESYE, 2006) conclude that most 
Internet non-users in Greece do not use the Internet because they lack the desire or 
interest. Also, EC research (2006 & 2004a) argues that people in Greece are highly 
reserved about the Internet and insecure when going online. Although this lack of 
interest in and need to use the Internet is not unique to Greek culture, it appears to be 
greater in Greece than in other countries. Also, it appears to be interconnected with 
other elements of social and political life in the country making resistance a key driver 
of people’s attitudes to the Internet.
In searching for the causes of what is perceived as resistance to Internet and 
other technologies in Greece, one could draw on historical analyses of the Greek 
context. Such analyses examine the ‘intermeshed’ relationships between the state and 
civil society and argue that they have discouraged the adoption of new technologies in 
the country by making civil society dependent on state structures and highly inflexible
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to change and evolution. Greek Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis recently argued5 
that there is a common feeling among Greeks that society relies too much on state 
authorities and the state’s role has expanded extremely and is less efficient than it 
should be. He acknowledged that significant residues of past mentalities still exist in 
the country, yet without referring explicitly to the dominance of the intermeshed 
relationships between the state and society.
In concluding this section, the present research explores the Greek information 
society and its digital divides as a relatively distinctive case in Europe with society’s 
culture and decision-making being noted as possible causes of delays and non-progress 
in the country. The aim of the research is to provide empirical evidence about such 
arguments along with insights into whether and to what extent society’s culture and 
decision-making intersect. It seeks to take into consideration that ‘societal change 
takes more time. It requires organizational changes, a shift in mindsets, modernization 
of regulation, different consumer behaviour, and political decision’ (EC, 2002:18).
i . j  The digital divides literature and the concepts o f  society9s 
culture and decision-making
The thesis is framed by literature that examines key trends in the information 
society and consequent changes in how people are adopting Internet technologies. 
This section outlines some of this literature and underlines the importance of the 
concepts of society’s culture and decision-making for gaining a better understanding of 
digital divides.
1.3.1 The information society
The information society is the context in which digital divides emerge, take 
shape and evolve, and it has attracted significant research and public attention. In 
popular approaches, the information society is defined as ‘the use of information and 
communication technologies and the related social, economic, political and cultural 
developments linked to the growing availability of new forms of information and means 
of communication’ (Mansell and Steinmueller, 2000: 8). In etymological terms, the 
notion of the information society has been criticised for taking on the static, a-social 
and non-dynamic term ‘information’ instead of the dynamic and interactive term of 
‘knowledge’ and ‘communication’ (Siochru and Bruce, 2003:1; Silverstone and Sorensen, 
2005:213-214). A similar techno-centric emphasis is noted in approaches to the history
5 Source: notes taken from the public lecture by the Prime Minister of Greece at the LSE, 20 November 
2006.
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of the information society, which began in the first years after World War II with the 
advent of the digital-stored programme computer and gained great potential in the 
1990s. A chain of technological, industrial and societal changes lie at the core of this 
newly emerging information era that many call the ‘media revolution’ (van Dijk, 1999) 
and surround it with a widespread ‘rhetoric of revolution and crisis...a rhetoric of 
competing utopian or dystopian visions’ (Silverstone, 1996: 218).
Regarding ordinary people, scholars have claimed a series of new possibilities in 
the take up of technologies. Space and time fragmentation, ‘time-space compression’ 
(Harvey, 1989 & 1993) and ‘time-space distanciation’ (Giddens, 1994) are claimed to be 
some of the changes that people experience through new media technologies. 
Information and communication technologies (ICTs) are seen as capable of paving new 
paths for ‘virtual’ collaboration and community-building across time and space 
distances. The effects of ICTs on economies are seen as revolutionary and supportive 
of the establishment of the information industry and the advent of economic 
prosperity of a new quality and scale (Splichal, 1994; Toffler, 1983). Others note the 
effects of ICTs on democracy and culture (see Evans, 2004:14-8), with ICTs spanning 
all areas of social life.
Although the role of ICT users in development of the information society is 
acknowledged (Mansell and Steinmueller, 2000: 21), the interdependencies between 
users and the political, social and cultural context in which people use and take 
advantage of technology are very often not at the epicentre of discussions accounting 
for the information society and its consequences: ‘the realization of socio-economic 
consequences lies in the ways that technologies are designed, deployed or evolve 
according to the “logic” of the incremental search for better ideas and approaches’ 
(ibid: 21-2). On the other hand, Webster (1995: 6-29) identifies five dimensions of the 
information society -  technological, economic, occupational, spatial and cultural-and 
argues that although the cultural conception of the information society ‘is perhaps the 
most easily acknowledged’ it is ‘the least measured’ (ibid: 21).6 The cultural dimension 
relates ICTs and the ways they are used to people’s everyday life and culture. This 
dimension indicates, at least partly, the existence of a multi-stage process in how 
technology is adopted, influencing human activities and communications.
1.3.2 Digital divides: nature, sources and significance in the information society
Regardless of the technological advances achieved and the often techno- 
deterministic approaches to the information society, inequalities in the distribution, 
access and use of ICTs frame the notion of digital divides.
6 Webster (1995:7) describes these five facets as ‘mutually exclusive’, but they normally co-exist, overlap 
and depend on each other, questioning the scope and characteristics of the information society.
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‘Digital’ refers to hardware, content and applications, and points to 
heterogeneous information, resources and services that individuals access through 
various technological platforms (Selwyn, 2004a: 346-7). The concept of the ‘digital 
divide’ appeared in the 1990s as an umbrella concept and is conventionally understood 
in terms of access to and usage of digital technologies: ‘unequal access to technologies 
or digital exclusion at an international as well at a local level’ (Cammaerts and 
Audenhove, 2003a: 7). In diffusion terms, Mansell (2002:407) defines the digital divide 
as ‘the uneven spread of the new media’. Some discuss it without looking at any specific 
ICT technology (Selwyn, 2004a; Frissen, 2003).
The thesis adopts the term in its plural meaning since many different aspects 
and forms of divides co-exist today: ‘this is, in fact, a whole series of interlocking 
“divides” -  the gaps that separate segments of society as well as whole nations into 
those who are able to take advantage of the new ICT opportunities and those who are 
not’ (OECD, 2000a: 3). These ‘interlocking’ divides go beyond the access to and usage 
of technology, while their nature, scope and importance evolve along with the social, 
economic and political conditions in which technology is designed, developed and 
consumed. Also, the thesis focuses on Internet technologies and examines Internet 
adoption in Greece as a critical facet of digital divides.
Digital divides is a complex phenomenon, a complex and problematic object of 
study (Haddon, 2004) ^ d  some wonder whether it has any real meaning (Brady, 2000; 
Chaney, 2000). Gunkel argues that ‘the problems of the digital divide have been and 
probably will continue to be moving targets’, suggesting that ‘the term’s definition 
should be similarly mobile’ (2003: 505). In this respect, Warschauer (in press: 1) 
questions our understanding of the phenomenon: ‘{t]he “digital divide” is one of the 
most discussed social phenomena of our era. It is also one of the most unclear and 
confusing. What after all is the digital divide?’ As a result, it is widely considered a 
shifting area of research (Compaine, 2001a).
Initial literature stressed technological advancement or inequalities in relation 
to socio-demographic causes and effects (e.g. Angwin and Castaneda, 1998). For some, 
‘divide’ implies a strict dichotomy by bipolar accounts, the “‘all or nothing’ scenario” 
(Gunkel, 2003: 506) and neat ‘social stratification’ (Warschauer, in press: 1). Again, 
others have contrasted this dichotomy, arguing about the need for ‘sufficient 
sociological sophistication’ (Webster, 1995: 97).
Regarding the sources of digital divides, researchers’ attention has been 
conventionally drawn to socio-economic and demographic differences as the main 
source of divisions between ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’. However, empirical surveys, 
commentaries on empirical findings and other scholarly works (NTIA, 2001a, 2001b & 
2000; Hoffman et al. 2001; Walton, 1999; Wilhelm, 2001; Walsh et al. 2001; Kirkup,
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20oi) have reported contrasting findings with regard to existing inequalities and the 
role of demographics.
At an early stage of the discussion, Silverstone and Haddon (1996a) showed that 
people’s use of media technologies depends, among other factors, on the aims of use 
and ‘the disposable time’/ ‘temporal capital’. Today, there is an increasing volume of 
literature that challenges the simplistic ‘bipolar societal split’ between ‘haves’ and ‘have 
nots’, and illustrates the role of physical, digital, human and social resources in posing 
barriers to access to and use of ICTs (Warschauer 2003a: 6). Regarding the Internet, it 
is argued that, although ‘social divisions in internet access continue to exist’ (Wyatt et 
al., 2002: 29), the breadth of online activities, abilities, skills, means to overcome 
potential barriers to functional use, as well as ‘techno-culture’ (Selwyn, 2004a) are 
becoming increasingly important for digital divides. Thus, inequalities in the skills and 
usage of ICTs (Hacker and Van Dijk, 2003:324; Perri 6 and Benjupp, 2001:7), as well 
as ‘cohort’ and ‘awareness’ (Katz and Rice, 2002:35-65) have been seen as other aspects 
of divides.
In this context, the focus of the thesis, namely Internet adoption (i.e. Internet 
use, the quality of use, concerns about online risks, self-protection on the Internet etc), 
is seen as a critical aspect of divides that influences the overall course of the 
phenomenon and allows other forms of digital inclusion and participation to be 
examined. The thesis contends that the parameters of Internet adoption are 
inseparable from daily routines and an integral part of policies and regulations in the 
information society. Existing literature often connects digital divides to ‘social 
exclusion and deprivation’ (Haddon, 2000), as well as to ‘community involvement and 
social capital’ (Kavanaugh and Patterson, 2001). General accounts of why we should 
look at digital divides view this phenomenon ‘as a practical embodiment of the wider 
theme of social inclusion’ (Selwyn, 2004a: 343). Thus, scholars argue about the overall 
importance of the phenomenon for the market and the economy,7 as well as for social 
inequalities which can either be increased due to digital gaps (van Dijk, 1999: 235) or 
decreased due to the curing potential of new media (Mansell, 2002: 407).
Going beyond normative accounts of ICTs as creators of a ‘more harmonious 
and egalitarian society’ (Cammaerts and Audenhove, 2003a: 8), a growing volume of the 
literature acknowledges that digital divides emerge in complex realities (Haddon, 
2004). In these realities, people’s needs, desires, skills, capacities and social roles matter 
(Mansell and Steinmueller, 2000: 37) and significant implications emerge for the 
empowerment of people’s citizenship (Couldry, 2003). The discussion of the role of 
digital divides in social inclusion, citizenship and deliberative democracy is gaining 
increasing importance in the literature as it has the potential to shed light not only on 
the role of digital divides but also on the relationship between social inclusion and the
7 For instances of this rhetoric, see Couldry, 2007: 385-8.
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degree of digital opportunities or restrictions that people are subject to. Appropriating 
Sen’s capability approach (1992 & 1999),8 Couldry (2007) elaborated the idea that 
people’s capabilities are important for communications, emphasising the implications 
for communicative entitlements and democracy. Also, within the spirit of Sen’s 
‘capabilities’ Mansell (2002) suggests new media configurations and a ‘rights-based 
approach to new media policy’ (ibid: 409) that will empower ordinary people, providing 
them with an active role in communications based on their capabilities and beyond the 
mere consumption of content.
Discourses on digital exclusion and citizenship allow a better understanding not 
only of the importance of digital divides but also of the nexus of relationships between 
ordinary people (or citizens) and decision-makers in relation to digital divides. People’s 
engagement with digital technologies relates to technology design, which needs to be 
flexible, as well as to policy support of social rights and participation (Mansell and 
Steninueller, 2000:40-52). The role of politics is well embraced by the debate between 
defenders and opponents of the welfare state model. This debate obtains new interest 
as social rights and services go hand-in-hand with communication issues such as ‘media 
access, public service broadcasting, universal telephone service, trade and investment of 
global telecommunications, media education, and cultural identity’ (Calabrese and 
Burgelman, 1999: 2). The debate is also closely related to regulation since market 
criteria and free market competition are, from a neo-liberal point of view, to replace 
tight regulations and state intervention, with the latter being the foundations of the 
welfare state.
These issues point to the importance of looking at decision-making practices 
and citizenship9 in communications by situating ordinary people at the epicentre: 
‘...access to and competence in the use of the means of communication arguably define 
a relationship that contributes substantially to defining the quality of the experience of 
citizenship in the modern world’ (ibid: 8). Communications influence people’s inclusion 
and participation, with the latter being dependent on social, political and economic 
provisions, further challenging policy and regulation processes (Henten, 1999: 85-6).
1.5.3 Digital divides: the role o f society's culture and decision-making
The above discourses have driven the thesis to look at the role of society’s 
culture, and specifically of everyday (e.g. Bakardjieva, Silverstone, Berker, Haddon and 
others) and resistance culture (e.g. Bauer, Wyatt and others), in the adoption of 
information, communication and other technologies. Also, the research accounts for
8 Garnham (1999) was the first to integrate Sen’s ‘capabilities approach’ in media and communications.
9 Although citizenship and its importance are brought up in the empirical findings I obtained, the 
examination of citizenship in relation to digital divides is not at the core of this thesis. Citizenship 
touches on many aspects of social life and activity, while it entails implications for policy- and 
regulation-making.
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the role of decision-making, and specifically of policies and regulations, in the 
shrinking of digital divides (e.g. Mansell, Garnham, Preston, Silverstone; Pauwels & 
Burgelman and others). On the grounds of these research threads, the thesis examines 
society’s culture and decision-making separately as well as together. It does so in order 
to understand ordinary people’s decisions to adopt the Internet or not by accounting 
for their dispositions to and evaluations of the Internet and by linking this to what is 
often considered practice-oriented and problem-solving policies and regulations in the 
information society.
Culture is a broad concept and constitutes a key object of analysis in cultural 
studies (Hall, 1980a & 1980b), the humanities (Hoggart, 1957), linguistics (Saussure, 
1974; Levi-Strauss, 1968) as well as in sociology and Bourdieu’s hierarchical view of 
culture as ‘cultural capital’ (1984). Hall (1980a: 63) defines culture as the meanings, 
values, lived traditions and practices of social groups and classes which are built on the 
basis of historical conditions and relationships and through which people’s 
understanding of the world is expressed. Williams (1997: 6) highlighted the evolving 
character of culture, calling culture ‘ordinary’ and defining it as the known meanings 
and directions to people as well as the new observations and meanings offered to and 
tested by people. In intercultural communication studies, E. Hall highlights the bonds 
between culture and communication and argues that ‘culture is communication and 
communication is culture’ (1959: 186). As regards society’s culture or civic culture, 
scholars have maintained that ‘civic culture points to...dispositions, practices, 
processes -  that constitute the preconditions for people’s actual participation in the 
public sphere, in civil and political society’ (Dahlgren, 2003:154). With respect to the 
role of new media and communications, Castells argues that culture shapes and is 
shaped by ICTs, becoming a ‘real virtuality’ that influences society through ‘cultural 
codes’ (1998: 367).
Reflecting the broadness of the notion of culture, the thesis tackles aspects of it 
which are helpful for explaining digital divides in Greece. More specifically, it explores 
ordinary people’s everyday life culture and ‘resistance culture’.10 On one hand, there are 
sociological approaches to technology that emphasise everyday settings of life and the 
related meanings, ideas, values and practices that matter for the adoption of media 
technologies (e.g. Bakardjieva, Silverstone, Berker, Haddon, Hartmann and others). On 
the other, empirical studies (Bauer, 1993,1994 & 1995a) and works on the history of 
technology (Mokyr, 1990 & 1992) examine ordinary people's attitudes to technology 
and instances of ‘resistance culture’. Regarding the Internet, Wyatt et al. (2002) in 
their typology of Internet non-users use the category o f‘resisters’.
By selecting these two aspects of culture, the thesis aims to explore the 
following questions: how can different everyday settings of life influence people’s
10 These theoretical perspectives are discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
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decisions to adopt the Internet?; what are the specificities of everyday life that 
influence people’s options to make effective use of the Internet?; how do everyday 
settings of life deal with people’s negative predispositions to the Internet?; what is the 
joint effect of everyday life and resistance culture on specific parameters of Internet 
adoption?; why do these two aspects of culture matter when looking at the forces of 
Internet adoption?; how do these two aspects of culture interact with other forces in 
the information society?; what are the possible analytic drawbacks when excluding 
other aspects of culture from research?
Parallel to this, the thesis examines the role of official decision-making. 
Decision-making consists of policy and regulation which, although often used in the 
same framework, differ significantly.
Policy is ‘a set of coherent decisions with a common long-term purpose(s)’ 
(ILRI, 1995) and points to debates about the deconstruction of the legacy of the 
welfare state under the imperatives of liberty and independence (Calabrese, 1997:20). 
In media and communications, policy has mostly been looked at from a political 
economy perspective (e.g. Melody, Mansell, Garnham, Smith and others), although 
Garnham’s work introduced some cultural considerations to the field. The thesis 
argues that the focus needs to be not that much on the institutional mechanisms in 
policy-making, but rather on how policy ‘products’ and mechanisms reflect on, 
correspond to and are influenced by society’s culture. In discussing digital 
entitlements, Mansell (2002) attempts this to some degree when she argues that social 
needs and cultural differences do not inform media policy to the extent they should as 
policy is surrounded by the rhetoric of the digital economy vision (ibid: 417).
Regulation is a more technical and complicated term. It represents the 
enforcement of policy decisions and visions by regulatory bodies through: (i) the 
presentation of rules and their subsequent enforcement usually by the state; (ii) any 
form of state intervention in the economic activity of social actors; or (iii) any form of 
social control initiated by a central actor such as the state and including all acts either 
intended to be regulatory or not. This last element is often seen as equivalent to 
governance (Baldwin, et al. 1998). In media and communications, regulation is 
discussed with respect to whether it jeopardises ordinary people’s interests. The 
‘citizen and/or consumer’ question goes beyond rhetoric and attempts to capture 
whether ordinary people are identified with the market and consumer’s interests or are 
distinguished on the basis of regulatory provisions for inclusion, participation and 
citizenship (Livingstone et al., 2007). Regulation in media and communications is a 
blurry term and, although it impacts on market operation as well as on security and 
other conditions of technology usage, its role remains invisible to the user. The role of 
new media user and non-user in how regulation deals with exclusion and inequality in 
the information society remains equally unclear.
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The thesis takes a sociological approach to policy and regulation. On one hand, 
critiques (Preston, 2005 & 2003b; Silverstone 2005; Mansell, 2002; Pauwels and 
Burgelman, 2003) to policy schemes in the information society inspire the present 
research to account for the role of policy in digital divides with concern to two issues: 
policy responsiveness to societal needs and requests, and the multi-layered influence of 
policy by visible or not cultural traits of society. On the other hand, the Sociology of 
Regulation tradition (e.g. Braithwaite, Slater and Slater and others) looks at 
regulation’s social accountability in various regulatory domains and feeds, albeit not 
directly, the discussion of Internet regulation and digital divides. Also, works by the 
Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation (CARR)11 touch upon dialogical and 
participative accountability mechanisms and the democratic responsiveness of 
regulation, going beyond technical regulatory regimes (e.g. Black, Hutter, Scott and 
others).12
However, no specific policy and regulatory domains are explored in the thesis. I 
aim to address the multi-dimensional role of policy and regulation in a flexible way and 
on the grounds of key actors’ insights into this role and the dialogue of policy and 
regulation with society’s culture. On one side, I am not interested in examining any 
specific domain of policy and regulation13 as I approach their role in digital divides 
looking in general at political mindsets and practices in the field. Of course, in order to 
review the role of policy and regulation critically I refer to some examples, cases or 
areas where policy and regulation act, without however examining any of these cases 
in-depth. On the other side, the source of knowledge is the discourse and perceptions 
of the key actors rather than some objective survey or observation of actual policies 
and regulations. The role of policy and regulation in digital divides is specifically 
evaluated according to what elite actors (Chapter 5) and ordinary people (Chapters 6-8) 
argue. In other words, policy and regulation are examined in more general terms and 
by drawing on elite actors/ordinary people's evaluations, since I cannot invest my 
efforts in observing both actual policies and regulations and key actors’ reflections in 
detail over time. This research strategy aims at the same time to illustrate that policy 
and regulation are the domains where society’s culture is formalised, filtered and 
transformed through and into decision-making processes.
Regarding the decision of the thesis to examine the interactions between 
society’s culture and decision-making, literature on digital divides does not provide 
sufficient references to the linkages between society’s culture and decision-making 
forces. Although some literature points in the direction of looking at the role of 
society in forming and developing policy and regulation and the cultural elements of 
the latter (Bennett, 2004: 485), empirical research should move further in this
11 For more information on CARR research, see http://www.1se.ac.uk/collections/CARR/.
12 These theoretical perspectives are discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
13 Only the survey in the second phase of the empirical research addresses specific policy and regulatory 
issues (e.g. Internet security and privacy) in order to approach respondents’ attitudes more reliably.
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direction. For instance, European research has only recently shown and relatively 
fragmentarily the possible linkages between decision-making and society’s culture: ‘EU 
policy discourses have played an important ideological {as well as practical, I would 
add] role in changing users’ perceptions and in stimulating the purchase of ICT 
equipment and services’ (Preston, 2005:195).
1.4 Significance o f  the research
As noted above, the national contexts in which digital divides take place differ 
while divides evolve and acquire new meanings, requiring further study of the nuances 
underlying questions of access and use.
By looking at the role of everyday and ‘resistance’ culture and its linkages with 
policy and regulation in shaping Internet adoption in Greece, the thesis goes beyond 
the examination of economic, technological and infrastructural drivers of digital 
divides. It situates the phenomenon in a socio-political context, having the potential to 
feed other empirical research in the field. It can also be informative for national 
research since current ICT studies in Greece are mostly quantitative, neglecting 
questions of culture and culture’s interactions with policy and regulation. Also, the 
thesis can constitute grounds for cross-national research as the insights obtained from 
the Greek case could become the research basis for other countries to be examined in 
a comparative perspective.
Finally, the thesis aims to provide policy recommendations that will inform 
civic organisations, policy-makers and regulators within and outside Greece about the 
key drivers and dynamics of the digital divides phenomenon. Although the thesis does 
not seek to provide any solutions to the phenomenon, the research insights obtained 
aim to allow a better understanding of the phenomenon by all stakeholders involved in 
the specific context of Greece and within the broader European framework.
j. $ Research process and methodology
In the first phase of the research, the study conducts an extensive literature- 
based examination of the key issues at stake. It thus addresses the research questions 
by exploring the following areas:
a. The Greek information society in comparison to other European countries.
b. The social, economic, technological, cultural, political and regulatory milieu 
in Greece; its importance and the implications for the country’s information society.
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In this phase, evidence of and discourses on digital divides in Greece and on the 
role of culture and decision-making are to be identified. Also, literature that argues 
about ‘anti-developmental’ public administration as well as ‘individualistic’ and 
‘resistant’ culture of society in Greece is to be discussed and reviewed extensively.
The study then conducts a three-staged empirical research, drawing on both 
elite actors’ and ordinary people’s insights into the subject matter of the research:
a. In-depth individual interviews with elite actors: this provides an overview of 
the key traits of the Greek information society, filtering the broad conceptual 
framework of the research.
b. & c. Survey and follow-up focus-group interviews of Internet users and non­
users in Greece: this allows a more focused exploration of the research questions. The 
employment of quantitative and qualitative means of examination seek to enable the 
exploration of multiple parameters that influence ordinary people’s decisions to adopt 
the Internet or not.
In the empirical research, the research questions are approached in a two-fold 
direction: first, through stakeholders’ (e.g. regulators, policy-makers, market-players 
and researchers) accounts of how the Greek information society has evolved over time; 
second, through ordinary people’s (Internet users and non-users) evaluations of the 
Internet, its role in everyday life, and the related policies and regulations. The thesis 
employs mixed methodology and collects data from multiple sources, aiming to 
complement and enrich the relevant findings as well as to compare and cross-validate 
the data collected throughout the research (for more on the methodology, see Chapter
4).
Finally, possible challenges and implications for the future of the European 
information society conclude the study, although they are not discussed extensively.
1.6 Thesis Outline
The thesis is structured as follows:
• In Chapter 2 the theoretical and conceptual framework of the research is 
presented and discussed.
• In Chapter 3 the Greek information society and its major traits with regard to 
digital divides are examined and discussed.
• In Chapter 4 the methodology of the research is outlined and the research design 
is presented in detail.
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• In Chapter 5 the empirical findings obtained from interviews with elite actors are 
presented and discussed.
• In Chapter 6 the quantitative results obtained from surveying users and non-users 
of the Internet are analysed and reported through descriptive statistical analysis.
• In Chapter 7 the quantitative results obtained from surveying users and non-users 
of the Internet are analysed and reported through advanced modeling statistics.
• In Chapter 8 the empirical findings obtained from follow-up focus-group 
interviews of a sub-sample of surveyed individuals are presented and discussed.
• Finally, Chapter 9 provides a synthesis and a critical discussion of the empirical 
findings in light of other research in the field as well as in relation to the 
theoretical framework and research questions. In its conclusion, this last chapter 
discusses the research’s contribution in the context of related work, its limitations 
and possible avenues for future research.
j.7 Conclusion
In summary, the thesis aims to contribute to the idea that we cannot view 
technological innovations as an autonomous field of living and working. People’s 
attitudes to technology are a constituent of their lives and an extension of their multi­
sided identities, with a big part to play in the ways in which technology is socially 
distributed and situated.
The thesis extends beyond non-contextualised accounts of technology access 
and use, aiming to investigate Internet adoption within everyday life contexts and 
under the operation of policies and regulations. It also questions the focus on socio­
demographic forces of divides, yet without entirely disregarding their importance. 
Although other digital technologies could be looked at and other perspectives taken 
into consideration, the thesis looks at the role of society’s culture and decision-making 
in Internet adoption in Greece under the influence of the general idea of the ‘social 
embeddedness of technology’ (Warschauer, 2003b).
How can digital divisions be explained within a complex and rapidly changing 
socio-economic and political environment where technological development is taking 
place? The literature review that follows attempts to address theoretically and to 
contextualise such a ‘big’ question, narrowing down the principal research questions 
and paving the way for their empirical study.
26
2 Theoretical and conceptual framework
2.1 Chapter overview
This chapter sets out the theoretical and conceptual framework of the thesis. It 
provides a critical account of the literature on digital divides and draws on the role of 
society’s culture and decision-making in particular. It thus paves the way for 
understanding how the issues arising in the literature frame the conceptual foundations 
of the thesis, thereby driving its methodological and empirical directions.
The chapter presents a general-to-specific flow of discussion and is structured 
as follows. Section 2.2 sets out the conceptual foundations of the present research. 
Section 2.3 highlights the dominant discourses on digital divides and introduces the 
two key concepts of society’s culture and decision-making. Section 2.4 looks at general 
socio-cultural accounts of technology and argues for the value of everyday life 
traditions and studies that explore cultures of resistance to technological artefacts. 
Section 2.5 discusses decision-making in the information society and in relation to 
digital divides. It discusses policy and regulatory models and reviews their approaches 
to the development of new technologies in diverse socio-cultural contexts from a 
sociology of policy and regulation perspective.
The chapter concludes with Section 2.6 that outlines the conceptual framework 
within which the empirical part of the study is situated. The thesis narrows down the 
principal research questions introduced in Chapter 1 and links to Chapter 3, where a 
country report of digital divides in Greece is presented. It also links to Chapter 4 
where the research methodology is set out and the research questions are 
operationalised in order to be pursued empirically.
2.2 Conceptual foundations: a general account and a specific 
example
The conceptual foundations of the thesis are set by literature discourses on 
society’s culture and decision-making in the information society and as far as digital 
divides are concerned. The thesis espouses literature that takes into consideration the 
complex picture of society’s culture in the information society as well as claims about 
the connections between society’s culture and decision-making. It calls for critical 
thinking on these connections, pointing to the power relations between politicians or
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regulators and ordinary people (Murdock, 1997:81) in the information society as well as 
to the complex association of digital divides with other social divisions, as illustrated in 
Section 2.3.3.
In order for the reader to comprehend the links between society’s culture and 
decision-making and their influence on digital divides, a contextualisation of these 
three concepts is needed. First, I examine digital divides and, more specifically, aspects 
of Internet adoption, associating them with individually- and system-driven parameters 
of social life and exclusion. Also, I argue that society’s culture and decision-making are 
constituents of social reality and influence social life in general and, as such, play an 
important role in shaping digital divides. Second, I examine society’s culture and I 
argue that people's needs, desires, conceptions and dispositions vary. People living in 
different cultural contexts are very likely to express different attitudes to the messages 
they receive and to new phenomena that arise. Given that technology design, 
infrastructure, services and content aim to correspond to human needs and desires, it 
is more likely that different cultural contexts take advantage of technology differently 
rather than technology being perfectly adjusted to such contexts. Third, as regards 
decision-making, I argue that welfare or neo-liberal policy and regulation models play a 
role in people’s inclusion, involvement, participation and citizenship overall, being 
either in tune with or in contrast to specific elements of society’s culture. The ways in 
which decision-making is associated with everyday culture and instances of a resistance 
culture in Greece in particular are examined empirically in the thesis.
The example of EU policies and regulations for the information society and the 
critiques they have been subject to illustrate the need to link society’s culture and 
decision-making in the information society. The vision of a European information 
society has been framed by specific and evolving political initiatives and regulatory 
settlements.14 The 1993 White Paper and subsequent documentation15 have presented 
the advent and dissemination of the information society as unavoidable and natural 
(EC, 2003: 23). Thus, only its positive effects in the economic and business life of 
Europe have been brought up, overlooking difficulties that arise from the diversity and 
inconsistency of development in the European regions involved. In this techno- 
enthusiastic spirit, the EU policy and regulatory strategy for the information society is 
marked by the following principles: ‘cutting red tape’, including the faster entrance of 
enterprises in new markets; ‘technological neutrality’ to achieve the necessary 
flexibility when dealing with emerging technologies and their convergence; ‘light 
regulation’, according to competition principles; and ‘consistency across the European
14 The 1993 European Commission White Paper Growth, Competitiveness, Employment: The Challenges and 
Ways Forward into the zT1 Century articulated the vision of a European Information Society for the first 
time.
15 The follow-up document that put in place a specific action plan for realisation of the European 
Information Society was the Bangemann plan in 1994.
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market’ so that the establishment of a single and unified market is attained (DG 
Information Society, Overviews of the European Union activities: Information Society).
These principles are largely reflected in the EU electronic communications 
regulation established in 2003, illustrating the essential detachment of decision-making 
from the mass of ordinary people in Europe. Although the policy initiatives and 
regulation in the EU envisage the creation of a European information society for all, 
scholars such as Mansell and Steinmueller (2000) predict the advent of negative effects 
which would be overcome through social regulation only. Instead of the deterministic 
vision of a uniform European information society, the national and local 
distinctiveness of the EU member states arise as an intervening factor that draws a 
diverse and differentiating picture of the information society across European borders: 
‘There are many different configurations of the European information society. These 
configurations involve different industrial structures, different roles of users, and 
different approaches to policy in both the private and public sectors’ (ibid: 18). Such 
differentiations and their economic, cultural and societal grounds are to be understood 
as influential parameters for the course of the information society in Europe and, 
therefore, as indicators that matter for decision-making in the field.
These discourses and critiques are discussed in more detail in Section 2.5.3 as 
the EU (or Europe, although not a synonymous term) is the broader context within 
which the Greek information society is situated and influenced by. In Section 2.3, a 
more focused discussion of digital divides and relevant literature discourses paves the 
way for understanding how and why society’s culture and decision-making parameters 
matter.
2.3 Digital divides and social exclusion: a dialogue between 
technology, society ’s culture and decision-making?
The conceptual framework of the thesis first draws on general literature that 
presents digital divides as embedded in a wider social context in which various forms of 
social exclusion exist. Section 2.3.1 discusses how digital divides are conceptualised in 
the literature. Works by Norris, Selwyn, Livingstone, van Dijk and Rogers feed this 
discussion. Section 2.3.2 presents dystopian and utopian approaches to the present and 
future status of digital divides, noting the implications for measuring the phenomenon. 
Section 2.3.3 discusses the association between digital and social divisions and the 
implications for all domains of social life. Here, the discussion draws on the works of 
Couldry, Mansell, Selwyn, Cammaerts, Loaders and others, shedding some light on the 
role of society’s culture and decision-making in shaping digital divides.
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2.3.1 Conceptualising digital divides: a shift from ‘exclusion* to ‘inclusion* and from
quantitative to qualitative rhetoric?
A worldwide debate has taken place over the last two decades about digital 
divides and their constituents, as well as their dimensions and variations in the 
different contexts in which they emerge.
Scholarly works have seen digital divides as a dichotomy between the 
‘information haves’ and ‘information have-nots’ (Wresch, 1996) or, in economic terms, 
the ‘information poor’ and the ‘information rich’, lacking ‘sociological sophistication’ 
(Webster, 1995: 97). Well-known works (Roger, 2001 & 1995) have espoused narrow 
and quantitative accounts of divides, overlooking qualities of diffusion and the 
contexts where diffusion takes place. The dominant rhetoric on the phenomenon has 
looked at the split between use and non-use, as well as at economic and easily 
quantifiable drivers of divides such as socio-demographics. A volume of studies has 
supported linear and arbitrarily predetermined causal relations between socio­
demographics and divides, understanding the phenomenon as ‘the differential access to 
and use of the internet according to gender, income, race, and location’ (Rice, 2002: 
106).
In empirical research, early studies argued that Internet users drop-out due to 
non-affordable cost and a lack of skills (Katz and Aspden, 1998). Later, Katz and Rice 
(2002) confirmed this conclusion by presenting Internet dropouts as primarily younger 
and less educated people and secondarily as people with a lower income and being less 
likely to be married. Also, recent studies such as the Australian national survey 
conducted in 2005-06 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2006) provide non- 
contextualised accounts of digital divides, mainly relying on access, use, demographics 
and infrastructural indicators. Even more recent studies (Chinn and Fairlie, 2007) talk 
about the role of economic, demographic and infrastructural parameters, ignoring 
socially embedded indicators that assign a range of qualities to divides.
Although no single and universally accepted indicator can be espoused when 
researching digital divides (Vehovar, et al., 2006), quality of access and use as well as 
contextual indicators are needed for a systematic account of people’s engagement with 
technology (Selwyn, 2004a: 351; Couldry, 2003: 96). Today, a growing volume of 
literature criticises dichotomies and quantifications of digital divides, shifting the 
conceptualisation of the phenomenon. The term ‘digital inclusion’ is now used as an 
alternative to that of‘digital exclusion’ and more emphasis is increasingly placed on the 
various qualities of inclusion and exclusion. This progression raises issues of quality and 
levels of technology use as well as issues of attitudes to and usage of digital 
technologies, going beyond numbers of people who access and use such technologies. 
A brief presentation of the history of discourses in the field will describe this 
progression more illustratively.
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More specifically, the diffusion theory emerged in the 1950s and 1960s, 
while diffusion theory works such as those by Rogers (1995) influenced the initial 
theorisations of digital divides in the 1990s. As commentaries have shown (Bradbrook 
and Fisher, 2004; Selwyn 2003,2004a & 2004b; Warschauer, 2003a), diffusion theory 
presented a limited conceptualisation of digital divides as it argued that the acquisition 
of and access to computers and Internet equipment is a fundamental criterion for 
overcoming divides. Following diffusion theory, a more popular thesis was articulated, 
maintaining that access to ICTs does not eliminate divisions and exclusion from digital 
opportunities. Thus, from 2000 onwards scholars such as Norris (2001) have presented 
a more complex picture of digital divides, discarding the dichotomy between haves and 
have-nots and taking the quality and efficiency of technology use into account. Works 
on how increased access might maintain or exacerbate existing divides have increased 
in number. Also, different degrees and qualitative aspects of divides concerning 
material, economic, social, cultural and technical forces that mediate access to and use 
of technologies, such as the Internet, have become objects of research (Livingstone
2002).
The literature is increasingly opening up the discussion to include more forces 
and allowing more middle-way positions, suggesting a ‘thicker description of the 
various shades of information and telecommunications inequalities’ (Wilhelm, 2000: 
69-70). Scholars such as Selwyn (2004a: 347) have argued that content and resource 
divides matter and that access does not determine the existence of divides. Parameters 
of social, cultural and educational quality influence the capability of an individual to 
use digital technologies, attributing more nuances to the concept of access itself as well 
as to the effective usage of technology through requisite skills, knowledge and support 
(van Dijk 1999).
Thus, skills and motivations have become increasingly important indicators in 
empirical research, even in countries where not much research and technological 
development exists. For instance, Estonian experts (Kalkun and Kalvet, 2002) 
identified three main types of barriers to digital inclusion in Estonia: first, a lack of 
motivation; second, non-users’ unwillingness to obtain new skills due to their 
psychologically complicated sense of use whereby issues of language, learning, 
hardware cost and accidentally harmful online behaviour matter; and, third, non-users’ 
dismissal of lifelong learning. One can conclude that, in this case, people’s attitudes to 
and skills in technology usage matter significantly, challenging simplistic accounts of 
digital exclusion.
As a result, ‘digital inclusion’ has been proposed as an alternative concept, 
highlighting variations particularly in Internet usage. In Livingstone and Helsper 
(2007), such variations are presented as gradations in digital inclusion, while the 
authors suggest that research should be refocused on the physical, digital, human and 
social forces that influence the social integration of ICTs. The authors employ ‘a
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continuum of use’ (ibid: 682) where gradations of use allow the detection of inequalities 
in use, the exploration of the efficiency and benefits of use, as well as the identification 
of the reasons underlying non-use. Their idea of a staged process of going online (ibid: 
683) paves the way for researching digital inclusion in connection to the various 
systemic factors that influence gradations of use. Similar conclusions are reached in 
accounts that suggest a hierarchical definition of digital divides, with access to 
technology in various contexts resulting in varying levels of engagement and 
consequences (Selwyn, 2004a: 351).
This graduated approach constitutes a conceptual progression in the sense that 
it distinguishes the types of capital that people have at their disposal, as well as the 
ways that different forms of capital influence people’s abilities, willingness and 
effectiveness regarding ICT usage. Factors such as material resources and economic 
capacity, socialisation in the dominant culture, skills and awareness of the prevalent 
techno-culture, as well as social networks, are all forces that shape our understanding 
of digital divides (ibid: 352-5). Thus, more and more scholars attempt to approach 
digital divides beyond access and use issues. Skills, knowledge, literacy, capabilities and 
breadth of use (van Dijk, 1999:153; Mansell and Steinhueller, 2000: Ch.2; Livingstone, 
2007) or engagement with technology, and cultural, societal and economic parameters 
(Selwyn, 2004a) have now become the prevalent areas of concern in the digital divides 
literature.16
However, the above conceptual progression is still quite limited and the 
literature has hardly touched upon the interconnections between ordinary individuals 
and political agencies in the distribution of diverse forms of capital.
2.3.2 Digital divides: dystopian’ vs. ‘utopian’ debates and findings. Implications for
measurement
Two camps have marked the research on digital divides: one espousing 
‘dystopian’ views and the other adopting ‘utopian’ approaches. A similar distinction 
can be made with respect to the methods of researching and measuring digital divides.
On one hand, the existence of digital divides has been denied. In Compaine’s 
words, new media technologies have been considered ‘crucial factors in the spread of 
both access to information and the skills to use information’ (2001b: 109). The 
‘utopian’ perspective, expressed in Clinton’s political planning for wiring all American 
schools by the year 2000, sees the steps taken as contributing to realisation of a vision 
of an information society where everybody has a role to play. In this respect, ‘the
16 Others even challenge the ‘truth claim’ (Carpentier, 2003:104), asking whether digital divides exist 
and what their extent and shape is ‘on empirical, conceptual, ideological and epistemological grounds’ 
(ibid: 114).
phrase “digital opportunity” has lately replaced “the divide”, putting a blandly positive 
spin on all things computer related’ (Strove, 2003: 274).
On the other hand, Hacker and van Dijk argue that this phenomenon ‘growsls] 
and cornels] on top of old inequalities of income, education, age, gender, ethnicity and 
geographical location’ (2003: 321). The ‘dystopian’ thesis, in Katz and Rice’s words 
(2002: 6), ‘...says that the digital divide between socio-demographic groups is 
worsening and that unequal access to digital information and communication 
technology...hurts already disadvantaged minorities...’. According to this argument, the 
information revolution signifies a new danger, a new condition of enslavement, and Ide 
(1980: 40) asks whether ‘information revolution may effectively enslave rather than 
serve people?’. Besides, an increasing number of works acknowledge that digital divides 
is a complex phenomenon that ‘is marked not only by physical access to computers and 
connectivity but also by access to the additional resources that allow people to use 
technology well’ (Warschauer, 2003a: 6). Thus, it is recognised that the digital divide 
concept depends heavily upon ‘the multifaceted concept of access’ (Hacker and van 
Dijk, 2003:315) and that the multiple dimensions of access constitute serious barriers 
to inclusion.
The controversy between the ‘dystopian’ and ‘utopian’ theses has been 
approached by empirical studies that apply different measures or methodologies, thus 
producing contrasting findings. On one hand, scholars such as Hacker and van Dijk 
stress the ‘relative differences between categories of people’ (ibid: 321). They draw on 
surveys such as the US Census Bureau, 1984,1989,1993,1997 and 2000, as well as the 
NTIA’s findings in 2000, which all show that in the 1980s and 1990s digital divides 
expanded in relation to varying resources -  material, social and cognitive Gbid: 321-323). 
In line with this view, media imperialism scholars such as Schiller (1996) view 
information inequality as being additional to inequalities of education, income, 
ethnicity, gender, social class and occupation, emphasising the contribution of 
demographic differences to the formation of digital divides (Browning, 1996: 77). On 
the other hand, researchers like Morrisett (2001: ix) argue that the existing 
informational gap will be weakened due to ‘steadily decreasing costs of use and steadily 
increasing ease of use’. This argument essentially relies on empirical findings in the 
USA (Nie and Erbring, 2001; National Public Radio, Kaiser Family Foundation, and 
Kennedy School of Government, 2001; Cheskin, 2001). These findings maintain that 
gaps are shrinking and excluded groups are gradually less excluded as market and 
technological indicators increasingly improve.
An example of empirical research that is split between the ‘dystopian’ and the 
‘utopian’ positions is the British Telecom study (2004) in the UK. This study discusses 
the social impact of digital divides and reports on ten interviews with experts. These 
experts were categorised into ‘digital optimists’ and ‘digital pessimists’ with regard to 
the degree of optimism they expressed about the closure of divides in the future and
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the interaction between technological and social exclusion. Thus, some argued that 
divides will be eliminated in the future while others believed that such divides will be 
maintained and exacerbated, obtaining new forms and qualities
Katz and Rice (2002:13) attempted to bridge the gap between the ‘dystopian’ 
and ‘utopian’ positions by proposing the ‘syntopia’ thesis. They talked about ‘a 
persistent but declining digital divide’ (ibid: 39), as ‘for some dimensions of the digital 
divide -  especially income and age -  there is still a long way to go before the digital 
divide disappears’ (ibid: 322). They addressed the existence of digital divides, as well as 
whether the differences in possession and use of ICTs entail deprivation and social 
inequality, suggesting that we need to consider not only the immediate effects on the 
occupation of social franchises but also ICTs’ symbolic value as a parameter of social 
differentiation and inequity.
Although this ‘syntopia’ thesis overlooks the political and regulatory aspects of 
digital divides, it is close to the aim of the thesis to explore the complexities between 
technology, culture and decision-making. Dynamic and complex digital divides 
challenge one-dimensional and non-contextualised dystopian or utopian arguments. 
What is needed is a synthesis, namely a ‘syntopic’ conceptualisation and 
contextualisation of digital divides so that the ambiguity that surrounds them is 
disclosed.
2.3.5 Digital divides in the context o f social divides: implications for a socio-cultural and
decision-making approach
Most of the above discourses about the nature and extent of digital divides 
tackle various aspects of divides by relating them to social exclusion.
Debates on digital divides are concerned with the impact of these divides on 
the distribution and effective use of communication resources and power (Wilson,
2000), namely with the impact on social exclusion. Looking at causality, ICTs are 
often deterministically perceived as influencing social marginalisation (Loader and 
Keeble, 2004:37). Scholars argue that ‘being disconnected, or superficially connected, 
to the internet is tantamount to marginalization in the global, networked system’ 
(Castells, 2001:269). Also, recent empirical research has argued that digital exclusion is 
the result of social exclusion and further deteriorates socially exclusionary mechanisms 
(UK Online, 2007). Dekkers (2003) illustrates the correlation between pre-existing 
poverty and low diffusion of ICTs. On the other hand, there are those who argue that 
the Internet does not have the potential to influence economic deprivation and social 
disparities substantially: ‘the world has always been a place of haves and have-nots and 
I can see no way that internetworking is going to change this very much’ (Haywood, 
1998: 25).
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The emphasis placed on easily measured economic and technological drivers of 
digital divides seems to go hand-in-hand with normative assumptions about the 
importance of technology diffusion and the extent to which it ‘must not create an 
information underclass’ (Bickerstaffe, 2001:104). Relatively little attention has been 
paid to the complex role of human resistance to and mediation in digital inclusion or 
exclusion; mediation that holds important implications for people’s social inclusion and 
participation overall. The literature considers society’s culture not as a primary factor, 
but as one of many factors that influence the participation of ordinary people in the 
information society: ‘...lack of financial resources, knowledge, skills, or ‘’cultural 
capital" is said to prevent them from benefiting from ICT developments...’ (Frissen, 
2003: 20). Likewise, dominant policy discourses often stick to the discontinuity 
paradigm, claiming that technological evolution has no links with structural, contextual 
or historical factors (Cammaerts, 2005:73), thus guiding research to normative choices 
about the role of the state, the market and the position of the public interest (ibid: 75).
Although, as discussed in Section 2.3.1, the notion of digital inclusion 
constitutes some progression in the study of mediating systemic factors, the 
relationship between digital and social exclusion is understood overall in a linear way 
(Cammaerts and Audenhove, 2003a). This linearity partly consists of the argument that 
technology domination can change the landscape of social exclusion. This argument 
largely overlooks the role of socio-cultural and political capital and the importance of 
their connections for how people adopt ICTs and for the implications for social 
exclusion.
From a socio-cultural perspective, early research found that ordinary people can 
feel uneasiness with the cost and the ‘disruptive’ function of telephones (Haddon, 
1994), with the content of television programmes (Haddon and Silverstone, 1995a) and 
with the ‘addictive’ character of the latter (Lodziak, 1986). Also, people often view 
ICTs as technologies that transform social networking, replacing the familiar face-to- 
face social interaction (Haddon and Silverstone, 1995a). In his research on single 
parents and young elderly, Haddon showed that priorities and horizons in life matter, 
as ‘non-adoption is based on values and priorities’ which depend upon people’s 
biography and socio-cultural background (2000: 402). People’s needs, cultural 
background, customs and everyday life have been raised by some research as 
parameters that generate divergent evaluations of ICTs and the Internet in particular. 
From this perspective, Wyatt et al. (2002) emphasise self-exclusion and the existence 
of ‘Internet resisters’.17 In addition, Ofcom (2004) and OxIS show that a lack of 
interest is a significant parameter of Internet non-usage, with 46% of non-users in the 
UK being not interested in using the Internet (Dutton and di Gennaro, 2005:53). This 
raises the issue of digital choice rather than that of digital exclusion, with OxIS 2007
17 Wyatt et al. refer to a ‘potential gap between heightened expectations and the reality of the “internet 
experience”’ (2002: 33) as one of the causes of dropping-out.
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arguing that the Internet has become an ‘infrastructure of everyday life’ (Dutton and 
Helsper, 2007: 8).
Attempting to move beyond these initially useful insights into everyday cultures 
and their role in ICT and Internet adoption, research has largely failed to extensively 
tackle the deeper role of everyday and resistance cultures in people’s decisions to adopt 
certain technological artefacts. For instance, the ‘Internet and Daily Life’ Pew survey 
(Fallows, 2004) provides an extensive discussion of the integration of the Internet into 
American users’ everyday lives, failing to look at non-users. In this study, the everyday 
is viewed only as a ‘recipient’ or ‘reflection’ of people’s decisions to use the Internet. It 
is not seen as a possible driving force of such a decision or as a space where offline and 
online activities interact, influencing the Internet experience and the overall quality of 
living. Also, this Pew study examines the role of the Internet in users’ daily lives mosdy 
from an ‘online activity’ perspective and fails to capture people’s perceptions, views 
and attitudes to technology, as well as the role of everyday life in Internet adoption 
and quality of Internet use. Another, more recent Pew Internet survey (Horrigan and 
Rainie, 2006) attempts to examine the role of the Internet in people’s major moments 
of life by looking at the Internet’s role in eight everyday occasions only. However, what 
I argue is that every person has different priorities in life and, therefore, the 
consideration of a moment being ‘major’ varies among people and cultures. On the 
other hand, a qualitative study (Kvasny, 2006) in the USA conducted interviews with 
IT trainees at a Community Technology Centre in a low-income neighbourhood of a 
major American city in order to gain insights into the trainees’ views of how 
technology training had made a difference to their lives. This study looked at the role 
of culture in reproducing digital inequality and argued that ‘culture is useful for 
understanding how groups conceptualise, use, and react to ICTs (ibid: 166).
From the point of view of political capital, the emphasis is placed on the direct 
role of policy-making and regulation in guaranteeing inclusion and in fighting against 
exclusion, whereas the interconnections with socio-cultural and other systemic 
parameters remain under-explored. Ordinary people’s positions in the system and 
policy provisions for the empowerment of citizenship are increasingly linked to the 
ideas and practices of the information society (Mosco, 1999: 36). Digital divides 
discourses draw the attention of politics to inclusion and the implications for ordinary 
people and public life, raising matters of people’s empowerment and power relations 
(Silverstone and Sorensen, 2005: 216). Thus, debates on welfare and the neo-liberal 
state and on how policy should deal with issues of inclusion, social rights and 
participation acquire fresh interest today.
Couldry (2003) looks at digital divides from an empowerment perspective and 
in a later contribution (2007) he attempts to take this argument further, stressing the
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importance of digital divides for democracy.18 Thus, he (ibid: 93) and others 
(Stevenson, 1999: 33; Murdock and Golding, 1989; Schudson, 2003; Wilhelm, 2000) 
argue about the significance of digital inclusion for democracy and people’s 
empowerment. In this spirit, Mansell (2002) points to the implications of digital 
divides for democracy. She critically reviews the market-tuned policy-making in the 
information society as well as dominant media configurations that undermine the 
establishment of a new ‘publicness’ that would be addressed to the majority of people. 
Mansell suggests that what is needed is people’s empowerment through the substantial 
facilitation of their ‘capabilities’ and the acquisition of new media literacies.
These authors, as well as Castells’ early point that ‘outside the media sphere 
there is only “political marginality” (1996: 312), take, at least partly, a linear and 
normative perspective.19 In this sense, I agree with Loader’s (1998: 3) early criticism 
that most of the literature understands the relationship between ICTs and society as 
linear, and with politics being perceived as influencing digital divides in a one­
dimensionalway. ICTs are still presented as fundamentally transforming societies and 
constituting the foundation of democracy and people’s empowerment. The uneven and 
unequal ICT diffusion is considered critical for the shrinking or widening of other 
disparities, while the ways in which socio-cultural and political patterns of organisation 
separately and together influence the take up and use of technology and its social 
impact have, wrongly, drawn only little attention.
Only limited research literature provides some insight into this direction. For 
instance, ethnographic interviews of 70 Internet users and non-users in 20 family 
groups in the USA (Clark et al., 2004) provide an account of the everyday 
micrographics of digital divides, looking indirectly at policy-making from the 
perspective of ordinary people. Also, the study of digital divides in South Africa 
(Khumalo and Sibanda, 2006) highlights the role of decision-making from a gender and 
geographical perspective. Khumalo and Sibanda interviewed 64 groups of 10 women 
per group across four districts in South Africa and explored the disadvantaged position 
of women in rural areas with regard to their access to and usage of ICT s. Although this 
study has certain methodological flaws (e.g. excessively structured topic guides), its 
conclusions help one understand how decision-making may reflect society’s culture, 
guaranteeing inclusion for certain groups of the population only (e.g. males in urban 
areas of South Africa).
The quite limited research literature that looks at both society’s culture and 
decision-making to account for digital divides indicates the need for a careful and
18 Couldr/s account is a recent attempt to discuss Sen’s capability approach in media and 
communications. Mansell’s work in 2002 and Gamham’s initial attempt in 1999 constitute earlier 
attempts to employ Sen’s framework.
19 We should he sceptical of Couldry’s and Mansell’s accounts that approach engagement with 
technology and the quality of technology usage from a ‘capability’ perspective. Capabilities are presented 
as attributes that are easy to measure and isolated from other contextual forces.
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systematic exploration of the ways in which people’s values, evaluations, competencies 
and potential are interconnected and influenced by individual internal forces, as well as 
by institutional and systemic factors. For example, close dependencies of participation 
mechanisms on systemic structures might appear (Mansell and Steinmueller, 2000:97), 
with ordinary people dissociating and excluding themselves and with decision-makers 
and other minority groups taking over both institutionally and psychologically.
As regards the excluded ones in particular, Loader and Keeble remark that a 
more ‘grassroots perspective’ is now needed: ‘whilst excluded communities and 
individuals are unable or reluctant to use the technology, their identities and cultures 
remain invisible’ (2004: 35). An early qualitative study (Haddon, 1999a) in five 
European countries merely scratched the surface of the possible role of cultural 
differences between the five countries. It questionably showed that, even at the early 
stage of Internet diffusion, European countries with different socio-economic and 
political characteristics presented a quite coherent picture of Internet adoption. A 
‘grassroots perspective’ should go deeper. It should shed light on the complex 
relationships between ICTs and multi-sided social exclusion as well as on the illusive 
nature of discourses which argue that digital inclusion can effectively eliminate social 
exclusion and marginalisation. Also, reasonable theses such as Selwyn’s suggestion 
(2004a: 351-5) that social and cultural capital along with economic and technological 
assets are mediating factors in shaping people’s engagement with ICTs should develop 
a more complex and dynamic picture of how digital divides are socially and politically 
contextualised. Digital inclusion is not a solution to the multi-dimensional problem of 
social exclusion and it should be seen as a facilitator in some instances and as a result 
of policies that aim to fight other structural aspects of social exclusion in other 
instances (Cammaerts et al., 2003: 304).
In concluding, I propose a theorisation of digital divides that emphasises the 
critical role of socio-cultural and decision-making dynamics in structuring Internet 
access and use in both qualitative and quantitative terms. I propose a theorisation 
according to which a web of cultural traits in a society, with their own gaps and 
disparities, as well as policy and regulation dynamics, are in a constant dialogue with 
technology, together influencing social inclusion and participation. In Section 2.4 and
2.5 the socio-cultural and decision-making forces of ICT adoption and the dialogue 
between them are discussed.
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2.4 The social embeddedness o f  technology: digital divides and the
forces o f  everyday life & resistance culture9
This section presents the socio-cultural perspective of the thesis. Section 2.4.1 
introduces the argument of the social embeddedness of technology, indicating its 
significance for understanding digital divides. A more focused examination of socio­
cultural forces of digital divides follows, examining the notion of everyday life in 
Section 2.4.2, and that o f‘resistance culture’ in Section 2.4.3. The discussion of these 
two socio-cultural parameters drives the discussion in Section 2.4.4 to relate society 
and its culture to decision-making. This paves the way for Section 2.5, where the 
perspective of decision-making is discussed in detail.
2.4.1 The social embeddedness of technology: determining digital divides?
The importance of technology design has been raised by key scholars 
(McLuhan, 1964; Lin and Comford, 2000; Latour, 1999) and supported by the 
argument that ‘technologies would unravel social difficulties by opening up new 
avenues of information’ (Marvin, 1988: 66). Techno-enthusiasts often articulate 
utopian views about the future of societies that enter the information era.20 They 
support a-social accounts of social and economic power relations in the information 
society (Loader, 1998: 7), maintaining that the empowering potential of ICTs can be 
fulfilled as soon as people are given computer equipment and training (Loader and 
Keeble, 2004:39). Communication is taken to be a highly mediated process and ICTs 
are considered to play an important role as mediators that impose certain meanings 
through mediating communication processes (Silverstone, 2002: 762). In this sense, 
‘technology matters’ (Mackenzie and Wajcman, 1999:18) and design defines the scope 
or potential of use (Cawson, et al. 1995; Winner 1993 & 1999). Along these lines, the 
Cultural Lag hypothesis (Ogburn, 1922) argues that societies change more slowly than 
technology. With regard to the Internet, much has been said about its potential to 
operate as a ‘powerful predictor of democracy’ (Kedzie, 1995), with Werbach (1997:84) 
arguing that ‘the endless spiral of connectivity is more powerful than any government 
edict’.
Technological determinism and McLuhan’s declaration that ‘the medium is the 
message’ (1964) are juxtaposed with user-oriented and socio-centred approaches 
(Haddon, 2005). A number of traditions emphasise the socio-cultural embeddedness of 
technology, including: Social Construction of Technology; Feenberg’s Critical Theory 
of Technology (Feenberg, 1991,1995 & 1999); cultural and linguistic studies (W oolgar
20 Indicative is Bangemann’s argument that ‘the first countries to enter the information society will reap 
the greatest rewards. They will set the agenda for all who must follow’ (1994: 4).
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and Grint, 1997); Schutz’s Phenomenological Sociology and ‘lifeworld’ (Schutz, 2003; 
Schutz & Luckmann, 1974), and Levebvre’s Critical Theory (Levebvre, 1991).
Indicatively, the Social Construction Of Technology (SCOT) (Pinch and Bijker, 
1987; Bijker and Law, 1992; Bijker, Hughes and Pinch, 1987; Latour, 1987) argues that 
technology is socially shaped. The concepts of ‘relevant social groups’ and 
‘interpretative flexibility’ of technological artefacts (Pinch and Bijker, ibid: 27) 
constitute its main conceptual equipment. The SCOT departs from the a-social 
account of the ‘impact’ approach, claiming that ‘relevant social groups’ adopt divergent 
meanings of technology and that technology exhibits ‘interpretative flexibility’. Social 
constructivists argue that certain interpretations and meanings are accepted at the end 
only, determining the design of an artefact which finally ‘stabilizes’ its shape and 
function, and comes to a closure -  albeit a provisional one (ibid: 44). By fighting 
technological determinism, the SCOT situates social actors at the core of the process 
of technology creation and attributes power to the notion of the ‘social shaping’ of 
technology.
In approaches that adopt the argument of the ‘social embeddedness of 
technology’, ‘social usability’ (Sotamaa, 2005), or the ‘cultural industry’ (Haddon, 
1999b: 326), the user operates as an ‘active contributor to the shaping of technology’ 
(Bakarjieva, 2005: 9). Also, attention is paid to the role of media literacy and cultural 
identities, with some arguing that these factors make the mediation process highly 
dialectical but at the same time severely uneven and divisive (Silverstone, 2002: 762). 
Studies on the importance of the socio-cultural milieu for ICTs (SevenOneMedia, 
2002; Cathelat, 1993; Mediagruppe, 2000; Klamer et al., 2000) look at sub-cultures or 
groupings of culture among various social and cultural groups. For instance, studies on 
the social values of openness (Rogers, 1995; Thomas, 1995; Hofstede, 1980; 
Trompenaars, 1993; Mante, 2002; Thomas and Mante-Meijer, 2001; Smoreda and 
Thomas, 2001) try to make sense of the various ways in which such values influence the 
use, adoption and integration of ICTs by and into particular socio-cultural milieus. 
Also, historical accounts give an overview of how society-driven factors influence 
technological change (Flichy, 1991; Winston, 1998; Williams, 1975).
Such socio-cultural studies challenge techno-determinist streams in theory and 
research, and present the ‘divide’ question as inherent in ‘computer culture’. In this 
sense, the architecture, ideas and content-embracing computer technologies reflect the 
deep social conditions within which those technologies were set up and developed 
(Streeter, 1999). Also, people’s needs, desires and preferences in the cultural and social 
settings in which people live determine engagement with technology and consequent 
instances of digital exclusion or inclusion (Mansell and Steinmueller, 2000: 38). 
Technology and the supply of infrastructure or services are not sufficient prerequisites
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for the achievement of digital inclusion since providing people with the potential for 
engaging and participating in the information society are critically important.
Opposing technocratic views that consider the information society 
revolutionary and civil society a banal social formation of the past (Guedon, 2003), 
approaches to social embeddedness of technology examine the role of human actors as 
appropriators of or resisters to technology. Here the emphasis is not on design, 
advertising, marketing and other issues of technological development. ‘Society and 
technology are recursively linked in complex ways’ and the ‘technology-impact-society 
effect model’ is obviously not valid (Graham, 1995: 55).
The concepts o f‘everyday life’ and ‘resistance culture’ deserve more attention 
though, as the thesis employs them for the empirical exploration of digital divides in 
Greece. Section 2.4.2 considers Schutz’s perspective of the ‘lifeworld’ and the example 
of EMTEL’s work on ICT adoption in an everyday life framework. Then, Section 2.4.3 
discusses the notion of ‘resistance’ and its role in the adoption of ICTs, with the 
emphasis on the foundations of Bauer’s work.
2.4.2 Everyday life and d ista l divides: Schutz’s ‘lifeworld’
E veryday life and  th e  s tu d y  o f  d ig ita l divides
Everyday life studies constitute a conceptual and research advancement. They 
view the cultural elements of everyday life as highly interconnected with people’s 
experiences with technology, allowing digital divides to be seen as associated with 
socio-cultural contexts of life:
Our answers...must recognize the significance of cultural differences and the inequalities of access to 
the symbolic and material resources ...{they} must take into account the specificity of the individual 
and the local as well as the generality of the national and the global. They must understand, finally, 
the particularity of information and communication technologies, which are central to the conduct 
of everyday life... (Silverstone, 2003: $).
What is the ‘everyday5? No matter how fundamental the concept of everyday 
life appears to be, its commonality is a problem as ‘...it is very difficult to grasp -  and 
hence research -  the unspeakable and/or unquestionable, the taken-forgranted, which 
the everyday is seen to represent’ (Hartman, 2007:1). Thus, it is recognised that it is 
not easy to define the ‘everyday5 (Featherstone, 1995:55). Others criticise the currently 
dominant forms of attention to the ‘everyday5, arguing that ‘the everyday doesn’t have a 
form of attention that is proper to it’ (Highmore, 2002:161).
In more analytical terms, the notion of everyday life poses a range of questions 
with respect to digital divides, reflecting certain options and possibilities that the 
researcher has. The following table provides a list of answers to possible questions in
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the everyday life framework of research, indicating the different possibilities available 
to the researcher:
Table 2-1:Everyday life framework
W hat level of everyday life: the 
micro- the meso- or the macro­
level?
The meso- and macro-level go beyond ‘home’ and 
domestication of technology, looking at social 
groupings within society. The individual is 
perceived as part of the social, being influenced 
and influencing society’s culture through 
engagement or resistance.
W hich parameters and actors 
are looked at when taking an 
everyday life approach to digital 
divides?
The parameters of resistance, integration or 
engagement can be looked at with respect to the 
Internet and other digital technologies. 
Consideration of other parameters external to 
the individual (e.g. decision-making) may also be 
useful.
W hen do we need to look at 
everyday life to explore 
phenomena such as digital 
divides?
W hen forces of the phenomenon under 
exploration can be situated in people’s everyday 
settings of life.
W hat is the ‘quality’ of the 
everyday? Is it also ‘quantifiable’
?
Quality depends on the context in which 
everyday life is examined. On the other hand, 
quantifications cannot be excluded, although 
they may raise some problematic issues as the 
everyday constitutes a quality.
Is everyday life something users 
understand as such or is it 
something different?
It is hard to say; what matters is the clarification 
of whether the research explores users’ 
understanding of everyday life or actual everyday 
practices.
Should eveiyday life and its role 
in technology adoption be 
looked at from a user or non­
user perspective?
It can (and should sometimes) take both 
perspectives so as to support the argument that 
everyday life plays a role in people’s decisions to 
use technology.
From the above list of questions and respective answers, it becomes obvious 
that the thesis is not interested in individual everyday life and its uniqueness. It instead 
looks at shared meanings and settings of everyday life within the broader context of a 
country. The concept o f ‘domestication’ (Silverstone and Haddon, 1996b; Silverstone 
and Hirsch 1992; Silverstone, 1994) and the argument that the study of ICTs does not 
end in people’s decisions to buy them, as ‘domestication’ takes place through ‘taming 
of the wild and a cultivation of the tame’ (Silverstone, 1996: 223), hold a certain value in 
the context of the present research.21 However, my understanding of the everyday is 
closer to Schutz’s ‘lifeworld’ and to the argument of phenomenological sociology.
Schutz’s ‘lifew orld’ and the study o f  digital divides
An important contribution to studying technology in a social framework comes 
from phenomenological sociology. Phenomenological sociology builds its argument on 
the grounds of intersubjective communication and interaction where socially
21 For other domestication studies, see: Silverstone and Hirsch, 1992; Silverstone and Haddon, 1996a; 
Haddon and Silverstone, 1994; Haddon, 1994.
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constructed knowledge is shared and developed (Schutz, 2003). Especially Schutz’s 
examination of how people experience their ‘everyday life-world’ (Schutz and 
Luckmann, 1974: 3) draws my attention. In Schutz’s sociology, the agent is viewed as 
manipulating physical and social structures in the pursuit of his/her purposes of living. 
Technology, in turn, is viewed as being appropriated by users into a different ‘finite 
province of meaning’ (ibid: 23), such as the ‘scientific-theoretical attitude’ (ibid: 24).
However, in this framework the everyday life-world is non-problematised and 
taken for granted as the experiences of the individual in his everyday life-world are 
perceived as ‘unproblematic until further notice’ (ibid: 4). Schutz does not deal with 
outside social relations and hierarchies, limiting himself to the investigation of human 
choice as determining the structure and balance of the everyday life-world (ibid: 18).22 
Nevertheless, these conceptual tools are useful for investigating the position of ICTs 
at different levels of relevance in the subject’s everyday life-world, while identifying the 
potential of technology to change the type of relevance for the user.
Although this understanding of the everyday does not deal with outside social 
relations and hierarchies, it guides research beyond a micro-scale or family-centred 
view of the everyday context. It also guides research towards examining the role of 
agency (e.g. users or non-users) in shaping everyday shared meanings and knowledge 
about issues of interest (e.g. Internet adoption). In comparison to the domestication 
tradition, the present research finds Schutz’s ‘lifeworld’ to be a more useful framework 
as Schutz’s attempt to define boundaries between individual freedom and constraint 
points out the interplay between imposed and freely chosen actions and choices in 
everyday life (Schutz & Luckmann, 1974: 100). Schutz conceives the existence of a 
stock of knowledge -  inherited from the past -  which puts constraints, gives chances 
and draws boundaries in the subject’s effort to pursue his/her interests. He does not 
see individual interests and actions as separated from the experienced situation and the 
latter’s relevance to the individual/s interests and actions; on the contrary, he sees 
individual interests as being ‘swept along’ (ibid: 115) by the situation, thus being 
modified by it. Therefore, the concept of‘situation’ locates the individual in the social 
and cultural environment, defining their here and now and constituting ‘the province 
of what is open to me now to control’ (ibid: in). These conceptual tools can be of use 
for the thesis and the examination of how ICTs and the Internet in particular are 
adopted on the grounds of people’s freely made decisions and the possible constraints 
placed on them by historically inherited cultural and other trends in the country.
On the other hand, the evolving nature of everyday, as argued by Schutz and de 
Certeau’s perception of the everyday as both oppressive and subversive (1984), poses 
the question of how we fix a certain frame of the everyday at a particular moment in 
time. This calls on us to be cautious about the time frame and the conditions in which
22 Habermas charges Schutz with ‘hermeneutic idealism’ (1987:148) as he ‘screens out everything that 
inconspicuously affects a sociocultural lifeworld from the outside’ (ibid).
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a specific snapshot of the everyday is studied. Also, parameters of engagement, consent 
or resistance are all important when studying the everyday. In the framework of the 
present research, such parameters could be not only factors of lower or higher Internet 
adoption but also reflections of the latter, with Internet adoption being a partial and 
integral element of the everyday. This partly reflects the argument of everyday life 
studies in media and communications that people ‘do not simply adopt, but 
appropriate and use the media as one of their resources to assure them of their 
everyday lives and to construct the social world’ (Hartmann, 2007: 80).
2.4.3 ‘Resistance’ and the empirical study o f digital divides
‘Resistance culture’ is the second aspect of culture that is employed for the 
study of digital divides in Greece. Research on technology adoption often tackles 
issues concerning ‘not-wants’ or ‘resisters’ so as to gain a better understanding of digital 
gaps and inequalities.
‘Resistance’ is a prominent aspect of society’s culture. Fiske (1989: 23-47) 
discusses the notion of culture in media and communications as a range of formations 
of ordinary people resisting media ‘products’ created by the dominant ‘power bloc’. 
Hall (1981: 228) sees resistance as a constituent of culture, describing the ‘double 
movement of containment and resistance’ in culture. Nevertheless, Fiske’s and Hall’s 
notions of resistance seek to examine the power struggles and hierarchy conflicts 
inherent into resistance, something that goes beyond the scope of the thesis.
Historians of technology have argued that ‘resistance’ is a force to be examined 
(Mokyr, 1990 & 1992) as ‘the resistance to innovation is identified as a central element 
governing the success of new inventions’ (ibid & 1992: 325). However, ‘resistance’ is a 
loaded term and from a techno-determinist perspective is considered to be ‘a structural 
or a personal deficit...irrational, morally bad, or at best understandable but futile’ 
(Bauer, 1995a: 2). In addition, the term ‘resistance’ is understood and takes shapes in 
many different ways, varying on the basis of the social context where it appears, the 
technological artefacts it concerns and the time period it comes to life. Resistance to 
ICTs is only one instance of technology-related resistance, being determined by the 
structural and time conditions in which it occurs.
For the purpose of this conceptual discussion of resistance, it is useful to review 
some possibilities discussed in Bauer’s work. Although more scholarly works have 
reported on resistance to technology (Breakwell and Fife-Schaw, 1987; Hirschheim and 
Newman, 1988; Northcott et al., 1985; Willcocks and Mason, 1987), these mostly 
concern particular parts of the population (e.g. children)23 or specific areas of living
23 Breakwell and Fife-Schaw (1987) argue that young people's attitudes to new technology are pragmatic 
rather than evaluative and that such attitudes are strongly related to psychological factors, education and 
family background.
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(e.g. the workplace) and do not quite touch on the different types of new technologies 
that Bauer’s work does. Bauer (ibid: 13-5) questions the idea of ‘resistance’ as a 
diversion from the ‘one best w a/ and examines the phenomena of resistance as a form 
of opposition or a challenging action against. He also questions the observable or not 
character of resistance, with questions of motivation and purposefulness determining 
the distinction between ‘resistance’, ‘avoidance’ or ‘ignorance’. Bauer (ibid: 16-21) 
identifies intrinsic qualities and dynamics of resistance. He thus classifies resistance as 
‘active or passive’, ‘individual or collective’, resistance referring to ‘technology design’, 
‘technology effects’ or ‘technology governance’, and resistance where experimental, 
quantitative or qualitative means of measurement apply.
The present research has a more specific scope and focus of exploration, 
limiting the breadth of the issues examined from a resistance perspective. The ‘what’ 
of resistance involves the perceived role and effects of Internet technologies, while the 
‘who’ of resistance looks at the cumulative impact of individual resistant behaviours 
and attitudes. Without excluding the possibility that resistance in the Greek context 
constitutes an informed and conscious manifestation of opposition, the thesis 
hypothesises that ‘resistance’ has by and large been inherited by historical legacies and 
cultural trends that the Greek civil society of modern times has been marked by. 
Nevertheless, the thesis does not intend to proceed to normative judgements of the 
resistance culture in Greece. It instead aims to unpack its complexity and importance 
for digital divides in the country. Thus, the hypothesised resistance culture towards 
Internet technologies and services will be first evaluated by the elite actors’ general 
account of the information society in Greece. This is in terms with Bauer’s argument 
that ‘in analysing effects we need to take into account the reactions of innovators and 
regulatory bodies’ (ibid: 25).
Cyberphobia or technophobia is an aspect of the ‘resistance culture’ that the 
thesis focuses on. Bauer (1995b: 99) regards cyberphobia as the epitome of‘the clinical 
eye on resistance to new technology5 that ‘prioritizes personal therapy over 
technological design’, thus attributing a pathological deficit to the non-user. In Bauer’s 
view, cyberphobia or technophobia expresses a techno-centric and normative view of 
people’s attitudes to technology. It arguably overlooks the specificities of the 
environment within which resistance takes place, relying on self-reported data about 
whether and why people resist technology. Bauer (ibid: 113) contrasts technophobia, 
arguing that resistance is like the acute pain which signalises the mismatch of 
expectations between users and designers. Hence, he argues (1993) that in many cases 
resistance affects technological development through re-allocating attention, 
evaluating and inducing modifications. He proposes that, instead of ‘medicalizing 
everyday life’ (1995b: 107), we should view ‘the systemic process between designers and 
users over time’, with resistance constituting the ‘“testbench” information that makes a 
contribution to the process’ of design formation and evolution (ibid: 112). The present
45
research takes a different approach at this point as it aims to illustrate that 
technophobia can be a useful analytic tool for disentangling the drivers of digital 
divides in contexts such as Greece. The usefulness of researching the term 
‘technophobia’ and manifestations of it in real life can be fully uncovered only when its 
driving forces are identified and the mechanisms at work are examined in-depth, 
without getting involved in a psycho-driven discussion of the symptoms and 
diagnostics related to technophobia. Technophobia is often the result of socio-cultural 
conditions largely unknown to researchers and should not itself constitute a negative 
connotation of people’s attitudes to new technologies.
As regards empirical research, resistance to ICTs has been studied since the 
1990s. Empirical study has shown that people resist digital or cable TV for aesthetic 
reasons and because of the fear of technology dominance in everyday life (Silverstone 
and Haddon, 1996a). Resistance is often situated in everyday life, with personal life 
circumstances being studied as possible reasons for resistance. An indicative example is 
the pressure of responsibilities that population groups, such as lone parents, feel most 
of the time (Haddon and Silverstone, 1995b). Interestingly, resisting behaviours have 
been identified even in young people’s reluctance to adopt certain ICTs (Hartmann, 
2005:144-5) while, as mentioned earlier, the typology of Internet non-users in Wyatt 
et al. (2002) contains the category o f‘resisters’. The P-903 European survey in 2000 
showed that non-users’ indifference about the Internet can be taken as a passive form 
of resistance (Mante-Meijer et al., 2001). Also, Dutch women who took part in 
Internet training decided that the Internet does not fit in with their lives, thus 
becoming ‘informed rejectors’ (Rommes, 2003). A study conducted in Northern 
Ireland concluded that university students show strong indifference to the Internet, 
with the Internet being quite unimportant in young people’s lives (Kingsley and 
Anderson, 1998). The 2007 UK Online report (2007:13) argued about the existence of 
a number of non-adopters who are ‘digitally dismissive’ and have decided not to adopt 
the Internet although they had the opportunity to do so. Finally, studies in the USA 
have reached similar conclusions (Horrigan et al., 2003), arguing more about 
indifference or passive resistance and less about hostility to or negative action against 
the Internet.
2.4.4 Everyday life and resistance to technology: links to decision-making and
implications for digital divides
Regardless of the value of arguments concerning the power struggle between 
the dominant and the subordinate in the culture of the everyday (Lefebvre, 1971; de 
Certeau, 1984; Fiske, 1989: 23-47), the thesis does not get involved with the 
antagonisms and conflicts between ordinary people or what has been called the ‘power 
bloc’ of dominant institutional and systemic forces (Fiske, ibid). The thesis looks at
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everyday life and resistance practices and considers the web of actors interacting in 
ways that go beyond antagonisms and which are hardly subject to thorough 
examination and revelation.
The thesis backs Preston’s (2005: 198) argument that ICTs’ meaning and 
relevance are shaped by socially prescribed roles and identities in the everyday lives of 
different groups. Yet, beyond this argument and Ricci’s (2000) claim that life cycle, 
economic conditions and generally ‘life style’ are strongly correlated to the use of and 
interest in new technologies, it is important to identify the links of the ‘everyday5 and 
‘resistance’ aspects of culture to decision-making. The latest trends in everyday life 
studies attempt to extend the scope of research into the field of politics, arguing that 
people’s place, categorisation and limitations in society have a role to play not only in 
people’s attitudes to and evaluation of technology but also in politics. Everyday life and 
people’s evaluations and attitudes entail ‘important implications for public policies and 
strategy...which may serve to challenge or enhance the kinds of thinking and 
considerations that currently inform policy decision-making or practices’ (Preston, 
2003a: 3-4).
In this sense, the notion of the ‘social shaping of technology5 concerns not only 
technology but also decision-making as different socio-cultural contexts influence the 
development of different policy models. For instance, in neo-liberal post-Keynesian 
systems market- and competition-driven policies on technology are in place. In 
‘dirigiste’ ideologies derived from Marx, Confucius and Keynes, greater emphasis is 
placed on state intervention, controllable competition and people’s participation in the 
information society (Moore, 1998:153-6).
From this point of view, the European Media Technologies in Everyday Life 
Network (EMTET)24 made an important empirical contribution. The EMTEL 
conducted empirical research in various regions of Europe and explored the links of 
the everyday with ICTs and the importance of these links for policy-making. Thus, the 
EMTEL aimed to provide the EU authorities with an insight into the possible 
insufficiencies of ICT policy frameworks in Europe, arguing that:
...without this sensitized investigation of the dynamics of the everyday and of innovation as a 
contested process of social as well as technological change we will misread and misunderstand the 
realities of innovation and the implications of those realities for policy (Silverstone, 2003: 8-9).
The aim of this research is to disentangle the understanding, evaluation and 
integration of Internet technologies in specific cultural settings and in close 
connection with the political and regulatory domains of activity. While technology is 
only an area in which culture and decision-making act, the engagement of users with 
technology entails broader cultural and political consequences (Silverstone and
24 For other EMTEL research outputs, see: Georgiou, 2003; Cammaerts and Audenhove, 2003b; 
Durieux, 2003; Hartmann, 2003; Ward, 2003; Preston, 2003b.
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Mansell, 1996:224), with a reciprocal and highly interdependent relationship between 
technology, society, culture and politics developed over time. The vision of an 
apparently optimistic future in the information society masks profound uncertainties 
and concerns regarding questions such as: What is the role of new technologies in 
ordinary people’s lives?; How are new media and information technologies controlled 
and regulated?; WTio has the power to decide?; How does the policy over the Internet 
correspond to social needs and concerns?; How does society’s culture influence policy- 
and regulation-making in the information society?; What, if anything, should change?
2.5 Decision-making: its role in digital divides and connections 
with society9s culture
This section discusses decision-making, namely policy and regulation, and its 
role in digital divides. Section 2.5.1 introduces the importance of looking at decision­
making when researching digital divides. Section 2.5.2 examines the element of 
regulation and draws on sociological accounts of regulation for the study of digital 
divides. Section 2.5.3 discusses the policy element and draws on conceptualisations of 
policy as socially driven and accountable for the study of digital divides. Section 2.5.4 
recapitulates the discussion on decision-making and points to the dialogue of decision­
making with culture in relation to the phenomenon of digital divides.
2.5.i  Decision-making in the information society: determining digital divides?
Why should decision-makers care about digital divides? This question brings 
me back to some of the literature discussed in Section 2.3.3, where digital inclusion was 
seen in relation to a complex map of socially exclusionary mechanisms. This question is 
often heard as the political significance of digital divides is commonly driven by 
normative assumptions regarding the effects of the phenomenon on social exclusion 
(Cammaerts et al., 2003: 301-6). The political significance of digital divides is 
supported by the idea that a democratic society needs to provide its people with equal 
opportunities (Frissen, 2003: 19). The literature maintains the importance of media 
literacy (Calabrese, 2003) and people’s participation in the information society for the 
accomplishment of the democratic potential of society and the enforcement of social 
participation (Frissen, 2003: 28-31). Techno-enthusiasts, in particular, maintain that 
ICTs can empower the democratic potential of society and enforce social 
participation. Thus, techno-enthusiasts underline ‘...the connections among 
communication policy, welfare politics, and the ideal of the competent citizen in an 
information 800461/ (Calabrese, 2003:125-126).
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Regardless of the techno-utopian aspects of such arguments, these arguments 
illustrate how access and constructive use of ICTs should constitute a ‘part of social 
citizenship’ (Cammaerts et al., 2003:302) and that decision-making should reflect the 
needs of ordinary people and of the digitally excluded ones in particular settings of life. 
This indicates the necessity of illustrating the socio-cultural factors at work and their 
political implications so that the digitally excluded ones and the complex nature of 
exclusion are taken into account (ibid: 306). This touches upon issues of social justice 
and growth (Tambini, 2000), and political and regulatory bodies must confront the 
challenge of taking differential perceptions of digital divides into consideration, also 
accounting for phenomena of self-exclusion.
From this point of view, some argue that EU authorities are increasingly placing 
more emphasis on society’s awareness of technological innovations under democratic 
processes of regulation and control (Steele, 1998). However, the decisions made by 
official authorities seldom correspond to the particularities of the socio-cultural 
contexts in which ICTs are taken up since they adopt a linear understanding of ICT’s 
effects on economic and social development.25 For instance, the dominant free market 
capitalist model sustains the market-driven idea of information as a commodity, failing 
to foster human needs (Haywood, 1998:22). The narrow ‘learning and earning’political 
agenda, a top-down model of coercing ICT use, and a linear political model of access, 
skills, use and social inclusion are some of the criticisms articulated about policy- 
making in the field (Selwyn, 2005). Sections 2.5.2 and 2.5.3 provide a better insight into 
relevant criticisms articulated about the EU regulation and policy for the information 
society.
Critical literature in the field calls on decision-makers to tackle issues that 
relate to engagement with technology, as well as to the outcomes and consequences of 
technology use (Selwyn, 2004a: 356). Decision-makers are expected to respond to the 
challenges o f ‘social context, social purpose, and social organization’ (Warschauer 
2003a: 201), while confronting the deeper socio-cultural factors driving self-exclusion 
and since ‘all technologies are imbued with cultural significance’ (Wyatt et al., 2002: 
39). On the other hand, scant literature accounts for the multi-dimensional ways in 
which socio-cultural traits may influence decision-making in hidden or more obvious 
ways. The question ‘why should decision-makers care about digital divides?’ should be 
given an answer that goes beyond literature accounts of the socio-political significance 
of ICTs and technology’s role in the development of a socially and politically inclusive 
society. Instead, it should receive an answer that sheds light on the under-explored ties 
between society’s culture and decision-making.
Taking a sociological approach to regulation and policy, the next two sections 
examine discourses and critiques concerning the policy responsiveness to societal
25 Since the early days of the information society, decision-makers’ efforts have relied on two tightly 
interrelated motivations: economic development, and social harmony and cohesion (Moore, 1998:150-2).
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needs and requests, as well as the social accountability of regulatory schemes within 
and outside the information society. This sociological approach also aims to account 
for the actual and potential role of society’s culture in influencing directly or not policy 
and regulatory practices and mindsets in the field. Hence, the present research makes 
the point that a more in-depth examination of the dialogue between ‘bottom up’ -  
culturally-driven -  and ‘top down’ -  decision-making driven -  approaches to digital 
divides is needed.
2.5.2 A  sociological approach to regulation and its importance for digital divides
This section provides a historical account of regulatory models and argues that 
the literature must pay attention to the underlying role of society’s culture in 
regulatory mindsets and practices in general and in relation to digital divides.
‘C om m and and C o n tro l’ regu la tion  in  crisis: w here  is th e  public?
The historical evolution of regulation illustrates the complexity of interactions 
between regulatory authorities, the market and societal actors who are involved in the 
regulatory process.
The traditional Command and Control model is increasingly criticised (Black, 
2002: 2) and a ‘decentred’ regulatory model is taking its place. This ‘decentred’ model 
sets ‘an alternative diagnosis for “failures” of state-centred action’ and requires that we 
‘reconsider not only how the state might act in order to pursue its goals but also how 
we should understand “regulation” itself (ibid: 3). This decentred model has the 
following three elements:
First, a multi-layered privatised regulatory state which challenges the welfare 
regime. Liora and Rick Salter (1997) identified six trends in this new regulatory state: 
the decentralisation of operations; a focus on processes; politicalisation; an emphasis 
on co-operation and co-management; the dominance of the objectives of industrial 
development; and the fragmentation of civil society into stakeholders. These trends 
have created fears about the future of public accountability in the new regulatory state 
(Midwinter and McGarvey, 2001). Scott proposes overlapping accountability 
mechanisms (2000) that will be able to ‘secure closer compliance with public 
objectives’ (2001:353). Others have argued that the regulatory state should not lead to 
the eclipse of the Keynenian welfare state by the Hayekian neo-liberal state 
(Braithwaite, 2000). From a management perspective, Black (2003) states that the 
decentred analysis challenges regulation by emphasising complexity and fluidity over 
simplicity and predictability.
Self-regulation is the second element of the new decentred model and is 
constituted by the co-existence of public and private forms of regulation (Hutter,
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2001). Braithwaite (2000) highlights the value of self-regulation, while Gunningham 
(1999) argues in favour of a regulatory process that relies on continuous improvement, 
benchmarking and internal self-regulation. On the other hand, self-regulation has been 
criticised as incapable of controlling enterprises, taking socially responsible action and 
protecting the public interest (Schofield and Shaoul, 2000; Jacobson, 2001; Parker, 
1999). In the midst of appraisals and criticisms of self-regulation, Ayres & Braithwaite 
(1992) and Hutter (2001) discuss the alternative of enforced self-regulation.26 
Nonetheless, Hutter (ibid: 381) recognises that enforced self-regulation still depends on 
the regulatory capacity of companies and the state’s ability to play a monitoring role.
The third element of the decentred model is the privatisation of regulation. 
The literature acknowledges the huge risks that the privatisation of regulation might 
entail for the public interest as some private regulators are not legally authorised for 
their activities, constraining governments and jeopardising the public interest (Scott
2002). Alternatively, Scott proposes a ‘reverse form of co-regulation’ that will stimulate 
democratic input and inform private regulators of a regulatory regime in the service of 
the public interest (ibid).
A sociological app roach  to  regu la tion  concern ing  d ig ital divides
The emerging decentred regulatory model, its components and the risks arising 
for the public interest drive the thesis to propose a sociological account of regulation, 
especially in relation to digital divides.
What does a sociological approach to regulation stand for?
Under the influence of the above regulatory trends, regulation and culture are 
not regarded as being obviously connected. For instance, these days scholars speak 
about ‘a post-political order’ (Garsten and Jacobsson, 2007) where antagonisms and 
power conflicts have been replaced by consensus and moralisation, leaving space for 
self-government and choice. They argue that authorities play a decreasing role ‘thanks 
to’ the domination of the market and the liberal modes of thought (ibid). They claim 
that post-political regulation lies at the junction between the political, the social and 
the ethical (ibid: 14), while they do not challenge the simplistic assumption that light 
regulation goes hand-in-hand with freedom, democracy and ethos. This ‘post-political’ 
model signifies that regulation moves away from the political sphere of consultation, 
favouring the market, appraising individualism and degrading the role of the public. 
This challenges the ways in which citizenship is situated in decision-making, as well as 
the role of the public sphere(s) as a decision-making barometer.
26 Hutter (2001: 380-381) argues that regulation in this model is not as dependent upon state control, 
companies are more committed to rules and systems they have devised, and the state receives notable 
cost benefits.
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On the other hand, the Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation (CARR)27 
adopts a more sociological view of regulation. The CARR points to the increasingly 
prominent non-state regulatory forces, such as economy and civil society, and to their 
dialogue with traditional state regulation and governmental authorities (Hutter, 2006). 
Remarkable emphasis is placed on what is called ‘civil regulation’ (Tully, 2004). This 
consists of partnerships between civil actors and market corporations, which aim to 
complement state regulation, to enforce market responsibility, and to benefit the civil 
society and market operators. Although critics warn that power and efficiency issues 
may arise, ‘civil regulation’ has the potential to enable informed participatory 
mechanisms in the regulatory domain (ibid: 12), pointing to the underlying links 
between decision-making and societal factors. Also, other CARR research (Lodge et 
al., 2008) illustrates how cultural worldviews can be used as an analytical tool for 
understanding and explaining public policy and regulatory strategies: ‘a regulatory 
regime has to be understood as a temporary settlement that reflects the dominance of 
one worldview over others’ (ibid: 3).
These instances of CARR research support a sociological approach to 
regulation as they point to the actual role of society in regulation-making and to the 
underlying role of cultural values in the strategies and practices applied in regulation. 
Nevertheless, this research framework does not shed light on the two-way interaction 
between society’s culture and regulation in the domain of media and communications 
in particular.
Why is a sociological approach to regulation valid in media and communications?
A sociological approach to regulation has the potential to give a new 
perspective on the model of non-state regulation, involving socio-cultural factors in the 
interactions between state and market forces in media regulation.
In media and communications, the model of non-state regulation and the 
deconstruction of the welfare state under the imperatives of liberty and independence 
seem to undermine state regulation (for more, see Calabrese, 1997:2o;Mattelart, 2003; 
Stelzer, 2001: 40-2). On the other hand, literature continues to exist that contrasts 
popular neo-liberal views in support of deregulation and argues that the state still 
influences significantly the availability of resources, the establishment of legal 
frameworks and the development of investments (May, 2002:150).
A sociological approach to media regulation could find support in the 
argument that the regulation-scape has close connections with society’s culture and 
media culture (Silverstone, 2004). Silverstone recognises that regulatory provisions are 
‘not sufficient as guarantors of humanity or culture’ (ibid: 440), pointing to the market- 
oriented character of regulation and the undervaluation of the social aspects of media
27 For more, see: http://www-lse-ac.uk/co1 1ections/CARR/research.
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regulation. He argues that such social aspects depend on ‘a critical and literate 
citizenry’ (ibid), although he did not look at the potential or actual role of culture in 
media regulation.
In pragmatic terms, a sociological approach to media regulation can be 
appealing to arguments that the social character of regulation in telecommunications 
has been at risk over the last ten years. The International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU) (1996:6) observes the increasing shift of telecommunications regulation towards 
the market, stating that regulation ‘focuses on the rapid transformation of 
telecommunications markets’. Bauer (2002) discusses why the electronic 
communications regulatory framework proposed by the EC has shifted its focus from 
issues of public interest to those representing business interests. He warns that the 
notion of the ‘public interest’ has almost disappeared from the EU regulatory 
framework for the information society, pointing out the proportionally large 
participation of market forces in consultation processes compared to public 
institutions and civic organisations (ibid: 124).
Drawing on empirical research on media regulation, Livingstone et al. (2007) 
argue that ordinary people’s interests are broadly defined through expanding the scope 
of the consumer instead of defining one against the other (ibid: 78). The debate 
between ‘citizen’ and ‘consumer’ illustrates the difficulty in the regulatory provisions 
and resources allocated to different parts of society (ibid: 73-4). Citizens are consumers 
as well as human, social and political beings whose expectations go beyond market 
provisions. Regulation and decision-making processes are positioned within the public 
sphere, with the state being very interdependent with civil society (Habermas, 1996; 
Mouffe, 1992). However, the ‘consumer or citizen interests’ issue remains unsolved 
(Walton, 1989), while the lack of a ‘positive definition of the citizen interest in relation 
to media and communications’ (Livingstone, et al. 2007: 85) does not guarantee a 
sufficient account of people’s interests in relevant regulatory practices.
Especially in the conventionally perceived anarchic space of the Internet 
(Grossman, 2001), regulation constitutes a broad, rapidly evolving and difficult to 
define practice. On the other hand, the Internet is a web of technology and people, 
being ‘determined not by technological capabilities alone, but through a multitude of 
intricate social processes’ (Dutton, 2003: n). The deeply social nature of Internet 
services requires a regulatory regime that recognises these complex interactions and 
corresponds to people’s needs and interests. Literature in the field argues that this 
constitutes one of the challenges that EU Internet regulation has not encountered 
successfully (King, 2003). The literature also asks whose laws and interests apply in 
cyberspace, arguing that the forces driving legislation lie at the core of the problem 
(Hedley, 2003). Along these lines, the neglect of end-users and the over-appreciation of 
technical prospects by law-makers is underlined (O’Brien and Ashford, 2003), often
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resulting in technological advancements that leave some social groups behind (Russell,
2003).
In addition, the new market-oriented policy paradigm calls for the uniformity 
of Internet laws across nations, creating the ‘paradox of nationalism’ (Hedley, 2003). 
The establishment of an international order to which all nations subscribe (Hughes,
2003) and where socio-cultural differences remain beyond consideration is a paradox. 
In the EU, the goal of uniformity and compliance poses questions concerning the 
feasibility of a uniform EU cyber-order while divergent socio-cultural and national 
identities co-exist. It is here that questions about the importance of national contexts 
for regulation arise (Sancho, 2002), necessitating the consideration of how ICTs 
interact with diverse social, technical, cultural and political relations to produce a 
mixed set of outcomes (Goodwin and Spittle, 2002: 235).
Non-state regulation and privatisation in the media mean that the relationship 
between regulatory practices and citizens as well as between the market system and 
consumers is not understood well enough (V eljanovski, 2001:113). This lack of clarity is 
met not only on the side of regulators but also in severely fragmented civic action in 
the field. Increasing changes of social stratification go hand-in-hand with the decline 
of community action and the prevalence of individualism and cultural proximity across 
national borders (W ebster, 2001). People are not defined anymore on the basis of their 
social class or national identity, whereas their personal choices might bring them close 
to different social structures and geographical or time locations; this is Castells’ 
‘systemic volatility’ (1996). Thus, societal actors often fail to articulate a unifying, 
concrete and overarching definition of their interests (Collins and Murroni, 1996). 
Cultural nuances and their unclear role in media regulation pose the question not only 
of whether regulation takes society’s culture into account but also of how society 
represents itself and influences regulation in a positive direction.
The thesis aims to employ a sociological approach to regulation in order to 
understand the complexity of actors and relations involved in Internet regulation as 
well as the role of this complexity in the Greek case of digital divides.
2.5.3 A  sociological approach to policy and its importance for digital divides
Policy in the information society consists of initiatives that aim to promote new 
technology equipment, infrastructure and content through use, research and trade at 
all levels of social life. The concept and reality of the information society attract 
criticisms regarding the role of policy-making in general and in relation to digital 
divides.
On one hand, there are discourses that raise the rhetorical character of the 
information society and place the blame on policy. Such discourses argue that the
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information society is nothing more than political rhetoric: ‘it meets the needs of 
politicians because it promises a technological fix to deep seated social and economic 
problems, but as a “new” initiative it distracts attention away from the failure of 
previous similar initiatives to solve these problems’ (Garnham, 1997:327). On the other 
hand, some literature suggests more open policy models such as the layered model 
where the interfaces between four layers will facilitate open and inter-networked 
communication: ‘traditionally, communications policy was organized around horizontal 
divisions between service categories and between geographic regions... [and] the 
introduction of computers into communications networks challenged the horizontal 
model’ (Werbach, 2002: 39-40).28 Other literature brings up the insufficient social 
accountability of policy-making in the information society, arguing that policy is 
surrounded by a rhetoric that addresses economic interests and the digital economy 
vision (Mansel, 2002: 417). Such views criticise the economy-centric character of 
current policies and claim for user-driven, content-concerned and culture-sensitive 
policies. Below, I present the core of such critiques, as synoptically presented by 
Servaes (2003:19):
Table 2-2:Policy-making in the information society
Agitated market/uncertain revenues ‘Controlled’ market/‘guaranteed’
Competition ‘New deal’ type of policy
Short term Long-term objectives
Technology-push/technology-specific User-driven solutions
The medium is the message Content-oriented
The above critiques illustrate the importance of a sociological approach to 
policy-making, with policy attention to civil society in the information society lying at 
the core of the interest of such critical voices. The exemplar of EU policy is indicative 
in this respect, while the EU is the broader context in which Greek policies are 
positioned in and influenced by.
In March 2000 the European Council meeting in Lisbon declared that an 
overall strategy is required, inviting the Commission to draw up an eEurope Action 
Plan. This Plan aimed to build an information and knowledge-based economy where 
better jobs and greater social cohesion would take place (EC, 2000). The EU 
enlargement addressed new questions and brought up new challenges and 
opportunities for the member states. The 13 candidate countries launched a collective 
action, the eEurope+ Action Plan injune 2001. The eEurope+ aimed to accelerate the 
reform and modernisation of the economies in the acceding and candidate countries, 
clustering its actions around the same objectives of eEurope and the same indicators
28 It is proposed that communications policy is developed around four vertical layers -  content, 
applications services, logical and physical layer -  rather than around horizontal categories (Werbach, 
2002). In this way, the convergent and crosscutting nature of services and networks will be taken into 
account and the more open-access use and development of the Internet will be supported.
55
selected by the EU-15. Its objectives mainly concerned the promotion of a cheaper, 
faster and secure Internet, the investment in people and skills and stimulation of 
Internet use.
Although eEurope called on the European authorities ‘to ensure a truly inclusive 
information societ/ (EU, 2001:4, quoted in Carpentier, 2003:100), EU policies have 
been characterised as being ‘technology-fixated’ and accused of going against ‘socially- 
centred visions and imaginations’ (Preston, 2003b: 48). Such criticisms point out that 
more policy emphasis has been given to ‘the design and production of new ICT devises 
and systems over the application and use of existing technologies for social and cultural 
ends’ (ibid: 48-9). Also, the EU authorities are criticised for over-emphasising market 
liberalisation in the information society, while overlooking other critical aspects of 
policy-making in this tough area (Jordana, 2002a: 8-11). The critique concerning the 
over-emphasis on market liberalisation goes hand-in-hand with critiques concerning 
the absence of public debate and consultation. What is argued is that the ‘public 
interest’ plays a particularly limited role in development of the vision of the European 
information society and in the design of specific policies and regulations (Bauer, 2002). 
EU communications policy seems to struggle with past normative legacies in its effort 
to establish an efficient paradigm (Cuilenburg and McQuail, 2003: 196-7). The 
normative policy model29 of the past today gives way to an emerging policy paradigm 
‘driven by an economic and technological logic, although it retains certain normative 
elements’ (ibid: 198). The critical element is that normative and public interest 
parameters are increasingly weakened, whereas market criteria are ever more 
empowered in this policy process.
Likewise, the socially accountable language used in official EU policy 
documentations has largely been viewed as just a semantic shift. It is considered a shift 
that constitutes ‘little more than occasional rhetorical gestures’, masquerading the 
deeply consumerist logic of policy-making (Preston, 2003b: 51). In this spirit, some 
argue that, in the fragmented and liberalised market environment in Europe, socially 
sensitive policies to ensure a public universal service are insufficient (Pauwels & 
Burgelman, 2003: 77). Thus, critical voices bring up social interest as a policy aim and 
the medium through which successful policies are achieved, with culture being 
conceptualised as both the vehicle and goal of policy-making.
In addition, striking national heterogeneity has marked the EU. Different 
national governments attempt to interpret the European policy in different ways, 
pursuing diverse goals through different means. National variability and divergence 
became obvious in the 1990s when domestic opposition and resistance to 
telecommunications liberalisation emerged (Thatcher, 2002). As far as Southern
29 The normative model was introduced in the 1945-1080/90. It legitimised government intervention in 
communication markets for social purposes, as well as a public monopoly over radio and broadcasting 
(Cuilenburg and McQuail, 2003:191-5).
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Europe is concerned, research identifies a ‘Southern European’ interventionist policy 
approach to telecommunications which has much to do with ‘cultural affinities’ in the 
countries of that region (Jordana, 2002b).
Thus, EU policy in the field has confronted difficulties and contradictions 
caused by varying representations of conflicting interests (Schneider and Werle, 1990), 
as well as by intra-institutional rivalry and policy entrepreneurship (Simpson, 2000: 
445). For instance, the convergence of ICTs caused policy divergence in the European 
Commission as policy entrepreneurship was situated against cultural differences and 
the conflicting interests of the Commission, leading different DGs to express sectoral 
interests (ibid: 447). Esser and Noppe (1996:555) claim that the Commission has only 
apparently exhibited leadership in the ICT sector, while Peterson and Sharp (1998:223- 
5) emphasise the dominant role of industries in the development of EU policy agendas 
in the 1980s and 1990s. From this standpoint, Simpson argues that the Commission 
‘...has merely created an arena within which the most powerful private sector actors 
have determined policy’ (2000: 457).
Finally, the particularities of each EU member state entail certain challenges for 
policymakers since it is acknowledged that ‘no single road to the Information Society’ 
exists and that ‘subsidiarity plays an important role’ (Servaes, 2003:27). Critical debates 
concerning the real character and quality of the European information society question 
the argument of the ‘Euro-specificity’ of policy. Instead, they perceive ‘Euro- 
specificity’ as a rhetorical vehicle to cover the illusive and contradictory character of 
the EU information society and to keep the equilibrium between heterogeneous 
member states that view EU policy as an ‘a la carte system’ (Pauwels & Burgelman, 
2003: 63). It is here that questions concerning the local versus the global element of 
policy and the principles of subsidiarity versus uniformity arise, emphasising the 
bottom-up legitimacy that a European unity of nations requires (ibid: 80). The 
principle of subsidiarity indicates that ‘each social and political group should help 
smaller or more local ones accomplish their respective ends without, however, 
arrogating those tasks to itself (Carozza, 2003: 38). Although a general and, in some 
respects, vague concept, characterised by internal tensions and paradoxes (ibid: 39), 
subsidiarity can operate as a significant structural principle for the full and successful 
implementation of decisions made in the EU centrally by the member states. 
Respecting cultural and other differences in the EU region, subsidiarity promotes and 
‘integrates international, domestic, and subnational levels of social order on the basis of 
a substantive vision of human dignity and freedom’ (ibid: 40). In order for the abstract 
idea of subsidiarity to obtain a practical orientation, mediating mechanisms between 
the EU and the member states can be employed. This can happen through the 
formation of mediating networks and, in particular, the establishment of European 
agencies which will stimulate National Regulatory Authority (NRA) independence and
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monitor decision-making procedures of co-operation between NRAs, member states 
and the EU (Geveke, 2003: 27).
Besides the above critiques of EU policy in the information society, there is 
empirical research in Europe that supports the idea of the ‘social shaping of 
technology’ and raises its implications for policy-making. Such research illustrates the 
diversity o f‘users’ adoption of, engagement with and attitudes towards new ICTs in 
the sphere of everyday life in contemporary Europe’, arguing about the ways in which 
policy will respond appropriately (Preston, 2005:205-6). Empirical research in Europe 
concludes about the following socially-driven implications for policy-making: the 
importance of ‘downstream’ applications in the digital context and communication 
services; the need for more demand-driven policies; attention to innovative modes of 
networking and the participation of civil society; and, greater attention to non­
utilitarian applications of new ICT (Silverstone, 2005).
The above critical views of EU (and not only) policy in the information society 
pose the question of whether policy-makers are taking societies and their cultures into 
account. Regardless of the usefulness of this question, the extent to which societies 
and their cultures may have a less obvious and more indirect role in shaping policy 
cultures and practices remains relatively under-explored.
2.5.4 Decision-making and its dialogue with society's culture: determining digital
divides?
The discussion in Sections 2.5.2 and 2.5.3 does not reject any of the innovative 
regulatory or policy models that are emerging in the information society. It only 
proposes a sociological approach so as to review such models critically, locating them 
in a social context. Although the consideration of ordinary people in decision-making 
may have some bearing on policy and legislation initiatives, on self-regulation and 
public awareness, these initiatives are often marked by fragmentation, inconsistency, 
contradiction, sporadic applicability and a non-satisfactory reflection of social needs 
(Kizza, 1998: 98). Further questions are posed in relation to the Internet as some 
consider it ‘a source of regulatory arbitrage’ (Froomkin, 1996), posing the question of 
whether it is ‘the modern hydra’ (ibid: 129).
Apart from social accountability, the discussion in Sections 2.5.2 and 2.5.3 points 
to other areas to be examined in the literature. On one hand, the CARR work and 
sociologically inspired approaches to regulation and policy review critically the 
consideration of ordinary people and their cultures in decision-making. In this sense, 
the suggestion of the CARR research that cultural studies could be a analytical device 
in examining the influence of worldviews or cultures on policy and regulation practices 
might offer a useful research tool (Lodge et al., 2008). On the other hand, the
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complexity of society’s culture and its role as an active actor in decision-making are 
areas of examination which remain substantially unexplored.
I acknowledge the research and practical usefulness of arguments concerning 
the social fragmentation of the current regulatory state, which Liora and Rick Slater 
(1997) call ‘stakeholderization’, representation of the public interest and the 
democratisation of regulatory governance. Also important are works that support the 
‘proceduralization’ of regulation (Black, 2001 & 2000), namely the establishment of 
social regulatory frameworks through public consultations, public access to 
information and procedural fairness and the encouragement of third parties’ 
participation in regulation. Nevertheless, there are other possibilities that the research 
needs to examine empirically. These are possibilities concerning so far largely 
disregarded arguments, such as Hall et al.’s argument that culture ‘regulates’ implicitly 
-  possibly by putting governments under the control of credit ratings -  with no need 
for intentionality (1999:5-7). Along these lines, the research literature should examine 
in depth Gunningham and Grabovsky’s (1999: 4) understanding of regulation as 
displacing the role of authority and power in the regulation process.
The vision of the ‘multimedia revolution’ calls for a reformulation and 
reorientation of existing regulations and policies and leaves open the possibility for 
‘multiple futures for the multimedia revolution’ (Silverstone, 1996:217). Thus, it invites 
the research to develop a socio-cultural and decision-making account of digital divides 
instead of a technological and economic one. The present research explores digital 
divides and their driving forces by situating divides in context and by bridging, 
conceptually and empirically, the gap between decision-making and the socio-cultural 
traits of the information society.
2.6 Conceptual framework
The thesis aims to examine the reasons digital divides in Greece are more 
exacerbated than in the great majority of counties in the European region by 
examining the dialogue between specific facets of society’s culture and decision­
making in the Greek information society. To achieve this, a conceptual framework 
that examines digital divides from a socio-cultural and decision-making perspective was 
put forward in this chapter. This conceptual framework is framed to some extent by 
sociological approaches to technology but aims to go even further, improving our 
understanding of the phenomenon of digital divides as well as the theory we use to 
understand it.
More specifically, the conceptual framework of the thesis problematises 
literature discourses that dichotomise the phenomenon of digital divides. Also, it
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mobilises the concepts of social inclusion/exclusion and self-exclusion and examines 
the key arguments concerning the role of decision-makers and the implications for 
ordinary people. On the grounds of this critical approach to digital divides, the thesis 
adopts a socio-cultural perspective and draws upon the elements of‘everyday life’ and 
‘resistance culture’ that conceptualise technology adoption as socially-dependant and 
culturally-driven. The selection of these two aspects of society’s culture as drivers of 
technology adoption is also grounded by the socio-cultural specificities of Greece, as 
discussed in Chapter 3.
The research literature somewhat fails to illustrate the reciprocal and highly 
interdependent relationships between technology, society’s culture and decision­
making. This brings the discussion to the perspective of decision-making and the 
elements of policy and regulation. The conceptual approach to decision-making taken 
in this chapter relies on literature that discusses policy and regulatory models in the 
information society and their evolution from a sociological perspective. Such 
sociological literature brings to the fore the issue of the social accountability of 
decision-making practices, but fails to illustrate the complex interaction between 
decision-making and the cultural and life contexts in which ordinary people live and 
digital technologies are adopted. The discussion in this chapter attempted to argue for 
this interaction in relation to digital divides, while the significance of this argument for 
the Greek case of divides is shown in Chapter 3.
In short, the conceptual framework is constituted by the following elements:
• an approach that considers digital divides as being culturally-, politically- and 
regulatory-driven;
• an analytical framework that draws on the sociology of technology literature and 
employs insights from everyday life and ‘resistance culture’ studies; and
• a framework for the study of decision-making, its role in digital divides and its 
interconnections with people’s everyday lives and culture.
This conceptual framework guides the investigation of the principal research 
questions introduced in Chapter 1:
1. What are the general characteristics of the Greek information society?
2. How far does society’s culture influence digital divides in Greece?
3. How far do Internet policy and regulation influence digital divides in Greece?30
30 As stated in the introductory discussion of Chapter 1, the source of knowledge for policy and 
regulation is the discourse and perceptions of key actors rather than some objective survey or 
observation of actual policies and regulations. More specifically, the role of policy and regulation in 
digital divides is evaluated according to what elite actors (Chapter 5) and ordinary people (Chapters 6-8) 
have argued.
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4- How do society’s culture and Internet policy and regulation intersect in influencing 
digital divides in Greece?
The first principal research question aims to overview the field and therefore no 
particular lines of investigation are followed. The other three principal research 
questions are examined by pursuing the following lines of investigation (research 
questions):
• What are the cultural and everyday life settings of ordinary people in Greece of 
relevance to and importance for the course of the Greek information society?
• How is decision-making shaped in Greece and what are its key features for the 
country’s information society?
• What is the dynamic between society’s culture and decision-making in the Greek 
information society and in relation to digital divides?
The chapter that follows provides a detailed presentation of the Greek case of 
digital divides. This presentation aims to illustrate how the conceptual framework fits 
in with the Greek case of divides and to obtain a better insight of this case. Then, the 
above lines of investigation (research questions) are operationalised methodologically 
in Chapter 4.
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3. Greece: Digital divides from a socio-cultural and decision­
making perspective
j . j  Chapter overview
This chapter introduces the case of Greece, highlights certain aspects of the 
puzzle of digital divides in Greece and brings to the fore the role of society’s culture 
and decision-making. Further, the conceptual framework discussed in Chapter 2 is 
elaborated and connected to the case of divides in Greece.
Section 3.2 overviews the Greek information society, highlighting the 
persistence of digital divides and role of society’s culture and decision-making. Section
3.2.1 provides empirical evidence of commonsense aspects of digital divides in Greece, 
giving the Greek information society a European context. Section 3.2.2 presents ICT 
and Internet adoption in Greece and argues that more progress is needed. Section 3.2.3 
highlights the cultural grounds of digital divides in the country. Section 3.2.4 discusses 
policy and regulation in Greece with regard to Internet technologies. Section 3.2.5 
presents the divergence of Greece from EU regulation, pointing to effects on its digital 
divides.
In Section 3.3 I espouse a historical view of the factors driving the Greek 
information society. Section 3.3.1 reviews the history o f‘late-late’ industrialisation and 
early parliamentarism, as well as the legacy of romanticism and patriotism in Greece. It 
discusses clientelism and patronage networks and their implications for social policy, 
culture and citizenship, as well as for the country’s information society. Section 3.3.2 
presents the historical conditions of the economic underdevelopment and state- 
dependency of the IT  sector as the driving forces of the slow development of the ICT 
market in Greece. Section 3.4 concludes the discussion.
3 .2 . The Greek information society: digita l divides and the 
elements o f society ’s culture and decision-making
This section illustrates the key traits of the Greek information society within a 
European (EU) framework and the features driving the thesis to explore digital divides 
from socio-cultural and decision-making perspectives. The aim is not to test a theory 
or a phenomenon across different borders, nor to compare a set of countries within a 
particular theoretical or empirical framework. Greece stands as a case study on its own 
account or, according to Kohn’s typology (1989), as an object of study. Any
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comparisons with the EU and other European countries will only allow me to discern 
idiosyncrasies of the Greek information society and its divides without conducting 
cross-national research. The potential for cross-national comparisons is considered in 
the thesis’ concluding chapter when the Greek case has been tackled extensively and 
other national contexts can be considered for comparative research in the future.
3.2.1 The Greek information society: d ista l divides and the European context
Greece is a long-standing EU member state with one of the highest national 
development rates across the EU. On the other hand, the available statistics on digital 
divides in Europe, which mostly look at physical access and penetration indicators of 
digital divides, show that Greece has one of the lowest Internet and new technology 
penetration rates in the EU, undermining the vision of a European information 
society.
Regarding economic indicators of the information society, when the 
information society began to develop in 1997 public telecommunication investment 
was 3.7% in Greece and 5.4% in the EU (Greek Information Society Initiative, 1999: 
2). However, investment in the Greek information society had risen by 27% more than 
the annual global increase in gross national product in the same period (ibid). The 
annual growth rate of ICT expenditure between 1992 and 1999 was very strong in 
Greece and only slightly lower than the EU average (DDSI, 2001:1). Moreover, the 
ICT market in Greece was growing rapidly in the early 2000s (EITO, 2001: 465) 
although Greece still had the lowest percentage of network digitisation in the EU 
(Greek Information Society Initiative, 1999:1). More recent data from Eurostat show 
that, although ICT expenditure in 2004-2006 remained the same (2.7% of GDP) in 
the EU-27, Greece lagged behind with 1.2% of GDP in 2006, slightly lower than in 
2004 (1.3%). This ICT expenditure share was the lowest in the EU-27.31
Delays in development of the Greek telecommunications market are part of 
several delays in ICT diffusion in the country since the early 1990s. Reflecting debates 
concerning the North-South digital gap in Europe, countries such as Greece and 
Portugal have been lagging behind in the adoption of all three clusters o f‘television’, 
‘computer’ and ‘mobile’ technologies (Servaes, 2003:23). Early research in 1999 showed 
that Greece and Portugal had the lowest penetration rate for the video recorder, with 
this then being the most advanced technology in Europe of that time. In the same 
year, Greece had the lowest satellite dish penetration rate (2%) in contrast to countries 
like Austria where 52% of the population had a satellite dish. In this period, the usage 
of CD-ROM technology ranged from 53% in Sweden to 6% in Greece.
The picture has been similar since Internet networks were first developed in Europe.
31 For more statistics, see Eurostat at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/.
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Table 3-1: Internet and computer indicators
Home access to the Internet 1999 3% I2^»
2000 5.8% 18.3%
The Internet in schools (1999- Primary schools 1% 59%
2000) Secondary schools 18% 88.7%
Internet use (2000) 11.2% 25.7 %
Computer for work (2000) 25.3% 45%
Internet access (2001) 12% 36%
Internet use (2003/04) 15% 49%
Internet use (2005) 24% 49%
Computer at home (2007) 41% 57%
Internet access at home (2007) 19% 42%
Broadband at home (2007) 14% 36%
Internet access at home (2008T 22% 49%
* Depending on when research was conducted the figures are for the EU-15, ETJ-25 or EU-27.
As shown in the above table (Table 3-1), in 1999-2000 1% of primary schools 
and 18% of secondary schools in Greece were linked to the Internet, with Greece 
having the lowest school connectivity in the EU (EC, 2001a: 4).32 Also, Greece failed to 
keep pace with the use of computers as in 2000 only 25.3% of the population used 
computers for work compared to the EU average of 45% (ibid: 7). In 2001, 12% of 
households in Greece and 36% in the EU had access to the Internet (EC, 2001b: 6). 
Regarding the Internet at home, the percentage of people with home access to the 
Internet in 1999 was 3% in Greece and 12% in the EU. By April 2000, the respective 
figures were 5.8% in Greece and 18.3% in the EU and, by October 2000, 11.7% in 
Greece and 28.4% in the EU (European Commission DGINFSO).
More recently, the 2005 Eurobarometer (EB) survey concluded that Greece was 
last in Internet usage in the EU-25 with a mere 24% of the population using the 
Internet in 2005 (rising from 15% in 2003/2004) (EC, 2006a: 14). The same survey 
showed that mobile telephony in Greece is more common than the Internet, even 
among children, with 30% of children owning a mobile phone and 26% using the 
Internet in 2005 (36% and 50%, respectively, in the EU-25) (ibid: 19). The EB E- 
Communications Household survey found that only 41% of Greek households had a 
computer in 2007, positioning Greece below the EU-27 (57%) and only above Portugal 
(39%), Romania (35%) and Bulgaria (27%) (EC, 2008a: 49). The same survey concluded 
that computers are more prevalent in old member states (60%) than in the NMS-12 
(45%), with Greece (41%), Portugal (39%), Spain (46%) and Italy (49%) being those old 
member states with lower computer availability than the average member state (ibid). 
As regards Internet penetration (ibid: 54), 49% of households in the EU-27 had 
Internet access in 2008, with Greece (22%) being the old member state with the 
lowest Internet access rate and at the bottom of the EU-27 together with Bulgaria
32 The next lowest percentage was Luxembourg, 25% of primary schools connected, and Germany, 81% 
of secondary schools connected.
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(22%).33 This figure is comparatively lower for Greece than in 2007, as Greece was then 
in a better position (19%) than Bulgaria (14%) and Romania (12%) (ibid). In Internet 
connection terms, the EB 2007 survey (ibid: 56) concluded that 36% of European 
households had a broadband connection in 2007, with Greece having only 14% of its 
households accessing the Internet via broadband. Greece is again at the bottom of the 
EU-27 together with new member state Bulgaria (14%).
The figures reported in EB 2005 and 2007 confirm the particularly slow change 
in Internet penetration in Greece over the last few years and show that Greece is the 
country with the highest share of households with a PC but no Internet connection 
(ibid: 55). Likewise, the Eurostat research (2007) confirmed the above conclusions with 
respect to how Greece is positioned in the European context. Also, it added that while 
45% of individuals in the EU-27 access the Internet at least once a week, the respective 
percentage in Greece was 23%, just above Bulgaria (22%) and Romania (i8%).34 
Depending on the aspects of digital divides one looks at, such as access to or use of a 
computer and the Internet, type of Internet connection, penetration of mobile and3G 
telephony and digital technologies available at home, school or work, one can reach the 
conclusion that Greece lags behind the rest of Europe in the penetration of 
information and communication digital technologies and particularly Internet 
technologies.
3.2.2. The Greek information society: catching up but more development is needed
In attempting to evaluate digital divides in Greece, I can conclude that the 
Greek information society made some progress in the first years of this decade, but a 
stagnation has appeared in the last 3-4 years.
More specifically, the 2005 Greek Research and Technology Network survey 
(GRNet, 2005) painted an improved picture of ICT adoption in Greece in the early 
years of the decade. This was also reflected in the EB 2005 survey which pointed to the 
relative decrease in the digital gap between Greece and the EU (EC, 2006a: 14). On the 
other hand, the GRNet survey (2005) illustrated that the growing penetration of ICTs 
in Greece in 2001-2003 was followed by stagnation in 2004-2005. In 2005, Internet use 
increased (24.6%) by just 0.1% compared to 2004 (24.5%), while remaining lower than 
in 2003 (25.2%). Also, in 2005 0.7% of Greek households were connected to the 
Internet via ISDN, 10.8% via ADSL, while 1.4% declared they were connected with 
the fastest (i.e. broadband) Internet connection (ibid: 95). Computer usage in 2002- 
2003 rose by 1.7%, reaching 34.2% of the overall population in 2003. The decrease of
33 Even the countries of the NMS-12 group had higher Internet penetration than Greece; the only 
exception was Bulgaria, with the same penetration rate as Greece (EC, 2008a: 54).
34 For more statistics, see Eurostat at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/.
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2% in 2004 and 2.1% increase in 2005 did not substantially change the picture of low 
penetration, with only 34.3% of the population using computers (ibid: 5).
Looking at more recent figures, the ITU (2004-07) confirms that, although 
Internet and broadband penetration have gone up in Greece, this increase is unsteady, 
varying from year to year and hindering substantive progression. The ITU figures 
illustrate this shaky course of the Greek information society, presenting this problem 
in a European framework. For instance, the ITU argues that in 2007 Greece was the 
country with the lowest Internet penetration (22.8%) among all EU-27 countries 
(55.7%). The same data show Greece in the same year only had broadband penetration 
of 7.4%, ranking just above Latvia (5.2%) even though Latvia had twice as much 
Internet penetration as Greece.
3.2.3 The Greek information society: shaped by‘cultural divides'?
The above data showing that Greece is behind other European countries and 
particularly slow in Internet access and usage does not give us the whole picture of 
digital divides. Other, more qualitative aspects of divides matter (e.g. quality and 
extent of usage, integration of the Internet in everyday life etc). Therefore, it is 
important to explore possible drivers of digital divides that go beyond access to 
physical equipment, especially drivers concerning society’s culture and decision­
making. Moving beyond technology access and usage figures, the available national 
data imply a persistent culture of little interest in new technologies in Greek society; a 
culture marked by contradictions and interrelations with other parameters of social 
living, as discussed later.
Specifically, national GRNet surveys explored why most citizens in Greece do 
not use ICTs in general and the Internet in particular. The 2005 data indicated that ‘I 
don’t need it’ is the most important reason given for not using the Internet, although 
this percentage decreased slightly from 30.7% in 2003 to 29.3% in 2004. Also, a 
significant number of non-users cited ‘lack of interest’ as the reason for non-use, with a 
very small increase from 15.6% in 2003 to 15.8% to 2004. On the other hand, ‘lack of 
access’ has become an increasingly less important reason for Internet non-use. Also, 
‘lack of an Internet connection’ was in 2003 (25%) a less important reason for not 
using the Internet than in 2002 (30.8%) (GRNet, 2003: 32). As regards cost-related 
reasons for non-use, a quite small number of non-users was concerned about 
affordability issues as 10.3% in 2004 and just 4.2% in 2003 mentioned high cost 
(GRNet, 2005:77). Likewise, in 2003, even more people (30.7%) than in 2002 (23.1%) 
stated they do not need the Internet, while concerns about the cost of an Internet 
connection appeared smaller (4.2%) than in 2002 (9.2%) (GRNet, 2003:32), illustrating 
a persistent culture of little interest in new technologies in Greek society.
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Surveys by the National Statistical Service of Greece (ESYE) confirm these 
observations, concluding that non-appreciation of the Internet is the main reason for 
its non-usage. In the 2005 ESYE survey, most respondents (43.1%) stated the main 
reason for not accessing the Internet was the belief the information provided online is 
not useful or interesting (ESYE, 2005). In the 2006 ESYE survey, even more non-users 
(55.7%) argued the main reason for not using the Internet is the lack of desire or 
interest (ESYE, 2006), while cost- and security-related reasons accounted for only 
about 20% of Internet non-users in the 2005 and 2006 ESYE surveys.
In a comparative perspective, it was shown above (Section 3.2.1) that Greece 
lags behind almost all, if not all, EU member states in computer, Internet and 
broadband penetration. This means that a higher number of non-users exists in the 
country, raising questions about why people in Greece do not use the Internet. The 
EB 2007 survey showed that this large number of non-users goes hand-in-hand with 
the larger number of people in the country (58%) than in the EU-27 (50%) arguing that 
they lack Internet access at home because no one in the household is interested in the 
Internet (EC, 2008a: 76). On the other hand, conventional forces of non-usage such as 
the high cost of an Internet connection and equipment seem to matter less in Greece 
(17%) than in the EU-27 (29%).
Besides empirical research, official statements within the country argue that 
Greeks lack familiarity with new technologies. Such statements present, albeit quite 
normatively, a picture of public fear and raise questions concerning the cultural drivers 
of digital divides in the country:
In our country today there is a tendency to distinguish the few (but rapidly increasing in number) 
users of computers and communication networks such as the internet from the many who treat 
the new  technologies at best as a m ystery and at w orst as a danger for their future  
(emphasis added) (Greek Ministry of the Economy and Finance, 2002:12).
This picture of public fear seems to have been encouraged by the practices and 
attitudes of official authorities in the country. It is indicative that the Head of the 
Electronic Crime Squad, Mr. Sfakianakis, argued in the Greek parliament in 2008 that 
1% of children in Greece are addicted to the Internet and 20% are close to addiction.35 
Although no authority in the country provides evidence of this, politicians, journalists, 
public authorities and civil society organisations rushed to not only unquestionably 
accept this argument but also to spread it further, demonising the Internet.
Thus, the questions to ask are: do Greek people’s negative attitudes to the 
Internet stem from their cultures and life settings, or do formal policies and 
regulations fail to provide them with a good understanding of the potential of Internet 
technologies? Can such negative attitudes be explained by looking at possible 
interactions between society’s culture and policy and regulation in the country? These
35 Source: SKAI TV, News bulletin of 18:00, 22 January 2008.
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questions are so far unexplored by national or international research on the Greek case 
of digital divides. The socio-cultural part of this question has, however, been explored 
by empirical research outside Greece which argues that people experience uneasiness 
with technological artefacts such as ICTs for several reasons (see Chapter 2, pp. 35-6). 
Such research poses challenges for the Greek case of divides, calling us to go beyond 
factual data about digital inequalities. Besides, the theoretical discussion of resistance 
and technophobia in Chapter 2 (pp. 41-8) points to the broader relevance of resistance 
culture, complicating claims about the appropriation of ICTs within people’s everyday 
lives and giving some conceptual support to the question concerning the cultural 
drivers of digital divides in Greece. However, the thesis aims to move beyond purely 
socio-centric research literature and to look at the role of decision-making and how 
the latter may interact with socio-cultural parameters, co-influencing digital divides in 
one way or another.
3.2.4 Policy and regulation in the Greek information society: old problems, new
challenges
Moving on to decision-making, it is important to begin with a brief 
presentation of the course and traits of official policy and regulation in the Greek 
information society.
As regards regulation, the Greek government delayed to move to a decentred 
model of privatisation and self-regulation as it started to liberalise and privatise the 
telecommunications market in the early 1990s. Overall, in the 1990s regulatory 
practices aimed at the parallel achievement of two equally important goals: first, the 
encouragement and promotion of ICT growth and development and, second, the 
protection of privacy and other fundamental human rights (Greek Ministry of the 
Economy and Finance, 1999: 86). The need to compromise these two goals led to the 
creation of a state-independent, info-communication commission to regulate the 
market. Thus, full privatisation of the Greek telecommunication sector only took 
place on 1 January 2001 and under the regulatory supervision of the National 
Telecommunication and Post Office Commission (EETD (Gantzias, 2001: 23-43).
The national regulatory framework of that period not only failed to keep up 
with the new regulatory model but also did not correspond with the evolving nature of 
technology. It failed to see the social and contextual nature of technology, without 
considering the social particularities and cultural differentiations of technology usage 
in different social spaces. In this respect, national regulation failed to keep up with 
people’s expectations, needs and customs (PDGS, 1999).
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In the current decade, the Greek regulator has been faced with new 
challenges,36 while the long-lasting shortcomings of regulation in the Greek 
information society are increasingly raised: ‘first, it is oriented towards regulating 
“static” situations; secondly, it is primarily concerned with the “material”, the 
“tangible” world, while more and more activities involve “intangible” goods and 
services’ (Greek Ministry of the Economy and Finance, 2002:76). These shortcomings 
hinder the regulator’s capacity in the information society (ibid) and the 2002 White 
Paper acknowledges the need for ‘new rules for the protection of data, the protection 
of privacy, the commercialization of material protected under intellectual property 
rights, etc’ (ibid), as well as the need for ‘citizens participation’ (ibid: 83).
Although regulation in the Greek information society covers a range of areas, it 
does so in an incomplete, partial and anti-social way. For instance, in 2001 official 
terminology in Greece had reportedly not accepted the term ‘cyber-crime’, whilst 
there was no specific and effective regulation for the prevention of online fraud 
(DDSI, 2001). The lack of legal terminology concerning cyber-security, on one hand, 
and the definitional gap for ‘web’ and ‘hacker’, on the other, indicate the legal 
deficiency. In addition, there have been huge delays and continuing disagreements in 
the country about what laws and fines to apply for the phenomenon of paedophilia on 
the Internet. The incomplete, static and quite rigid regulatory framework in the Greek 
information society constitutes a key challenge for Greek policy-makers and 
regulators, requiring further investigation.
The need for regulatory change is brought up by the OECD report on 
regulatory reform in Greece that interestingly points to instances of societal resistance 
to such change. The report argues about the need for more efficient regulatory reforms 
through more drastic political leadership, as ‘although most Greeks will benefit from 
regulatory reform, the resistance of many protected groups to needed change is hard to 
overcome’ (OECD, 2001: 2). The OECD recommends Greek civil service reform to 
support the establishment of an efficient and transparent regulatory system. It pays 
attention to existing administrative barriers (ibid: 2-3) and the tight state control of the 
economy and independent regulators since such control obstructs regulatory reform, 
maintains the old-fashion Command and Control regulatory model and deters the 
creation of a competitive telecommunications market in Greece (OECD, 2002b: 57). 
Thus, the OECD highlights the need for ‘structural change’ (ibid), underlining the 
criticism of other literature that the Greek public sector lags behind forward-looking 
ideologies and practices for promoting ICTs (Voulgaris and Sotiropoulos, 2002).
As regards policy-making, in 1995 the Greek government declared for the first 
time its intention to work towards developing the information society. The
36 The 2002 White Paper remarks: ‘technological convergence does not necessarily involve a 
“convergence of legislation”...’ (2002: 76).
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government addressed the technological delays by emphasising the lack of sufficient 
infrastructure. It thus aimed to limit the technological gap with other European 
countries, while neglecting the social and cultural implications of the information 
society (Constantelou, 2001). Such policy practices entailed that the authorities of the 
country failed to address questions about how policy and decision-making in general 
could handle the cultural specificities of Greek society and fight long-standing 
historical legacies, as shown later. The need to advance institutional change in order 
for society’s culture to be addressed was partly recognised in the 1999 White Paper: 
‘the changes that technology brings with it question the adequacy of existing laws and 
impose their re-orientation from the institutions for the industrial society to those of 
the Information Society’ (Greek Ministry of the Economy and Finance, 1999: 8). On 
the other hand, the Operational Programme Information Society (OPIS)37 launched in 
2001 and which ended in 2006 had a top-down character and illustrated that policy­
makers in Greece have aimed to encourage the diffusion of ICTs without touching on 
societal issues and cultural influences on technology adoption. Thus, initiatives taken 
by the OPIS promoted short-sighted public administration strategies and entailed the 
empowerment of well-established socio-political identities in the country.
The failures of traditional state-driven policies in the Greek information society 
become obvious from development indicators such as the investor interest indicator. 
According to the OECD (2000b), the ICT sector’s percentage of total capital 
investment in Greece was very small in 2000 -  only about 8% compared to countries 
with 20% such as Sweden, France, Austria, Germany, the UK and the Netherlands, to 
60% in Belgium and to 80% in the USA. This low level of investor interest in Greece 
is arguably ‘related to the lack of efficient policies on behalf of the State’ (DDSI, 2001: 
9). Likewise, private-driven initiatives have not managed to do well in Greece. Non­
governmental institutions and associated public funding have played a minimal role in 
development of the information society in Greece: ‘the number of non-government 
institutions is limited and the contribution of the latter to policy-making is 
minimal...public funding in Greece has been kept to a minimum of 0.5% of GDP 
annually, approximately four times less than the respective EU average’ (ibid).
The above shortcomings highlight the need for revised regulation and policy in 
the Greek information society. However, contrasting and conflicting interests among 
involved parties are currently obstructing realisation of such a need. The private sector 
of providers and networks requires the full exploitation of information, whereas public 
bodies and government initiatives aim for protection of the common good, 
fundamental rights and democratic principles. On the other hand, rules, regulations 
and policies must overall be discussed further with participants and elaborated by 
representative public bodies so that the relevant frameworks fit people’s needs better.
37 More information is available at www.infosoc.gr.
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Government, private sector and administrative/independent authorities are all needed 
in the decision-making process (PDGS, 1999).
3.2.5 Regulation in the Greek information society and divergence from the E U:failures 
and outcomes
As this section started with an overview of the Greek information society in the 
EU context, it is worth looking at how the national regulation responds to EU 
regulations and addresses key areas of concern in the field. This will allow the study to 
provide evidence about the traits of decision-making in Greece. In the following bullet 
points, the OECD report on regulatory reform in Greece (2002b: 56) points out such 
evidence:
■ delays in meeting the requirements of EC derogation;
■ considerable delays in implementing the necessary regulatory framework and lack of 
essential safeguards;
■ a lack of expertise within the independent regulatory authority;
■ a lack of advanced telecommunication services;
■ a lack of an alternate infrastructure;
■ discriminatory licence allocation for fixed wireless access; and
■ relatively far behind in telecommunication market development compared to EU 
partners.
I now discuss some of these points, emphasising Greece’s delays in 
implementing EU regulation and the lack of essential safeguards.
T he im p lem en ta tion  o f  E U  regu la tion
CARR research touches upon EU regulation of telecommunications and early 
accounts (Thatcher, 2001) argue that a broad consensus has been achieved between the 
EC and national authorities on the key principles and actions of EU regulation on 
telecommunications. Such accounts argue that even minor disagreements between 
national and European authorities more concerned issues of timing and procedures 
than substantive matters of regulatory strategy (ibid: 2). Nevertheless, Greece has 
become subject not only to delays in the transposition and implementation of EU 
regulation but also to governmental inactivity and reaction to the overall EU regulatory 
dictate.
In the implementation of EU Electronic Communications Regulatory Package, 
the 9th report of the European Commission in 2003 states there were major 
divergences of transposition in most EU member states in key areas of concern to the 
new regulatory package (EC, 2003:3). The report expresses concerns about delays and
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inconsistencies in implementation of the regulatory package in most member states, 
including Greece: ‘The national measures (and drafts in the case of member states that 
have not yet transposed)... give rise to some concerns that the Commission considers 
should be addressed if the objectives of the new framework are to be realized to the 
full’ (ibid: 5).
Later, the 10th EC report on implementation of the EU Electronic 
Communications Regulatory Package (EC, 2004a) announces the generally positive 
picture of notifications and legal measures taken in member states. Nevertheless, it 
notes that five countries -  Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece and 
Luxemburg -  had not transposed the framework one year after the deadline. As a 
result, the Commission launched infringement proceedings for non-notification and 
proceedings before the European Court of Justice against Belgium, Greece and 
Luxemburg (ibid: 9). The latest 11th EC report highlights the Greek case and states 
that Greece only adopted primary transposition measures in January 2006, stressing in 
addition that a lot needs to happen in Greece with respect to the transparency of 
public authorities and market autonomy (EC, 2006b: n).
The delayed and incomplete adoption of EU regulation raises the issue of 
divergence across the EU and questions concerning the possible usefulness of the 
principles of mediation and subsidiarity briefly discussed in Chapter 2 (Carozza, 2003; 
Endo, 2001; Fisher and Schley, 2000; Geveke, 2003).38 The case of Greece is 
nevertheless particularly challenging for European telecommunications regulation.
In te rn e t  regu la tion  in  G reece: failu res and  concerns
Besides Greece’s formal regulatory delays and structural difficulties, EU 
documentation illustrates the inefficiency of regulatory frameworks in the Greek 
information society. This concerns evidence about socially-driven Internet indicators 
such as low awareness and lack of security among Greek Internet users.
Public awareness in shortage in Greece
Internet regulation is expected to take action and set rules in order for public 
awareness of Internet risks to increase.
According to the Eurobarometer survey (EC, 2006a), Greek parents (8%) are 
the least likely after Hungarian parents (5%) in the EU-25 to set rules when their 
children use the Internet. Although Greece has a higher percentage (60%) of rules set 
by parents on their children’s media use than other European countries (57%), these 
rules mostly concern traditional media forms. For instance, 49% of Greek parents and
38 The European Council (2004) confirmed that more monitoring is needed. The question is whether 
the EU needs to extend the infringement proceedings or should reinforce subsidiarity and mediation 
processes through, for instance, National Regulatory Authorities.
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only 41% of parents in the EU-25 have expressed intense worries and set rules for 
television (ibid).
In addition, Greek parents (86%) are those with the strongest need for more 
information on how to protect their children from illegal or harmful Internet contents 
(44% of parents in the EU-25) (ibid). This shows that Greek parents are the least 
informed about the Internet in the EU, making further policy and regulation action a 
necessity.39 This is also illustrated by the fact that Greek parents have comparatively 
little awareness of where to report illegal Internet contents as 43% of Greek families 
are aware of where to report such contents compared to 52% in the EU-25 (ibid).40
Internet security andpublic fears
Another aspect of regulatory success is whether and to what extent regulation 
strengthens people’s sense of security and safety on the Internet.
The 2004 Eurobarometer survey (EC, 2004b) noted a general increase in 
security attacks and threats over the Internet in Europe (ibid: 9). Due to the rising 
attacks, Greece was, after Portugal, the country with the lowest percentage of Internet 
users who engaged in e-commerce in the first years of this decade. Whilst the EU 
average share of users purchasing items and services online was 35.6% in 2001, the 
respective percentage in Greece was 15% (EC, 2002: 13). Also, in 2000 and 2001 
Greece had the lowest number of secure servers among all EU member states (ibid: 9). 
The latest 2008 data (EU, 2008b: 20-21) confirm this picture since only 11% of the 
Greek population feel safe using the Internet for purchases (33% in the EU-27). This 
means that only 34% of those with Internet access at home in Greece make online 
purchases, whereas the respective average for the EU-27 is 56%.
Especially as regards minors, Greek regulation lacks sufficient provisions for 
minors to feel safe online. Greek legislation does not distinguish between illegal and 
harmful contents on the Internet, treating everything as illegal, especially in relation to 
the production and trading of harmful online contents. The only distinction refers to 
television (Presidential Decree 100/2000 introduces the EC Directive 2000 on 
‘Television without Frontiers’). Internet regulation in Greece can be characterised as 
opaque; there are a few laws that regulate the online environment but none stipulates 
content control and no provisions explicitly cover the protection of minors. This may 
either entail or reinforce pre-existing public fears about risks on the Internet, 
discouraging Internet adoption and challenging the forces monitored and the results 
achieved by Internet regulation in the country.
39 On the other hand, the majority of people in North European countries do not feel the need for more 
information, pointing out an awareness gap between the North and South (EC, 2006a).
40 A greater information deficit lies in countries where children’s access to the Internet is low (ibid).
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In summary, this section provides insights into the argument that digital 
divides in Greece are more exacerbated than in the rest of Europe, especially in 
relation to Internet penetration. Also, it argues that the examination of digital divides 
in Greece can be facilitated by looking at technology adoption figures along with the 
exploration of the socio-cultural and decision-making landscape in the Greek 
information society. Especially with respect to the links between society’s culture and 
decision-making, the conclusion of the EC benchmarking report that ‘societal change 
takes more time. It requires organizational changes, a shift in mindsets, modernization 
of regulation, different consumer behaviour, and political decision’ (EC, 2002:18) is 
particularly applicable to the Greek case. This is illustrated in the following historical 
discussion of the Greek context.
j . j  History o f  Greek culture andpolitics: shaping digital divides?
The historically grounded discussion in this section aims to provide an overview 
of the main traits of the Greek context, touching in particular on socio-cultural and 
political vehicles of the Greek information society and the divides in it.
3.3.1 Greek culture andpolitics: weak civil society and clientelistic state-dependency
The historical context in which the Greek information society has developed is 
described in the following statement: ‘as a newly developed country, Greece has had to 
fight with several problems from the past, such as poor network infrastructure, 
inflexible bureaucratic structures, largely ineffective State apparatus and distortions in 
competition’ (DDSI, 2001:3). Yet this statement requires an in-depth examination of 
the socio-cultural and political trends of the contemporary history of Greece, 
accounting for the ways in which history has influenced digital divides in the country.
The epicentre of interest involves the historical conditions of ‘late-late’ 
industrialisation and early parliamentarianism in Greece. These conditions have led to 
social inertia and state-dependency and subsequently to a culture of clientelism, 
patronage networks, individualism and romanticism in the country. These historical 
elements have resulted in a particularly weak civil society and in a gigantic public 
administration that has distorted the market and discouraged technological 
development in Greece.
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‘L a te -la te ’ in d u stria lisa tio n  and  early  pa rliam en ta rian ism
In existing socio-historical accounts, Greece is seen as belonging neither to the 
capitalist centre of the West nor to the periphery of the under-developed South. 
Instead, Greece is considered part of the semi-periphery as it developed a premature 
Western-like type of democracy and an economy of the late-late development 
paradigm with industrialisation taking place after 1929 (Mouzelis, 1986).
On one hand, the premature development of parliamentary mechanisms was 
coupled with increasing urbanisation and a lack of industrialisation in the late 19th 
century. This drove the majority of urban population in Greece to increase the 
pressure to be absorbed in public bureaucracies and resulted in the creation of a 
gigantic, inflexible and ineffective public sector. On the other hand, the Greek 
economy faced delayed industrialisation, while the existence of light industry only 
drove the establishment of state-controlled institutions which suppressed the 
autonomous development of non-state economic actors. As a result, Greece diverged 
from the capitalist centre, performing unevenly under close state-control of the 
economy (ibid). Thus, Greece has been categorised as a ‘“late-late” industrialising 
capitalist society with early and persistent quasi-parliamentary politics’ (ibid: xiv); traits 
which allow me to bring up historical evidence in support of the particularities of the 
Greek information society.
In more analytical terms, Balkan countries like Greece were under the full 
control of the patrimonial Ottoman Empire until the 19th century and had never 
experienced absolutism as did other European societies. They obtained their 
independence in the 19th century, attempting to implement Western parliamentary 
settings. However, these settings were based on restricted popular participation and an 
authoritarian particularistic state which was controlled by a small number of land­
owning families Ctzakia’ in Greek), thus manipulating the electorate in both legal and 
illegal ways.
The transition to broader patterns of political participation was achieved 
gradually through the extension and transformation of political patronage networks at 
the turn of the 20th century (ibid: xviii). Towards the end of the 19th century and 
during the rise to power of Eleutherios Venizelos’ Liberal Party, the previously 
powerful land-owning families Ctzakia’) became politically weak, signalling the end of 
the oligarchic political monopoly of those families and the transition to post- 
oligarchism. In the same period, massive urbanisation allowed multitudinous urban 
middle classes to exert pressure and broaden the political system, while retaining the 
clientelistic characteristics of the oligarchical system and with no substantial 
industrialisation in place (ibid: 50).41 The broadening of political participation before
41 At the beginning of the last century, the public sector in Greece was larger than in more developed 
political systems in Western Europe (Mouzelis, 1986: 7-15).
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industrialisation and with the absence of an industrial proletariat resulted in the 
transition to mass politics without the presence of autonomous trade unions and 
working-class parties. As an outcome, the personalistic organisational forms of the 
oligarchic period prevailed, but by extending and centralising the traditional forms of 
clientelistic politics. Clientelism remained the key characteristic of Greek politics after 
the military coup of 1909 and during the 20th century,42 with previous clientelistic 
mechanisms becoming centralised through state expansion and the centralisation of 
the major political parties of that period (ibid: 39*45).
As regards the economy in the phase of the transition to more representative 
forms of political participation, industrialisation had not emerged as yet and thus its 
effects on the transition were weaker in Greece than in Western Europe (ibid: 3-7; 
Stavrianos, 1958:607). Greece established a ‘late-late’ industrialised economic system, 
achieving a degree of industrialisation only during the inter- and post-war years of the 
20th century (ibid: xiii-xiv). Even then, industrialisation was import-substitution, 
without the encouragement of dynamic export-production processes. This was because 
the well-established state apparatuses played an incorporative and leading role in the 
industrialisation process, controlling the action of trade unions and working-class 
organisations in a vertical way (ibid: 50-1). Working classes were under state control, 
lacked a dynamic of productivity, as well as autonomy in the political arena, and were 
subject to vertical/dependent relationships with the post-oligarchic incorporative state 
(ibid: 70) :43
The thesis is interested in looking at the influence of the above political and 
economic characteristics on technological development in Greece. The dominance of 
clientelistic and incorporative politics, and the emergence of ‘late-late’ import- 
substitution industrialisation in the country influenced technological development in a 
negative way. Industrial capital in Greece never managed to develop its own dynamic, 
being deeply dependent on a personalistic and clientelistic state. The dominance of 
patronage networks in the Greek political arena created an increasingly weak and 
passive civil society. The clientelistic relationships between the state and civil society, 
the late and state-controlled economic development, and the gigantic public 
administration made private business bodies and investors reluctant about promoting 
new technologies in the country:
...the emergence of the import-substitution difficulties of the 1950s, the slowdown in 
manufacturing investments on the one hand, and the more massive and aggressive popular demands 
for redistribution on the other made private investors increasingly reluctant to involve themselves 
in technologically more complex and economically less certain industrial ventures (ibid: 175X
42 Clientelistic mechanisms have been persistent in other Mediterranean countries as well. A detailed 
analysis of Mediterranean countries is offered by Gellner and Waterbury, 1977.
43 Tne Greek army played the role of an interest group, exercising political pressure within a highly 
heterogeneous ana weak civil society (Mouzelis, 1986: 97-183).
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C lien te lism  and  pa tro n ag e  netw orks: im plications fo r  social policies
At this point, it is worth discussing some of the above historical traits in 
relation to their effects on social policies and decision-making in the country.
The historical formation of the state, economy and society in contemporary 
Greece points to interdependencies, with patronage networks and clientelistic 
relations dominating peculiar interactions among the actors involved. More 
specifically, increasing urbanisation in the late 19 th century, the lack of industrialisation 
and premature development of parliamentary mechanisms all created early-established 
clientelistic relationships between the state and civil society. Society was selling its 
political value (votes) in order to gain a post in the tertiary sector, whilst the state was 
enhancing its political assets by creating a giant, inflexible public administration sector. 
The state aimed to take advantage of social dependency. It attempted to attract votes 
and enlarge its political capital by granting posts and establishing anti-developmental 
state mechanisms which prevented Greece from experiencing full and timely 
industrialisation and development (Mouzelis, 1995; Tsoukalas, 1977).
Greece witnessed an extreme form of ‘partitocracy’ since the loci of political 
partisanship and party clientelism undermined all institutional sub-systems and 
immobilised civil society (Mouzelis and Pagoulatos, 2002). Even in the post­
dictatorship period after 1974, the restoration of democracy carried with it the legacies 
of the past century. The highly personalistic and local baron-based clientelism of the 
past was transformed into a form of ‘bureaucratic clientelism’ (Lyrintzis, 1984), with 
trade unions being absent from the process of the restoration of democracy.44
On the other hand, clientelism significantly affected the state, preventing the 
development of a strong and professional public administration. The bargain between 
voters and political parties made the state subject to successive and frequent 
governmental changes, experiencing regular changes of the character of and human 
resources in the public administration. This state uncertainty resulted in a lack of 
professionalism, meritocracy, productivity and stability in the public sector, 
intensifying the ineffectiveness of the gigantic and unstable organising system of the 
public administration (Lyberaki and Tsakalatos, 2002). Therefore, social policy in 
Greece has been marked by a legacy of heavily politicised and centralised decision­
making and an impoverished administrative infrastructure, while lacking continuity, 
long-term planning and co-ordination (Venieris, 2003).
Bureaucracy and a lack of continuity in the public administration, coupled with 
civil servants’ sense of stagnation and lack of incentives, have restricted the policies 
and initiatives for technological development to so-called ‘hardware’ equipment. Also, 
there appears to be underinvestment in and an underestimation of cultural and social
44 This is in contrast to cases such as Spain where trade unions had an important role to play in the 
restoration of democracy (Zambarloukou, 1996).
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capital within the public administration as far as it concerns the aim of policies to 
promote technological development in the country.
Today, an increasing number of analysts, scholars and policy-makers recognise 
the need for structural change in Greece; change that will redraw the boundaries 
between the state and civil society (Patmesidou, 2000: 304). At the same time, it is 
broadly recognised that the above historical legacies, the continuous lack of socio­
political consensus and support, and the climate of political inertia all prevent the 
materialisation of such a change in contemporary Greece (Venieris, 2003).
C lien telism  and  individualism : im plications fo r  civil society
The legacy of the despotic Ottoman regime prevented the presence of 
intermediate groups between the state and ordinary people in Greece, constituting a 
tremendous impediment to the development of an active and autonomous civil society 
in the country. On the contrary, what emerged were state protected and corporatist 
civil associations subject to close state control and in accordance with well-established 
patronage networks (Davaki, 2001). In this respect, the continuous imbalance of 
institutional spheres, mostly through early partitocracy and intermeshed interests that 
controlled political and cultural spheres, has historically weakened the autonomy of 
Greek civil society (Mouzelis and Pagoulatos, 2002:13).
The notions of civil society and citizenship in Greece were also underdeveloped 
in the last century and seriously undermined in the post-war era. This is mostly due to 
the colonisation of most institutional spheres by the state and party system until 1974 
and to the emergence of economically powerful individuals after 1974.45 New 
institutional imbalances were created, and partitocratic and plutocratic elements were 
intensified through the competition of political parties and economically powerful 
elites for the control of civic actors (ibid). This has led to ‘the incorporative- 
clientelistic mode’, according to which civil society is determined by personalistic 
patron-client networks (Mouzelis, 1995), while it is driven by individualistic goals that 
ignore common social aims and interests (Sotiropoulos, 1996). Even today, civil society 
in Greece is weak and has a low stock of social capital and trust. Even though 
democracy has flourished in Greece since 1974, civic organisations have remained 
dependent on central state institutions with their massive emergence in the 1990s 
being a top-down political decision rather than a bottom-up process (Sotiropoulos and 
Karamagioli, 2006:19-20).
The lack of civic spirit and conscious social citizenship, coupled with 
incomplete industrialisation, reliance on family bonds and disassociation from social 
collective action, can explain the existence of social heterogeneity as well as the lack of 
collective culture in Greece (Petmesidou, 1996). The lack of horizontal civic action,
45 The IT market and industry is discussed in Section 3.3.2.
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independent society and voluntary organisations, as well as the close relationships 
between representatives of conservatism such as the church and the state have all 
discouraged awareness-raising in Greek society. By implication, the country is short of 
a culture of universalism and social citizenship. Values that rest on the family and kin 
are strong, social resistance to progressive change occurs and weak social participation 
in policy-making prevails (Venieris, 2003 & 1996; Petmesidou, ibid).
The conditions of social heterogeneity, clientelism and individualism have 
created an atmosphere of short-termism in the country which neglects the importance 
of social inclusion and social transformation. Thus, the country’s civil society has 
obtained cultural characteristics that influence new developments negatively. 
Indicative of these characteristics is what the literature points out as a tremendous 
difficulty of Greek society in adopting and incorporating new ways of living and doing 
(Voulgaris and Sotiropoulos, 2002). As an outcome, what has been gradually 
established in Greek society is an identity of reaction and negativism to technological 
and not only developments, making it difficult for people in Greece to absorb new 
technologies and incorporate them in their everyday lives. This is why Greek society 
has been stamped as a largely non-receptive society where technological artefacts do 
not find the space to grow and spread.
R om antism  and  p a trio tism : im plications fo r  th e  in fo rm a tio n  society
The above historical review of politics and society in Greece clearly points to 
implications for the Greek information society. At this point, it is worth pointing out 
the role that patriotism and romanticism have played in the emergence of 
contradictions and imbalances in the Greek information society.
Patriotism and romanticism have marked Greece due to the existence of a 
national identity before any economic, political and cultural institutions were 
established in the country. The notions of patriotism and romanticism resulted in the 
formation of the ambivalent national identity o f ‘Greekness’. This identity has been 
marked by a feeling of superiority and has been accompanied by distrust of national 
institutions (Mouzelis, 1995). This identity, coupled with a pretty extrovert lifestyle, 
has driven people in Greece to the usage of technologies which allow showing-off and 
an improvement of their social profile. At the same time, more creative technologies 
and usages have been less popular in Greece as they are not considered to contribute 
to personal exposure and social acceptance.
The enthusiastic reception of mobile telephony in Greece is indicative, which 
contrasts Greek people’s reluctance to use ICTs, such as computers and the Internet. 
Mobile telephony and oral speech have been somewhat substitutes for the Internet in 
Greece, while in countries like the UK e-mail and written speech may be regarded as 
respective substitutes. Hence, Greece differs significantly from the Finnish
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information society model as this model was developed thanks to a strong and well- 
established national identity and to a collective civil spirit, as well as due to an overall 
positive attitude to technology (Castells and Himanen, 2002).
3.3.2 Economy and state-dependency in Greece: under-development o f the IT  sector
The historical discussion in this chapter contains three axes: society, politics 
and the economy. Thus, I will conclude the discussion by looking at issues concerning 
the state-dependency of the economic sector in Greece. These issues illustrate in 
particular how politics and the state-dependency of the economy have deprived the 
Greek information society of a dynamic IT sector that would allow market openness 
and the dissemination of IT products and services throughout society.
The market in Greece has been driven by state-dependency, particularly after 
the economic depression of 1929. The delayed industrialisation in the 1930s found the 
enormous state mechanisms to be well-established and dominant. This led the private 
economic sector to comply with the existing situation, pursuing the state’s protection 
for its benefit and without developing its own autonomous action (Lyberaki and 
Tsakalotos, 2002). Thus, clientelistic relations were also developed between economic 
actors and the public sector, with a number of economic actors being well-privileged 
and protected by the state (Mouzelis, 1986).
The economic interventionism of the state significantly determined the course 
of the market in Greece. The state created the economic infrastructure and controlled 
the economy through the establishment of specialised agencies and investment in a 
range of economic projects. This resulted in a significant economic crisis in the late 
1950s and early 1960s as the simple technologies used and the hothouse conditions in 
which the Greek economy was operating prevented the international competitiveness 
of national economic actors. The over-inflated service sector, the low-productivity jobs 
in the state bureaucracy and the low-efficiency agricultural sector entailed the 
mistaken management of resources and lack of modernisation in a costly and non­
competitive industry (ibid: 113-5).
The above are reflected in the IT sector. The IT sector in Greece has been and 
is still dominated by small firms that rely heavily on state funding and protection. This 
can possibly explain the inertia of the IT sector with respect to the delayed 
liberalisation of the IT market in Greece. The telecommunications market in Greece 
was only opened up in January 2001 as until that point the Hellenic 
Telecommunications Organisation (OTE) had a state monopoly (Anestopoulou and 
McKenna, 2001:1). On the other hand, the state did not take the necessary initiatives 
for digitisation of the public administration in time. Also, the small number of large IT 
companies in Greece has not been given the chance to develop internationally as the
80
introverted policy-making of Greek state authorities does not allow a move to 
synergies with international firms (Voulgaris and Sotiropoulos, 2002). In this way, 
businesses in the IT sector tend to be in line with current delays and deformity of 
Greek society and the public administration, being characterised by a limited and 
traditional way of thinking and doing, as well as by persistent state-dependency (ibid).
The OECD confirms the obstructive role of the state in development of the IT 
market in Greece. It stresses that, despite the achieved progress, ‘burdensome 
regulations through the whole of the Greek economy are still slowing structural 
adjustment and job creation, discouraging market entry and foreign investment, 
encouraging work in the informal sector and reducing public sector effectiveness’ 
(2001: 2). On the other hand, recent research has shown that the market sector in 
Greece is attempting to compensate for the lack of state-driven innovative initiatives 
and funding: ‘ICT companies had to look for alternative ways of funding, and at the 
same time press the State to adopt policies that would attract more foreign capital, 
both from the EU and overseas’ (DDSI, 2001: 8).
Nevertheless, these appear to be unique characteristics of the Greek case, 
raising critical questions of the efficiency of policy and regulation in the Greek 
information society as a whole.
3.4 Conclusion
In conclusion, digital divides appear to be more exacerbated in Greece than in 
the rest of Europe, with the majority of Greek people being Internet non-adopters. 
Also, the Greek case of digital divides challenges conventional discourses on aspects 
and forces of digital divides, illustrating the significance of viewing digital divides from 
a socio-cultural and decision-making perspective.
Greece stands historically in between the industrialised rich North and the 
poor developing South, being part of what is called the ‘semi-periphery’ (Mouzelis, 
1986). This politically and economically ‘hermaphrodite’ position has established rigid 
social-cultures and led to a history of disproportional development and integration of 
new technologies in Greek society. Along and due to this disproportional 
development, Sarikakis and Terzis (2000) argue that a knowledge gap is evident, with 
the big majority of Greek citizens being excluded as new media users. Still, although 
Greece is attempting today to make a successful transition to the new liberalised 
information society, it has well-established cultural and long-standing political and 
regulatory frameworks. In this sense, it is an interesting case study for researchers who
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wish to draw conclusions about the body of countries that confront similar transitions, 
as well as about the role of society’s culture and decision-making.
The thesis seeks to examine empirically if and the ways in which the socio­
cultural and political legacies of the past can be argued to be the forces shaping digital 
divides in the Greek information society. Chapter 4 aims precisely to illustrate how 
this empirical examination will be pursued through insightful and multi-layered 
research design. This research design and the empirical examination of elite actors’ and 
ordinary people’s views that cover the remainder of the thesis thus attempt to 
convincingly answer the research question concerning the relationship between 
society’s culture and decision-making and its role in shaping digital divides in Greece.
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4 - Methodology and Research Design
4.1 Chapter overview
This chapter outlines the methodology and mixed three-step research design of 
the thesis, while also indicating how the methodology relates to the overall conceptual 
framework. Section 4.2 presents the methodology’s main elements and how the 
research questions are operationalised by employing qualitative and quantitative 
methods. Section 4.3 presents the in-depth qualitative interviews with elite actors in 
Greece. Section 4.4 presents the large-scale quantitative survey of Greek Internet 
users and non-users. Section 4.5 describes the follow-up focus groups with a small 
number of surveyed individuals. Section 4.6 discusses the administration issues 
involved in this three-staged empirical research and outlines the analytical framework 
for analysing the qualitative and quantitative data obtained. Section 4.7 summarises the 
main elements of the research design and how they inform the thesis through 
complementarity and elementary triangulation of the obtained findings. The chapter 
concludes by stating some possible methodological limitations.
4.2 Research design: m ixed methodology and operationalisation o f  
the research questions
The thesis attempts to explore Internet adoption in Greece from a socio­
cultural and decision-making perspective. To do so, it employs a three-staged mixed 
methodology: in-depth interviews with elite actors; a large-scale survey with Internet 
users and non-users; and, focus-groups with Internet users and non-users.
The use of multiple data sources, the type of methods to employ (e.g. mixed- 
method approach), the design of methods (e.g. sequential model) as well as the data 
analysis strategy (e.g. complementarity or cross-validation of findings) are all issues 
discussed by key methodological textbooks and reviews (Lobe et al., 2007). In any case, 
the methodological decisions made and overall research design employed are 
determined by the objectives of research, the quality and type of research subjects and 
the type of data that research aims to obtain.
In deciding which data collection methods could yield the information needed 
to answer the research questions of the thesis, I evaluated the points of distinction 
between qualitative and quantitative methods. Although the conventional distinction 
between qualitative and quantitative research appears to be clear-cut and simple, 
together these two methodological systems constitute a whole. They share the same 
goals of objectivity, reasoning and reduction of observations without losing
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information, while they have the potential to be employed in the same research as ‘a 
continuum’ (Alasuutari, 1995). W hat distinguishes these two methodological systems is 
the processual, analytical and interpretative means of exploring the subject matter of 
research: quantitative research is based on numbers and statistical testing of causal 
relationships in order to conclude about the study population as a whole; in qualitative 
research, the collected data are considered a totality and no inference is made about 
objects lying outside the study.
For the purposes of this research, I consider that both qualitative and 
quantitative methods are valuable for exploring the research questions: ‘Quantitative 
methods focus inquiry on a discrete set of variables to address a specific research 
question or hypothesis. Qualitative inquiry opens up the field of investigation by 
recognising the broader but interconnected complexities of a situation’ (Lobe et al., 
2007:15). In this sense, I believe that qualitative research can have a dual role in the 
thesis: first, it can provide an overview of the issues the research subjects consider 
important for the topic under examination, without imposing a certain list of issues for 
consideration (e.g. the in-depth interviews with elite actors); second, qualitative 
research can provide a qualitative insight into patterns of issues, attitudes and 
behaviours which quantitative research has marked as prominent (e.g. the focus groups 
of Internet users and non-users). In this respect, the recommendation is indicative that 
a ‘qualitative approach is best...when you want to grasp the meanings, motives, reasons, 
patterns, etc, usually unnoticed in standardised approaches’ (Lobe, et al., 2008:6). On 
the other hand, quantitative research is useful in the thesis as it allows a generalisation 
of findings and hypothesis testing, while identifying patterns of opinions, behaviours 
and attitudes in the studied population (e.g. the survey of Internet users and non­
users).
A mixed-methodology design is applied in the present research in order to 
obtain insights into the issue of digital divides from more than one perspective, 
comparing and cross-validating the obtained data. This strategy is suggested in 
opposition to a one-stage and single methodological approach because the research 
questions point methodologically to designing both a bottom-up (ordinary people) and 
top-down (elite actors) account of digital divides; an account where population 
patterns of attitudes and behaviour will be jointly considered within contextual 
parameters and meaning construction processes. In this sense, the thesis moves away 
from arguments that separate the ‘ecologically valid, interpretative techniques’and the 
‘more experimental, quantitative or supposedly “scientific” methods’ (Lunt and 
Livingstone, 1996: 4).
Regardless of the risk of placing a different weight on different methods and 
thus reaching inconsistent conclusions, the thesis’ goal is to obtain rich insights into 
digital divides in Greece. This will be achieved by complementing each type of data
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with another and using ‘each approach in relation to a different research problem or 
different aspect of a research problem’ (Brannen, 1992: 12). I will also make an 
elementary attempt to triangulate all three types of data, aiming at what Denzin (1978: 
291-305) named methodological triangulation as a between-method approach. Despite 
claims that triangulation cannot be considered unproblematic (Bryman, 1992: 63), it 
can provide an increased validity of data (Bryman, 2000:134) and ‘more detail, multi­
layered and multi-dimensional perspectives of the phenomenon under stud/ (Kopinak, 
1 9 9 9 : 1 7 0 .
Nevertheless, this mixed-methodology design does not fall within any of the 
design categories described in the literature (Lobe, et al., 2007:15-16) as it does not 
employ two methods and two stages of data collection. Instead, it employs three 
methods in a three-staged data collection process. Specifically, the study’s three-step 
research design has the following components.
4.2.1 In-depth interviews with elite actors
The first phase of the empirical research started in 2005 and constituted in- 
depth interviews with 12 key actors in Greece. These were subjects involved in the 
domains of policy-making, regulation, industry, research and civic action in the Greek 
information society. The interviews were conducted in Athens, were face-to-face and 
translated into English.
The elite actor interviews sought to allow key actors in the field to point out 
issues of interest to the research of digital divides, without being predisposed to 
specific matters as in the case of a closed quantitative survey. This methodological 
decision was also in line with the thesis’ aim to explore digital divides not by looking at 
numbers of diffusion but by explaining such numbers and accounting for phenomena 
of socio-cultural and political relevance; phenomena which can more easily be traced 
through qualitative methods of research.
The goal was to provide an overview of the Greek information society and the 
forces driving digital divides in Greece so as to enable more focused research. The 
interviews explored the main factors influencing Internet adoption and the processes 
through which Internet policy and regulation take place in Greece. They emphasised 
socio-cultural trends and policies or regulations which touch upon social concerns 
about the Internet. Hence, the first phase of the research qualitatively explored the 
ways elite actors in the Greek information society perceive Internet policy and 
regulation, their contentions about the spirit dominating decision-making and their 
arguments about the dialogue between ordinary people and their culture with decision­
making practices in the field. Especially in relation to the dialogue between society’s 
culture and decision-making in the Greek information society, the emphasis was
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placed on the role socio-cultural traits play in shaping the mindsets and practices of 
decision-makers in Greece and on decision-makers’ responses to such traits and trends.
The collected interview data were coded and analysed in a systematic way by 
conducting computer-assisted thematic analysis with the software package ATLAS/ti. 
This computer package is useful for the thematic analysis of texts (see Section 4.6.1) 
and, by operationalising the functions it offers, the analysis in this phase paved the way 
for the next phase where ordinary people’s arguments were at the centre.
4.2.2 Survey o f individuals
A survey of a representative sample of Internet users and non-users was 
conducted between 20 April 2006 and 31 January 2007. A survey design based on the 
research objectives, the theoretical framework of the thesis and a series of research 
hypotheses was employed to explore the main forces influencing digital divides in 
Greece. The questionnaire was administered by telephone and the Greater Area of 
Athens (Attica) comprised the survey area for reasons explained later.
The survey sample had the following characteristics:
• males & females;
• aged 15-85 years; and
• permanent residents of Attica.
The decision on a large-scale survey to follow the elite actors’ interviews was 
made on the grounds of the need: first, to review how ordinary people in Greece 
evaluate the issues raised by the elite actors; second, to trace other important issues 
and obtain findings which could be generalised to the whole study population; and, 
third to pave the way for a further qualitative examination of the obtained findings so 
as to allow an attempt at a comparison and cross-validation of the findings. Thus, the 
survey can trace behaviour patterns, measurable opinions and most importantly 
attitudes to the Internet in Greek society. Also, it can shed light on social awareness 
and evaluations of policies and regulations in the field.
The survey data were analysed quantitatively with the SPSS software. SPSS 
allows regression, factor analysis and other statistical techniques to be employed and it 
was used on the basis of careful thinking of the structure and types of questions 
addressed in the questionnaire and in accordance with the study’s aims (see Section 
4.6.2). The survey findings were then elaborated qualitatively through the focus groups.
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4 . 2 Follow-up focus groups ofsurveyed individuals
Follow-up focus groups of a sub-sample of surveyed individuals were conducted 
in the first week of September 2007. They were conducted in Athens, were face-to- 
face and translated into English.
The focus groups with ordinary people aimed to reflect on the survey findings, 
reviewing and enriching them with qualitative meanings (i.e. a complementary method 
to the survey). They also aimed to allow comparisons with the findings obtained in the 
elite actors’ interviews, cross-validating all three types of data and showing a possible 
application of methodological triangulation. Dismissing the view that qualitative 
should precede quantitative research (Bryman, 1984:84), I argue that the focus groups 
allow the thesis to explore the consistency and quality of the survey findings, 
qualitatively researching the part that society’s culture as well as policy and regulation 
play in ordinary people’s decisions to adopt the Internet or not.
In this phase, qualitative indicators were weighted more so that an in-depth 
understanding of digital divides in Greece could be gained. The data collected in this 
phase were consistently analysed in conjunction with what the elite actors argued in 
the first phase of the research and what the quantitative examination of the issues at 
stake indicated. Thus, the focus groups answered the thesis’ key research questions, 
particularly with respect to possible interconnections between society’s culture and 
decision-making when accounting for digital divides in Greece. The data analysis 
method I applied was two-layered thematic analysis (see Section 4.6.1).
4.2.4 Operationalising the research questions
The principal research questions introduced in Chapter 1 were narrowed down 
at the end of Chapter 2 as a series of research questions. This chapter operationalises 
the research questions in sub-questions which are to be explored in one or more of the 
three phases of empirical research presented briefly above. An exception is the first 
principal research question W hat are the general characteristics of the Greek information 
society?) which introduces the Greek information society and there is no need to 
narrow down its focus. This first principal question is only examined in the elite actors’ 
interviews as these interviews provide an overview of the Greek information society. 
As shown in Table 4-1, the other principal research questions (2,3,4 in the ‘Principal 
Research Questions’ column) were articulated in more specific terms at the end of 
Chapter 2 as three research questions that fit the conceptual framework of the study 
(2, 3, 4 in the ‘Research Questions’ column). In order to empirically examine these 
three research questions, I break them down further into a series of operationalised 
questions (‘Operationalisation of the Research Questions’ column): three
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operationalised questions for research question 2; three operationalised questions for 
research question 3; and two operationalised questions for research question 4.
The number of operationalised questions per research question was determined 
by the concepts and issues involved in each research question. Also, the level of detail 
required by the operationalised questions determined whether these questions would 
be examined in the elite actors’ interviews only (i.e. where only a general insight was 
needed) or in all three phases of empirical research (i.e. where a more detailed and 
multi-sided account of the issues at stake should be obtained).
Table 4-1: Operationalisation of the research questions and empirical research
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everyday life settings of Greek 
people influence digital 
divides in Greece and in what 
ways?______________________
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4*3 Phase i: in-depth interviews with elite actors
This section discusses the individual interviews with elite actors in the Greek 
information society. Section 4.3.1 presents sampling issues and the themes covered by 
the interviews. Section 4.3.2 discusses the connections with the conceptual framework 
and the other methodological elements of the thesis while drawing on the strengths 
and weaknesses of such qualitative research.
43.1 Sampling and thematic guides
The sampling procedure in the in-depth semi-structured elite actors interviews 
was based on the principle that the number of necessary subjects depends on the 
study’s purpose, as ‘new interviews might be conducted until a point of saturation...in 
current interview studies, the number of interviews tend to be around i5±io’ (Kvale, 
1996:102).
I conducted 12 interviews. The number of 12 interviews may be considered 
sufficient to enable the study to trace themes and factors at work, encouraging the 
understanding, contextualisation and initial mapping of digital divides in Greece. 
Nevertheless, this number allows an insightful understanding of the issues at stake as 
long as the sample is rationally selected. Although small-scale free-style interviewing is 
not necessary to include representativeness, I attempted to achieve a good spread of 
respondent characteristics so as to cover the main spectrum of key actors in the Greek 
information society.
Specifically, the interviewees were selected after making a list of key policy, 
regulatory, market, civic and research bodies in Greece. Members of those bodies who 
play a relevant role concerning the subject matter of the research were contacted and, 
after a first round of telephone communication, 12 of them were selected. The first 
cycle of interviews took place in April 2005, consisting of eight interviews with policy 
makers, regulators, researchers and market players in Greece. The second cycle of four 
interviews took place in September 2005, thus completing the series of 12 interviews. 
All 12 interviews were conducted after a consent form (Appendix 4-1) had been signed, 
confirming the confidentiality of the interviews.
The interviews were categorised according to the study’s conceptual 
framework and on the basis of the professional status of each interviewee. Thus, the 
study resulted in three interview perspectives, each being addressed by a separate 
thematic guide (Appendix 4-2),46 and with each interviewee discussing issues derived 
from one interview perspective. Table 4-2 below presents the names, expertise and
46 The thematic guides allowed some other areas of interest to be brought up.
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domain of activity of the 12 interviewees, while it categorises its members in the three 
interview perspectives.







Vassileios Asimakopoulos (VA), Special Secretary, 
Operational Program Information Society (OPIS) 0 —1 1Manoussos Voloudakis (MV), President of the 
National Committee for Electronic Commerce & 
General Secretary of Commerce 0
Costas Balictsis (CB), Director of 
Telecommunications, Hellenic Republic National 
Telecommunications aiul Post Commission (EETD
0







Dr. lng. Veronica Samara (VS), SafeNetliome 
Project (Safer Internet Action Plan) 0
Associate Professor Gregory Yovanof (GV). Head of 
Broadband Wireless & Sensor Networks at the Athens 
Information Technology Institute (A II) 0






Nicos Vassilakos (NV), President of the Association 
of Cireek internet Users (EEXI)
0
ldena Spyropoulou (ES), legal Consultant of EEXI 0 1Nikos Frydas (NF), President of SA FEN EX (the 
Hellenic self regulation body) and SAFEL1NE (the 
Hellenic Hotline) 0
Athena Bourka (AB), Auditor, Hellenic Data 






Sophia Parissi (SP), Officer of the Federation of 
Hellenic Information Technology & (Communications 
Enterprises (SEPE) and Product Manager of 
FORTlInet (second largest ISP in Greece)
0
I 1
The interviews had three types: scoping, bottom-up and theory-driven. For the
scoping interviews, which emphasise the scope and focus of the research, four
interviewees from the broader policy and regulation domain were selected. All four
interviewees were in a position to report on the Greek information society, while
representing decision-making authorities within and outside the country. For the
bottom-up interviews, which emphasise issues that derive from the web of social
actors, three interviewees were selected. All three interviewees were associated with
Greek society in general and with the community of Greek Internet users in particular,
thus reporting on digital divides due to their grassroots links. For the interviews led by
theory, which emphasise issues deriving from the literature, five interviewees were
selected. All five interviewees were working on research areas that relate to the
benefits, risks and implications of Internet adoption and the ways Greek society
perceives them. This category of interviews challenges issues of access and brings to
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the fore the critical importance of the interdependencies between cultural and political 
forces in the shaping of digital divides in Greece.
These 12 interviewees cover the field of experts in the Greek information 
society, whilst their classification in three interview perspectives allows an examination 
of all issues of interest from more than one angle. The interviewees’ expertise enables 
the research to address power relations as well as to articulate a complex account of 
the socio-cultural, policy and regulatory forces influencing digital divides in Greece. 
Although a series of difficulties was encountered during the sample selection process 
(e.g. restricted access to key actors in the field; imbalances in the profile of the 
interviewees as only one representative of the market was interviewed etc), I argue that 
the sample represents multiple areas of activity and different approaches to the current 
status of the Greek information society. Thus, this first phase of the empirical research 
paves the way for the second and most ambitious component of the research design, 
the large-scale survey discussed in Section 4.4.
4.3.2 Connection with the conceptual framework and other elements ofmethodology
From a methodological point of view, interviewing has the potential to 
operationalise a number of concepts and topics. The choice of individual interviews is 
grounded in the axiom that single cases can facilitate the exploration of the 
relationship of a specific behaviour to its context (Kvale, 1996: 103), namely of the 
individual and the socially constructed reality. Also, the employment of a loosely- 
structured thematic guide, where no standard techniques or rules apply, has the 
advantage of‘openness’, allowing new issues or concepts to be raised and leading the 
researcher to new paths of analysis (Gaskell, 2000).
The aim of the elite actors’ interviews was to map out the field by tracing the 
major factors that influence the Greek information society in general and Internet 
adoption in particular. Because of the broad scope of the interviews, certain selectivity 
was necessary, thus prioritising the themes and issues already raised in the literature 
and other research. At the same time, this broadness helped the thesis map out the 
field, spanning all research questions (see Table 4-1) and pointing to the themes and 
issues for investigation in the next two phases of the empirical research.
Emphasis was given to the role of society’s culture, as well as how policy and 
regulation respond to society’s views about the Internet. In this sense, the elite actors’ 
understanding of the ways the Internet is integrated into ordinary people’s lives within 
the socio-cultural and policy context of Greece was explored throughout the first 
phase of the research. For the purposes of the research, of particular interest were the 
views of policy-makers and regulators about the ways socio-cultural traits influence the
9i
mindsets and practices of decision-makers in Greece and the ways decision-makers 
respond to such socio-cultural traits.
Nevertheless, the above thematic rationale cannot entirely make up for the 
drawbacks identified in the design of this qualitative research; drawbacks somehow 
inherent in qualitative methodology in general. By interviewing a diverse sample of 
experts, a lack of focus was brought about, to some extent preventing appropriate 
contextualisation of the interviewees' arguments. This lack of focus in turn restricted 
the in-depth analysis of those arguments, allowing the study to merely scratch the 
surface of issues of the research. The next two stages of empirical research aim to 
address these weaknesses by carrying out a more focused and detailed investigation of 
the macro-level findings obtained in the elite actors’ interviews.
4.4 Phase 2: Survey ofordinary people
This section presents the design of the large-scale survey of Internet users and 
non-users in Greece. Section 4.4.1 discusses the criteria determining the selection of a 
telephone survey as an appropriate data collection method. Section 4.4.2 presents the 
survey sample and relevant sampling procedures. Section 4.4.3 discusses the survey 
questionnaire design in light of the research objectives. Section 4.4.4 presents the links 
with the conceptual framework and the thesis’ other methodological elements.
4.4.1 Telephone survey and other data collection methods
Initially, self-completion was selected as the survey data collection method. 
However, after discussions with experts at the National Statistical Service of Greece 
(ESYE) I was advised not to use a self-completion questionnaire. Previous experience 
has shown that response rates in self-administered surveys are particularly low in 
Greece, preventing reliable and representative findings from being obtained.
In light of this risk, I decided that a telephone survey was the appropriate 
method. This decision was made on the grounds of the following administrative, 
sampling and data quality considerations (Frey, 1989):
■ Pragmatic limitations imposed by time, resources and equipment favoured the 
selection of the telephone method. Telephone interviewing is comparatively the 
most cost- and time-efficient data collection method, being appropriate for an 
individual project like this. This is so because mail surveys are cost-efficient only and 
face-to-face surveys require extremely large budgets.
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■ In sampling terms, the telephone method ensured that the critical mass of the Greek 
population residing in the region of Attica would be included in the sample frame, as 
only 2-3%, of the population do not have a landline in Greece. Also, the big majority 
of the Greek population still lists their telephones in public telephone directories. 
Finally, the problem of double-listed telephones was overcome as the telephone and 
address contacts were drawn from the latest population database of the ESYE and 
matched with the most recently updated regional telephone catalogue.
■ Telephone interviewing is more effective than mail surveying in producing high 
response rates,47 especially when also sampling within households (Frey, 1989:58-9). 
Given that the thesis aimed to achieve a response rate of between 70-75%, only 
telephone and face-to-face strategies could be considered.48 Although face-to-face 
interviews usually bring higher response rates than telephone interviews, some 
studies report similar rates (Groves and Kahn, 1979). For the present research, a pre­
interview letter (Appendix 4-3) introducing the research was posted to the desired 
sample to encourage higher response rates. Also, the geographical scope, the urban 
area of Attica, was a means to minimise response biases stemming from low response 
rates as telephone interviewing works better in urban than in suburban and rural 
areas (Fowler, 1993: 60).
■ In terms of data quality, telephone interviewing has a comparative advantage as data 
collection can be easily controlled by the researcher, reducing distortion from the 
interviewer’s performance (Frey, 1989:62-4). On the other hand, a telephone survey 
is more likely than a self-completion questionnaire to produce socially desirable 
answers (Fowler, 1993: 58-9). Aiming to improve data quality, the study employed 
Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) software. In general, CATI 
allows timesaving, ease of question management and rapid data compilation, while it 
enables the identification of any inconsistent data, increasing data quality (Frey, 
1989: 68; ibid: 62-4).
As Table 4-3 shows, the telephone method has strengths and weaknesses, 
requiring a careful and well-planned design. In Frey’s words (ibid: 75): ‘...there have 
been a considerable number of improvements in sampling procedures, questionnaire 
design, and administrative practice for telephone surveys...’ reinforcing the 
appropriateness of this method for the thesis.
47 The response rate is the number of completions compared to the number of potential respondents 
including eligible and excluding non-eligible and reachable respondents. The refusal rate is the 
proportion of eligible respondents contacted who declined to be interviewed (Frey, 1989: 50-3).
48 Tne response rate is an important indicator as low response rates introduce response bias which might 
differentiate the characteristics of the initial sample, questioning the credibility of the findings.
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Table 4-3: Advantages and disadvantages of telephone survey
Lower costs than face-to-face 
interviews
Sampling omitting those without telephone
Random Digit Dialing (RDD) 
sampling of general population
Nonresponse associated with RRD.
Sampling is higher than in face-to-face 
interviews
Easier access to certain populations 
-  compared to face-to-face 
interviews
Questionnaire or measurement constraints 
(limits on response categories, on use of visual 
aides & on interviewer observations)
Shorter data collection periods Less appropriate for personal or sensitive 
questions if no prior contact
Advantages of interviewer 
administration -  compared to mail 
surveys
Interviewer staffing and 
management easier than with face- 
to-face interviews
Better response rate compared to 
mail surveys
4.4.2 Sampling design: a two-stage probability sample
One critical aspect of survey design is sampling. In telephone surveys, sampling 
depends on whether probability-sampling procedures are implemented and available 
lists or telephone directories are used instead of Random Digit Dialling (RDD).
Sam pling from  a population list and telephone directory
The respondent selection in the thesis was primarily based on the latest 
population list of the ESYE. The selected telephone numbers were matched with the 
latest publicly available telephone directory for the Attica region.49 The aim was to 
collect from a final number of 1,000 questionnaires from eligible members of sampled 
households.50
This procedure allowed the study to encounter the problem of duplicate listings 
when population lists are used (Frey, 1989: 82-3). The ESYE population list meets 
satisfactory population coverage as it is updated twice a year. Through matching 
household names, postal addresses and phone numbers with the latest telephone 
directory, the study is able to discover unlisted numbers. However, this procedure does 
not keep track of the latest phone number changes. Also, under-coverage in telephone 
directories51 and the exclusion of households with frequent mobility are limitations 
which cannot be addressed by such a procedure.
49 In this way, even if the list is not fully updated we can obtain the missing numbers through a 
telephone directory. This strategy can also solve problems such as double-recorded numbers.
50 Tne sample size is determined by confidence intervals (ibid: 92), and the sampling error estimates can 
be reduced by multiplying them with the value i-f, where f=the fraction of the population included in a 
sample (Fowler, 1993 33-5I.
51 RDD is not suggested for this survey as it is problematic for sampling within small areas where 
telephone exchanges do not correspond to area boundaries (ibid: 23-40).
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The regional limitation of Attica can be justified in pragmatic and 
epistemological terms. On one hand, an individual project often cannot reach a 
nationally dispersed sample for time and money limitations. On the other, the survey’s 
goals relate more to exploring ordinary people’s attitudes to the Internet and the 
respective decision-making mechanisms, rather than to measuring Internet 
penetration per se. Hence, the selection of the urban region of Attica where Internet 
penetration appears higher (25-35%) than in the rest of Greece (19-25%) allowed the 
study to obtain a sufficient number of completed questionnaires from users and to 
conduct a quantitatively sustainable data comparison for both groups of users and non­
users.
S ystem atic  sam pling and  sam pling e r ro r
The thesis applied systematic sampling as it is easily adjustable to local and 
regional samples (ibid: 87) and ensures the same precision as random sampling, while 
being less laborious and better organised. By using a population list consisting of 
households units and deciding about the sample size, the division of the latter by the 
former gives a fraction (i.e. 1,000/1,000,000 =1/1,000). This fraction determines the 
starting point of the randomised selection of a number (i.e. a number from 1 to 1,000). 
Given that, the sample selection proceeds by selecting every 1,000thhousehold on the 
list (Fowler, 1993:14-5).
Sample design affects sampling error.52 The first step is to calculate the error for 
a simple random sample and then to calculate the effects of any deviations from a 
simple random sampling design. Although RDD is perceived as producing lower error 
(ibid: 31-3), sampling error is part of the survey design where the sample frame, 
probability character and size of sample, along with the distribution of what is being 
estimated, matter (ibid: 35-6).
Sam pling -within households
A second stage of sampling took place within households where eligible 
respondents had to be identified. This is necessary in order for a probability sample to 
be created and every member of the study population to have a non-zero chance of 
being selected (Frey, 1989:105). When implementing sampling within households, two 
criteria were used:
a) Household over 15 years: this is a convention in most surveys where the general 
population is the target population.
b) The household member who had the last birthday: this is a probability technique 
where the ‘last/next birthday’ criterion is assigned randomly. This has the
52 Sampling error for random samples: the statistic of a standard error of a mean (a proportion) by 
calculating the variance of the statistic of proportion (the percentage of the sample that has a 
characteristic) and dividing it by the sample size (ibid: 28-9).
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advantage that ‘every member having an equal chance of selection, numbers are not 
wasted because every household has someone with a last (or next) birthday’ (ibid:
113).
Weighting procedures apply where a household contains more than one eligible 
member. Thus, a probability sample is ensured and no particular category of the study 
population is favoured, making the use of quotas unnecessary. At the same time, I did 
not select people with an intrinsic interest in the research. Hence, the target sample 
consisted of individuals aged over 15 and its spread equally covered the main socio­
economic and demographic categories of the population.53
Sam ple characteristics and w eighting factors
In order for the final sample to be representative of the regional population, the 
following weighting factors were applied in line with the real distribution of the 
population aged 15-85 years in Attica:
Table 4-4: Weighting factors
15-24 17%^ 9Vo 8%
2 5 -3 4 20% 10% 10%
35-44 _ 18% 9% 9%
45-54 16% 8% 8%
55-64 12% 6% 6%
6 5 -7 4 11% 5% 6%
- 6% 2% 4%Total 100% 49% 51%
This weighting aimed to remove demographic biases such as the over-coverage 
of females, the participation of a large number of people aged 25-39 an^ the a^ct t i^at 
very few people aged 65+ responded. Also, a larger sample of people with children and a 
more even distribution across all education levels was desirable. Thus, I measured and 
analysed the following weighted sample:
53 How socio-demographics affect Internet adoption is analysed in Chapters 6 & 7.
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25-39 34 3 0 .5
Age 40-64 37 36.2
65+ 10 16.2
None, or grades 1-8 5 6.4
High school incomplete 16 17-4
High school graduate 32 29.6
Education
Business, Technical, or vocational 
school 12 12.6
Some college, no 4-year degree 7 6.3
College graduate 21 20.8
Postgraduate training 5 54
Don't know/Refused to answer 1 i*5
Less than 10,000 euros 9 9-7
10,000 to under 29,999 euros 1 9 20.3
Family income* 30,000 to under 49,999 euros 3 3-250,000 to under 99,999 euros 0 0.4
100,000 or more euros 0 O.I
Don't know/Refused to answer 66.2
Children in the
Yes 52 53-3
No 4 " 44.9
household Don't know/Refused to answer 1 i-7
Total i°/o) 100 100
Base: N = i o o i , *Family income before taxes
• 61% of the respondents are females and 39% are males.
• 18% of the respondents are 15-24 years old, 34% are 25-39 years old, 37% are 40-64 
years old and 10% are 65+.
• 67% of the respondents refused to reveal their family income, 28% belong to the 
two lowest economic groups (under 29,999 euros in annual family income), whereas 
only five respondents stated that they annually earn more than 50,000 euros54.
• 5% of the respondents have either no education or up to primary education, 16% 
have not completed high school, 32% are high school graduates, 19% have finished 
some vocational school or college, 21% are university graduates, and 5% have 
received some postgraduate training.
• 52% of the respondents are in households with children and 47% are in households 
without children.
The response rate and how  to  reduce non-response
In contrast to sampling error, a high non-response can bias the sample
significantly (Fowler, 1993:39X55 Even response rates in the 60% to 75% range can have
54 It seems that the respondents considered the question about income quite sensitive, while nearly all 
who answered this question identified themselves with the lowest income groups.
97
important effects on sample estimates even if non-response is biased only modestly as 
some variance between the surveyed sample and the study population occurs.
The response rate anticipated in the study was between 70-75%. Estimating 
that 97-98% of the Greek population in Attica has a telephone, the best estimate of 
the percentage of the population represented in the sample was .97_.98 times the 
response rate for a telephone survey.56 With respect to enlisting co-operation, which is 
a second parameter affecting response rates, one should expect a high non-response 
rate from less educated and elderly people.
Although I do not know whether and how much the non-response is biased, I 
had to ensure a reasonable response rate. Therefore, the following strategies to reduce 
non-response were applied as an integral element of the survey design:57
a) Numerous calls; 5-6 calls at a minimum, concentrating on evenings and weekends.
b) An informative letter was sent in advance to inform and prepare the selected 
households about the survey (see Appendix 4-3).
c) Respondents were asked to become informed about the survey purposes before 
refusing to be interviewed. In the case of a final denial, another attempt was made 
whereby an adjusted refusal inversion introduction was used (see Appendix 4-4).
d) Respondents who initially refused to participate were contacted again at a later 
date. If the eligible respondent refused to be interviewed, an appointment for 
another day/time had to be pursued when an adjusted call back introduction was 
used (see Appendix 4-5).
e) The purposes of the survey were presented in the introduction of the questionnaire 
(see Appendix 4-6) and before the actual enlistment of co-operation of the eligible 
individual.
f) Skilful, communicative and experienced interviewers were employed. For this 
survey, one experienced interviewer and myself conducted the interviews.58
By following these strategies, I obtained a response rate close to 70% (67.4%), 
which is acceptable and sufficient for the thesis’ aims.
55 The response rate is the number of surveyed units divided by the number of sampled units. Units that 
are not finally selected (non-eligible) are not included (ibid: 39).
56 Numbers that do not work or do not serve residential units were excluded from the response rate.
51 Some of these strategies are suggested by Fowler (ibid: 44).
581 briefed the second interviewer during which time all questions were explained and all queries were 
answered through specific examples. Following the briefing, the interviewer conducted two real 
interviews and discussed them with me.
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4-4-3 Questionnaire design: the science and art o f design
T h e  science o f  questionnaire  design
A questionnaire has to conceptualise the research questions in the form of 
important factors, expected associations, patterns of behaviour, attitudes and opinions 
(Frey, 1989: 117). Therefore, the following steps proposed by Fowler (1993: 95) were 
taken when designing the questionnaire for the present study:
a) Definition of survey objectives', the survey explored the operationalised research 
questions (see Table 4-1) by setting a series of relevant hypotheses. The hypotheses 
tested in the survey were the following:
i Digital divides in Greece are highly associated with cultural and everyday 
settings of life (2c operationalised research question);
ii Digital divides in Greece are highly associated with Internet policy and 
regulation (3c operationalised research question);
iii People’s culture and everyday settings of life have a two-way interaction with 
Internet policies and regulations, which determines digital divides (4b 
operationalised research question).
b) Definition of questionnaire themes?9 the themes addressed by the questionnaire were 
closely related to the conceptual framework, the research questions and hypotheses 
of the study. The questionnaire explored the following three themes.
i Internet use and attitudes to the Internet in association with traditions and 
everyday settings of life (hypothesis i);
ii Internet use and attitudes to the Internet in association with the evaluation of 
EU and national Internet policy and regulation (hypothesis ii);
iii Evaluation of national and EU Internet policy and regulation in association 
with everyday settings of life (hypothesis iii).
c) A list of variables to be measured', indicators to be explored and respective variables to 
be measured are set at this point. In the present research, the three questionnaire 
themes were operationalised in a range of questionnaire topics60 which were in 
turn addressed by one or more variables.61 These variables were measured via four 
main types of questions: factual, opinion, attitude/opinion and 
awareness/knowledge.
59 The questionnaire and a script of instructions for the interviewers are provided in Appendix 4-7.
60 Examples of topics: patterns of Internet use; attitudes to the Internet in relation to everyday life; 
people’s evaluation of national and EU policy and regulatory schemes etc
1 Examples of variables: frequency of Internet use; activities on the Internet; reasons for non-use; the 
Internet as a threat to users' security; the Internet as a danger for social traditions; the accountability of 
national and EU authorities; the awareness of Greek authorities; awareness of laws and policies on the 
Internet etc.
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d) An analysis plan of how the variables are measured: at this point, it is important to 
define which variables are dependent, which are independent allowing the capture 
of distributions and patterns of association, and which are used as control or 
intervening variables to explain patterns and check competing hypotheses. 
Although certain alternatives in the treatment of the variables are always part of 
the analysis process, I already had a relatively good idea about the variable 
associations I wanted to test and the models I wished to run as part of multivariate 
statistical analysis. More information about the data analysis process is provided in 
Section 4.6.
T he  a r t  o f  questionna ire  design
Besides the questionnaire design process, the questionnaire was structured and 
worded so that it could secure the neutral character of the interviews and facilitate the 
respondents’ response task.
Introducing and ordering the questionnaire
As suggested for telephone interviews (ibid: 99), the questionnaire begins with 
an introduction and continues with warm-up questions, asking specific topics in the 
middle and closing with routine demographic questions (see Appendix 4-7). Regarding 
the question sequence,62 I grouped the questions in six thematic areas, some 
concerning Internet users, others concerning non-users and some posed to both 
groups. Also, I followed the general-to-specific question sequence in order to facilitate 
the response task (Frey, 1989:154). Finally, transitional statements were used to keep 
the conversational tone of the interviews and to help respondents follow the shift to 
new topics (ibid: 147).
Writing and wording o f  questions
Answers are meant to be good measures when the questionnaire) is carefully 
designed (Fowler, 1993: 69-70). In this respect, I made the following decisions:
a) Three types of questions were asked: knowledge, attitude/opinion and behaviour. 
The validity of data can be ensured with respect to questions that trace behaviours. 
The validity of those concerning subjective emotional states can be increased when 
examining correlations with other answers (ibid: 80)63.
b) The majority of questions were standardised and, in most cases, had up to five 
response categories. Closed questions allow the respondent to perform the 
response task more reliably and the researcher to analytically interpret the answers 
(ibid: 82-3).
62 The question sequence affects the response error. For more, see Frey, 1989:147-151.
63 The distribution of answers to a subjective question cannot be interpreted directly: it only has a 
meaning when differences between samples are compared (i.e. users and non-users) or when an 
association among answers to different questions are looked for (Fowler, 1993: 91-2).
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c) In terms of measurement, the majority of questions were ordinal. Nominal 
questions followed and only a few cases of interval-ratio questions were asked. This 
is because most questions measured behaviour or attitudes.
d) Finally, the questionnaire has: (i) conventions that differentiate the words the 
interviewer reads to respondents from the instructions; (2) instructions to skip 
questions; and (3) all the words that the interviewer has to read.
F ie ld  p re - te s t  o f  th e  questionnaire  an d  questionnaire  finalisa tion
The survey instruments were tested by interviewing 20-25 respondents. The 
subjectivity of the interviewer made the employment of one of the strategies broadly 
suggested necessary (ibid: 100-102). Specifically, I filled out a rating form on each 
question with respect to whether the question was easy to be read as worded, and 
whether respondents understood the question in a consistent way and answered it 
accurately.
After the pre-testing, a final evaluation and amendment of the survey 
instruments was carried out. After I approved the final version of the questionnaire, 
200 pilot interviews were conducted in the first 2 months of the data collection 
(20/04/-20/06-2006). This ensured the even flow of the questionnaire and that all 
questions were understood in the same way by all respondents.
4.4.4 Connection with the conceptual framework and other elements ofmethodology
The survey design was based on the findings obtained from the elite actors’ 
interviews and in tune with the thesis’ objectives. Although qualitative research is 
prominent in the field (Haddon, 2006: 8), some examples of surveys can be found in 
the domestication tradition, Belgian research on non-adoption (Punie, 1997) and on 
SMEs (Pierson, 2005). Also, complementarity and/or the triangulation of qualitative 
and quantitative methods are gaining increasing popularity among researchers, as also 
espoused in this thesis.
Implementation of the survey design delivered a quantitative analysis that 
provided a measurable picture of Internet users’ and non-users’ attitudes, emphasising 
the potential influence of socio-cultural and decision-making parameters. The survey 
espoused the two main, theory-driven, analysis angles: first, that looking at the forces 
affecting people’s decisions to adopt the Internet and their attitudes to the medium, 
focusing on the role of everyday life and resistance culture; second, the perspective of 
social awareness and evaluation of Internet policy and regulation in Greece.
In relation to these thematic foundations, the survey sample consisted of
Internet users and non-users. On one hand, users allow a picture of the limited
Internet adoption in Greece to be outlined and insightfully connected to the ways in
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which policy and regulation respond to users’ concerns about the Internet. On the 
other, non-users constitute the big majority of the Greek population, accounting for 
the influence of cultural traits as well as for the barriers to digital inclusion which 
policy and regulation aim to address.
Nevertheless, the survey offers a quantitative picture of patterns and forces of 
digital divides in Greece, lacking a qualitative evaluation of how these patterns and 
forces lie in complex socio-cultural and political contexts. Thus, the survey findings 
were enriched and reviewed by interviewing a small number of individuals in a focus 
group setting.
4.5 Phase j:  Follow-up focus group interviews
In the last phase of the research I conducted focus groups. Section 4.5.1 
examines the rationale of the research design, outlining the sample and thematic 
guides of the focus groups. Section 4.5.2 looks at how these interviews are connected 
to theory and the previous two methodological elements.
4.$. 1 Sampling and thematic guide 
Sam pling
Four focus groups were interviewed. The decision about the number of groups 
relied on the consideration that the study should be informed by at least more than 
one group of Internet users and non-users, while I drew on other examples of research 
and on practical matters concerning time and budget constraints. The rule of thumb 
that ‘one should continue to run new groups until the last group has nothing new to 
add’ (Lunt and Livingstone, 1996: 7) was also taken into consideration. Nevertheless, 
this rule is hardly applicable as each group has its own identity and new discourses can 
be articulated continuously, particularly when the study population is diverse and 
internally inconsistent.
The sample recruitment process was based on the second phase of research, 
when surveyed individuals were asked to give their consent to be interviewed at a later 
stage. Over 300 surveyed individuals gave their consent and some of them were 
randomly contacted by phone and asked to participate in the interviews. Thus, I 
selected 24 individuals to constitute four groups, namely six individuals per group. The 
four groups were equally divided between Internet users and non-users, being more or 
less proportionate to the percentage of users and non-users surveyed in the second 
phase.
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Regarding demographics, socio-demographic diversity was established. 
‘Internet usage’ was the only criterion of the sample selection and group formation, 
with each group consisting of either Internet users or non-users. No limitations were 
posed on the socio-demographics of the sample since collecting insights from different 
demographic categories of the population was one of the aims of the interviews. The 
sample’s socio-demographic characteristics are presented in the following table:
Table 4-6  Sample demographics
Stefanos 32 Male
Investment
analyst Single, no children
Myriam 2 ~ Female
Postgraduate
student Single, no children
Apostolos 44 Male Civil servant Married, one child
Agapi 35 Female Decorator Single, no children
Ioanna 72 Female Pensioner
Married, two 
children
Petros 19 Male Military service Single, no children
Antonios 44 Male Self-employed Married, one child
Eirini 3 2 Female Accountant Single, no children
Pantelis 25 Male
Postgraduate
student Single, no children
Anastasia 27 Female Teacher Single, no children
Kwnstantina 33 Female Administrator
Married, two 
children
Michalis 17 Male Student Single, no children
Antonia 33 Female Self-employed
Married, no 
children
Dimitrios 18 Male Student Single, no children
Maria 43 Female Housewife Married, 3 children
Konstantino
s 62 Male Plumber Married, 2 children
Andreas 5 0 Male Doctor Married, 1 child
Dionysia 36 Female Saleswoman Single, no children
Ioannis 25 Male Civil engineer Single, no children
Evangelia 29 Female Shop owner Single, no children
Anna 38 Female Teacher
Married, two 
children
Petros 39 Male Receptionist
Married, two 
children
Menios 42____ Male Waiter
Married, three 
children
The 6tn member of the group did not show up
Them atic guides
Two thematic guides were employed in the discussions with the groups of users 
and non-users (see Appendix 4-8). These guides aimed at a qualitative examination of 
the topics explored quantitatively in the survey and were based on the grounds set by 
the elite actors’ interviews.
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On one hand, the focus groups aimed to dig deeper into the survey conclusions 
concerning society’s culture and decision-making in relation to Internet adoption in 
Greece. In the focus groups, particular emphasis was placed on discourses concerning 
‘life circumstances’, ‘choice’, ‘priorities’ and ‘identity’ so as to contextualise, 
complement and cross-validate the complex web of factors that determine users’ and 
non-users’ attitudes to and practices on the Internet. The following questions occurred 
in the survey analysis and were examined further in the focus groups: what are the 
everyday culture parameters that determine users’ and non-users’ attitudes to and 
practices on the Internet, and why?; why are households with children less likely to 
adopt the Internet?; how do people understand the role of their age, education and 
other demographics with respect to the Internet?; how do users and non-users 
understand Internet policy and regulations and how does this influence their attitudes 
to and practices on the Internet?; and how can we explain the linkages of everyday life 
and resistance culture with Internet policy and regulation?.
On the other hand, part of the focus groups was dedicated to the elite actors’ 
discourses so as to trace the degree of complementarity and cross-validate the 
qualitative data obtained from different research subjects. More specifically, the focus 
groups were asked to respond to the following elite actors’ discourses: the techno­
phobic, non-technocratic and traditional character of Greek society; ignorance and a 
lack of awareness in Greek society; social inactivity; the failure of Greek authorities to 
implement EU policies and regulations on the Internet; the non-modernised, delayed, 
techno-phobic and bureaucratic public administration in Greece; the need for more 
socially accountable and human-centred policies and regulations; the high cost of 
Internet services and networks; the lack of an Internet infrastructure and satisfactory 
services.
The discussions in the focus groups were loosely structured. The interpersonal 
relation between the interview situation and any matters arising during the interviews 
can always alter the initial thematic framework. The present research follows the 
principle that when conducting interviews, ‘you can adapt as the situation changes. If a 
promising topic comes up, you can pursue it’ (Berger, 1998: 57). Also, particular 
emphasis was placed on how participants in the focus groups reflected on their 
attitudes and practices through the interactions emerging and the convergence or 
divergence of arguments within each group.
Hence, the setting of the interviews and the way in which they were organised 
aimed to contribute to the openness and loosely structured character of these 
discussions. The interviews were conducted in quiet public spaces and were audio 
recorded. I adopted the role of a moderator, attempting to probe interactions while 
being cautious about my interference in the discussions. In order for the discussions to 
be managed efficiently, another person was the note keeper. This allowed me to focus
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on my role as a moderator, while ensuring that interactions throughout the interviews 
were traced more efficiently. Each interview lasted 2-3 hours, while the interviews with 
users were roughly half an hour longer due to the greater interactions within the user 
groups.
4 .5.2 Connection with the conceptual framework and other elements ofmethodology
In the domestication tradition qualitative research is broadly accepted in the 
study of everyday life (Haddon, 2006:199) as it enables social discourses and meaning 
construction to emerge in context. However, the domestication tradition rarely 
exhibits examples of studies that use focus groups. In Haddon’s words: ‘I can't think of 
any examples of people using a domestication analysis and focus groups...’ (email 
communication, 12 July 2007). One exception might be Livingstone’s work on children, 
family and the media (Livingstone and Bober, 2003; Livingstone and Bovill, 2001 & 
1999), although this focuses on media usage by children and the family. Liebes and 
Katz’s study (1990) on the family use of TV is another example of focus group 
interviewing, even if it does not belong to the domestication tradition.
Also, it has been argued that the qualitative can often complement the 
quantitative (Silverstone, 2005) and the thesis dismisses the rule of thumb that the 
qualitative usually constitutes ‘a source of ideas for quantitative testing’. In the present 
research, the focus groups aimed to provide answers to all three research questions, 
connecting with the previous two phases of the research and carrying the arguments 
firmly forward. The focus groups were to give more depth and exploratory power to 
the quantitative findings, while achieving integration with the qualitative findings 
obtained in the elite actors’ interviews.
More specifically, the focus groups went beyond quantitative groupings and 
classifications of ordinary people’s views, providing a less quantifiable picture of digital 
divides in Greece. They provided some space for tracing the thread of users’ and non­
users’ thinking and for identifying emerging themes. They were seen as the appropriate 
technique for further investigating the hypotheses tested in the survey and developed 
out of a restrictive theoretical perspective. They thus enabled a deeper analysis of 
people’s behaviours and attitudes, of the associated role of everyday settings of life and 
the particular role of policies and regulations by reflecting on citizens’ discourses and 
complex interactions in the interview process. In this way, the complexities and 
uncertainties that the study of technology and its social embeddedness encompasses 
were disentangled to a certain degree.
Focus groups collect views that capture ‘public discourses and interpretive 
communities’ (Lunt and Livingstone, 1996: 4). They facilitate interactions between 
group members, allowing for ‘collective’ views to emerge throughout group
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interactions. The emphasis is on the power relations and hierarchies lying within the 
conversation structures, with the researcher being able to say more about the collective 
points of view (Gaskell, 2000: 46-7; Holstein and Gubrium, 1997:120). Focus groups 
fail to say a lot about the individual situation, whereas rich conclusions can be reached 
about the ‘group culture’ (Alasuutari, 1995: 94). Thus, focus groups were selected 
precisely because the thesis goes beyond the household boundaries and explores 
culture at the level of civic life and in certain societal formations. Even though focus 
groups do not allow generalisations, it was anticipated that they would bring up the 
nuances of the cultural traits of Greek society that the survey tested and the elite 
actors had pointed out.
As regards the study of the everyday in particular, focus groups provide the 
appropriate discursive means to approach ‘everyday5 from an ‘everyday5 perspective 
(Lunt and Livingstone, 1996: 9). Burgess et al. (1991: 502) argue that focus groups 
‘provide a means of replicating some of these [everyday] social interactions although, 
inevitably, the settings within which they are conducted and, crucially, the ways in 
which they are conducted, are much less naturalistic’. By qualitatively approaching a 
sub-sample of surveyed individuals, this micro-level of research provided more 
explanatory means than the survey for exploring social knowledge, social awareness and 
people’s experiences with the Internet. It also provided explanatory means for 
exploring the ways ordinary people in Greece perceive the role of Internet policy and 
regulation within their everyday settings of life.
This phase of empirical research was also expected to allow integration with the 
first phase of data collection and for appropriate links and connections between all 
three phases of the research to be attained. This is in line with the overarching goal of 
the thesis to provide diverse empirical data that allow a research-based dialogue 
between different agents and activity domains in the Greek information society. From 
a methodological perspective, the thesis thus became able to deliver a working case of 
complementarity and methodological triangulation for further elaboration and 
development.
4.6 Data analysis and administration
Different types of data require different analysis strategies. This is so the data 
can inform and cross-validate one another, while the research can identify 
contradictions and new insights from a topic and research subject perspective.
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4.6.i  Analysis ofqualitative data
A thematic analysis was employed for analysing the elite actors’ and focus 
groups’ interviews, albeit through different analytical strategies.
Ist Phase: C o m p u te r-assis ted  th em atic  analysis
When qualitative data are collected, namely a ‘text’, one option of analysis is 
the positivist ‘factist perspective’ (Alasuutari, 1995). In this case, the data are treated as 
a reflection of reality and source of information about facts, phenomena and real 
situations. This perspective can be called thematic, as language, intangible situations 
and latent factors are not considered. On the grounds of the thesis’ objective to at this 
stage provide a broad and comprehensive outline of digital divides in Greece, a 
thematic analysis was considered the appropriate analysis technique for the elite 
actors’ interviews.
All 12 interviews were transcribed and made available in an electronic format. 
The interview texts underwent a detailed thematic analysis through systematic coding 
with the assistance of the ATLAS/ti computer software package.64 Through ATLAS/ti, 
networks of arguments (codes) were identified in the interview texts. These networks 
brought up relationships and hierarchies of complex phenomena in the Greek 
information society. As a result, I built up a thematic framework consisting of the 
following six themes:
1. The information society in Greece. This theme explored the traits of the Greek 
information society and tackled issues of infrastructure, market operation, policy 
and regulation, as well as indicators of technology adoption.
2. Cultural drivers in the Greek information society. This theme focused on everyday life 
and the cultural drivers of the Greek information society.
3. EU regulation drivers in the Greek information society. This theme dealt with the EU 
telecommunications regulation in 2003 and the consequences of its non­
implementation in Greece. The aim was to contextualise and comparatively view 
decision-making in the Greek information society.
4. Policy and regulation drivers in the Greek information society. This theme made more 
specific references to Internet policy and regulation in Greece, with the 
interviewees highlighting the links between society’s culture and official decision­
making ideas and practices.
5. Other forces at work. I n addition, market, media and education forces were brought 
up in the texts. This theme completed the picture of the Greek information 
society, raising additional parameters that matter for digital divides.
64 Because the interview texts were lengthy, the use of ATLAS/ti was a major benefit. A hermeneutic 
unit was created, all twelve interview texts were inserted into that unit and dominant themes were 
identified in the texts through systematic coding.
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6. Critical reflections. Lastly, the analysis provided reflections on the interview texts 
and the atmosphere of the interview discussions. These reflections are not of a 
purely thematic interest as they pointed to interview discourses and to the 
interview process as a whole.
Each theme consisted of a series of networks of arguments that interconnected, 
and Chapter 5 (Sections 5.3_5-8) presents and discusses them in detail. Each theme 
aimed to answer one or more research questions as operationalised in Table 4-1 (see 
Chapter 5, Section 5.9). However, these themes are the product not only of the topic 
guides used in the interviews (Appendix 4-2) but also of the particular arguments put 
forward in the interview texts. Also, this thematic framework does not include all 
issues raised in the interviews, with a presentation of the findings in Chapter 5 
following an equally selective strategy. Finally, the themes and findings discussed in 
Chapter 5 are not set by significance since the interviews aimed to map out the field 
and pave the way for more focused research in the second and third phases.
3rd phase: A tw o-layered  th em atic  analysis
As regards the analysis of the focus groups, on the first layer the thematic 
analysis addressed questions of ‘what’ and ‘why* on the grounds of the thematic 
structure of the topic guides that directed the group discussions (Appendix 4-8). On 
the second layer, the interview discourses were examined in relation to the contextual 
and power-related forces, thus resulting in a contextualised analysis of the patterns of 
behaviours and arguments emerging in the texts. Aiming to go beyond the specific 
structures of text, the analysis in Chapter 8 relates text (focus group discourses) to 
structures of the socio-political context. The analysis aspired to disentangle the 
interactions between focus group discourses and socio-political contexts that relate to 
the forces driving digital divides in Greece. To understand and interpret the interview 
discourses, I placed the texts in context and employed the following analytical terms:
• Reflectivity: thinking about what is said and the context of its production, 
including circumstances (e.g. everyday life circumstances) and policy context (e.g. 
links between personal experiences on/with the Internet and policy or regulatory 
forces).
• Reflexivity: considering how one’s position in society impacts upon what one does 
and how one interprets things (e.g. the impact of a profession, lifestyle etc. on 
people’s understandings of the Internet and its importance).
• Dialogue: the collaborative constructing of understandings was something that 
was greatly facilitated in the focus groups. The focus in the present research was 
on contradictory, contrasting or converging arguments provoked by and 
articulated through dialogue.
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• Comparison: comparing discourses on the same topic, with attention to 
similarities, differences and implications (e.g. how similarly or differently users 
reflect on the same topic and what that means for their positioning in the broader 
socio-political context).
These analytical terms were used to complement the first-layer thematic 
analysis that answered the questions of‘what’ and ‘why\ Thus, the findings obtained 
through this mode of analysis aimed to build a coherent framework of discourses and 
arguments in context.
In procedural terms, the interview texts were saved in Word format and, due to 
the limited number of texts, it was decided that no software was needed for their 
analysis. Instead, a series of grids of interview arguments were created with the 
assistance of Excel Office. These grids are provided in Appendix 8 and summarise the 
interview discourses for both users and non-users groups and on the grounds of the 
thematic structure of the interview discussions. Besides the grids, the analysis process 
relied on many readings of the interview texts and on the insertion of comments in 
relevant Word files. Then, the traditional mode of ‘text highlighting’ applied when 
reading the interview discourses carefully and observing the interactions of the 
discourses with external socio-cultural and political parameters.
4.6.2 Administration and analysis o f quantitative data
As regards the survey, it is worth presenting the biggest administration and 
implementation issues before the data analysis strategies are discussed.
A dm in istra tion  and  im p lem en ta tion
I used a centralised location of telephone surveying and Computer-Assisted 
Telephone Interviewing (CATI)65 in order to speed up the data collection process and 
improve the quality of the questionnaire’s administration. The finalisation of the 
required budget, implementation of sampling procedures, installation and running of 
CATI software (IT by DESAN), interviewer’s training, posting of pre-letters to 
households, organisation of a small call centre and the time schedule of the interviews 
were some of the tasks involved in the survey administration. In order for these tasks 
to be implemented, I set the following timelines:
6* CATI is for large-scale surveys where filter and skip questions apply (Frey, 1989: 205-15).
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Table 4-7: Implementation timelines




Survey design & 




1st phase of 
interviews ■ ■
2nd phase of 
interviews ■
Completion
* Installation and running of CATI software, interviewer training, posting of pre-letters, organisation of 
the call centre etc.
Two interruptions occurred in the data collection during holiday times. This is 
because in the urban region of Attica most people travel to rural regions in holiday 
times. During data collection, a large number of contacts were made66 and N = i o o i  
interviews were completed (Table 4-8):
Table 4-8: Contacts and phone calls
Complete IOOI 14.6%
Busy line 94 1.4%
No answer 1260 18.3%
Refusal 2115 30.8%
Wrong/non-existing phone number 792 11.5%
Fax/computer 115 1.7%
Ineligible person 651 9.5%
Secret number 2 0.0%
Business/public services 449 6.5%
Ineligible person due to age 239 3.5%
Do not know if he/ she uses a PC or the Internet 105 1.5%
Absence of an eligible person 3i 0.5%
Interview closed halfway due to fatigue 11 0.2%
Interview closed halfway due to hurry 2 0.0%
Interview closed halfway due to refusal to answer specific 
questions
4 0.1%
Interview closed halfway for other reasons 2 0.0%
Total 68 73 100.0%
Data analysis: descriptive and m odelling statistical techniques
After the completion of the data collection the open-ended questions as well as 
‘Other’ were grouped and coded by me. Since all the data were available electronically, 
they were transferred to QUANTUM (data processing programme) so as to be cleaned 
up and edited electronically. A tabulation of the data was generated and I checked the
66 In order to keep track of the interview status, I used an electronic call record sheet where every 
number and call statuses were recorded.
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tables on a logical level so as to identify any contradictions. Once the final tables were 
produced, all the data were transferred to SPSS 15.0 software.
In order for the survey hypotheses to be tested (see Section 4.4.3), I applied 
descriptive (frequencies, cross tabulations, means etc) and simple testing techniques 
(e.g. chi-square statistics etc), as well as the following modelling techniques:
a) Multiple Linear Regression
Multiple linear regression is used extensively in my analysis and is employed 
when the response variable is a non-dichotomous, continuous, interval-level variable, 
and the explanatory variables are of any type. Because more than one explanatory 
variable is used at once, this technique has the advantage that even tentative claims 
that the effect of a variable on the response variable is causal can be put forward only if 
this effect survives conditioning on all control variables which are thought of as 
relevant.67
As Chapter 7 explains in detail, the interpretation of the regression outputs 
takes the coding of each variable into account. For example, ‘frequency of Internet use’ 
was coded so that lower levels implied a higher frequency of use (1 represented the 
highest frequency and 7 represented the lowest one). An F test was used to assess 
whether all the coefficients of the independent variables were joindy equal to zero, and 
T-test statistics were used to assess the significance of each independent variable. 
Further, the R-squared statistic accounts for the strength of each regression model.
b) Logistic Regression
On the other hand, logistic regression modelling is used when the dependent 
variable is observed and dichotomous (e.g. ‘Internet use’, ‘type of Internet connection: 
dial-up/broadband’ etc). Statisticians argue that it is not a good idea to treat a 
dichotomous response variable like a continuous one and to use a multiple regression 
(the reasons go beyond the scope of this discussion). As with a multiple linear 
regression, a logistic regression involves modelling differences between individuals 
using multiple explanatory variables. The explanatory variables can be of any level of 
measurement and they are used in exactly the same way as in a multiple regression.68
The coefficients yielded from the estimation of the logistic regression represent 
the relationship of the level of their associated independent variable with the 
likelihood of the ‘higher’ outcome of the dependent variable. For example, as ‘Internet 
use’ was coded with ‘2’ denoting ‘no use’ and with 1 denoting ‘use’ a positive coefficient 
would imply that an increase in the independent variable is associated with an increase 
in the likelihood of "no use". Omnibus chi-square tests are used to assess whether all 
the independent variables are significant jointly (similar to the F test for multiple linear
67 For more, see Agresti and Finlay, 1997: Chapters 11 and 14.
68 For more, see ibid: Chapter 15.
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regressions). Individual chi-square tests are used to assess the significance of each 
explanatory variable separately.
4 .7 Concluding remarks and limitations
This chapter presents the overall research design and illustrates how the 
research questions are operationalised and explored empirically. The research strategy 
of the thesis relies on a three-step research design and is based on a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative methods. This strategy aims to not only explore the 
research questions and provide rich insights through complementarity but also to 
cross-validate all the data collected, making a contribution to methodological 
considerations in the field along with the anticipated theoretical and empirical 
contribution.
In the first phase of the research, the elite actors’ interviews provide a first-level 
overview of the information society and digital divides in Greece. The survey 
conducted in the second phase addresses more specific issues, testing a series of 
hypotheses concerning the role of society’s culture, policy and regulation in ordinary 
people’s decisions to adopt the Internet or not. Lastly, the focus groups provide an in- 
depth explanatory reflection on the survey findings, cross-validating all three types of 
data.
This research design has a range of advantages, while being subject to certain 
limitations. On one hand, research often requires a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative methods as the whole research process involves the interaction of 
qualitative and quantitative approaches (Mayring, 1983). By using mixed methods, the 
researcher is able to use different data sources to validate and crosscheck findings. By 
securing the ‘objective’ quantification of the obtained data, on one hand, and the 
‘openness’ of the qualitative data, on the other, new issues and concepts can be raised, 
and the study is led to new paths of analysis (Gaskell, 2000). Hence, the thesis 
attempted to bridge the gap between the prevalent ontological assumption that the 
social world is a mathematically ordered universe, and the consequent epistemological 
demand that research should be quantitative in order to be commensurable across 
theories, and the need for ‘quality1 in the process of pursuing knowledge (Kvale, 1996: 
67).
On the other hand, I encountered the challenge of sequencing the above 
methodological tools and integrating their findings. This required a connection of the 
main areas of concern in accordance with how these areas were outlined in each 
research phase so as to allow consistent conclusions to be reached. This was achieved 
by examining the ways in which both elite actors and Internet users/non-users
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understand, describe and perceive areas of importance, thus identifying possible 
divergences or commonalities in meanings, positions and contextual frameworks of 
expression. From this standpoint, the findings had to be insightfully combined, 
contrasted and compared so as to illustrate possible contradictions, strengths and 
weaknesses. The quantitative data mostly answered questions of what’ and ‘how*, while 
the qualitative data addressed the question of ‘why*, either challenging or 
strengthening the ‘quantitative’ insights.
Lastly, there were practical difficulties in pursuing the research. One limitation 
was that the research subjects for the focus groups were selected by unavoidably ad hoc 
criteria and by using purposeful sampling. Another limitation relates to the validity and 
reliability of the qualitative parts of the research. Although these conventions are 
always one of the goals of qualitative research (ibid: 235-6), interviewing validity and 
reliability depend heavily on structural and individual restrictions. The thesis 
attempted to overcome these limitations by conducting tests of reliability and validity 
throughout.
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5- Overview of digital divides in Greece: in-depth interviews with 
elite actors
5 .J  Chapter Overview
This chapter presents the findings obtained in the first phase of the empirical 
research where 12 in-depth interviews were conducted with elite actors in Greece. The 
chapter presents the key traits of the Greek information society as portrayed by the 
elite actors. It takes a top-down perspective, examining the elite actors’ views of 
policy, regulation and society’s culture and their role in digital divides in the Greek 
information society. It thus answers the following questions operationalised in 
Chapter 4 (Table 4-1):
a. ‘W hat are the general characteristics of the Greek information society?’ (1st 
principal research question).
b. ‘W hat are the cultural characteristics of Greek society of past and current times?’; 
‘More specifically, how do the cultural characteristics of Greek society take shape 
in the Greek information society?’; and, ‘W hich cultural and everyday life settings 
of Greek people influence digital divides in Greece and in what ways?’ (all drawn 
from the 2nd principal research question).
c. ‘W hat is the general picture and key features of policy- and regulation-making in 
Greece?’; ‘More specifically, how does policy- and regulation-making take shape in 
the Greek information society?’; and, ‘W hat is the role of policy- and regulation- 
making in Greece in the course of the country’s information society and with 
regard to digital divides?’ (all drawn from the 3rd principal research question).
d. ‘W hat are the key parameters of the dynamic between society’s culture and 
decision-making in digital divides in Greece?’; ‘How does the dynamic between 
society’s culture and decision-making influence digital divides in Greece? To what 
extent and in what direction?’ (all drawn from the 4th principal research question).
Section 5.2 presents an overview of the interview arguments, positioning them 
in two spheres of analysis, namely the socio-cultural and policy/regulatory spheres. 
From Section 5.3 to Section 5.8 the key interview findings are discussed in relation to 
six research themes. Section 5.9 reviews the findings in connection to the research 
questions and the next two phases of the research. The chapter concludes with an 
overall evaluation of the elite actors’ interviews.
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2 Overview o f  the interview discourses
The interviews oscillated between two spheres of discussion, namely the socio­
cultural and the policy/regulatory sphere, and the interview arguments were grouped in 
one or both spheres. The analysis of the interview texts resulted in a list of 116 
arguments (codes).69 A careful look at the frequency of the arguments in each sphere of 
discussion allows the key issues raised by the interviewees to be identified. In total, 24 
out of 116 arguments had a high frequency of appearance, with over 10 interview 
quotations attached to each (Table 5-1).70
Table 5-1; Key arguments in the interview texts
ESI
Political liability 36 10 Lack of awareness in Greek society 
(social ignorance)
29 8
Distinctiveness of the Greek case* 29 9 Careful approach to the 
question/neutral answer
29 10
Careful approach to the 
question/neutral answer*
29 10 Distinctiveness of the Greek case 29 9
Policy and regulatory delays 17 7 Lack of infrastructure and/or 
satisfactory online services
16 5
Delays of the political and 
regulatory authorities in Greece
17 9 Lack of social action & institutional 
organisation
15 8
Greek information society, policy 
and regulatory environment
15 8 Need for awareness-raising 13 6
Significance of (EU) regulation and 
its full implementation
15 6 Non-technocratic culture (negativism & 
indifference) in Greek society
14 6
Policy, regulation and other 
initiatives
15 8 Negative role of the high cost of 
Internet services & networks in Greece
13 7
Need for more social policies 14 9 Cultural distinctiveness of Greek 




9Limited power of regulation 14 3 Low development of the information 
society (Internet) in Greece
Political language used in 
explaining the Greek information 
society
13 3 Importance of education 10 2
Need for more policy effort and 
change
12 7
*lt appears in both spheres
Lack of modernisation in the 
public administration
10 5
Importance of socially 
accountable policies in the 
information society
10 4
Policy initiatives in relation to the 
EU: recognition of nationality
10 6
The above table (Table 5-1) illustrates that the interviewees paid attention to 
issues of socio-cultural and policy or regulatory interest in their attem pt to account for 
Internet adoption in the Greek information society.
69 The ATLAS/ti analysis output consisted of quotations, codes and memos providing graphical, 
qualitative and only partly quantitative sketching of the interview texts. All different interview 
arguments, including those with a high frequency presented in this section, were thematically 
categorised in six themes. See Appendix 5.
70 These 24 arguments relate to more than one interviewee who said the same thing possibly more than 
once, but in different interview contexts. Therefore, they are indicative of the arguments dominating 
the texts. However, this approach results in discussing only a small number of arguments. In order to 
mitigate this disadvantage, the analysis of key thematic patterns in the next sections will bring up more 
arguments, divergent discourses and arguments that are exceptions.
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In the policy and regulatory sphere, the dominant argument was that of 
political liability (36)?I for the persistently low Internet adoption rates as well as for the 
lack of completed and fully revised Internet regulation in the Greek information 
society. The liability of political forces arose from one question I posed at the general 
level of discussion, while being further supported by what the interviewees argued. 
Strongly associated with this argument were arguments concerning policy and 
regulatory delays (17), the lack of modernisation of the public administration (10) and 
the limited power of regulation (14) in Greece. These arguments and the discussion 
concerning the extent to which decision-making negatively influences the integration 
of the Internet into people’s everyday lives drove the majority of the interviewees to 
hold a quite open discussion about the distinctiveness of the Greek case (29) and the 
existence of a particular policy and regulatory environment in the country (15). A 
significant number of interviewees suggested more social policies (14), additional policy 
effort and change (12), as well as more socially accountable policies (10) in the Greek 
information society. A few stressed the importance of implementing EU regulation 
promptly (15) in order for the above requirements to be met. Finally, a reflexive issue 
with a countable impact on the themes that emerged in the texts is that a large number 
of interviewees (10) kept a distance from the questions I posed, adopting a careful 
approach and providing relatively neutral answers (29). This remark invites the present 
research to critically interpret the interview arguments by examining possible 
contradictions as well as the factors that influenced the interview process.
As regards the socio-cultural sphere, the argument about the distinctiveness of 
the Greek case (29) was also prominent in this discussion domain. Questions about the 
role of society in the course of the Internet in the country brought up arguments 
concerning a lack of public awareness or social ignorance (29), as well as insufficient 
social action and a lack of institutional organisation (15). In response to questions 
about the reasons behind such societal traits, some interviewees maintained that these 
traits are becoming more intense due to the lack of sufficient infrastructure and/or 
satisfactory online services (16), and because of the high cost of Internet services and 
networks (13). Thus, six interviewees underlined the need to raise awareness (13), while 
two stressed the potential contribution of education (10). Finally, a large number of 
interviewees (10) were careful in how they answered questions of societal interest (29).
This general and quite out of context presentation of the key interview 
arguments illustrates that the interviewees approached issues of the distinctiveness of 
the Greek information society from a socio-cultural and policy or regulatory 
perspective, somewhat confirming the conceptual framework of the research. In 
addition, the interviewees stressed the importance of establishing a hilly informed 
society through more socially accountable policy and regulation, and awareness-raising
71 The parentheses indicate the number of interview quotations for each argument.
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initiatives. Parallel to this, they underlined the critical role of sufficient regulation by 
drawing on the critiques of officials, researchers and citizens concerning Greece’s 
delays in implementing EU Internet regulation.
However, a more detailed analysis of the thematic components of the 
interviews is needed. What follows is a deductive thematic analysis of the interview 
texts -  from the general to more specific -  that details the coding framework 
constructed and its six themes72 as presented in Chapter 4 (pp. 107-8).
5.3 The information society in Greece (ist theme)
The interviews initially revolved around general characteristics of the 
information society in Greece, gradually shifting to issues concerning digital divides 
(see Appendix 5-1). Section 5.3.1 touches upon general traits and trends of the Greek 
information society, with the interviewees suggesting policy, regulatory and socio­
cultural changes. In Section 5.3.2, the argument of‘Greek distinctiveness’ is presented, 
especially in relation to socio-cultural specificities as well as the policy and regulatory 
practices in the Greek information society.
5.3.1 The information society in Greece: general trends anddrivingforces
The elite actors raised, from a societal and policy perspective, the role of 
culture in the Greek information society. A significant number referred to ‘techno­
phobia’ in society and the public administration as the force driving the low adoption 
of new technologies in Greece.
Elite actors involved in decision-making argued that a techno-phobic culture is 
deeply embedded in society and only reflected in the country’s political life. For 
instance, Vassileios Asimakopoulos, the Special Secretary of the Operational 
Programme Information Society (OPIS) is a key political figure and argued that:73
VA: ...the difficulties...relate to the fact that we talk about technology in a society that is 
marked by techno-phobia...and this has influenced, in terms of delays, the efficiency of the 
Operational Programme Information Society, as even members of the public authorities in 
charge, such as ministries...do not put as much effort into it as they should, possibly because 
they do not understand the benefits of technology or because they are afraia of it.
Interviewer: ...it has to do with culture...
VA: (interrupts) Yes...this definitely reflects the dominant culture in society.
72 The six themes and arguments (codes) that each theme consists of are presented in Appendix 5. The 
discussion of the six themes in the main text does not cover the whole range of arguments, but aims to 
provide a contextualised and discursive picture of some key arguments per theme, highlighting the ways 
one argument connects to another.
73 Each argument is linked to one or more interview quotations. The latter are presented in a selective 
way due to practical and analytical restrictions.
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On the other hand, researchers and those who represent civic associations and 
socially-driven initiatives in the field criticised the country’s authorities. They argued 
about a lack of modernisation and a non-technocratic culture in the public 
administration. An interesting reference was made by Professor Gregory Yovanof, 
from the Athens Information Technology Institute (AIT), to the techno-phobic 
culture of society as transferred to the public administration and shown in civil 
servants’ negative attitudes to the introduction of new technologies in the workplace, 
the public sector:
...civil servants are afraid; they react to the introduction of new technologies in public services 
as they are afraid of being replaced by technology and losing their jobs because of computing.
So, they think: ‘it is better if I do not use it. (G'Y)
However, which forces did the elite actors regard as drivers of the ‘techno­
phobic’ and ‘non-technocratic’ culture in Greece?
As regards the social domain, elite actors who are close to ordinary people 
acknowledged in one way or another that a ‘techno-phobic’ and ‘non-technocratic’ 
culture is dominant among ordinary people in the country. At the same time, not all 
emphasised the same forces as the drivers o f‘techno-phobia’ in society. Ignorance, a 
lack of awareness, a lack of familiarity, the high cost of Internet services, and the low 
quality of Internet services and infrastructure are some of the forces mentioned by the 
interviewees. These forces and the different emphases placed by the interviewees 
seemed to reflect their own experiences and roles in the information society.
More specifically, a significant number of interviewees pointed to forces related 
to low public awareness in the information society. Athena Bourka, the Auditor of the 
Hellenic Data Protection Authority (DPA), is a daily recipient of messages from 
ordinary people about privacy risks and argues that a lack of information and low level 
of awareness discourage people from adopting technologies such as the Internet:
...there is not much information on privacy issues on the Internet and we could certainly 
improve and provide more information to citizens on both generic and specific issues of public 
interest. (AB)
Practical issues concerning cost, infrastructure and Internet services were raised 
by those elite actors involved in different sectors of the information society. Academic 
researchers, such as Gregory Yovanof and Ioannis Tomkos at the AIT, representatives 
of Internet users, such as Nicos Vasilakos, President of the Association of Greek 
Internet Users (EEXI), and Nicos Frydas, President of the Greek Hotline, pointed to 
practical barriers to the diffusion of the Internet in Greece such as the high cost of 
services, lack of necessary infrastructure and lack of satisfactory services. Indicatively, 
Nicos Vasilakos, who represents the community of Internet users in Greece, argued 
that the high cost of high-speed Internet in Greece is obstructing Internet adoption:
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The Internet is very expensive...canyou find an ADSL connection at a cost of less than 50 euros 
per month? Where do we live, in Monaco? Enterprises cannot afford such an amount and 
ADSL is a technology that Europe is abandoning whereas Greece is only discovering now ...
Nicos Frydas, who runs the Greek Hotline and collects users’ reports on 
Internet risks, noted similar practical issues. He pointed to the lack of IT economies 
of scale in Greece due to insufficient infrastructure and online services on the 
Internet:
Greek enterprises wanted but they probably did not know how to use new technologies for the 
creation of large-scale economies. On the other hand, there was no appropriate infrastructure 
or sufficient and wide-ranging online services from the public administration to enterprises. 
Greek enterprises also faced the problem of high cost, as telecommunication services are 
expensive... (NF)
Further, Professor Gregory Yovanof, Head of Broadband Wireless & Sensor 
Networks at the AIT, drew on his personal experience and stressed the lack of 
satisfactory online services in Greece. He confessed that, after he had moved back to 
Greece, he stopped using the Internet (Greek sites) for information searching and 
other non-work activities due to the low quality and limited number of services that 
Greek sites provide:
...when I was abroad, I used to use the Internet all the time to...find information about where 
to see a film, where to buy something; eveiything could be found on the Internet. Because in 
Greece...there are many services on the Internet but they are not broadly diffused, instead of 
wasting my time tiying to find something on the Internet, I’ve decided not to go online for such 
purposes anymore. (GY)
Quite unsurprisingly, Sophia Parissi, Officer of the Federation of Hellenic 
Information Technology & Communications Enterprises (SEPE) and Product 
Manager of the second largest ISP in Greece, did not point to such issues of delayed 
market development, the high cost of Internet services and lack of satisfactory services 
and infrastructure. On the contrary, she argued that a lack of awareness and negative 
media messages about new technologies contribute to techno-phobia in society:
Negative advertisements of the Internet, on one hand, and insufficient information about the 
benefits of the medium and a lack of technological culture, on the other, contribute to the 
Greek citizen saying about the Internet: ‘I do not accept it’. (SP)
As regards the policy and regulatory domain, politicians, regulators and 
researchers attempted to explain the phenomena of ‘techno-phobia’ and ‘non- 
technocratic’ culture in society by admitting the liability of the country’s authorities. 
They argued about political liability in terms of practices and mindsets that dominate 
decision-making in the country. They placed an emphasis on regulatory delays, the 
existence of a non-technocratic and inefficient public administration, the lack of 
appropriate regulatory initiatives and the socially non-accountable character of the 
public administration. The way they approached some of these issues also reflects their 
own experiences and roles in the Greek information society.
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Ioannis Tomkos, Associate Dean at the AIT and member of the Greek 
academic community, underlines the role of mindsets in the policy domain and the 
country’s public administration, remarking that:
...we are talking about the diffusion of broadband services, the Internet, in Greece, but what we 
actually see when TV cameras go to ministers’ offices is a picture of Jesus Christ because this 
‘sells’. We have not seen any picture of a laptop on ministers’ desks to show that the minister 
uses new technologies himself (IT).
Vassileios Asimakopoulos, Special Secretary of the OPIS, critically reviewed the 
practices of the country’s public authorities. As an insider, he provided a clear picture 
of the phenomena of non-collaboration, bureaucracy and lack of modernisation in the 
Greek public sector, pointing to the hindering role of such phenomena in development 
of the information society:
...a lack of previous experience in promoting new technologies contributes to the persistent 
difficulty in the harmonious co-operation of public authorities and in drawing a common policy 
line for the information society... Besides, time-consuming bureaucratic processes and alack of 
modernisation of the public administration are important barriers to implementation of the 
Information Society Programme. (VA)
In summarising this section, one can argue that the elite actors perceived the 
non-technocratic and techno-phobic culture as the determining force of the Greek 
information society. They pointed to multiple manifestations of culture and domains 
where culture takes shape, while most indicated the liability of the country’s political 
authorities. Also, actors not involved directly in policy and regulation in the 
information society highlighted the existence of structural barriers (e.g. market, cost, 
services, infrastructure) to technological development, something that expands the 
study’s knowledge base as such barriers were not examined extensively as elements of 
the conceptual framework of the work.
5.3.2 Digital divides in light o f a Greek distinctiveness
The above trends in the Greek information society raise the question of 
whether we can argue about a ‘Greek distinctiveness’, particularly in relation to 
Internet adoption. My intention in the interviews was to view Greece as part of a 
‘whole’, as a case among others in the European region, and to explore the elements 
that make the Greek information society diverge from other countries in the region. 
As shown in the figure below (Figure 5-1) the interview texts framed and associated the 
theme of ‘Greek distinctiveness’ with arguments concerning the existence of a non- 
technocratic culture in Greece, Greek people’s lack of familiarity with the Internet 
and the Greek lifestyle in general. At the same time, the interview discourses brought 
up contradictory arguments regarding the extent to which Greece differs from other 
countries (e.g. some interviewees dismissed the argument that Greece is a distinctive 
case).
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More specifically, in attempting to address the under-development of the 
Greek information society I posed questions concerning the existence and role of 
Greek identity. Most interviewees recognised the existence of a cultural identity and 
argued that this identity drives Greece to maintain traditions that dissociate it from 
the increasingly powerful world of new technologies. The interviewees decoded 
cultural identity in a pessimistic way, referring to the existence of a non-technocratic 
and techno-phobic culture in society, policy and regulation, social ignorance, as well as 
to what they perceived, in general, as a Greek lifestyle. At the same time, alternative 
and somewhat contradictory views of distinctiveness shaped a complex and puzzling 
picture of Greek distinctiveness in the interviews.
George Papapavlou, Officer at the EC DG Information Society, is a Greek 
national familiar with the Greek context from having worked at the EC for 
implementation of the European telecommunications regulation. This gives his views 
about Greece and the distinction between Greek and European identity a particular 
weight. He argued that a particular culture exists in Greece, which he called 
‘Mediterranean’, and linked this to the geographical location of the country, providing
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examples of what this particular culture stands for. He supported the case of ‘Greek 
identity’ by referring directly to the adoption of new technologies and the contrasting 
adoption rates of different technologies in Greece (e.g. mobile telephony and the 
Internet).74 Although he lives and works abroad, he used the first person plural (we) 
when referring to Greece, showing that he still attaches himself to the country:
...the difference is that we [Greece] are a Mediterranean country, we live more ‘outside’ than 
‘inside’...we are fans of short- and not long-term work... I think this is why we are better with 
mobile phones than with the Internet... On the other hand, if we understand what exactly the 
Internet, even mobiles, are about, if we realise that Internet services can do more 
things...because we are clever, adventurers, because...we look at the future, we have fantasia, 
because of all these, I believe we will use all the things that the Internet offers to a certain 
degree. (GP)
On the other hand, Costas Balictsis, Director of Telecommunications at the 
Greek National Regulatory Authority for Telecommunications (EETD, supported the 
existence of a particular Greek identity, referring to the broad notion of‘lifestyle’ and 
calling for modernisation and more information for the public. Although he is a 
regulator who lives in Greece and works for the National Regulatory Authority, he 
referred to his fellow countrymen using the third person plural (they), somewhat 
distancing himself from the overall situation in Greece: ‘people in Greece are still 
attached to a traditional lifestyle because they are not informed or because they have 
not seen examples of people in other countries using new technologies successfully.’ 
(CB)
I must note that, although both interviewees are decision-makers, they did not 
refer to Greek identity in relation to decision-making. On the contrary, they argued 
that Greek identity lies in society and its culture. Yet actors in non-policy domains 
went beyond this socio-centric discussion, arguing about a lack of ‘citizenship’ and a 
gap between citizens and decision-making mechanisms in Greece. For example, Nikos 
Frydas, President of SAFELINE (the Greek Hotline), discussed the role of‘citizenship’ 
and awareness when he reflected on the disappointing results of the Greek Hotline. He 
explained these results by arguing that people do not avail themselves of publicly 
available tools of assistance as they lack awareness and a sense of participation:
...we do not have many more reports than in the first year and we are concerned about it. We 
have to raise social awareness about risks on the Internet...basically, we are egoists, we are not 
‘citizens’ and modern Greek society has not had a long history of citizenship...just after the 
restoration of democracy in 1975. (NF)
The notion of citizenship and how it concerns both society and decision­
making were illustrated vividly by Veronica Samara, Head of Research and 
Development of the SafeNetHome project in Greece. She argued that feelings of 
phobia and apathy are present in how Greek society dismisses calls for the responsible 
adoption of new technologies like the Internet:
74 This example of differing adoption rates is also pointed to in Chapter 3, p. 64.
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...although people in Greece are afraid of the Internet to some extent, they do not want to 
become more informed, while being generally negative regarding new messages... I am not really 
sure whether it is about apathy or a persistent negativism to anything that seems challenging, 
and requires effort or familiarisation... (VS)
Veronica Samara is in touch with both Internet authorities and ordinary people 
in the country in order to promote the goals of the Safer Internet Programme. Thus, 
she can evaluate the ways the country’s authorities respond to the Programme’s 
initiatives as well as to instances of phobia and apathy in society. In this respect, she 
charged the authorities with a ‘lack of appropriate collaborative policy-making’, 
arguing that more collaboration is needed to increase social knowledge and awareness:
...this culture of apathy is present, I think, in policy-making as well. Despite our efforts for 
closer co-operation with the authorities...I have to admit there is a lack of collaborative policy- 
making...we need more attention from policy-makers and regulators...we need them to hear our 
concerns and seriously consider our reports on the disadvantaged position of Greece with 
respect to children’s secure Internet use and the lack of social knowledge and awareness... (VS)
As the interviewees represent different interests in the Greek information 
society, they often articulated contradictory arguments, indicating not only the multi­
faced character of the information society but also the intricacy of ideology and power 
relations in the field. For instance, although most interviewees highlighted the 
distinctiveness of the Greek case, they were sometimes uneasy accepting the 
particularity of Greece in comparison to other European countries. Vassileios 
Asimakopoulos, an official policy-maker in the field, referred to the specificities of the 
Mediterranean region to argue that lifestyle and social values in Greece do not differ in 
anyway from other countries in the region. However, he failed to explain why Greece 
has lower Internet penetration rates than those countries:
The answer is that Greece does not differ in any way from other countries. For instance, in 
Spain there is also sunny weather and the sea; in Italy there are also traditional families, while 
Portugal also has very nice coffee shops. However, all these Mediterranean countries have made 
progress for instance in broadband Internet. (VA)
Also, some elite actors did not reject the Greek distinctiveness but attempted 
to give a positive tone to their words, maintaining that the Greek information society 
will catch up in the future. At the same time, they failed to address issues of cultural 
change which they raised elsewhere in the discussion. For instance, Costas Balictsis, 
Director of Telecommunications at the NRA, made the point about change, referring 
to political and regulatory interventions only, whilst he was not concerned with the 
ways such change will impact on society and culture:
Even worse is the i% of broadband penetration {in Greece]. Is it possible? This means that the 
demand is not satisfied or that the products we offer are not what they should be. At the same 
time, there is some positive increase; so there is space for action and we need further 
interventions. (CB)
These two sub-themes, general trends in the Greek information society and
Greek distinctiveness, illustrate to some extent the diversity of views that the elite
actors articulated in the interviews. These sub-themes point to the core place that
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culture and its various aspects hold in the Greek information society. Also, issues such 
as the dialogue of the socio-cultural with the policy and regulatory spheres of action, 
the potential of future change and the role society and politics play accordingly, were 
all brought up in the interviews.
$.4 Cultural drivers in the Greek information society (2nd theme)
After pointing to the general traits of the Greek information society, more 
specific issues were raised when following up the above general remarks. Emphasis was 
placed on how ordinary people in Greece participate in the information society and 
the links to policy and regulatory practices (see Appendix 5-2).
5.4.1 Ordinary people and the ‘techno-phobic’ culture
As shown in Figure 5-2, the interviewees admitted the existence of low Internet 
adoption rates in Greece, pointing to society’s culture as the driving force. They paid 
attention to what they called ‘techno-phobia’ and resistance to new technologies in 
Greek society, while they attempted to justify these arguments by drawing on their 
experiences as key actors in the field. A significant number attempted to identify from 
where ordinary people’s techno-phobia stems and argued about the close links between 
society’s culture and political culture in Greece. Nonetheless, some were quite 
optimistic as they argued that techno-phobia in society is on the way to changing.
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Figure 5-2: Ordinary people and the techno-phobic culture
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The majority of interviewees argued that a non-technocratic and techno-phobic 
culture exists in Greek society, driving most people not to integrate the Internet into 
their everyday lives. For instance, Vasileios Asimakopoulos, the person in charge of 
major policy decisions for the information society, claimed that beyond the liability of 
political authorities techno-phobia in society plays an important role in how the 
information society is developing in the country:
...beyond the horizontal character of the Programme [OPIS] and the lack of modernisation of 
the public administration, difficulties also relate to the fact that we talk about technology in a 
society that is marked by techno-phobia. In other words, if the same Programme was about 
roads and not technology then it would be easier because it would be more comprehensible to 
the people. (VA)
Precisely how does techno-phobia influence Internet adoption in the country? 
Low awareness, social resistance, a lack of social action and institutional organisation 
in everyday life activities, as well as a lack of familiarity with new technologies were 
some of the issues the interviewees pointed to as reflections and supporting factors of 
the techno-phobic culture of society. Whereas interviewees with different roles in the 
information society pointed out different issues, the interview discourses drew more or 
less the same picture of Greek society: a society that declines to integrate the Internet
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into everyday routines and resists technological artefacts such as the Internet. For 
instance, Sophia Parissi expressed market concerns and argued that a lack of 
knowledge results in public fear about the Internet’s effects on user safety:
...from a commercial point of view, Greek citizens do not know how to protect themselves and 
their children even from simple and broadly known Internet risks, such as viruses. They do not 
have thorough knowledge and this might create fears about using the Internet, [thus] being a 
source of discouragement. (SP)
George Papapavlou, an EC official, maintained that ordinary people in Greece 
are hugely inactive and this leads to societal obscurantism and the further growth of 
people’s negative attitudes to the Internet. He compared Greece with other European 
countries to justify this point and to show that a European perspective allows the 
identification of instances where techno-phobia in Greece results in a lack of social 
action and institutional organisation and this, in turn, to more phobia and negativism 
regarding new technologies:
In other, and mainly in Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian counties, there are civil societies which 
are organised in a way that active civil groups exist, take measures, communicate with public 
authorities, protect citizens’ and consumers’ rights etc, etc... In Greece, atomism dominates 
society and therefore collective social action is far less existent than in other European 
countries. (GP)
The two excerpts above show that market and policy actors acknowledge the 
role that social perceptions, social knowledge and integration of technologies into 
people’s lives play in development of the information society. These views are in tune 
with what researchers, such as Dr. Veronica Samara from the Safer Internet 
Programme, claimed. Aiming to reflect on societal needs and increase people’s 
awareness and online safety, Veronica Samara argued that a complex culture of 
resistance and phobia drives people in Greek society to be unwilling to receive new 
information and knowledge.
Inadequate social awareness is also noted by actors who hold official data on 
the protection of Internet users from privacy risks on the Internet. Athena Bourka, 
Auditor of the Hellenic Data Protection Authority (DPA), reports that in comparison 
to DPAs in other European countries Greece has a particularly low number of reports 
on online privacy and security problems, especially with regard to spamming. As she 
points out, this is not because there are less security problems in Greece, but because 
Greek users lack awareness of and interest in reporting such problems:
...compared to other European countries, we have a lower number of reports on spamming.
This does not mean that we have less spam. It rather means what I told you before...low 
awareness... initially, some of those reports had not been addressed to us, the EETT transferred 
some of them to us, as citizens are not informed about where to address their complaints. (AB)
Nevertheless, a couple of interviewees attempted, in a relatively fragmentary 
and not empirically grounded way, to articulate a more positive view, arguing that 
‘techno-phobia’ in Greece is on the way to changing. For instance, Vasilleios 
Asimakopoulos expressed a positive view about the changes that the techno-phobic
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culture of Greek society is now undergoing. He also supported, albeit in a quite biased 
and simplistic way, the contribution that his and the government’s policy have made in 
this direction:
This culture [techno-phobia} is reflected in Greek society, although the latter is changing. We 
can see that it is changing and we believe that our work contributes to that. At the level of 
citizens, we believe that if citizens are told about the information society in simple words, 
without technocratic terms and in a language that fits their standards, thus becoming recipients 
of our work, we can come closer to them. (VA)
However, the way in which decision-makers evaluate and assess societal traits 
and phenomena is often socially distant. Costas Balictsis, Director of 
Telecommunications at the NRA, was inclined to refer to citizens as consumers75, 
while arguing that these two concepts are two sides of the same coin. This is important 
for the discussion at this point as it indicates the way society and its traits are often 
treated by policy-makers and regulators in the field:
Interviewer: However, you are talking about consumers and not citizens...
CB: Both terms...probably they indicate different notions and definitions, but ‘consumer’is a 
broader term as ‘citizen’refers to a person who lives in this country, while ‘consumer’can also be 
a foreigner who visits the country. Hence, these two terms present two aspects of the same 
thing...they are supplementary terms.
5.4.2 Techno-phobia, non-integration o f the Internet into everyday life and links to 
policy and regulation
Arguments concerning the techno-phobic and resistance culture of ordinary 
people in Greece go beyond the societal domain, involving decision-making strategies 
and practices as well. The figure below (Figure 5-3) illustrates the links between 
society’s culture and decision-making in the Greek information society as outlined in 
the interviews:
Figure 5-3: Non-integration of the Internet into everyday life & links to policy
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The links between society’s culture and decision-making and, more specifically, 
the significance of policy and regulation for integrating the Internet into ordinary 
people’s everyday lives were raised by many elite actors. First, decision-makers such as 
Costas Balictsis, the Director of Telecommunications at the NRA, recognised the role 
of the low level of integration of the Internet into people’s lives in the country’s digital 
divides:
The story of the Internet in Greece is pretty surprising as Internet penetration is not as high as 
it should be. This can be explained if we take into account broadband and the social conditions 
in our country... It might be that Greek people have not integrated the Internet into their daily 
lives and activities. Definitely, cost plays a role but I think it is the utility of the Internet that 
affects the Greek citizen more. (CB)
On the grounds of the utility5 and ‘integration’ factors, Costas Balictsis argued 
that change must begin from the country’s public administration and authorities. He 
proposed e-government services and modernisation of the public administration. He 
also stressed the need for policy to respond to people’s expectations and needs, 
criticising the country’s public authorities in those terms:
What would be very stimulating for the Internet - 1 believe this at the personal level as well -  is 
e-government so that citizens become more familiar with online services and realise their utility.
I’m afraid that the public sector is still very behind. We are talking about infrastructure and 
wires, but citizens need new and useful online public administration services for their everyday 
lives. (CB)
Likewise, other actors involved in decision-making at the EU and national 
levels, such as George Papapavlou and Vassileios Asimakopoulos respectively, claimed 
that the integration of technology into people’s lives can be achieved through more 
socially flexible and appropriate policies and regulations:
...where technical barriers are not simple for the citizen, there is some ground for further policy 
efforts to be made so that Greek society becomes substantially informed. (GP)
The main {policy} mistake was that local particularities were not taken into account. What we 
attempt to do now is to take them into consideration as we intend our policies to be more 
comprehensible at the level of everyday life and better understood by citizens not only in terms 
of language but also in terms of action. (VA)
Even actors involved in market- and socially-driven activities, such as Nicos 
Frydas, provided arguments with a strong mix of societal and political rhetoric. Nicos 
Frydas, President of the Greek Hotline and a businessman working for the 
establishment of co-regulation in the Greek information society, placed everyday and 
cultural parameters at the core of this rhetoric:
...if Greek people were certain about the benefits the Internet can bring to their lives, possibly 
they would obtain Internet connection. There is no sufficient infrastructure or significant offer 
of e-government services as the people in the public sector are negative regarding the 
development of online public administration, while the high degree of social ignorance does not 
let citizens develop a rational perception and usage of the Internet. (NF)
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Hence, policy and regulation were considered in the interviews to be key forces 
in the Greek information society and their role is discussed in greater depth in the two 
themes that follow. These two themes also shed more light on the linkages of policy 
and regulation with society and on the dynamics of culture in both domains.
5 .5  EU regulation drivers in the Greek information society (3rd 
theme)
The theme of EU regulation was introduced by the interviewer to follow-up 
the regulators’ remarks about the role the delay in implementation of EU Internet 
(telecoms) regulation has played in the Greek information society (see Appendix 5- 
3). As shown in the figure below (Figure 5-4), the interviewees referred to the traits 
and importance of EU regulation, the difficulties Greece has faced in implementing 
EU regulation and the consequences of these. Nevertheless, some arguments 
suggested Greece is currently making progress in implementing EU regulations.
Figure 5-4: EU regulation in Greece
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5.5.1 EU  regulation and its significance
The interviewees supported the EU regulatory framework of 2003. Those 
working on Internet polity and regulation argued that EU regulation constitutes a 
sufficient tool for the management of regulatory challenges in cyberspace. Vassileios 
Asimakopoulos, Special Secretary of the OPIS, confirmed the Greek government’s will 
to implement the EC telecoms regulation. However, he did not explain the delays in 
the implementation process and shifted the discussion to general EU policies and 
action plans:
We are happy that Europe understands new technologies in such a way. Particularly the new 
plan of the Commission, i20io, that replaces the e-Europe programme, satisfies us, showing 
that the direction of European policy is absolutely compatible with the way we perceive the 
information society. (VA)
Costas Balictsis, Telecommunications Director at the NRA, blamed the Greek 
Ministry of Transport and Communications for the delays in the implementation 
process. Also, he noted the negative effects of non-implementation of EU regulation 
on the overall regulation-making process in the country, stressing the urgency of the 
matter:
We fEETT] are not directly involved. The ministry is responsible for transposing the EU law. 
However, we are affected by this delay because we cannot take action that conflicts with the 
new EU regulatory framework. Also, we cannot act without having a revised regulatory basis 
that will guarantee the legitimacy of our proposals. (CB)
However, regulators in the country seem to limit the importance of regulation 
to the smooth operation of the market and to consumers’ interests. Costas Balictsis 
avoids the social mission of regulation and the ways regulation may respond to societal 
needs and concerns:
...market competition and the need for regulatory supervision determine regulation itself. 
Besides, this concerns consumers as well as market competition and its regulation have 
remarkable effects on consumers' rights. (CB)
When the interviewees were asked about the potential of regulation to remedy 
the low Internet adoption in Greece, some like Manoussos Voloudakis, President of 
the National Committee for Electronic Commerce, acknowledged the limited power 
of regulation due to the global nature of the Internet and the fact that regulation runs 
behind technological advancement:
But I do not know whether Internet regulation could ever be a completed, absolutely secure 
and respected area of rules...the nature of the Internet does not really allow that...’ (MV)
The limited power of Internet regulation was also highlighted by activists who 
aim to increase social awareness, such as Dr. Veronica Samara from the SafeNetHome 
project in Greece. In these terms, Dr. Samara emphasised the important role self­
regulation can play in making up for the failures and insufficiencies of formal 
regulation:
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...what strikes us is not regulation itself...rather whether users can develop self-regulation and 
apply efficiently the various -  although again not completely sufficient -  self-regulatory 
measures they have available. (VS)
Self-regulation, its role and status in Greece are discussed later as part of the 
other propositions of the elite actors to shrink digital divides.
5.5.2 E U regulation: non-implementation and effects
The elite actors’ enthusiasm about EU telecoms regulation is in contrast to the 
fact that Greece has been the EU member state with the longest delay in 
implementing this regulation. This delay was confirmed by George Papapavlou, who 
oversees the implementation of EU regulation in member states, including Greece: 
‘...Greece has not implemented the new EU regulatory framework yet, although this 
framework should have been implemented by July 2003’. (GP)
Almost all the interviewees expressed concerns about the very delayed 
implementation of EU regulation in Greece and noted the importance of a revised 
regulatory framework to increase Internet adoption and development of the market in 
Greece. In this spirit, actors in the market and regulators underlined the negative 
impact of the non-implementation of EU telecoms regulation in Greece, particularly 
with respect to development of the broadband market:
...Greece has not implemented the new EU regulatory framework yet...this has made things 
difficult, especially in terms of providing competitive services...eeee...of broadband networks 
that allow access to the Internet. (GP)
I think that the Greek citizen is a step behind, as s/he has yet not trusted the medium. The lack 
of regulation and delayed transposition of EU laws on the Internet contribute, however, to the 
persistence of the current situation of nonmsage. (SP)
On the other hand, interviewees representing the body of Internet users in 
Greece went beyond the market-related effects that regulators and market operators 
emphasised. They maintained that the existing regulatory gap between Greece and the 
EU has implications for the extent to which people in Greece can change their 
preconceptions and become more willing to integrate new technologies into their daily 
lives. Elena Spyropoulou, the Legal Consultant of the Association of Greek Internet 
Users (EEXI), argued that regulatory delays and fragmentation play a fundamentally 
negative role in the protection of users’ privacy and security online, thus obstructing 
the change of society’s culture in the country:
...about Internet content, there is not a single regulatory body that sets specific provisions on 
the quality and types of the freely accessible and legal online content. ISPs are the only ones 
who can ensure access to legal and quality online content. (ES)
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5.5.5 Non -implementation ofEU regulation andpolitical liability
As part of the broader discussion of policy and regulation in the Greek 
information society (see Appendix 5-4) and as the figure (Figure 5-5) below shows, even 
the interviewees involved in policy and regulation considered bureaucracy, non­
modernisation of the public sector, policy delays and a lack of awareness in the public 
sector as the main reasons for Greece’s failure to implement in full and timely the EU 
telecoms regulation. These causes of failure seem closely associated with legacies and 
traditions in the country’s public administration. On the other hand, arguments in 
favour of current decision-making practices in the Greek information society 
constituted exceptions in the interview discourses:
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Researchers such as Professor Gregory Yovanof and Ioannis Tomkos raised the 
issue of the priorities set by the country’s authorities, while representatives of EU 
regulatory authorities such as George Papapavlou noted the issue of low awareness not 
only in Greek society but also in national authorities:
GY: It is a matter of priorities...
IT: (interrupts) ...definitely, definitely...
GY: ...politicians do not see it as...that would prioritise the diffusion of broadband services and
infrastructures as being critical for competition and all possible areas of development.
We do not have regulatory bodies and members of parliament who are informed and have good 
knowledge of these issues, so they do not inform the citizen properly. (GP)
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Even if policy actors admitted political liability, members of the Greek 
government at the time of the interviews such as Vassileios Asimakopoulos used strong 
political language. Vassileios Asimakopoulos argued that the political authorities in 
Greece have now progressed compared to the previous government of the Socialist 
Party:
Interviewer: However, Greece still presents weaknesses in its efforts to transpose and 
implement EU policies and regulations on telecommunications.
VA: That is right, but the Ministry of Transportations and Communications has proceeded to 
the formulation of a telecommunications regulation that transposes the new EU framework.
The new government corrected the mistakes and omissions of the previous government within 
just eight months of being elected.
On the other hand, social actors who proposed the alternative of self-regulation 
problematise the distinction between social and policy action particularly when it is 
about users’ protection on the Internet. These actors emphasised the absence of self- 
regulation in Greece more than official regulation, arguing, furthermore, about the lack 
of social and organisational action. The words of Dr. Veronica Samara from the 
SafeNetHome project are indicative, when she argued that the absence of social and 
organisational action, people’s cultural predispositions, as well as inadequate decision­
making all discourage self-regulation in the country:
Interviewer: Do you think that the lack of awareness impacts on self-regulation in Greece?
VS: Yes, no doubt about that...even the sawiest citizens are not aware of existing selfregulatoiy 
mechanisms, while there is no organisational action in supporting and disseminating self­
regulation. A lot has to change in society’s cultural predispositions as well as in how politicians 
make self-regulatory mechanisms known... As a Saferlnternet project...we try to play that 
role...it is not easy...we face a lot of ideological and political barriers...
Nicos Frydas supported another, more moderate direction of regulation. He is 
the President of SAFENET, an association of industry and other stakeholders, as well 
as the President of the Greek Hotline, promoting co-regulation among social, industry 
and regulation players in Greece. Thus, he referred to the conflict of interests between 
the bodies involved and to the inefficiency of governmental action in Greece as the 
reasons why co-regulation should be in place:
The argument that self-regulation is enough is idealistic. Co-regulation is the best for the 
interests of the public ana the industry. In our country, self-regulation does not work as it 
should and this is the reason I believe in co-regulation. For instance, in the UK the system of 
blocking child pornography works as a result of a purely governmental initiative. I do not know 
if such initiatives could work equally well in our country. (NF)
These issues again demonstrate the strong dialogue between society, policy and 
regulation within a complex system of actors and factors, suggesting that this dialogue 
is taken into consideration when researching digital divides. However, it seems that 
the elite actors mostly argued on the grounds of their expertise and professional 
interests, whilst the market appears to sit in between society and politics, being 
presented as a mediator affected by politics and society.
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6 Policy and regulation drivers in the Greek information 
society (4th theme)
This theme (see Appendix 5-4) examined Internet policy and regulation in 
detail and beyond EU regulation. The elite actors made arguments concerning the out- 
of-date and a-social policy and regulatory schemes on the Internet in Greece. They 
also noted underlying cultural forces that reside in decision-making in the Greek 
information society and account for the low Internet adoption rates in the country.
5.6.1 Non-technocratic decision-making: implications fo r  the information society
W hen questions were posed about the reasons underlying Greece’s failure to 
implement EU regulation and stimulate Internet technologies, the interviewees noted 
the critical role Greek authorities and the public administration have played. As the 
figure (Figure 5-6) below illustrates, the interviewees argued that a culture of poor co­
operation, bureaucracy, a lack of modernisation and techno-phobia dominates the 
Greek public sector and the country’s overall decision-making practices. At the same 
time, they attempted to disentangle the ways these traits of decision-making are 
associated with one another:
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The interviewees mostly resorted to bibliographic and research sources to 
support the argument that low Internet adoption in Greece and Greece’s long­
standing regulatory gap vis-a-vis the EU are closely related to bureaucratic, inefficient, 
non-technocratic and socially non-accountable decision-making practices in the 
country. Actors involved in ICT research, such as Gregory Yovanof and Ioannis 
Tomkos, gave examples of how the bureaucratic operation of the public administration 
accounts for policy and regulatory delays or failures in the Greek information society:
These {regulatory delays} are very indicative of the dominant bureaucratic mechanisms in our 
country...bureaucracy is much stronger in Greece than in other countries...one reason is the 
absence of electronic means and services in the public sector ...in order for draft legislation to 
be signed ten signatures are required. It could be electronic signatures so that it takes just one 
day. However, just the signing off of legislative drafts takes two months in Greece. (IT)
...why are we talking about broadband...since politicians do not recognise the benefit of e- 
services, how can we contribute to their diffusion? (GY)
Reflecting on the authorities’ self-evaluation of structure and operation, the 
interviews provided references to a lack of collaboration, absence of formal and 
systematic campaigns for public awareness-raising, and to the limited and socially 
distant scope of the authorities’ activities and services. The words of Athena Bourka, 
Auditor of the Greek DPA, are indicative when she indirectly points to the directions 
in which the authorities should work more intensively:
AB: ...the truth is that have only a few auditors. Another problem is that, technically and 
beyond the law, we do not have the necessary means to conduct extensive audits, to explore the 
operational systems in-depth and to use advanced technical tools.
Interviewer: However, do you participate in joint actions with other bodies of action?
AB: I would not say that we collaborate in such a way. We collaborate in some cases only. 
Eeem...but there is no regular co-operation line to follow. For example, we were asked to 
legislate in order to transpose the EU Privacy Directive and there was no collaboration with any 
other authority.
Interviewer: ...and what about increasing public awareness of privacy protection on the 
Internet?
AB: ....if we are talking about information provided to people...eeem...there is no particular 
awareness campaign that we run, something that we should promote further. Eeem...as people 
are interested in this as well. For example, last year...in our annual report these issues were 
mentioned, and when the DPA President announced the report the public was pretty 
interested...
On the other hand, market-players such as Sophia Parissi emphasised the lack 
of modernisation and traditionalism of the Greek public administration. Of particular 
interest is Sophia Parissi’s argument that people’s unwillingness to use new 
technologies, such as the Internet, is a phenomenon present not only in society but 
also in the public administration:
...unlike what happens in other European countries where policies are vertical, straightforward, 
clear and mandatory...in Greece there is no such functionality...this is due to the ‘old-fashion’ 
identity of the Greek public sector which is not modernised enough, and because of the 
reluctance of leaders to promote the Internet as a tool for the necessary modernisation of the 
public administration. (SP)
Thus, even interviewees not directly linked to decision-making argued about 
particularities concerning attitudes, traits and cultures in the public sector in their
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attempt to explain the drawbacks of the information society in Greece. In this sense, 
the interviewees highlighted a research area that has been overlooked in the national 
research of digital divides, whilst they approached cultural traits and trends as matters 
that go beyond society and ordinary people’s everyday living.
Conversely, although the elite actors identified cultural trends in the public 
administration along with society’s culture, it is puzzling that they pointed to the 
existence of a gap between society and formal policy and regulation in Greece. They 
argued about such a gap and supported the need for more socially accountable policies 
and regulations. Nicos Vasilakos, the President of the Association of Internet Users, 
pointed to the indifference and ignorance of decision-makers about technology-related 
matters, thus calling for more socially accountable policies:
For me the problem is that all politicians have...a laptop, a gift from the Parliament, and they 
have given it to their secretary to work with. This is a problem because we talk about the 
Internet like it does not concern us. The main political authorities seem to be far away from the 
Internet. The ministries have impressive websites constructed by companies, but we want to 
see that jobs and attention are given to people, to the citizen. The previous government was 
saying ‘lets talk about the Internet’, but this government avoids that, saying ‘I need more 
information, give me some time’. (NV)
Nevertheless, only a few actors emphasised the cultural characteristics of Greek 
society more than the practices and cultures of decision-making in the Greek 
information society. These were actors involved in policy and regulation who 
attempted to defend their own work and efforts in this domain, shifting the focus to 
society. One indicative example is Manos Voloudakis’ words on behalf of the National 
Committee for Electronic Commerce:
Interviewer: You mentioned the non-technocratic and monolithic culture in civil society. Do 
you think this is similar to the culture of the public administration and policy-making?
MV: No, no, no... I’m sure that there is no such non-technocratic culture in policy-making. This 
government is making a lot of effort to disseminate new technologies and keep up with other 
EU countries’ technological development. As a government, we inform people and launch 
action lines in agreement with citizens’ needs and the EU guidelines...the bad thing is that we 
do not find the enthusiastic acceptance from citizens that we expected...this is why no 
significant progress has been achieved yet.
Beyond the traits of decision-making, elite actors such as Ioannis Tomkos 
proposed that initiatives be undertaken for awareness-raising in the public sector. 
Ioannis Tomkos is involved in ICT research and proposed that awareness-raising 
campaigns and seminars be organised so as to increase awareness of necessary policies 
and regulations in the field among the country’s public authorities:
Before this discussion, we [he and Gregory] talked about the organisation of a workshop which 
would aim to increase the awareness at the citizen level, but first at the level of leaders, at the 
level of ministers...is that right? Rulers want to implement policy priorities that are acquired 
from the EU and are not rulers’ own priorities...they [rulers] may not understand the reasons 
that make such priorities a must. (IT)
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y.6.2 Socially-accountable decision-making a t the epicentre
In connection with the above remarks, the interviewees argued that decision­
making in the country must be more socially directed, suggesting socially accountable 
policies and regulations for the Internet. Their suggestion provides space for the 
participation of people in the information society to be enabled and for digital divides 
to be addressed (Figure 5-7):
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As discussed later, the elite actors argued that ordinary people cannot play an 
important role in decision-making and they suggested that change should begin with 
the authorities. An indicative example is Ioannis Tomkos, Associate Dean of the AIT, 
who pointed to the role political change should play in society’s change in the 
information society and the role of e-government in particular:
...[with] the development of e-government, society will also be dragged into using broadband 
services. Therefore, the government has a double role to play... I feel veiy sorry when I go to 
public services and see desks without computers and secretaries moving files between desks... If 
the change does not start with public services... (IT)
While political change was considered to be the driver to change the traditional 
and non-technocratic character of Greek society, society’s needs were proposed as 
lying at the core of decision-making. Although this sounds contradictory, it highlights 
the complexity of interactions between society and politics in the Greek context. Also, 
the interviewees emphasised the importance of socially-accountable decision-making 
by reflecting on their own expertise and roles in the information society. For instance,
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Nicos Vassilakos, President of EEXI, pointed to areas policy-making in Greece should 
touch on, such as public awareness, thus attempting to explain how decision-making 
can take ordinary people’s needs into consideration:
NV: A question regarding public awareness is also posed. Namely, when the public is not 
informed about where to address problems...is it our fault after all? If all those people [decision­
makers] were doing their job well, would we have to go around Greece to inform the public?
We are a body since 1994 and no matter how many governments will pass on we will always be 
here.
Interviewer: Do you feel like the political authorities have cast you aside?
NV: ...nobody came ever to ask us...did you see how the new government has treated the 
Internet? It promised to give free Internet...did it? Of course not! The previous government 
promised to educate its management staff on the Internet...did it? Of course not!
Even Vassileios Asimakopoulos, who is in charge of relevant policy initiatives, 
pointed to the distance between official policy-making and people’s everyday lives and 
the related negative effects on the information society. On the other hand, he 
presented the policies and practices that he is in charge of as different and sufficiently 
socially accountable:
Practically, we design our future activities in accordance with existing social concerns and 
needs... This, however, cannot happen through advertising or any such kind of promotion. 
Instead, we approach the citizen by making decisions and designing policies that would have a 
practical impact on the citizen’s everyday life...we want more socially accountable policies that 
will respond to people’s needs. (VA>
Another policy actor, Manos Voloudakis, President of the Committee for 
Electronic Commerce, proposed socially-accountable policies as the means for 
encouraging people to integrate the Internet into their everyday lives and for 
fighting against public fears in general and in relation to e-commerce more 
specifically. He argued this even if he claimed previously that politicians cannot do 
much if society’s culture does not change first:
...very few people use the Internet for transactions due to the lack of security and fear of fraud. 
Nonetheless, I do not think so...most Greek people have never taken a look at the Internet and 
the way they can deal with online transactions. The majority...at least this is what statistics 
show... feel distant and even afraid of the Internet. ...we need to draw a more holistic action line 
that brings people closer to e-commerce... (MV)
Nevertheless, actors with an insider’s view of decision-making, such as 
Vassileios Asimakopoulos and Manos Voloudakis, argued that more effort and time 
are needed before essential policy change is accomplished. In some sense, they 
attempted to present the difficulties this task holds for the Greek government, while 
themselves representing relevant governmental practices:
...we try to change things, but huge delays took place in the past...we cannot change the picture 
in a single year... in our country, there is introversion about new technologies and thus we try to 
follow the example of other EU members while looking at the situation within the country. We 
believe there is space for more extroversion. (VA)
...who could deny that we need more time as well as more knowledge and intensive work to 
achieve essential development? (MV)
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However, when the interviewees were asked about society’s contribution to 
decision-making most supported a top-down view. They maintained that Greek 
authorities have to be the driving force of decision-making. Even elite actors working 
on increasing public awareness failed to see the contribution that ordinary people can 
make to decision-making. It is surprising that those who argue for more socially- 
accountable processes do not find space for citizens to actively participate in decision­
making, somewhat in contrast with the idea of participatory democracy. For instance, 
Dr. Veronica Samara, who works on Internet awareness in the Safer Internet 
Programme, argued:
Interviewer: Do you think that the Greek civil society may have a role to play in regulation and 
policy-making on the Internet?
V.S: ...no...I’m afraid...how can society participate? ...It’s not interested...I don’t think that at 
the moment there is potential for social action. It’s like a chain...people need to get more 
interested and stimulated about the Internet first...
Likewise, Nicos Frydas, President of the Greek Hotline, expressed a 
pessimistic view of the potential of citizens to participate in decision-making. 
Although he runs a mechanism (the Hotline) that addresses citizens’ concerns about 
online contents to the country’s authorities, he considered that the lack of 
institutional organisation in society does not enable citizens’ participation in decision­
making:
In other countries maybe, but I do not think this is the case in Greece. We do not have social 
organisations and institutions that could play an active role in decision-making. I do not see 
how citizens might have an influence, unless new organisations and institutions emerge. (NF)
Nevertheless, Costas Balictsis at the National Regulatory Authority argued for 
the catalytic role of public consultations in decision-making. He pointed to the 
persistent gap between the public and decision-making, and argued that public 
consultations are an alternative to the top-down solution that most interviewees 
proposed. Public consultations were presented by this actor as the bridge between 
politics and society so as to make policies and regulations sufficiently accountable to 
society:
Public consultation is a practice that was given particular attention in the last foui^five years so 
as to allow the unlimited registration o f  the opinions and proposals of all parties involved. 
Therefore, participants can be enterprises and services providers, consumer bodies, as well as 
individuals. In general, there is no limitation. (CB)
5.7 Otherforces a t work (tfh theme)
Apart from the above four themes of discussion, the elite actors referred to 
other forces that interact variously with society’s culture and decision-making in the 
information society, thus completing the picture of the complexity of digital divides in
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the country (see Appendix 5-5). The following figure (Figure 5-8) points more 
specifically to the forces of the market, media propaganda and education:
Figure 5-8: Other forces at work
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Sophia Parisii, a market player, argued about the market’s contribution to 
shrinking digital divides in Greece. She considered that the market exerts effort to 
make up for the regulatory gaps and insufficiencies in the country’s information 
society: ‘As a working person, I think that Greek enterprises try to substitute the 
official regulatory schemes in order to cure a lot of the existing regulatory weaknesses’. 
(SP) She also supported efforts of the market to protect Internet users, in a way 
reflecting market interests and her own professional interests:
Clearly, ISPs inform their customers as much as possible to demystify customers’ fears and to 
protect them, as this is in the ISPs’ interests. This takes place through guides and online leaflets 
as well as through software and services that resolve security problems before these reach the 
end-user. These software and services include protection against spamming, viruses and other 
harmful programmes. Of course... it is very difficult to inform people about all the measures we 
take to make them feel safe. (SP)
Besides the market player, researchers and decision-makers acknowledged the 
importance of market liberalisation and development for boosting the Internet in the 
country. George Papapavlou, an EC Officer, recognised the importance of a fully 
liberated and dynamic market, at the same time underlining the negative effects of the 
slow market development on Internet penetration in Greece. He made it clear that the 
spirit of EC regulation favours the idea that the diffusion of Internet technologies and 
protection of users go hand-in-hand with well-grounded market development:
Interviewer: Does the market contribute to full implementation of the new regulatory 
framework?
GP: It contributes...as you know, one part of the framework looks at market issues... If you 
have market players who offer good services to users and earn money by doing their job well, 
probably the outcome will be in the interest of the user.
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Nevertheless, issues concerning the market ethos and the grim struggle for 
profit among market competitors question the role of the market and raise the 
inspectional role of political and regulatory authorities in the operation of market 
mechanisms. Nicos Frydas, President of the Hotline, argued that market players in 
Greece lack social responsibility and ethical behaviour. This critique has a certain value 
as Nicos Frydas is also a market player himself and his criticism yields from his role as 
a co-ordinator of SAFENET:
The industry is the main shareholder of SAFENET, of which I’m President. However, market 
players in Greece are not interested in overcoming the above weaknesses. The business-ethics 
relationship is market players’ last priority. Commercial interests determine the ways players 
behave ana the actions they take. I feel that the market in other countries is more responsible. 
(NF)
Elena Spyropoulou, Legal Consultant of EEXI, had a similar view of the market 
and the role of ISPs in particular. She approached the market from an Internet-user 
perspective and argued that regulation assigns insufficient responsibility to ISPs, 
leaving the user unprotected against online security risks:
Interviewer: Let’s discuss the responsibility of the ISPs you mentioned. Can you be more 
specific?
ES: ...for instance, when a cyber-crime takes place, a question arises regarding the extent to 
which the service provider is liable or can intervene and control the source of the crime... So far, 
providers have the option to check the various sources of content and to control their 
customers, but this should not be an option...
Interviewer: Does this affect users’ security?
ES: Yes, a lot.
In addition, the elite actors mentioned media propaganda as a source of 
negativism in Greek society against the Internet. Sophia Parissi, Officer of SEPE, 
expressed strong pessimism about the media’s role and the associated potential of 
citizens to contribute to shrinking digital divides:
...we constantly see negative media representations of the Internet. For example, child 
pornography and occasional incidents of suicide on the Internet are presented by the media 
much more extensively than the benefits of the Internet. We believe that this contributes 
significantly to social fear, obscurantism and ignorance. (SP)
Similarly, Nicos Frydas referred to ‘hysterical media propaganda’ to explain the 
varying receptions of different technologies by Greek society (e.g. mobile telephony 
and the Internet): ‘regarding the Internet, the fear of fraud has affected people. This 
has made us suspicious and reluctant, and the hysterical media propaganda has 
contributed to this reluctance. (N F ). He argued that the media could instead play a 
positive role as the medium through which the citizen’s voice is heard: ‘...we need co- 
regulation, supervision and control of the central authorities. To me, the state and the 
media, which reflect social concerns, are the drivers of the process.’ (N F).
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Finally, those working in education and awareness-raising initiatives pointed 
out the remedial role that IT education and training on safe use of the Internet can 
play vis-a-vis the weaknesses of the Greek information society. Dr. Veronica Samara of 
the SafeNetHome Project underlined the negative impact that the current lack of 
thorough IT training and education in Greek schools has on Internet diffusion and 
safe use of the Internet:
...we invest a lot in education...it is unacceptable that there is no computer or Internet training 
in primary schools. At the age of 12 and 13 it is too late to teach a child...what we propose is 
training from the age of 6 when the child goes to primary school for the first time...parents have 
to be more informed about the Internet too... (VS).
Also, higher education actors such as Professor Gregory Yovanof from the AIT 
emphasised the role of education. Professor Gregory Yovanof was, however, more 
optimistic and foresaw that thanks to education the next generation of Greeks will 
have a ‘healthier’ attitude to new technologies:
...young generations treat new technologies in a far ‘healthier’ way, as new technologies enter 
schools gradually; I think that culture will start changing with schools, while the way young 
generations can deal with technology efficiently has to be worked out at school. (GY/
In summary, the discourses about other forces at work highlighted domains 
lying in between decision-making and society and their role in digital divides. Also, the 
elite actors noted the potential of bridging decision-making and society’s culture 
through appropriate market, media, education and awareness-raising initiatives, 
although they all had negative accounts of the role these forces currently play in the 
Greek information society.
5.8 Critical reflections (6th theme)
I conclude the discussion of the findings by departing from the thematic 
analysis of the interviews. In this section, I critically reflect on the interview discourses 
in order to shed light on the interview process and the value of the texts for the thesis 
as a whole. Thus, the figure (Figure 5-9) below draws on distances, contradictions and 
professionally driven discourses in the interviews (see Appendix 5-6):
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Figure 5-9: Critical reflections
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As shown in the thematic analysis earlier, the interviewees provided tactful 
answers to or skipped important issues about some questions, whilst they entirely 
refused to answer other questions. This is explained if one takes into account the
research to trace multiple layers of societal, policy, regulatory and other conditions in 
the Greek information society. For instance, some times the interviewees were 
uncomfortable about being asked questions that touched upon issues of immediate 
professional interest, while the structure of the interviews aimed to avoid the 
introduction of preconceptions or predispositions in the interviewees’ answers. An 
indicative example is Manos Voloudakis, President of the National Committee for 
Electronic Commerce, who did not answer a question about the factors that influence 
the communication between politicians and citizens, while he tried to defend the work 
of the ministerial services he directs:
...because I’m the new General Secretary...to be honest...I’m not absolutely sure...ingeneral, we 
tiy to learn from the past and work on new principles...who could deny that we need more time, 
more knowledge ana intensive work to achieve development? (MV)
Closely related to this kind of distanciation in the elite actors’ discourses was 
the difficulty of many actors, particularly the politicians and market players, in using 
socially-driven language. These actors tended to use a somewhat policy- and market- 
driven language which either contradicted or altered the often deeper social meaning 
of the actual arguments. For instance, Costas Balictsis at the National Regulatory 
Authority used market-oriented language and, as shown earlier, he identified 
regulatory development with market development.
This led the interviewees to make contradictory statements regarding, in 
particular, the distinctiveness and future of the Greek information society. Nicos
professional and ideological background of the elite actors, as well as the goal of the
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Frydas, President of the Greek Hotline, acknowledged the distinctiveness of the 
Greek case, on one hand, and made contradictory remarks when issues of Greek 
identity and culture were raised, on the other:
Interviewer: Is Greek society characterised by such a culture affecting, in turn, the course of the 
information society?
NF: We have the example of mobile telephony that enjoyed commercial success soon after its 
appearance. Hence, Greek citizens accept anything new...there are indications that the Greek 
citizen can accept the new...it might not be the rule, it might be the exception though.
Contradictory arguments76 are an indication of the tactful approach taken by 
some interviewees. For instance, Athena Bourka, Auditor at the Greek DPA, was 
caught up in contradictions with regard to the DPA’s social impact. She represents the 
DPA, an independent authority for privacy protection which is, however, part of the 
Greek system; a system where even independent institutional bodies are closely 
controlled by the country’s political and regulatory authorities:
Interviewer: You mentioned before the low social impact of the DPA, as the majority of people 
may not be aware of...
AB: (interrupts) ...regarding some of the issues that I mentioned. Again, it depends on the case, 
as sometimes people may be more aware ...
Nonetheless, most interviewees made some suggestions. They emphasised the 
need for policy and regulatory action in order for market liberalisation, flat Internet 
rates, education and training, as well as public awareness and self-regulation to be 
reinforced. This was accompanied by references to socially accountable policies and 
regulations in order for society’s culture to change. Also, some of those involved in 
decision-making gave optimistic statements regarding the Internet’s future in Greece 
and despite the current status of digital divides in the country:
Interviewer: In other words, you maintain that the authorities have to come closer...
VA: ...exactly...
Interviewer: ...to citizens and to offering them useful ICT services...
VA: ...exactly, that is right, otherwise we will get in a vicious circle, saying that since there is 
nothing, citizens should not be bothered while, the state can say, in turn, that since society is 
traditional it is pointless to work on it. However, we believe that we can break this vicious circle 
and take the first step in the right direction.
Finally, subjectivity and professionalism marked many of the elite actors’ 
arguments, with policy actors, regulators and market players in particular positioning 
themselves on the basis of their professional interests. This to some degree explains 
the contradictions identified in the interview arguments as well as why different 
interviewees frequently reached similar conclusions when drawing on different aspects 
of the same issue. Subjectivity and professionalism also illustrate the ambivalent and 
multi-directional role that ideology and power frameworks play in the elite actors’
76 Another example of contradictions in the interview discourses is that the elite actors sometimes 
accepted statistics on the Greek information society and at other times dismissed them.
144
discourses. For example, policy-makers such as Vassileios Asimakopoulos tended to 
use policy-driven language, applauding their political allies for any successes and 
blaming their political opponents for any failures in the Greek information society:
Interviewer: ...you said that something changed since the elections of 2004...
VA: Yes there is some activation now. Indicatively, the implementation rates of the 
Programme tripled last year in comparison to the previous three years. Namely, the work 
carried out in the last eignt months of 2004 and since the government changed equals the work 
done between 2001-2004.
These critical reflections on the elite actors’ discourses allow the thesis to ‘read 
between the lines’ of the interviews, identify limitations in the interview findings and 
shed light on the role of the ideology-power complex in the interview discourses. The 
section below accounts for the interview findings in relation to the answers provided 
to the thesis’ research questions and in light of these critical reflections.
5.9 The elite actors9 interviews and research questions
The insights gained in the elite actors’ interviews indicate that the notions of 
everyday life and resistance to technology, on one hand, and socio-centric approaches 
to policy and regulation, on the other, can offer considerable space for more 
informative research of digital divides in Greece. At the same time, the interviews 
raised the interconnections between socio-cultural, political and regulatory forces in 
the Greek information society and pointed to implications for the future of the 
information society given the ideology-power complex.
More specifically, the interviews explored the first principal research question, 
sketching the traits of the Greek information society:
i. What are the general characteristics of the Greek information society?
The interviewees approached the Greek information society and its distinctiveness 
from a socio-cultural and decision-making perspective, to a certain degree confirming 
the thesis’ conceptual framework. The overarching role of culture was raised in the 
interview discourses in relation not only to society but also to decision-making in the 
country, as it was argued that techno-phobia in society and the public administration is 
the main driver of the low adoption of new technologies in Greece. The interviewees 
stressed the importance of creating a fully informed society by employing more socially 
accountable policies and awareness-raising initiatives. They also underlined the critical 
role that sufficient regulation plays, criticising Greece’s delays in implementing EU 
regulation. Overall, the expertise and role of the elite actors played a significant role in 
how they viewed the role of culture and the emphasis they placed on what they 
considered the reasons for low Internet adoption in Greece.
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In addition, the interviewees brought up pragmatic factors that discourage Internet 
adoption in Greece: insufficient infrastructure, a lack of satisfactory online services, 
the high cost of Internet services and networks, as well as a lack of social action and 
institutional organisation. Further, they pointed to other parameters that interact 
variously with society and politics and which complete the complex picture of digital 
divides in the country. These are the parameters of market liberalisation and 
development, media propaganda, as well as IT education and training, which were all 
discussed in the interviews as domains lying in between decision-making and society. 
More specifically, the elite actors articulated negative accounts of the current role of 
these domains in the Greek information society, problematising the role of the 
structures mediating the communication and interaction between society and politics. 
This constitutes an addition to the literature-based knowledge of the research since 
such structural factors have not been examined in the context of the thesis.
Besides the first principal question, the interviews explored all the research questions 
operationalised in Chapter 4 (Table 4-1); questions that help explore the other three 
principal research questions.
2. What are the cultural characteristics of Greek society of past and current times?
Most interviewees recognised the existence of a cultural identity that drives, in their 
view, Greek society towards maintaining a traditional lifestyle and dissociating itself 
from the increasingly powerful world of new technologies. This identity was decoded 
by the interviewees in a pessimistic way as they referred to the existence of a non- 
technocratic and techno-phobic culture in society, to social ignorance and what they 
perceived, in general, as the Greek lifestyle. These arguments brought up the notion of 
citizenship, with the elite actors arguing that Greek people lack a sufficient sense of 
citizenship since they behave more like individuals and less like citizens. At the same 
time, the interview discourses shaped a puzzling picture of Greek distinctiveness, with 
contradictory evidence about technologies that Greek people accept enthusiastically 
(e.g. mobile telephony) being often used by the interviewees against the argument of 
Greek distinctiveness.
5. More specifically, how do the cultural characteristics of Greek society take shape in the Greek 
information society?
Elite actors who are in close communication with ordinary people presented the
techno-phobic and non-technocratic culture as dominant in Greek society. At the
same time, they placed different weight on the forces that drive techno-phobia. Low
public awareness, insufficient familiarity with the Internet, the high cost of Internet
services, and low quality of Internet services and infrastructure were some forces
mentioned in the interviews. These forces and the different value that different elite
actors attributed to each of them reflect the interviewees’ own experiences and roles
in the country’s information society. Regardless of the frequently contradictory voices
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heard in the interviews, these arguments specifically confirm the notion of 
distinctiveness of the Greek information society that the thesis has drawn upon.
4. Which cultural and everyday life settings ofGreek people influence digital divides in Greece 
and in what ways?
A further decrease of public awareness, social resistance, lack of social action and 
institutional organisation in everyday activities, as well as a persistent lack of 
familiarity with new technologies were some issues the interviewees pointed out as 
parameters resulting from the techno-phobic culture of society. Actors with different 
roles in the information society pointed to different issues arising from the techno­
phobic culture of society, but their discourses contributed to the same picture: the 
picture of a society that refuses to integrate the Internet into everyday routines and 
resists it. Nevertheless, elite actors who participate in decision-making evaluated the 
traits of Greek society in a socially distant way, identifying, for instance, the notion of 
‘citizen’ with that o f‘consumer’.
5. What is the generalpicture and key features of policy-and regulation-making in Greece?
The interviewees argued that poor co-operation, bureaucracy, a lack of modernisation 
and techno-phobia dominate the Greek public sector and overall decision-making 
practices in the country. They underlined these parameters when questions concerning 
the forces that undermine the implementation of EU telecoms regulation in Greece 
were posed. Looking closer at the interview discourses, one can observe that 
professional interests influenced the elite actors’ views as most attempted to defend 
their own work, looking at the liability of policy and regulatory bodies in the country 
from different points of view. Also, some actors brought up self-regulation and co­
regulation as alternatives to state-driven regulation; alternatives, however, that were 
seen as currently hindered in Greece because of the lack of social organisation and 
political action on one hand and due to conflicts of interest on the other.
6. More specifically, how does policy- and regulation-making take shape in the Greek 
information society?
The elite actors argued that ordinary people cannot play an important role in decision­
making due to a lack of social organisation, techno-phobic culture and lack of 
citizenship. They suggested that change should begin with the country’s political and 
regulatory authorities. On the other hand, they stressed that socially accountable 
policies and regulations should be in place so that the traditional and non-technocratic 
character of society can change. They emphasised the importance of socially 
accountable policies by mostly reflecting on their own expertise and role in the Greek 
information society. Some mentioned the role of public consultations as an alternative 
for change to come from grassroots. However, when they were asked about the 
possibly immediate contribution of society to decision-making, most supported a top-
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down approach, maintaining that official authorities have to drive decision-making. 
Even actors who aim to increase public awareness of the Internet failed to see the 
contribution that ordinary people can make by participating in decision-making 
processes. It is quite surprising that those in favour of more socially accountable 
processes do not provide any space for ordinary people to actively participate in 
decision-making, thus contrasting with the idea of participatory democracy.
7. What is the role ofpolicy- and regulation-making in Greece in the course of the country’s 
information society and with regard to digital divides?
Politicians, regulators and researchers admitted the authorities’ liability for the 
techno-phobia and non-technocratic culture in Greek society. They talked about 
political liability in terms of practices and mindsets that prevail in the country’s 
decision-making processes. They more or less emphasised regulatory delays, the 
existence of a non-technocratic and inefficient public administration, and the lack of 
appropriate regulatory initiatives and the overall socially non-accountable character of 
the public administration. The emphasis they placed on some issues also reflects their 
own experiences and roles in the country’s information society.
8. What are the keyparameters ofthe dynamic between society’s culture and decision-makingin 
digital divides in Greece?
The elite actors highlighted a research area overlooked in national research as they 
approached cultural traits and trends as matters that go beyond society and ordinary 
people’s everyday lives. They argued that the techno-phobic and resistance culture in 
Greece extends beyond the societal domain and is closely linked to decision-making 
practices, influencing, among others, Internet adoption in the country. Thus, they 
illustrated the close interactions between society and politics that shape multiple 
domains of activity and the complex web of actors and factors in policy, regulation and 
society that drive digital divides in the country.
However, the links between society’s culture and decision-making and their influence 
on the Internet’s integration into ordinary people’s everyday lives were approached 
differently by different elite actors. Although the actors stressed that policies and 
regulations must come closer to the needs and particularities of society, those involved 
in decision-making defended their work and argued that the government they 
represent has already attempted to do so. In broader terms, there seems to be a 
distance between the forces raised in the interviews as the interviewees underlined 
these forces from more than one perspective and on the grounds of the interests they 
represent in the information society. On the other hand, the market seems to sit in 
between society and politics, being presented in the discourses as a force that can 
make up for the failures and insufficiencies of societal, policy or regulatory action in 
the country.
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9. How does the dynamic between society's culture and decision-makinginfluence digital divides 
in Greece? To what extent and in what direction?
On one hand, a culture of resistance and techno-phobia in Greek society were 
perceived by the interviewees as being reflected in the public administration, 
influencing the rhetoric and practices of decision-making on the Internet. On the 
other hand, the interviewees claimed decision-making should have a stronger social 
orientation, thus shedding light on the importance of awareness-raising and the 
incorporation of the Internet into people’s everyday lives. These claims support a 
sociological approach to policy and regulation in the information society as well as the 
examination of ICT adoption from an everyday perspective, strengthening the 
grounds upon which this thesis has theoretically relied.
Nevertheless, the elite actors provided little space for citizens to influence decision­
making, whilst IT education, market development and positive media propaganda 
were underlined as other means to achieve cultural change. Representing elite bodies 
of action, the interviewees argued that the solution to digital divides is to come from 
policy and regulation, overlooking the role the public could play. This is important if 
one considers that the interviewees thought of the public as the grounds on which 
politics is based and which shape political culture. They made similar claims when 
they pointed to the role that market development and continuous education could 
play in development of the information society, while being very critical of the role 
that media propaganda has played in the rejection of new technologies by most Greek 
people. Such arguments indicate to an extent the role the interviewees’ professional 
status and profile played in the way the cause(s) of and solution(s) to digital divides 
were presented in the interview discourses.
Before concluding, it is worth highlighting issues of professionalism and 
‘conflict of interests’ in the interview discourses. Many interviewees had difficulty 
using socially-oriented language as they downplayed the role of society in bringing 
about positive change in the Greek information society. Particularly interviewees who 
participate in policy- and regulation-making used politically-founded language in their 
efforts to explain the current situation and possible future of the Greek information 
society. In addition, the apparent consensus among the interviewees has to be viewed 
critically from an expertise and ‘conflict of interests’ point of view. Although the elite 
actors have different types of expertise, they all play a more or less important role in 
the country’s information society. Most reflected on issues concerning digital divides 
taking a top-down approach and representing interests (e.g. market, political etc) 
which are often at a distance or even in contrast to and not perfectly understandable 
by society. Although such a consensus was disrupted by contradictions and tensions, 
especially when sensitive accounts of responsibility were given, the analysis in the
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chapter aimed to identify common themes and prominent arguments in the interview 
discourses, without fully revealing the diversity of these discourses.
10 Concluding remarks: interview findings and the way to more 
focused research
Certain aspects of the complex meshwork of ideology and power relations, 
practices and discourses in the Greek information society were illustrated in the elite 
actors’ interviews. The chapter presented a thematic analysis of the interview findings 
and took a selective approach to key interview arguments on the basis of the frequency 
of their appearance, the number and status of the interviewees, and the association of 
the arguments with the thesis’ theoretical framework and research objectives. On the 
other hand, a critical approach to the interview discourses allowed the chapter to map 
out to some extent the complexity of these discourses and the answers they offer to 
the research questions.
The discussion in this chapter confirms the analytical validity of the historically 
rooted cultural legacies of Greek society. Also, it highlights the elite actors’ argument 
that these historical legacies and their underlying ties with policy and regulation drive 
the course of Internet technologies in the country. The interviewees confirmed the 
existence of a culture of resistance and techno-phobia in Greek society, and argued 
that this culture is reflected in the public administration, thus influencing the rhetoric 
and practices of decision-making on the Internet. At the same time, they claimed that 
decision-making should have a stronger social orientation, emphasising the importance 
of awareness-raising and incorporating the Internet into people’s everyday lives. In 
addition, the interviewees stressed the existence of more pragmatic forces of low 
Internet adoption in the country such as the lack of sufficient infrastructure and 
online services, the high cost of Internet services and networks and the lack of 
institutional organisation, along with the mediating factors of media propaganda, IT 
education and market development. Although these forces are not looked at in depth 
in the thesis, they are not entirely ignored as Internet users and non-users are asked in 
the next two phases of the research to report on what encourages or discourages them 
from adopting the Internet.
Lastly, discrepancies in the texts about the progressive character of Greek 
society, the future character of decision-making, the widely overlooked role of the 
public in the closure of digital divides, the role of the market, and the various 
dimensions of the notion of Greek distinctiveness point to the rhetoric employed by 
the interviewees. This rhetoric invites the research to adopt a critical approach to 
dominant interview discourses, whereas stronger connections to the theoretical
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framework and the research questions, as well as further considerations of the 
implications for the next phases of research must be made. Therefore, the thesis 
extends its analytical efforts through a large-scale survey and focus-group interviews of 
ordinary people in Greece, thereby shedding light on ordinary people’s views and 
practices, and juxtaposing the politically-founded language of the elite actors with the 
discourses of ordinary people.
The qualitative insights into the research questions obtained in the elite actors’ 
interviews set the grounds and pave the way for a more focused and critical analysis of 
digital divides through quantitative and qualitative research of the views of ordinary 
people in the second and third phases of the research, respectively. In the societal 
domain, resistance, a lack of integration of technology into everyday life, a lack of 
awareness, social ignorance, a lack of social action and low levels of citizenship are the 
parameters further explored by surveying and interviewing ordinary people. In the 
policy and regulatory domain, decision-making delays, a lack of social accountability, as 
well as inefficiency and a lack of social awareness of policies and regulations are the 
parameters explored when ordinary people are surveyed and interviewed.
The data collected in all three different phases of the research are evaluated for 
their research contribution in comparison to other research in the field and are 
synthetically discussed in Chapter 9.
6 . Digital divides in Greece: the role of society’s culture and 
decision-making. A descriptive approach to quantitative data
6.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter introduces the survey data collected in the second phase of the 
research and reports the results of the descriptive analysis. Section 6.2 introduces the 
survey aims. Section 6.3 reports descriptive findings and the statistical significance of 
demographics. Section 6.4 summarises the main findings and paves the way for the 
modelling analysis in Chapter 7. The survey explores ordinary people’s decisions to 
adopt the Internet or not, as well as their related perceptions and evaluations. It thus 
provides a bottom-up account of Internet adoption in Greece and raises issues to be 
qualitatively cross-checked and examined in the final phase of the research, namely 
focus-group interviews of a sub-sample of surveyed individuals.
6.2 Introduction
After setting the grounds with the top-down overview of the Greek 
information society in the elite actors’ interviews, in the second phase of the empirical 
research I conducted a survey of ordinary people’s attitudes to the Internet and 
Internet policies and regulations in Greece77 (for more on the research design, see 
Chapter 4). The following operationalised research questions (see Chapter 4, Table 4- 
1) were initially examined qualitatively in the elite actors’ interviews and in this phase 
were explored quantitatively from the point of view of ordinary people:78
1. W hich cultural and everyday life settings of Greek people influence digital divides 
in Greece and in what ways?
2. W hat is the role of policy- and regulation-making in Greece in the course of the 
country’s information society and with regard to digital divides?
3. How does the dynamic between society’s culture and decision-making influence 
digital divides in Greece? To what extent and in what direction?
77 Although the scope of the survey was the urban area of Attica, where almost half of the Greek 
population resides, I use the terms Greece/Greek’ in the discussion of the survey findings.
8 The elite actors set the ground by examining all the operationalised research questions. Then, only 
three of the questions -  those that could provide more insights and could be explored from the point of 
view of ordinary people -  were examined in the survey and focus groups. For more, see Chapter 4, Table 
4-1.
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Specifically, in this phase I attempted to trace and decode people’s attitudes79 
to the Internet relative to everyday and resistance culture and the role of Internet 
policy and regulation. To achieve this aim, I quantitatively explored the following 
questions:
o As regards Internet adoption (i.e. use, quality of use etc): what is the Internet 
diffusion in Greece?; which conclusions can be reached about the quality and 
breadth of Internet usage?; are users and non-users in Greece concerned with 
online risks?
o From an everyday life perspective: how do users and non-users perceive the 
Internet’s role in their everyday lives?; are Greek people marked by a dismissive 
attitude to the Internet and its role in their lives, and what are the differences 
between users and non-users?
o From a policy and regulation perspective: how do users and non-users evaluate the 
efficiency of national and EU policy and regulation for the Internet?; how aware 
are users and non-users of current Internet policies and regulations and the 
authorities in charge, and how satisfied are they with them?
The chapter discusses these questions by presenting descriptive results for all 
survey questions, providing full demographics in the Appendix, and noting significant 
demographic differences in the main text. Thus, these questions will allow the 
explanatory and hypotheses testing found in Chapter 7, where modelling techniques of 
statistical analysis apply.
6,3 Descriptive analysis and significance ofdemographics
This section aims to present the basic survey findings concerning Internet 
usage, non-usage, patterns of usage, people’s evaluations of the Internet, as well as 
people’s satisfaction and awareness of Internet policy, regulation and authorities. 
Demographics are tested in all cases80 and statistical significance techniques apply in 
order for the differences between users and non-users to be identified. The analysis 
follows the thematic structure of the questionnaire, with general issues of Internet use 
and non-use examined first and specific issues concerning society’s culture and 
decision-making then examined. Regardless of the large size of the survey sample, care
79 ‘Attitudes’ is an indicator that embraces respondents’ beliefs, perceptions or opinions, as well as 
behaviours.
80 The sample demographics are presented in Chapter 4 (p. 97). There it becomes obvious that I can 
compare with gender, age and education, but not with income, as 67% of the respondents did not reveal 
their family income. Since the data have been weighted according to the population demographics (see 
Chapter 4, p. 96), the discussion of the findings refers to the weighted body of data so as to generalise 
the findings to the whole population.
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was required to test the data’s representativeness and a certain selection strategy was 
followed to paint a clear picture of the key indicators.
6.3.1 M edia availability & Internet use
This section reports Internet use and examines issues of access so as to 
conclude about whether access still matters for Internet use.
Internet use by individuals (Q5)
W hat percentage of the population uses the Internet? Internet use is a useful 
indicator when other Internet adoption variables are measured and when it is a control 
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As shown in the above figure (Figure 6-1), 44.5% of the population uses the 
Internet and/or email, while 5.1% have used the Internet in the past but are non-users 
now. Also, 54.8% of the population use a computer, whereas 20.8% of computer users 
do not use the Internet. These figures diverge from other national or European surveys 
for Greece as computer and Internet usage in Greece usually ranges between 20-30%. 
This difference can be explained by the regional scope of the research, as residents in 
urban regions are more likely to use a computer or the Internet than those living in 
rural or semi-urban regions. This research focuses on the urban region of Attica only 
since the aim is not to report computer or Internet penetration per se, but to collect a 
sufficiently large amount of data from Internet users and non-users to allow the 
research questions to be explored from user and non-user perspectives.
Internet use and dem ographics
W hat are the socio-demographics of Internet use and what does this imply for 
gender, age, education and income divides? Research perceives demographics as a main
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Figure 6-1: Internet use by individuals (Q5)
source of divides. This survey finds interesting trends of use among different socio­
demographic groups, as shown in the table (Table 6-1) below.
T able  6-is Internet use by demographics (%)
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In the above table one sees that 59.6% of users are men, suggesting the 
presence of a gender divide to some extent. In terms of age, people aged 65+ are the 
least likely to use the Internet as only 1.3% of users are over 65 years old. Also, most 
users (55.7%) have attended a college or a higher education institution as the lower the 
education the less likely people are to use the Internet. Questionable conclusions are 
reached for the role of income since, although the higher the income the higher the 
use, 29.7% of users appear to have a family income under 49,999 euros and 69.4% of 
users do not reveal their family income. Interestingly, 32.1% of users are in households 
with children and 66.7% are in households without children.
M edia availability: questioning  access b a rrie rs
Does Internet use relate to access to media equipment? In media research, the 
level and characteristics of Internet usage are often related to the usage of other 
media, patterns of media use and barriers to media access. However, the following 
figures somewhat challenge such arguments, pointing to the significant access of non­
users to a computer and the Internet at home.
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Figure 6-2: Media availability at home (Qi)
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According to the above figure (Figure 6~2), not particularly interesting patterns 
emerge for the technologies of telephone, TV and radio, whereas some association 
emerges between Internet use and the availability of video game console, computer 
equipment and Internet access.
More specifically, 16.9% of Internet non-users have a video game console and 
42.3% have a home computer. Also, 15.1% of them have home Internet access. These 
figures support the argument that non-use goes beyond access. Thus, people may be 
digitally excluded because other external barriers discourage them from use or because 
they intrinsically and behaviourally tend not to use the Internet.
In summary, the survey found that Internet users are more likely than non-users 
to be men, younger, more educated, better off, and without children. Also, although 
Internet users are more likely than non-users to have home access to technologies such 
as a video game console, computer and the Internet, Internet and computer access are 
not sufficient predictors of Internet usage. Beyond Internet use figures, demographics 
and access barriers to Internet use, the survey aimed to explore patterns of Internet 
use and their implications for quality of use and Internet adoption in general.
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6.3.2 Patterns o f Internet use and implications fo r quality ofuse
Besides questions of who and how many use the Internet, a complete picture of 
Internet adoption requires the research to examine patterns, quality and breadth of 
use, including risks and opportunities for Internet users.
Place o f  In te rn e t  use: hom e and  w o rk
The question of in which place people go online (Q6) is important as it can 
reveal a lot about Internet access and activities online. Home (83.5%) and work (47.9%) 
are the two places where from most people go online. On the other hand, public or 
open spaces such as community and municipal centres are not used at all for accessing 
the Internet, indicating Internet usage is a relatively private activity in Greece which 
people do not want to make publicly visible. In demographic terms, education seems 
to influence where people access the Internet from. For instance, the majority (53.1%) 
of those using the Internet from home have not received a university education, and 
most (65.9%) of those using the Internet from work have received a college or 
university education. Also, age is important as users over 65 years and 85.7% of those 
aged 15-24 access the Internet from home, with the workplace being significant for the 
25-39 and 40-64 age groups, which constitute the most work-active groups of the 
population (see Appendix 6, Table A.6-1).81
The question of slow or fast Internet access for home Internet users can 
illustrate further possible limitations to access and implications for quality and breadth 
of usage.
D ial-up  u sers: o u tn u m b er ‘fa s t’ u se rs  & a re  n o t in te re s te d  in  b roadband
How do home users access the Internet and what types of Internet connection 
dominate (Q7)? Dial-up and DSL-enabled phone line are the two prominent 
connection types, accounting for 90.6% of the total number of Internet connections.82 
The higher the income the more likely users are to have either a DSL or high-speed 
Internet connection (see Appendix 6, Table A.6-2-A). In addition, slightly more than 
half (57.8%) of those with home Internet access via dial-up express their desire to 
obtain broadband.83
Next, the question of time length of Internet use is addressed as another 
measure with implications for quality of use and the overall picture of Internet 
adoption.
81 From this point on, when I advise the reader to check an Appendix table, the purpose is that they 
check the detailed figures and statistical significance of demographics.
82 Yet this question concerns the identity of those with broadband. This question is explored in Chapter 
7 where the association of this indicator with patterns of use and attitudes to the Internet is tested.
3 Socio-demographic indicators do not appear to have a significant correlation with dial-up users’ ‘desire’ 
for broadband or not (see Appendix A, Table A.6-2-B).
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D ecreasing  n u m b er o f  new  u sers  in  G reece?84
What is the proportion of new Internet users in Greece? The majority (60.3%) 
of Internet users (N=445) started using the Internet more than three years ago, one- 
quarter (24.6%) started two or three years ago and only 15.0% started using the 
Internet within the last year (5.8% in the last six months and 9.2% a year ago). These 
figures indicate the relatively slow increase of Internet adoption in Greece that is 
hardly comparable to the fast changing adoption rates in other European countries. 
Young users are more likely to have started using the Internet in the last year, while 
those with no or primary education (66.6%) and those who have not completed high 
school (39.5%) are similarly more likely to have started using the Internet in the last 
year (see Appendix 6, Table A.6-3).
Frequency of use is next measured as another key indicator of Internet use 
patterns, also pointing to the Internet’s role in people’s lives in general.
In te rn e t  u se rs  in  G reece a re  freq u en t u se rs  (Q .9)
How often do Internet users in Greece go online? Internet users (N=445) in 
Greece are frequent users, with the majority (66.9%) using the Internet once or several 
times a day, 28.0% once, twice or several days a week and only 4.3% less often. Men are 
more likely to use the Internet more often than women, with 70.6% of the former and 
61.1% of the latter using the Internet at least once a week (see Appendix 6, Table A.6-
4).
High frequency of use often implies high integration of the Internet in users’ 
lives. However, what is considered to provide more valid measures of breadth of usage 
and integration of the Internet are the activities users engage in when going online.
G reek  In te rn e t  u sers: In form ation  seekers and  em ail u se rs
What are the most popular activities of Internet users in Greece when they go online?
84 This indicator (Q.8) traces the history of Internet use in Greece.
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Figure 6-3: Please tell me if you ever <’ of the following when you go online...
Banking services |0 .2%  
Listen to music 10.2%  
Work through Internet 1 1.6%  
Visit music sites | 2 . 1 %
Other ■ 2 .7 %
0.0%  10.0% 20.0%  30.0%  40.0%  50.0%  60.0%  70.0%  80.0%  90.0%  100.0%
Base: N=445 (Internet users)
Most Internet users are information seekers (88.8%) and communicate with 
others via email (61.7%), whereas other online means of connectivity, communication 
and interaction are less common (Figure 6-3). Online activities vary among different 
socio-demographic groups of users. Well-educated users are more likely to be involved 
in creative activities, such as purchasing products online, job searching and 
communication with public services, and less likely to be involved in entertainment 
activities online, such as games and chatting (66.7% and 33.3%, respectively).85 On the 
other hand, youth play more games online (43.7%), chat more (39.5%), use less email 
(49.6%) and look less for jobs (6.7%) than older users, with adults aged 25-39 (22.4%) 
and 40-64 (27.5%) being those mainly using the Internet to contact the public 
administration.86 Also, interesting variations can be observed among people of 
different household status, income and gender (see Appendix 6, Table A.6-5).
Thus, there is a clear line of preference for information seeking and contact 
activities online, whereas more participatory online activities appear weak among 
Greek Internet users. Although these results are similar to what is observed in other 
countries, lower percentages appear in Greece for certain online activities, as shown in 
Chapter 9 (pp. 259-60).
Email 61.7%
Get information online 88 .8%
85 The only exception is users who have graduated from a college, as 35% of them chat online.
86 These groups are society’s workforce and thus in need of contacting the public administration.
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6.3.3 Online risks & constraints on functional use: implications for Internet literacy
Besides actual use and its quantitative characteristics (e.g. time spent online, 
frequency of use etc), online risks constitute a parameter that may constrain functional 
usage, thus being an important indicator of Internet adoption. The survey examined 
users’ awareness of, concerns about and security against online risks, pointing to the 
implications for Internet literacy (farther analysis in Chapter 7).
A w areness o f  online risks: viruses and cookies
Before accounting for users’ perceptions of online risks, it was important to ask 
‘how aware are users of online risks?’, as this question (Q.n) allowed a better 
understanding of popular discourses in Greece about Internet risks.
Internet users’ awareness is high for viruses (98.5%) and Internet cookies 
(57.2%), but relatively low for spam (48.5%),87 spyware (46.5%), adware (32.6%) and 
Internet phishing (28.8%). Men and those who have attended higher education are 
more likely to be aware of online risks than those with a low or middle education. Less 
importantly, young users, users with a high family income and those in households 
without children are more likely to be aware of some types of risks (see Appendix 6, 
Table A.6-6).
These awareness figures raise the question of the importance specific online 
risks hold for users, thus influencing quality and other parameters of usage.
Virus attacks as a source o f  fear: insecurity and non-confidence
Do online risks influence the experience of use and which risks are the most 
influential? How does this link to the awareness figures above?
Figtire 6-4: Do you worry about any of the following when you use the Internet?
(Q13)
Personal information violation 10.2%




Spam email ■ H H 1 11.5%
Internet cookies 11.5%
Spyware 12.4%
Don't worry about anything ^ ^ ^ ^ B  12.8%
Attack from computer viruses 80.0%
0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0% 70.0% 80.0% 90.0% 
Base: N=445 (Internet users)
87 Based on the assumption that all email users encounter spamming, awareness of spamming (48.5%) is 
low.
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The large majority (80%) of Internet users are worried about virus attacks. On 
the other hand, 12.4% are concerned about spyware, 11.5% about Internet cookies and 
spam and less about adware and Internet phishing (5.9% and 5.7%, respectively) 
(Figure 6-4).88 In demographic terms, gender, age and the existence of children in the 
household have a limited influence on users’ fears about online risks. Men are less 
concerned about viruses and more concerned about spam than women. Older users are 
more concerned about adware and Internet phishing and those with children in the 
household are more concerned about viruses (see Appendix 6, Table A.6-7-A).
Regarding users’ confidence in averting online risks, only a small minority 
(10.5%) of home users are ‘very confident’, pointing to the possible impact of online 
risks on the using experience as a whole. Female and educated users are less likely to be 
confident than men and users with no, primary or secondary education (see Appendix 
6, Table A.6-7-B).
However, a key issue related to online risks and users’ Internet literacy is the 
tools users employ to address online risks.
S ecurity  lim ited  to  an ti-v irus applications: know ledge and  tra in in g  needed
Which security tools are popular among users and why do some users not use 
any? (Q14.A).
Anti-virus applications are the most popular among users who have used tools 
for Internet security at home (N318): 90.0% have used anti-virus software and only a 
small number have used other tools for online security (19.8% spyware remover, 17.4% 
adware remover, 14.7% spam killer and 10.6% anti-phishing). Male users are more 
likely to use a firewall, people with a low income are more likely to use anti-virus and 
users in households without children are more likely to use spam-killer software (see 
Appendix 6, Table A.6-8-A).
A lack of sufficient knowledge is the main reason users do not use any online 
security technologies or tools. Most do not use such tools because they ‘don’t know 
how to install them’ (40.2%), ‘don’t know how to use them’ (3i.i%)89 or ‘don’t know 
what they are for’ (29.7%) (see Appendix 6, Table A.6-8-B).
Comparing these security tool figures with awareness of (Q.n) and concerns 
about online risks (Figure 6-4), it appears that users are more likely to use security 
tools and technologies when they are aware of and concerned about the effects of 
specific online risks. Therefore, a possible association between awareness of, fears for
88 It is worth looking at these findings further by testing their association with awareness of online risks 
(Q.n). This association is tested in Chapter 7.
8915.1% of users are not concerned about online security and 3.9% neglected using such tools. Factors 
such as cost are not important, with 5.4% of users not using security tools because ‘they are too 
expensive”.
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and confidence in averting online risks with users’ decisions to use Internet security 
tools against such risks is tested in Chapter 7 by statistical modelling.
6.3.4 Non-use, dismissive culture and fu ture prospects
Departing from issues of use, the survey addressed questions of non-use and use 
from a non-user perspective. The survey found that a culture of dismissal of and 
resistance to the Internet exists in Greece. This finding is tested in Chapter 7.
Reasons for non-use: lack o f  in terest in and need for Internet use
W hat are the demographics of non-users and the forces driving them not to use 
the Internet?
Figure 6-5: W hat are the reasons you don’t use the Internet or email? (Q16)
Don't know/Refused ■ 1.10%
I'm worried about my everyday life 1 0.9%
I'm worried about my security 11.0%
I do not know much about computers ■  2.5%
It's too expensive ■  3.6%
It's too difficult/frustrating ■ ■  5.7%
I don't have the time wtm 6 .9%
I don't have access 1
1 m not irueresiea 
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Base: N= 556 (non-users)
Women, middle-aged or old people and those in households with children are 
more likely to be non-users, while the more educated and the better-off are less likely 
to be non-users (see Table 6-1). As far as the reasons for non-use are concerned, a lack 
of need (63.4%) and interest (43.2%) are clearly the two most important reasons for the 
majority of people in Greece not using the Internet. On the other hand, commonsense 
factors such as lack of access (12.5%) and time (6.9%), lack of skills and difficulty in use 
(5.7%) and high cost (3.6%) are less important reasons for non-use (Figure 6-5). The 
old-aged, those with a low education and income, as well as those in households with 
children are more likely to have no interest in or need for the Internet (see Appendix 
6, Table A.6-9). W hat lies behind such a lack of interest and need, and how non-users 
conceptualise, understand and evaluate the Internet are issues discussed later, aiming 
to identify the driving forces of non-use mainly from a cultural and policy or regulatory 
perspective.
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Within the group of non-users one can identify those who have never used the 
Internet and those who have used it but dropped out for some reason(s). The second 
category of non-users is interesting and sheds light on the underlying factors that drive 
people in Greece away from the Internet.
D ropp ing  o u t and  a  lack  o f  in te re s t  in  o r  need  fo r  th e  In te rn e t
What forces people to drop out and what does this show in comparison to the 
reasons people do not to use the Internet at all? (Q20.A).
9.2% of non-users are former users (N=5i), namely the same percentage as 
current users who started using the Internet last year (9.2%). Men (14.0%) and youth 
aged 15-24 (30.8%) are more likely to be former users than women (5.8%) and middle- 
aged or old non-users (6.2% and 0.6%, respectively). Also, well-educated and non-users 
in households without children are more likely to be former users (see Appendix 6, 
Table A.6-10).
In terms of reasons for dropping out, a lack of need (38.0%), interest (15.5%) 
and time (14.7%), as well as loss of access (22.7%) are the forces driving Greeks to drop 
out. On the other hand, security concerns (2.1%), cost (5.8%), difficulty in use (8.7%) 
and concerns about the impact of the Internet on everyday life (2.5%) do not influence 
dropping out to a great degree.90 These figures illustrate that a lack of interest in and 
need for the Internet are the two dominant forces of non-use in general.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to examine not only the current state of non-use 
but also its future prospects. Thus, the survey looked at the long-term impact of the 
key forces of non-use and, thus, at the likelihood of non-users using the Internet in the 
future.
F u tu re  p ro spects: non -users n o t tu rn in g  in to  u se rs
The future prospects of Internet use are addressed by a question concerning 
non-users’ desire to use the Internet in the future and by another question 
investigating non-users’ self-evaluations of how likely they are to use the Internet in 
the future.
T able 6-2: Internet use in the future
P rospec ts  fo r th e  fu tu re “N o”
Would you like to start using the Internet and email, or isn't that 
something you’re interested in? (Q17) 81.9%
How likely do you think it is, if at all, that you will start using the 
Internet or email someday? (Q18) 76.4%
Base: N=556 (non-users)
90 The only significant demographics are: ‘You are not interested’ by education; ‘You are worried about 
the impact’ by education; ‘The computer was out of order’ by education; ‘You are not interested’ by 
income; ‘You are worried about the impact’ by income; and, ‘I have lost access’ by children in the 
household.
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81.9% of non-users are not interested in using the Internet in the future (Table 
6-2). The young, well-educated and those in households without children are 
significantly more likely to use the Internet in the future (see Appendix 6, Table A-6- 
11-A).
As regards non-users’ self-evaluations of the possibility of future use, the large 
majority (76.4%) think they are unlikely to start using the Internet in the future, 
confirming the picture so far of non-users’ dissociation from the Internet (Table 6-2). 
Men, the young, well-educated and those in households without children are 
significantly more likely to start using the Internet in the future, confirming more or 
less the demographics for non-use in general (see Appendix 6, Table A.6-11-B).
Hence, it appears that the great majority of non-users are not likely to turn into 
users in the future, thus pointing to matters of greater significance for future Internet 
adoption in Greece. This finding also strengthens the argument that the rejection of 
the Internet by non-users is the main force for the low Internet adoption rates in the 
country.
6.3.5 Evaluation o f the Internet in everyday life: contradictions andpuzzles
Going beyond use and non-use, the survey examined the ways people view the 
Internet as part of their everyday lives and activities. Perceptions, evaluations and 
attitudes were measured, and the relevant findings are as follows.
Role o f  th e  In te rn e t  in  everyday life: positive  view s and  specific fears
Questions concerning the role of the Internet in various domains of everyday 
life were addressed to users and non-users, allowing evaluations of the Internet to be 
measured from more than one perspective.
T able  6-3: What do you think about the statement...? (Mean)
(5 point scale from i=‘strongly disagree’ to 5=‘strongly agree’)
T o ta l
In te rn e t  (1)
Users ! Non-users
The Internet is a significant technology that 
positively changes our lives (Q. 21)
3.72 4-07** ; 3.42**
The Internet is a necessary tool for people’s everyday 
lives (Q.22)
3.36 3.69** 3.07**
The Internet is a danger for the security of users in 
terms of online fraud and violation of privacy (Q.26)
3.89 3.68** i  4.08**
The Internet is a danger for our personal relationships 
with other people and our social life (Q.27)
3-37 3.03** 3.68**
The Internet is a technology that might replace the 
individual worker in the workplace (Q.28)
2.99 2.86”  3.12”
i
1
The Internet is a technology that might jeopardise 
the moral values and traditions of society (Q.29)
3-35 2.96”  3.70”
Base: N=556 (for non-users) or N=445 (for users) -  filter: Internet use
Q.21: t = 10402, df= 970; Q.22: t = 8.894, df= 958; Q.26: t = -6.247, df= 947; Q.27: t = -8.820, df= 942; Q.28: t 
= -3.237, df=896; Q.29: t = -9.773, df= 947. Sig. (2-tailed): **significant at p<o.oi
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Most Greeks (66.1%) think the Internet has a significant role that positively 
changes their lives, while half (50.3%) think the Internet is necessary in everyday life. 
On the other hand, the big majority of people (70.3%) think the Internet is a danger 
for the security of users in terms of online fraud and violation of privacy, while half of 
Greeks (51.5%) think the Internet is a danger for their relationships with other people 
and their social life. In addition, Greek people are split between those who think that 
the Internet is a technology that might replace the individual worker in the workplace 
(37.9%) and those who think otherwise (34.1%), while half of Greeks (52.0%) think that 
the Internet is a technology that might jeopardise moral values and traditions. As far as 
the role of Internet use is concerned, Internet users are more likely to support the 
positive role of the Internet and its importance for people’s everyday lives. Likewise, 
Internet users are less likely to argue that the Internet is a danger for human 
relationships, a risk to moral values and traditions or a technology that might replace 
workers in the workplace (Table 6-3).
The findings for each of these questions are now presented in more detail.
The Internet and its impact on everyday life
Internet users are significantly more likely to argue that the Internet has a 
positive impact on everyday life (Table 6-3), with 80.1% of Internet users and 54.9% of 
non-users thinking so. Users and non-users who are young, well-educated and in 
households without children are more likely to think that the Internet has a positive 
role in everyday life (see Appendix 6, Table A.6-12).
The Internet as a tool in everyday life
Likewise, Internet users are more likely to argue that the Internet is a necessary 
tool for people’s everyday lives than non-users (Table 6-3), with 64.6% of Internet 
users and 38.8% of non-users thinking so.91 Internet users and non-users in households 
without children, as well those who are well-educated and young are more likely to 
agree that the Internet is a necessary tool in everyday life (see Appendix 6, Table A.6- 
12).
The Internet and its impact on privacy, security, work, and social values
Despite the overall positive role of the Internet in everyday life, mainly non­
users but also a significant number of users think that the Internet causes specific risks 
in their everyday lives (Table 6-3). 65.7% of Internet users and 74.1% of non-users agree 
that the Internet is a security danger in terms of online fraud and violation of privacy. 
Also, the relative majority of Internet users (41.4%) and 59.5% of non-users agree that 
the Internet is a danger for people’s social lives. Likewise, 37.9% of users and non-users 
agree that Internet technologies might replace the individual worker in the workplace,
91 There are less respondents than those supporting the positive impact of the Internet on everyday life. 
Although people think that the Internet has a positive influence, they do not to consider it necessary for 
their lives.
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whereas 41.6% of users and 61.1% of non-users agree that the Internet jeopardises 
social values and traditions. In demographic terms, the well-educated, young and 
people in households without children are less likely to agree that the Internet causes 
risks for people’s privacy, security, role in the workplace, as well as for moral values and 
traditions (see Appendix 6, Table A.6-12).
These patterns of findings were confirmed when people were asked about the 
role of the Internet in sociability, with the respective figures reported below.
T he In te rn e t  and  sociability: negative im p ac t p a rticu la rly  fro m  a  n o n -u ser 
perspective
Table 6 -4 : Role of the Internet in sociability Mean)
(Q.23: 5 point scale from i=fvery negatively* to 5=‘very positively’)
T o ta l
In te rn e t  (1)
Users Non-users
Think about the routine ways people interact or 
communicate with one another in their everyday 
lives...92 How do you think that the Internet may affect 
these kinds of activities? (Q.23)
2.81 3.09** 2.57**
(1) Base: N=556 (for non-users) or N=445 (for users) -  filter: Internet use. 
t = 7.811, df= 947. Sig. (2-tailed): **significant at pco.oi
As indicated in the table above (Table 6-4), most Greeks think the role of the 
Internet in human communication is negative. Internet users are significantly more 
likely to think the Internet has a positive role in everyday interaction and 
communication (Table 6-4), with 35.1% of users and only a small minority of non-users 
(16.5%) thinking so. In demographic terms, male and young non-users, as well as well- 
educated users and non-users, and those in households without children are more likely 
to think that this role is positive (see Appendix 6, Table A.6-13).
The survey posed another question to users and non-users about the role of the 
Internet in everyday routines, capturing people’s general views and confirming the 
views reported above.
T he In te rn e t in  daily rou tines: m ajo r ro le  particu la rly  fro m  a  u se r  
perspective
T able 6-5: Role of the Internet in daily routines (Mean) 
(Q.24: 4 point scale from i=‘no role at all* to 4=‘a major role’)_______________
T o ta l
In te rn e t  (1)
Users Non-users
Overall, how much of a role does the Internet play in 
the way people go about their daily routines and 
activities? (Q.24)
3.06 3.26** 2.88**
(1) Base: N=556 (for non-users) or N=445 (for users) -  filter: Internet use. 
t = 7.326, df= 952. Sig. (2-tailed): **signiflcant at pco.oi
91... ‘like keeping in touch with friends and family, or sending greetings, cards or invitations...’
The large majority of Greeks (78.3%) think the Internet plays a relatively major 
or a major role in the ways people go about their daily routines and activities. Users are 
significantly more likely to think that the Internet plays a more or less major role 
(Table 6-5), with 86.9% of users and 68.2% of non-users thinking so. Male, young and 
well-off non-users, as well as Internet users and non-users in households without 
children and those with a high education are more likely to think the Internet’s role in 
the ways people go about their daily routines is significant (Appendix 6, Table A.6-13).
Issues concerning non-users’ and users’ particular perceptions of the Internet’s 
role in some aspects of everyday life and its importance are reported below.
6.3.6 Non-users9 evaluation o f the Internet in everyday life: non-users not missing out 
Do non-users think they are missing out by not using the Internet?
The majority of non-users (55.0%) said they do not miss out on things because 
they do not use the Internet, whereas only 21.6% stated the opposite. Males, the 
young, well educated, those with a sufficiently high family income, and non-users in 
households without children are significantly more likely to think they are missing out 
because of non-use (see Appendix 6, Table A.6-14). Also, familiarity with computer 
technologies and services matters as PC users are more likely (39.3%) than non-users 
(18.2%) to think that they are missing out by not using the Internet (significant at 
pco.oi).
Hence, it becomes obvious that the majority of non-users consciously decide 
not to use the Internet, without being particularly concerned about the related 
disadvantages. On the other hand, it is interesting to see the extent to which and the 
areas where Internet users integrate the Internet into their everyday lives. The findings 
on this issue are reported next.
6.3.J Users' evaluation o f the Internet in everyday life: would non-use influence daily
routines negatively?
How do users perceive the influence non-use would have on their everyday lives?
T able 6-6: Future non-use and influence from a user standpoint 








If you couldn’t use the Internet at all in 
any phase of your life, how much would 
this affect your daily routines and 
activities? (Q.25)
2.63 17.8 25.6 30.6 24.9
Base: N=445 (Internet users)
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Although most users (55.5%) think that deprivation of use would have some or a 
lot of influence on their lives, a significant number (43.4%) think that a lack of access 
to and use of the Internet would not influence their lives significantly (Table 6-6). 
Differentiations between groups of different education, income and household status 
emerge (see Appendix 6, Table A.6-13).
Overall, users and non-users have different experiences with Internet 
technologies. However, significant numbers in both groups espouse the general 
positive role of the Internet in everyday life, whereas both groups put forward 
concerns about security, privacy, sociability and moral risks that the Internet brings 
about. The views on moral risks in particular confirm what the literature argues with 
respect to the traditional culture dominating Greek society. On the other hand, 
Internet users are more likely to think the Internet has a major role in daily routines 
and activities, as well as a positive role in daily interactions and communication. Thus, 
although the Greeks think the Internet plays a role in everyday life, they are 
particularly concerned about risks in specific domains of life such as security, privacy, 
work, and social traditions and values. In addition, discrepancies between the attitudes 
of users and non-users, as well as between people of a different education or household 
status emerge.
These findings are explored further in Chapter 7 where the factors underlying 
these attitudes of users and non-users are identified.
6.3.8 Internetpolicy and regulation: E Upolicy and regulation evaluated morepositively
After exploring how the Internet is related to and positioned in people’s 
everyday lives, the survey posed questions concerning policy and regulation, and users’ 
and non-users’ level of related awareness and satisfaction.
T ab le  6-7: Evaluation of Internet laws & policies (Mean) 
(5 point scale i=‘strongly disagree’ to 5=’strongly agree’)_____________________
TO TA L
In te rn e t  (1)
Users Non-users
The national laws and policies on the Internet 
can cope with security risks on the Internet
<Q.35> 2.66 2.57* 2.75*
The national laws and policies on the Internet 
can cope with privacy risks on the Internet 
(Q.36) 2.79 2.73* 2.84*
EU laws and policies on the Internet can cope 
with security risks on the Internet (Q.37) 3.08 3.14* 3.03*
EU laws ana policies on the Internet can cope 
with privacy risks on the Internet (Q.38) 3.14 3.20* 3.07*
(1) Base: N=556 (for non-users) or N=445 (for users) -  filter: Internet use
Q.35: t = -2.140, df= 612; Q.36: t = -2.223 > df= 624; Q.37: t = 2.187, df= 569 ; Q.38: t = 2.470, df= 569. Sig. (2- 
tailed): *significant at p<o.o5
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EU policies and laws are viewed as more effective in protecting users from 
privacy (24.0%) and security (23.1%) risks online than national policies and regulations 
(14.6% and 18.2%, respectively). However, most respondents chose the alternative 
‘Don’t know/Refused to answer’, showing that people in Greece are either unaware of 
issues concerning Internet policy and regulation or uncomfortable when asked such 
questions. Also, Internet users are more likely to view EU laws and policies as 
effective, whereas non-users are more likely to view national regulations and policies as 
effective (Table 6-7).93 In demographic terms, more educated and better-off non-users 
are less likely to think that national or EU laws and policies can cope with security and 
privacy risks, whilst younger users and non-users are more likely to think so (Appendix 
6, Table A.6-15).
Beyond these general remarks on Internet policy and regulation, the survey 
addressed more specific questions about policy and regulation to Internet users only, 
as users can report how policy and regulation responds to matters occurring during 
Internet usage.
6.3.9 Users' evaluation o f Internet policy and regulation and awareness o f Internet 
authorities
Questions concerning satisfaction with Internet policy and regulation and 
awareness of Internet authorities were addressed to Internet users and produced the 
following results.
L ow  sa tis fac tio n  w ith  na tiona l policy an d  regu la tion  on  th e  In te rn e t94
How satisfied are users with Internet policy and laws in the country?
93 Users are more likely to disagree that national laws and policies can cope with security (34.8%) and 
privacy (30.5%) risks than non-users (22.4% and 22.0%, respectively). Significantly more users (28.0%) 
think that EU Internet laws and policies can cope with security risks and slightly more (29.2%) think 
that EU regulations and policies can cope with privacy risks than non-users (19.1% and 24.0%, 
respectively).
94 The level o f satisfaction with security and privacy protection is based on the areas o f action that 
authorities in the field are to be involved in.
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I Users' security on the Internet. 
Are you...? (Q.30)
Users' privacy on the Internet. 











Very dissatisfied Dissatisfied Neither satisfied Satisfied
nor dissatisfied
0.7% 0.7% 
Very satisfied Don't 
know/Refused to 
answer
Base: N=445 (Internet users)
More than one-third of Internet users refused to evaluate policy and regulation 
on Internet security and privacy.95 On the other hand, only 10.4% of users were either 
satisfied or very satisfied with Greek policy and regulation on Internet security and 
privacy. Thus, over 60%  of users either did not evaluate or they evaluated Greek 
policies and laws as poor and non-satisfactory (Figure 6-6). In demographic terms, 
demographics do not play an important role in users’ levels of satisfaction (see 
Appendix 6, Table A.6-16).
These results are analysed more deeply in Chapter 7 where the forces 
underlying the low degree of users’ satisfaction and the ways this can be interpreted 
(i.e. dissatisfaction, lack of awareness etc) are examined further.
Lack o f  awareness o f  Internet authorities96
How aware are Internet users of authorities to which they can address issues of 
difficulty with Internet use and security or privacy risks online?
95 The high percentage of ‘Don’t know/Refused to answer’ (34.9% and 37.9% for Q.30 and Q.31, 
respectively) can be interpreted as non-awareness or a deficit of understanding of what the role of 
Internet policy and regulation is.
96 The indicator o f‘awareness’ is not captured easily through quantitative measures. In order to decide 
upon the measures of awareness factors, I drew on surveys outside of Greece due to the lack of national 
studies that provide such information.
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Figure 6-7: Do you know which authority to contact if you face... (%)
80.0 73.6 71.5
70.0 64.8 ■Y es
60.0 No







...som e problem  using th e  ...som e security  risk on th e  ...som e privacy risk on the  
in te rn e t, such as difficulty in te rn e t (Q.33) in te rne t (Q.34)
w ith use?(Q .32)
Base: N=445 (Internet users)
As shown in the above figure (Figure 6-7), the majority (64.8%) of users are not 
aware of authorities which they can contact if they face difficulties with use, even more 
(73.6%) do not know where to address security risks online and 71.5% are unaware of 
authorities to contact regarding privacy risks online. The more educated the users the 
more likely they are to know who to contact if they face difficulties with use or 
security. Likewise, the more well-off users are the more likely they are to know who to 
contact if they face privacy risks or use difficulties. Finally, male users are more likely 
to be aware of which authorities to contact regarding security problems (see Appendix 
6, Table A.6-17).
However, they survey provided some more specific insights into users’ 
awareness, asking users to refer to the specific authorities they are aware of.
W hich authorities?
W hen testing users’ awareness, those who claimed they are aware of where to 
address difficulties concerning use, security or privacy risks were asked to name some 
authorities.
For difficulties regarding use, users referred to a wide range of authorities, of 
which not all deal closely with issues of Internet use. Industry and ISPs were the 
bodies that most Internet users would contact concerning use difficulties. Regarding 
security risks, users narrowed down the previously broad list of authorities and 
mentioned bodies that specialise in the provision of security support. As regards 
privacy problems, users mainly mentioned the same bodies as for security risks, namely 
bodies that provide assistance with security and crime online, thus showing that users 
understood privacy as closely linked to security.
Beyond the above indicators of satisfaction with Internet policy and regulation and 
awareness of Internet authorities, the survey posed questions to Internet users and 
non-users which link Internet policy and regulation directly to what people think 
about their needs in relation to the Internet. Thus, the survey explored the degree to 
which policy and regulation respond to people’s needs. The results are reported below.
6.3.10 Perceived accountability o f Internet authorities: EU authorities more 
accountable than national authorities
The survey explored people’s evaluations of the social accountability of policy 
and regulation authorities on the Internet, thus attempting to bridge the everyday and 
political issues addressed so far. The indicator of social accountability was examined 
from a user and non-user perspective, and Table 6-8 presents the relevant results.
T able  6-8: What do you think about the statement...? (Mean) 
(5-point scale from i=‘strongly disagree* to 5=‘strongly agree’)__________________
TO TA L
In te rn e t  (1)
Users Non-users
National regulatory and policy authorities on the 
Internet don’t take into account the citizen’s 
voice on the Internet (Q.39) 3.19 3.25 3.13
EU regulatory and policy authorities on the 
Internet don’t take into account the citizen’s 
voice on the Internet (Q.40) 0 00 2.98 3.19
(1) Base: N=556 (for non-users) or N=445 (for users) -  filter: Internet use
Q.39: t = 1.374, df= 575; Q.40: t = -1.334, df= 527. Sign. (2-tailed): non-significant at p<0.05
Only a small number of Greeks97 think that policy and regulatory authorities for 
the Internet take the citizen’s voice into account, while the numbers for ‘Don’t 
know/Refused to answer’98 show that people are either unaware of or uncomfortable 
when asked such questions. Likewise, only a small number of Greeks disagree that 
national and EU authorities do not take into account the citizen’s voice on the 
Internet, with users being slightly more positive about authorities’ accountability 
(Table 6-8).
More specifically, more Internet users than non-users in the sample think that 
EU regulatory and policy authorities are more socially accountable than the national 
authorities: 30.3% of users and 20.6% of non-users agree that national authorities do 
not take the citizen’s voice on the Internet into account, whereas 19.3% of users and
11.0% of non-users do not agree that EU authorities do not take the citizen’s voice 
into account. Nevertheless, this is not a statistically significant difference, as noted in 
the above table (Table 6-8), whereas the large number of people who did not answer 
these questions (almost half the respondents) questions the reliability of the results and
9714.7% for EU and 15.4% for national regulation and policy authorities.
98 Over 40% of the respondents refused to give an answer.
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significance conclusions. In demographic terms, young and well-off users and non­
users are more likely to think that national and/or EU authorities take the citizen’s 
voice into account, whereas education influences non-users’ opinions about national 
and EU authorities’ accountability (see Appendix 6, Table A.6-18).
In conclusion, Internet users in the sample have more positive views of Internet 
authorities’ accountability than non-users, with EU authorities being evaluated more 
positively than Greek authorities. Nevertheless, the very low response rate raises issues 
regarding people’s awareness of and willingness to answer such questions. Thus, 
although no significant difference between users and non-users for the whole 
population was concluded in this instance, this finding may be questioned for its 
reliability.
6.3.11 Awareness o f Internet policies, laws and authorities: low awareness, with users
being more aware than non-users
Finally, questions of awareness were posed to both users and non-users so as to 
identify the possible convergence or divergence of awareness between users and non­
users. The questions covered different aspects of awareness, however all aspects related 
to Internet policy and regulation. The main results are presented below.
Only a small number of Greeks (14.7%) disagree with the statement that 
people’s awareness of laws and policies in the Internet is low. Likewise, only a minority 
of Greeks (23.6%) have heard of Greek authorities monitoring the application of laws 
and policies on the protection of Internet users, while even the majority of users 
(63.2%) are unaware of such authorities (see Appendix 6, Table A.6-20). On the other 
hand, most Greeks chose the alternative ‘Don’t know/Refused to answer’99 in both 
instances of awareness (laws/policies and authorities), showing that people in Greece 
are either unaware of or uncomfortable when asked such questions.
Internet users are less likely to think that people’s awareness of Internet laws 
and policies is low (see Appendix 6, Table A.6-19) and more likely to have heard of 
authorities monitoring initiatives for the protection of users (see Appendix 6, Table 
A.6-20). In demographic terms, young users and non-users are less likely to think that 
people’s awareness of Internet laws and policies is low (see Appendix 6, Table A.6-19), 
while the more educated users and non-users are the more aware they are of 
authorities monitoring the application of laws and policies for users’ protection (see 
Appendix 6, Table A.6-20).
99 47.2% of the respondents refused to give an answer.
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Hence, Internet usage seems to positively influence awareness of Internet
policies, regulations and authorities, although awareness is relatively low for both users
and non-users.
6.4 Conclusion and advanced analysis to follow
In summary, these key survey findings were reported in this chapter:
1. In te rn e t  ad o p tio n  and  issues o f  concern
a. Access is insufficient parameter to explain non-adoption of the Internet in 
Greece, as 15.1% of Internet non-users reside in connected households.
b. Although Internet users in Greece are frequent users, the majority are involved 
in a limited range of online activities, are dial-up users, do not use the Internet 
in public spaces and consist of only a small number of new users.
c. The majority of users in Greece are digitally constrained: insufficient awareness 
of online risks, lack of confidence and skills in averting online risks, as well as 
inadequate self-protection during use are some of the constraints. Thus, more 
awareness and training is needed to achieve increased Internet literacy levels in 
the country.
d. ‘A dismissive culture’ is dominant in Greece, with non-users being non­
interested in and having no need to use the Internet, and with the majority of 
them being highly unlikely to start using the Internet in the future.
2. Role o f  th e  In te rn e t  in  everyday life
a. People in Greece have generally positive views of the Internet, but express 
concerns about its role in specific areas of social life and activity such as 
security, privacy, work, social relations, as well as social values and traditions.
b. Users evaluate the Internet’s role in everyday life more positively than non­
users, with the majority of non-users arguing that they do not miss out on 
things because of non-usage. Nevertheless, slightly less than half the users think 
that possible non-use of the Internet in the future would not affect their lives 
significantly.
3. E valuation  and  aw areness o f  In te rn e t policy  and  regu la tion
a. People in Greece evaluate EU Internet policy and regulation as more efficient 
than national policy and regulation, with users more positively assessing EU 
policy and regulation than non-users.
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b. People in Greece think that awareness of Internet policy and regulation is low, 
with users being less likely to think so.
c. Internet users report low satisfaction with national policy and regulation on the 
Internet and low awareness of authorities which they can contact in case of 
problems with use or security and privacy risks online.
4. E valuation  and aw areness o f  In te rn e t  au th o ritie s
a. The majority of Greeks evaluate the social accountability of EU and national 
Internet authorities as low.
b. Users in the sample have a slightly more positive view of authorities’ social 
accountability and particularly of EU authorities’ accountability, but this 
finding cannot be generalised to the whole population.
c. The majority of users and non-users are not aware of the Greek authorities 
monitoring the application of policies and regulations on the protection of 
Internet users, with users being more likely to be aware of such authorities.
d. The high rate of “Don’t know/Refused to answer ’ responses to questions 
concerning Internet policy, regulation and authorities shows respondents’ lack 
of familiarity with or a sense of inconvenience when asked about such issues.
5. Demographics point to possible correlations between people’s socio-economic 
status and Internet adoption in Greece. The demographics of age and education in 
particular significantly influence people’s attitudes to the Internet and their 
perceptions of Internet policy and regulation. Also, gender and family status 
matter to some extent with men and those with no children in the household being 
more in favour of the Internet and more aware of and satisfied with related 
decision-making practices. Income is the weakest parameter of influence since 
more than 60% of Greeks refused to reveal their income. That is why income is 
not included in the modelling analysis in the next chapter.
6. Overall, Internet use is an indicator that influences Greeks’ patterns of behaviour, 
perceptions, attitudes and awareness.
In order to better understand the implications of the above findings and their 
importance for the research into Greek digital divides, Chapter 9 reviews these 
findings in a comparative perspective. The aim is not to develop a comparative 
framework but to better understand the research contribution the survey makes and 
how the Greek case can be seen in comparison to different contexts. Hence, in 
Chapter 9 these findings are reviewed in comparison to surveys that present either 
Greece in a European context or other cases outside Europe, allowing the thesis to 
reflect on areas where Greece differs from or converges with other countries or
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regions. Nevertheless, this comparative attempt does not by any means deliver an 
exhaustive and overarching discussion.
Finally, the findings reported in this chapter pave the way for a more advanced 
analysis where modelling techniques apply and specific research hypotheses are tested. 
This modelling analysis is presented in the next chapter, allowing the articulation of 
specific conclusions about the survey data in relation to the thesis’ overall objectives.
7. Digital divides in Greece: the role of society's culture and 
decision-making. Modelling and hypothesis testing
y .i Chapter Overview
This chapter introduces hypothesis testing and multifactor analysis of the 
survey data. In Section 7.2, 1 present the survey hypotheses and modelling techniques I 
employ for the data analysis. In Section 7.3, 1 report the findings obtained through the 
modelling and the conclusions reached about the respective hypotheses. In Section 7.4, 
I conclude with remarks on the key findings concerning Internet adoption and the 
two-way interaction between society’s culture and Internet policy and regulation. 
These concluding remarks lead on to Chapter 8 where follow-up focus group 
interviews provide qualitative insights into the survey findings and reflect on the elite 
actors’ discourses discussed in Chapter 5.
7 .2  Introduction: analytical strategy , hypothesis testing and 
modelling
j.2.1 Rationale and analytical strategy
The survey findings in Chapter 6 showed that Internet users have limited 
Internet literacy, a low awareness of online risks and low levels of self-protection on 
the Internet. They also showed that, although a significant number of people in 
Greece and Internet users in particular have relatively positive views about the 
Internet in general, they negatively evaluate its role in relation to specific domains of 
everyday life. From a decision-making perspective, the findings pointed to the low 
perceived effectiveness of national laws and policies on the Internet, low awareness of 
Internet authorities in the country and the perceivably limited social accountability of 
the national authorities. On the other hand, most users are daily users and seem to 
trust EU Internet policy and regulation more than the respective national policy and 
regulation. The indicator of Internet use plays a significant role in people’s attitudes 
and awareness as users are more positive about the Internet and relevant policies and 
regulations than non-users.
Whereas the practices and attitudes of users and non-users of different 
demographic categories were reported in Chapter 6, that chapter could not tell 
whether it is usage, demographics or other parameters that account for the differences 
in practices and attitudes of the study population. Many factors may correlate with the
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outcome measures but, if those factors are themselves correlated, one could 
overestimate which factors really play an explanatory or causal role. Hence, 
multivariate modelling is needed to control for such interrelations through a partial 
correlation analysis. For instance, multiple regression in this chapter tests the 
independent contribution that each significant variable (factor or explanatory 
indicator) makes by controlling for the effect of other variables, while the joint effect 
of the independent variables in the selected model is measured to either confirm or 
reject the tested hypotheses.
Hence, this chapter employs advanced modelling techniques to makeup for the 
limitations of the descriptive analysis in Chapter 6. I t tests hypotheses that reflect the 
research questions under examination (Chapter 6, p. 152), measuring the explanatory or 
causal role of factors with respect to three key research indicators: Internet adoption, 
role of the Internet in everyday life,100 and role of Internet policy and regulation.101 
Thus, the present research enables an exploration of the dynamic relationship between 
these three indicators and places them in a context where a web of media, socio­
economic and other forces operate.
j.2.2 Survey hypotheses and links to theprecedingfindings
The following hypotheses (see Chapter 4, p. 99) are tested in this chapter:
i. Digital divides in Greece are highly associated with cultural and everyday settings 
of life.
ii. Digital divides in Greece are highly associated with Internet policy and regulation.
iii. People’s culture and everyday settings of life have a two-way interaction with 
Internet policies and regulations, which determines digital divides.
Based on the descriptive findings reported in Chapter 6, these hypotheses are 
further specified with regard to the correlations tested and indicators measured:
1) In te rn e t  ad o p tio n 102 depends on the predictors of access to media technologies 
and computer use, the perceived role of the Internet in everyday life, as well as 
policy and regulatory predictors such as evaluation and awareness of Internet 
policy and regulation, and awareness and perceived accountability of Internet 
authorities.
100 The indicator ‘role of the Internet in everyday life’ captures society’s culture by measuring people’s 
views on the Internet, and possible resistant and dismissive attitudes to it in the context of the everyday.
101 The ‘role of the Internet in everyday life’ and the ‘role of Internet policy and regulation’ were 
examined separately for Internet users through additional questionnaire items. This is not only because 
digital divides touch upon issues (i.e. quality of Internet use, self-protection online etc) tnat users 
encounter, but also because users can provide a wider web of insights into the perceived role of the 
Internet in everyday life and the evaluation of the efficiency of Internet policy and regulation.
1021 conceptualise Internet adoption as a series of indicators which go beyond use and touch upon 
quality of use as well as psychological and pragmatic parameters of adoption, such as concerns about 
risks and self-protection. Thus, the indicators that measure Internet adoption are: Internet use, quality 
of use (Internet connection, frequency of use and online activities), concerns about online risks and self- 
protection.
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2) T he ro le  o f  th e  In te rn e t  in  everyday life depends on the predictors of access 
to media technologies and Internet use, as well as policy and regulatory predictors 
such as evaluation and awareness of Internet policy and regulation, and awareness 
and perceived accountability of Internet authorities.
3) T he ro le  o f  th e  In te rn e t  in  u se rs ’ everyday lives depends on the predictors 
of patterns of use (i.e. history of use, frequency of use and type of Internet 
connection), breadth of online activities, awareness of online risks, concerns about 
and self-protection against such risks, as well as policy and regulatory predictors 
such as evaluation and awareness of Internet policy and regulation, and awareness 
and perceived accountability of Internet authorities.
4) T he ro le  o f  policy and  regu la tion  (perceived efficiency of Internet policy and 
regulation) depends on the predictors of Internet use and the perceived role of the 
Internet in everyday life, as well as policy and regulatory predictors such as 
awareness of Internet policy and regulation, and perceived accountability and 
awareness of Internet authorities.
5) T he  ro le  o f  policy and  regu la tion  (perceived efficiency of Internet policy and 
regulation) fro m  a  u se r  perspective  depends on predictors of the perceived role 
of the Internet in everyday life, as well as policy and regulatory predictors such as 
awareness of Internet policy and regulation, and perceived accountability and 
awareness of Internet authorities.
7.2.3 Hypothesis testing and modelling strategy
Modelling techniques were employed to test the above hypotheses. These 
techniques are presented in Chapter 4 (pp. n  1-2). The variables and measures that 
shaped the analytical process of modelling in each case are as follows:
Logistic R egression
The following dependent variables are binary and were modelled with logistic 
regression (for more on the rationale of logistic regression, see Chapter 4, pp. 111-2):
• Internet use.
• Type of Internet connection: dial-up or broadband (the first variable that measures 
‘quality of use’).
M ultip le  L inear R egression
Multiple linear regression modelling was the modelling technique I employed 
mostly (for more on the rationale of multiple linear regression, see Chapter 4, p. 111). 
In order for this technique to be enabled some dependent variables had to be 
transformed. For instance, the variables of‘online risks’, ‘online activities’ and‘security
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tools’ were composed of several items, and it was decided that the responses would be 
grouped to show, respectively, the number of online risks, number of online activities 
and number of security tools employed by users. For example, if a respondent used the 
Internet to ‘send or read emails’ and to ‘chat with people’, then the number of online 
activities was set at 2.
The dependent variables103 modelled with multiple linear regression were the 
following:
• Frequency of use and online activities (the second and third variables that measure 
‘quality of use’, respectively).
• Concerns and selfprotection (concerns about online risks and use of security 
tools).
• Evaluation of the role of the Internet in everyday life (non-users).
• Evaluation of the role of the Internet in everyday life (users).
In addition, new variables were constructed based on the responses to more 
than one questionnaire item. Cronbach’s Alpha was the statistic used to assess the 
reliability of each construct (new variable). The reliability output in the table below 
shows, along with the value of Cronbach's alpha, the ‘N of items’, which is simply the 
number of questions that compose each construct (for a detailed list of all variables, 
see Table 7-2). For example, ‘Evaluation of the role of the Internet in everyday life (all)’ 
is a construct that includes 8 items (questions) and Cronbach’s alpha was high (0.88), as 
reported in Table 7-1:
T able 7-1: Constructs and Cronbach’s alpha
C o n stru c ts Q uestionnaire  item s
C ronbach 's
a lpha
Evaluation of Internet policy and 
regulation (all) {N=4l Questions 35-38 0.92
Evaluation of Internet policy and 
regulation (users) [N=2] Questions 30-31 0.84
Awareness of Internet authorities 
(users) {N=3l Questions 32-34 0.75
Perceived accountability of Internet 
authorities {N=2} Questions 39-40 0.81
Evaluation of the role of Internet in 
everyday life (all) {N=8] Questions 21-24 & 26-29 0.88
As can be gleaned from this table, Cronbach’s alpha was higher than 0.7 in all 
cases. This suggests that the constructs exhibit internal consistency; namely, the items 
within each construct appear to constitute measures of the same issues. Therefore, 
each construct can be treated as a single indicator in the analysis.
After constructing these new variables, the following three constructs were used 
as dependent variables in multiple regression models:
103 See all the dependent and independent variables in the ‘List of variables’, Table 7-2.
180
■ Evaluation of the role of the Internet in everyday life (all).
■ Evaluation of Internet policy and regulation (all).
■ Evaluation of Internet policy and regulations (users).
7.2.4 List o f variables
The following list (Table 7-2) presents the variables used in the analysis as well 
as the questionnaire items that each variable consists of:
T able 7-2 List of variables
VARIABLES QUESTIONNAIRE
A g e
Four dummies: Age 15-24; Age 25-39; Age 40- 
64; Age 65+
What is your age? (q .44 )
E d u ca tio n
Seven dummies: 1= ‘none or primary’ to 7= 
‘postgraduate training ‘
What is the last grade or class you 
completed at school? (7 levels) (q .45)
G en d er  (i=male; 2=female) What is your sex? (q .43)
C h ild ren  in  th e  h ou seh old ?  (i=yes; 2=no) D o you have any children? (q .47)
M e d ia  ava ilab ility
Six dummies: 1= ‘Telephone’ to 6= ‘Internet’
‘D oes your household have...? (q .i)
F r eq u en cy  o f  w a tc h in g  T V
(i=several times a day to io=not at all)
‘H ow  often do you match television 
programmes on average?’ (q.2)
F r eq u en cy  o f  read in g  n ew sp ap er
(i=several times a day to 9=don’t read 
newspapers)
H ow  often do you read newspapers on 
average?’ (q.3)
C o m p u ter  u se
Dichotomous: i=yes; 2=no
‘D o you ever use a computer at your 
workplace, at school, at home, or anywhere 
else?’ (q .4 )
In te r n e t  u se
Dichotomous: i=yes; 2=no
‘D o you ever go online to access the 
Internet or W orld W ide W eb or to send 
and receive email?’ (q .5)
P la c e  o f  u se
Dummies
‘Where do you go online from?’ (q .6 )
T y p e  o f  In te r n e t  co n n e c tio n
Five dummies: 1= ‘Dial-up ’ to 5 ‘Wireless’
Does the computer you use at home 
connect to the Internet through...?’ (q.7)
D e s ir e  fo r  b roadban d  co n n e c tio n
Dichotomous: 1= yes; 2= no
‘Would you like to have a faster, 
‘broadband’ connection anywhere that you 
use the Internet from, or isn’t that 
something you’re interested in?’ (q .7 .A )
H is to r y  o f  u se
Four dummies: 1= ‘last six months’ to 4= ‘more 
than three years ago’
‘W hen did you first start going online?’ 
(q .8)
F req u en cy  o f  u se
Seven dummies: 1= ‘several times a day’ to 7= 
‘less often’
‘in  general, how often do you go online?’ 
(q-9)
O n lin e  a c tiv itie s
Dummies
‘Please tell me if you ever do any of the 
following when you go online’ (q .io )
A w a ren ess  o f  o n lin e  r isk s
3-scale: 1= ‘yes, have a good idea’ to 3= ‘never 
heard’
‘...please tell me if  you have a good idea 
what the term means, if  you aren’t really 
sure what it means or if  you have never 
heard o f  it’ ( q .n )
C o n fid en ce  in  avertin g  o n lin e  r isk s
4-scale: 1= ‘not at all confident’ to 4= ‘very 
confident’
‘Overall, how confident are you that you 
can keep things like computer viruses, 
Internet cookies, spyware, aaware, Internet 
phishing and spam emails o ff your home 
computer when you want to?’ (q.12)
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F e a r s  a b o u t o n lin e  n s k s  Dummies ‘D o you worry about any of the following 
when you use the Internet?’ (q.13)
U sa g e  o f  se cu r ity  to o ls
Dummies
‘W hich o f the following tools or 
technologies for your protection on the 
Internet have you used at least once?’ 
(q .14)
R e a so n s  fo r  n o n -u se ‘What are the reasons you don’t use the 
Internet or email?’ (q .16)
I n te r e s t  in  fu tu re  u se  (N o n -u sers)
Dichotomous: i= Yes, interested’; 2= ‘no, not 
interested’
‘Would you like to start using the Internet 
and email, or isn't that something you’re 
interested in?’ (q.17)
L ik e lih o o d  o f  fu tu re  u se  (N o n -u sers)
4-scale: 1= ‘definitely not’ to 4= ‘definitely
‘H ow  likely do you think it is, if  at all, that 
you will start using the Internet or email 
someday?’ (q.18)
D ro p -o u ts?  (N o n -u se rs)
1= yes; 2=no
Did you ever at some point use the 
Internet or email, but have since stopped 
for some reason? (q .20)
R ea so n s  fo r  d rop p in g  o u t (N o n -u sers)
Dummies
What are the reasons you stopped using 
the Internet or email? (q .20 .A )
E v a lu a tio n  o f  th e  r o le  o f  In te r n e t  in  
everyd ay  l ife  (N o n -u sers)
5-scale: 1= ‘strongly disagree’ to 5= ‘strongly 
agree’
Level o f agreement with the statement: 
'I'm missing out on things because I am not 
using the Internet and email' (q .19)
E v a lu a tio n  o f  th e  r o le  o f  In te r n e t  in  
everyd ay  life  (a ll)
5-point, 4-point and 3-point scale, all 
standardised from positive (small scale) to 
negative (high scale). The higher the value the 
more positive the scale
■ ‘W h a t do  y o u  th in k  a b o u t th e  
s ta tem en t:...
-  The Internet is a significant technology 
that changes positively our lives’ (q.21)
-  The Internet is a necessary tool for 
people’s everyday lives’ (q.22)
-  The Internet is a danger for the security 
o f  users in terms o f online fraud ana 
violation o f privacy’ (q .26)
-  The Internet is a danger for our 
personal relationships with other people 
and our social life’ (q .27)
-  The Internet is a technology that might 
replace the individual worker in the 
workplace’ (q .28)
-  The Internet is a technology that might 
jeopardise the moral values and 
traditions o f a society’ (q .29 )
■ ‘Think about the routine ways people 
interact or communicate with one 
another in their everyday fives... H ow do 
you think that the Internet may affect 
these kinds o f  activities?’ (q.23)
■ ‘Overall, how much o f a role does the 
Internet play in the way people go about 
their daily routines and activities?’ (q .24)
E va lu a tion  o f  th e  r o le  o f  th e  In te r n e t  in  
everyd ay  life  (U sers)
4-scale: 1= ‘not at all’ to 4= ‘a lot’
‘If you couldn’t use the Internet at all in 
any phase o f  your fife, how much would this 
affect your daily routines and activities?’
( q . 2 5 )
E va lu a tion  o f  In te r n e t  p o licy  and  
reg u la tio n  (all)
5-scale: 1= ‘strongly disagree’ to 5= ‘strongly 
agree’ (mean score)
’W h a t do  y o u  th in k  a b o u t th e  
sta tem en t:
...The national laws and policies on the 
Internet can cope with security risks on 
the Internet’ (q.35)
...The national laws and policies on the 
Internet can cope with privacy risks on 
the Internet’ (q .36)
...EU laws and policies on the Internet 
can cope with security risks on the
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Internet’ (q.37)
...EU laws and policies on the Internet 
can cope with privacy risks on the 
Internet’ (q .38)
E v a lu a tio n  o f  In te r n e t  p o licy  and  
r e g u la t io n  (U sers)
5-scale: 1= Very dissatisfied to 5= ‘very satisfied’ 
(mean score)
‘W h a t do y o u  fe e l  ab o u t th e  w a y  th e  
p o lic ie s  and  la w s in  th e  cou n try  
p r o tec t ...
...users’ security risk on the Internet?’ 
(q .30)
...users’ privacy risk on the Internet?’ 
(q .3 i )
A w a r en ess  o f  In te r n e t  p o licy  and  
re g u la tio n
5-scale: 1= ‘strongly disagree’ to 5= ‘strongly 
agree’
What do you think about the statement: 
‘people’s awareness o f laws and policies on 
the Internet is low’? D o you...’ (q .41)
A w a r en ess  o f  In te r n e t  a u th o r it ie s  (all)
Dichotomous: 1= ‘heard’; 2= ‘not heard’
‘However, before today have you heard 
about Greek authorities monitoring the 
application o f laws and policies on the 
protection o f Internet users?’ (q .42)
A w a r en ess  o f  In te r n e t  a u th o r itie s  
(U sers)
3-scale: 1= yes; 2= no; 3= not sure/it depends 
(mean score)
D o  y o u  k n o w  w h ic h  a u th o r ity  to  
c o n ta c t  if...
...you face some problem using the 
Internet, such as difficulty with use?’ 
(q*32)
...you face some security risk on the 
Internet?’ (q.33)
...you face some privacy risk on the 
Internet?’ (q .34)
P e r ce iv e d  a cco u n ta b ility  o f  In te r n e t  
a u th o r it ie s
5-scale: 1= ‘strongly disagree’ to 5= ‘strongly 
agree’ (mean score)
‘W h a t d o  y o u  th in k  a b o u t th e  
sta tem en t:
...National regulatory and policy 
authorities on the Internet don’t take 
the citizen’s voice on the Internet into 
account’ (q .39)
...EU regulatory and policy authorities 
on the Internet don’t take the citizen’s 
voice on the Internet into account’ 
(q .40 )
7.3 Modellingfindings and hypothesis testing
This section presents the multiple and logistic regression models and the logic 
that supports each model, explaining the selection of predictors (independent 
variables) for each model when necessary. It also provides the analytical output for 
each model and informs about the independent influence of each predictor and the 
joint effect of all predictors in the model. Thus, I comment on which parts of the 
findings were anticipated and which were relatively surprising, reflecting on the 
relevant hypotheses above.
7.3.1 Internet use
The first survey hypothesis is that Internet adoption (i.e. Internet use, quality 
of use, concerns about online risks and self-protection) depends on access to media
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technologies and computer use, the perceived role of the Internet in everyday life, and 
policy and regulatory predictors.
In order to assess the factors that influence the first indicator of Internet 
adoption, namely Internet use, I ran a logistic regression. The dependent variable 
‘Internet use’ was coded with i if the subject was an Internet user and with 2 
otherwise. The factors included in the model were selected on the grounds of the 
descriptive findings in Chapter 6 (e.g. role of demographics) and of what existing 
literature and research have shown about the drivers of Internet use (e.g. computer and 
Internet access, patterns of media use, such as frequency of watching TV and reading 
newspapers, computer use etc). Even more significantly, the survey aimed to test the 
role of society’s culture and decision-making in Internet adoption so it included 
everyday life and policy factors in the model. More specifically, the factors in the 
model are:
• demographics: age (15-24,25-39 40-64 years old);104 gender; education; children
in household;
• media availability (Internet);105
• frequency of watching TV;
• frequency of reading newspapers;
• computer use;
• evaluation of the Internet’s role in everyday life (all);106
• evaluation of Internet policy and regulation (all);107
• perceived accountability of Internet authorities;
• awareness of Internet policy and regulation;108 and
• awareness of Internet authorities (all).109
A ‘backward’ stepwise procedure (Backward Wald)110 took place 10 times to 
clean the model of non-significant variables. This procedure was carried out for all 
regressions (linear and logistic) in the analysis. This is because this procedure allows all
104 The age bracket 65+ was excluded to avoid multicollinearity and was used as a reference categoiy. If I 
had included all possible ages as independent variables, then the ‘constant’ term in the regression would 
be equal to the sum of the ‘age’ variables (because each person must fall within exactly one of the age 
groups).
5 Computer availability was not included to avoid multicollinearity. Computer availability is highly 
correlated with the variables of computer use and Internet availability. The regression model measured 
Internet availability and computer use only as those who have Internet and use a computer definitely 
have a computer at home.
106 A latent variable that captures respondents’ views of the role of the Internet in various domains of 
everyday life (sociability, workplace, traditions, online fraud and privacy, daily routines, change of life 
etc).
107 A latent variable that captures respondents’ views on the effectiveness of national and EU Internet 
policy and regulation to encounter security and privacy risks on the Internet.
08 This captures respondents’views on people’s awareness of Internet policies and regulations.
109 This captures respondents’ awareness o f  Internet authorities in Greece.
110 This process is as follows: the regression coefficients are estimated using all the aforementioned 
variables as independent variables. Then, the variable with the highest/* value (0.05 significance level) is 
dropped from the analysis (the ‘least significant’ effect on the dependent variable) ana the regression is 
estimated once again, excluding that variable. This procedure is repeated until all the variables that are 
left are significant at 0.05.
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selected variables to be included in the initially saturated model, while ensuring that 
the model still adequately fits the data after all variables that do not contribute to the 
model have been eliminated. If it had been decided to apply a forward stepwise 
approach, the earlier introduced variable could have been ‘locked in’ the model and it 
might later have turned out to be non-significant, whereas the backward procedure 
does not ‘lock’ non-significant covariates in the model. Table 7-3 presents the results of 
the last step (step 10) of the Backward Wald:
T able  7-3: Internet use model
V ariable B S.E . W ald  D f Sig. Exp(B)
Age 15-24 -2.077 0.556 13.927 I 0 . 0 0 0 0.125
Age 25-39 -1.012 O.468 4.682 I 0.030 0.364
Education -0.595 0.145 16.855 I 0 . 0 0 0 0.551
Gender 1.482 0.422 12.334 I 0 . 0 0 0 4.403
Media availability: Internet -3.247 0.434 55-978 I 0 . 0 0 0 0.039
Computer use 3*595 0.548 43.046 I 0 . 0 0 0 36.434
Constant -1.936 1.051 3-394 I 0.065 0.144
C hi-S quare  
p  value
340.264
0 .0 0 0
Base: N=iooi (Internet users & non-users)
As the table reveals, the Omnibus Chi-square test suggests the rejection of the 
null hypothesis that none of the included independent variables have an effect on 
Internet usage (p c.ooi). The table also shows the coefficients andp  value for the null 
hypothesis that each individual coefficient is equal to zero. At the 0.05 level, the 
following variables are significant:111
• Age i5_24 (B = -2.077,P < 0.001) and 25_39 (B = -i.oi2,/> = 0.030). Since the age band 
of 65+ years old was used as a reference category, the fact these variables are 
significant suggests that subjects between 15 and 39 years old are significantly more 
likely to use the Internet than those aged over 65 years. On the other hand, people 
aged 40-64 are not significantly more likely to be Internet users than those 65+ 
years.
• Education (B = *0.595,P < 0.001). This implies that people with a higher education 
are significantly more likely to be Internet users than those with a lower education.
• Gender (B = 1.482,p  < 0.001). This suggests that men are significantly more likely 
than women to be Internet users.
• Media availability: Internet (B = *3.247, p < 0.001). This finding implies that 
individuals who have Internet access at home are significantly more likely to be 
Internet users than those with no Internet access.
111 In the analysis, I interpret the signs (e.g. -)  in front of the values of independent variables/factors 
according to the direction (e.g. coding) that each variable has been given in relation to the dependent 
variable.
185
• Computer use (B = 3.595, p < 0.001). This finding implies that people who are 
computer users are significantly more likely to be Internet users than those who do 
not use a computer.
Thus, I found that the likelihood of being an Internet user depends on Internet 
access, computer use and demographics. The only demographic that does not influence 
Internet use is that of ‘children in the household’. This finding appears to be quite 
surprising as in Chapter 6 1 found that those in households with children are less likely 
to use the Internet (p. 155). The usefulness of the multivariate analysis becomes 
obvious at this point since it shows that it is not the presence of children per se but 
other demographic characteristics of the people (most probably parents, as I 
interviewed people aged over 15 years) who have children (e.g. older, less educated 
people etc) that influence their decision not to use the Internet. On the other hand, 
there is not enough evidence that Internet use depends directly on other media use 
parameters (e.g. frequency of reading papers and watching TV), the perceived role of 
the Internet in everyday life or policy and regulatory factors. Although these results do 
not confirm the hypothesis about the role of everyday life and policy and regulation in 
people’s decisions to use the Internet, these factors are tested below for their role in 
other parameters of Internet adoption, such as quality of use, concerns about online 
risks and self-protection.
7.5.2 Quality o f use
Besides Internet use, quality of use is another aspect of Internet adoption that 
was modelled to test the hypothesis that Internet adoption (i.e. Internet use, quality of 
use, concerns about online risks and self-protection) depends on access to media 
technologies and computer use, the perceived role of the Internet in everyday life, as 
well as policy and regulatory predictors. In the analysis, quality of use was measured by 
the variables of frequency of use, online activities and type of Internet connection,112 
and each of these variables was modelled separately through a linear or logistic 
regression.
F requency  o f  use
In order to assess the factors that influence frequency of use, I ran a multiple 
linear regression. Frequency of use was set up as the dependent variable with lower 
levels representing a higher frequency of use. The independent variables are the same 
as for Internet use, also including Internet connection (broadband or dial-up), history 
of use, evaluation of the Internet’s role in everyday life (users),"3 evaluation of Internet
112 Thus, high frequency of use, a large number of activities and broadband Internet connection suggest 
the high quality of Internet use.
113 Users’ evaluation of the role of the Internet in everyday life is captured by measuring their 
perceptions of the influence of future deprivation of use on their everyday lives.
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poliq^ and regulation (users)114 and awareness of Internet authorities (users)."5 My 
analytical strategy was to include in the initial model all possible factors the research 
literature regards as associated with frequency of Internet use (e.g. history of use, 
Internet connection, place of use, media availability, frequency of other media use, 
demographics etc)."6 Also, I included variables that measure users’ perceived role of 
the Internet in their everyday lives as well as the role of policy and regulation, thus 
testing the role of society’s culture and decision-making in Internet adoption. Since 
the data on frequency of use were only available for users, this regression was limited to 
those who said they are Internet users.
Results of the last step (step 9) of the Backward Wald are shown in Table 7-4:
T able 7-4: Frequency of use model
V ariable B S.E. B eta T Sig.
(Constant) 3.860 0.544 7.094 0.000
Children in the household -0.019 0.007 -0.186 -2.776 0.006
Media availability: Internet -1.418 0.296 -0.320 -4*799 0.000
Dial-up 0.533 0.150 0.241 3.548 0.001
History of use -0.224 0.079 -0.194 1 P 00 00 0.005
Evaluation of the role of Internet in everyday -0.267 0.076life (users) -0.242 -3.531 0.001







Base: N=445 (Internet users)
The R-Squared of the model is 0.391, implying that the independent variables 
explain 39.1% of the variability in frequency of use. The null hypothesis of no joint 
effect of the independent variables on frequency of use was rejected (F 15.299 p < 
0.001). The variables that are significant at the 0.05 level are:
• Children in the household (B = -0.019,p  = 0.006). This finding implies that users 
who have children in their household make significantly less frequent use of the 
Internet.
• Media availability: Internet (B = -1.418,/) < 0.001). This finding suggests that users 
with Internet availability at home tend to make more frequent use of the Internet.
114 Users’ evaluation of policy and regulation is captured by measuring their assessment of the efficiency
of national policy and regulation in protecting them against security and privacy risks on the Internet. 
Iiy Users’ awareness of Internet authorities is a latent variable which captures users’ awareness of 
authorities they can contact when they face difficulties with use, security risks and privacy risks online.
116 The model was cleared up from variables causing multicollinearity or adding nothing to the fitness of 
the model (i.e. operating more like constants), such as ‘computer availability, ‘frequency of watching 
TV’, and ‘frequency of reading newspapers’. Also, ‘place of use’ was excluded because it would be coded 
as many dummy variables. However, the number of variables included was already at the maximum 
suggested limit given the sample size so including extra variables could have caused inaccurate 
estimations of the coefficients of other variables.
187
• Dial-up (B = 0.533,/) = 0.001). This finding implies that users with a dial-up Internet 
connection at home make significantly less frequent use than users who use 
broadband.
• History of use (B = -0.224, p = 0.005). This finding suggests that users who have 
used the Internet for a longer time also use the Internet significantly more 
frequently than users who have been using the Internet for a shorter period of 
time.
• Evaluation of the role of the Internet in everyday life (users) (B = -0.267,/) = 0.001). 
This implies that users who have a stronger perception that not accessing the 
Internet would affect their daily routines tend to make significantly more frequent 
use of the Internet.
• Awareness of Internet authorities (users) (B = 0.399,/) = 0.024). Given the coding of 
this variable, users who are aware of Internet authorities which they can contact in 
case of difficulty with use, security and privacy risks online are also significantly 
more frequent Internet users than users who lack awareness of such authorities.
Thus, I found that access to the Internet, patterns of Internet use (e.g. history 
and Internet connection), perceived role of the Internet in users’ lives and awareness 
of Internet authorities influence the frequency of use. On the other hand, frequency of 
Internet use does not depend on computer use, users’ evaluation and awareness of 
Internet policy and regulation, nor on the perceived accountability of Internet 
authorities. Also, it is important to note that the socio-demographics of age, gender 
and education do not influence Internet users’ frequency of use, challenging, for 
instance, the idea that young users are more frequent users than middle and old aged 
people. Nevertheless, this model shows that the demographic of children in the 
household matters for frequency of use, showing that, even if the presence of children 
per se does not influence people’s decisions to use the Internet, it does matter for their 
schedules and the time they spend online.
O nline activ ities
A multiple linear regression was also conducted to assess the factors that affect 
users’ online activities. The independent variables were the same as for the ‘frequency 
of use model’ above and their selection relied on the same rationale as above.”7 The 
dependent variable ‘online activities’ was operationalised as the number of activities
117 The model was cleared up from variables causing multicollinearity or adding nothing to the fitness of 
the model (i.e. operating more like constants), such as ‘computer availability’, ‘frequency of watching 
TV’, and ‘frequency of reading newspapers’. Also, ‘place of use’ was excluded because it would be coded 
as many dummy variables. However, the number of variables included was already at the maximum 
suggested limit given the sample size so including extra variables could have caused inaccurate 
estimations of the coefficients of other variables.
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users engage when online. These could include e-mail, games, online purchases etc. 
Results of the last step (step 19) of the Backward Wald are presented in Table 7-5:
T able 7-5: Online activities model
V ariable B S.E. B eta T Sig.
(Constant) 2.272 •351 6.474 .000
Dial-up -.748 .222 -.274 -3.368 .001
Evaluation of the role of the Internet in everyday life 







Base: N=445 (Internet users)
The R-Squared of this model is 0.132, implying that variability in the type of 
Internet connection and in the evaluation of the role of Internet in everyday life 
accounts for 13.2% of the variability in the number of users’ online activities. Also, the 
null hypothesis of no joint effect of the independent variables on the number of online 
activities was rejected (F = 10.577,p < 0.001). The variables that are significant at the 
0.05 level are:
• Dial-up (B = -0.748,p = 0.001). This finding implies that users who use a dial-up 
connection to access the Internet at home tend to carry out a significantly smaller 
number of online activities than users who use broadband.
• Evaluation of the role of Internet in everyday life (users) (B = 0.247 ,p = 0.026). This 
finding suggests that users with a stronger perception that non-use of the Internet 
would affect their daily routines tend to engage in a significantly higher number of 
online activities than those with a weaker perception of the importance of Internet 
use in their everyday lives.118
These findings suggest that users with a fast Internet connection and those who 
perceive Internet use as important for their lives are more likely to engage in a large 
number of online activities. On the other hand, I failed to find evidence that computer 
use, Internet users’ evaluation and awareness of Internet policy and regulation, their 
awareness of Internet authorities, and their perceived accountability of Internet 
authorities have a role to play in the breadth of their Internet usage. Also, socio­
demographics do not have an influence at all, in this respect challenging commonsense 
perceptions of the role of education and age in particular.
118 Evaluation of the Internet in everyday life is used to predict the number of Internet activities, with 
the latter being an aspect of Internet adoption. The direction of causality will change when I test how 
users evaluate the Internet in everyday life as online activities then constitute one of the factors to 
include in the model. Overall, causality is multi-directional and different causality directions test 
different hypotheses through modelling.
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Type o f Internet connection
It was shown above that the tyoe of Internet connection influences the range of 
online activities, raising questions about who is a dial-up or broadband user. At the 
same time, the type of Internet connection stands as an indicator of quality of usage in 
its own right. Research has shown that the type of Internet connection not only 
influences the range of online activities but also the quality of the experience of 
Internet usage, the time spent on the Internet and more or less the Internet’s overall 
role in people’s lives.
In order to assess the factors that influence the likelihood of the Internet user 
accessing the Internet through dial-up rather than broadband, I conducted a logistic 
regression. The dependent variable is dichotomous and was coded with i if the user 
had a dial-up connection and o otherwise. As regards the independent variables, I 
included factors which are broadly considered to influence the type of Internet 
connection available in the household (e.g. demographics, media availability, frequency 
and history of use etc). Although income is considered, in general, a factor that 
influences the affordability of broadband, it was not included in the analysis. Income 
was the weakest demographic as more than 60% of the respondents declined to reveal 
their income. On the other hand, the indicator of online activities was included under 
the hypothesis that those who engage in more activities are inclined to obtain a faster 
and more efficient Internet connection. Above, I found that broadband might, in turn, 
drive people to engage in a wider range of activities. Lastly, I included factors 
concerning the perceived role of the Internet in everyday life as well as policy and 
regulatory indicators, thus testing the role of society’s culture and decision-making in 
Internet adoption. The independent variables are the following:119
■ demographics: age, education, gender, children in the household;
■ computer use;
■ history of use;
■ frequency of use;
■ online activities;
■ evaluation of the role of the Internet in everyday life (all);
■ evaluation of the role of the Internet in everyday life (users);
■ evaluation of Internet policy and regulation (all);
■ evaluation of Internet policy and regulation (users);
■ perceived accountability of Internet authorities;
■ awareness of Internet policy and regulation;
119 ‘Place of use’ was excluded because it had to be coded as many dummy variables. However, the 
number of variables included was already at the maximum limit given the sample size so including the 
extra variables for ‘places of use’ might have caused inaccurate estimations of the coefficients of other 
variables.
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■ awareness of Internet authorities (all); and
■ awareness of Internet authorities (users).
After 18 reiterations, the model (Table 7-6) below was selected as the best fit of 
the data:
T able  7-6: Dial-up model
V ariable B S.E. W ald D f Sig. Exp(B)
Frequency of use 0 .589 0.179 10.810 1 O.OOI 1.801
Online activities -0 .4 83 0.155 9 .682 1 0 .0 0 2 0.617
Constant -0.158 0.565 O.O78 1 O.779 0 .8 5 4
C hi-S quare  
P  value
28.922
0 .0 0 0
3ase: N=445 (Internet users)
As the table shows, the Omnibus Chi-square test rejects the null hypothesis 
that none of the included independent variables has an effect on dial-up connection (p 
< 0.001). At the 0.05 level, the following variables are significant:
• Frequency of use (B = 0.589, p = 0.001). Given the coding of this variable, this 
finding implies that users who make more frequent use of the Internet are 
significantly less likely to have a dial-up connection.
• Online activities (B = -0.483,/> = 0.002). This finding suggests that users who carry 
out a greater number of online activities are significantly less likely to have a dial­
up connection.
None of the other independent variables has a significant effect at the 0.05 level 
on the likelihood of having a dial-up connection.
Overall, the above three models I ran for different aspects of quality of use 
tested the first survey hypothesis that Internet adoption (i.e. Internet use, quality of 
use, concerns about online risks and self-protection) depends on access to media 
technologies and computer use, the perceived role of the Internet in everyday life, as 
well as policy and regulatory predictors. I found some support for the hypothesis that 
quality of use is affected by users’ evaluations of the role of Internet in everyday life. 
On the other hand, the existence of children in the household, the availability of the 
Internet at home and awareness of Internet authorities play some role in frequency of 
use only. Also, the various parameters of quality of Internet use, such as frequency of 
use, online activities and type of Internet connection, appear to be interlinked, with 
the number of online activities being influenced by the existence of dial-up connection 
at home and with the latter being influenced by the frequency of use and number of 
online activities. However, I failed to find support for the hypothesis that quality of 
use depends on computer use, evaluation and awareness of Internet policy and 
regulation, as well as the perceived accountability of Internet authorities. Also, it is
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important to note that the above models show that socio-demographics such as age, 
gender and education do not influence users’ quality of use (i.e. frequency of use, online 
activities and type of Internet connection), contrasting popular research arguments in 
support of the role of demographic differences or inequalities as a major source of 
digital divides.
7.3.3 Online risks and self-protection
Beyond use and quality of use, users’ concerns about online risks and self- 
protection are two more indicators that measure Internet adoption. Apart from the 
split between users and non-users and the differences in quality of use (e.g. more or less 
frequent users, more or less skilled users etc), users’ attitudes to online risks 
significantly influence psychological and pragmatic parameters of Internet adoption. A 
multiple linear regression was conducted to test the factors that influence the 
dependent variables of ‘concerns about online risks’ and ‘usage of security tools’.
C oncerns ab o u t online risk s
To test the first hypothesis that Internet adoption (i.e. Internet use, quality of 
use, concerns about online risks and self-protection) depends on access to media 
technologies and computer use, the perceived role of the Internet in everyday life, as 
well as policy and regulatory predictors, I operationalised the dependent variable 
‘concerns about online risks’ as the number of risks that users are concerned about. 
Concerns might involve attacks by computer viruses, Internet cookies, spyware etc, 
and the following independent variables were included in the model:
■ demographics: age, education, gender, children in the household;
■ media availability (Internet);120
■ computer use;
■ awareness of online risks;
■ confidence in averting online risks;
■ usage of security tools;
■ evaluation of the role of the Internet in everyday life (all);
■ evaluation of the role of the Internet in everyday life (users);
■ evaluation of Internet policy and regulation (all);
■ evaluation of Internet policy and regulation (users);
■ perceived accountability of Internet authorities;121
120 Computer availability was not included to avoid multicollinearity. For more, see the same case in 
footnote 28.
121 This is a latent variable that measures respondents’ perceptions of the social accountability of national 
and EU authorities on the Internet.
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■ awareness of Internet policy and regulation;
■ awareness of Internet authorities (all); and
■ awareness of Internet authorities (users).
These independent variables were selected to measure how various indicators of 
Internet expertise or literacy (e.g. awareness of online risks, confidence in averting 
risks and usage of security tools), as well as more general media and other indicators 
(e.g. media availability, demographics and computer use) influence people’s concerns 
about online risks. In addition, everyday life and policy and regulatory factors were 
included to test the role of society’s culture and decision-making in Internet adoption.
After 18 iterations of dropping insignificant variables, the results are as follows 
(Table 7-7):
T able 7-7: Concerns about online risks model
V ariable B S.E. Beta t Sig.
(Constant) 1-735 0.285 6.082 0 . 0 0 0
Confidence in averting online risks -0.253 0.115 -0.184 -2.196 0.030







Base: N=445 (Internet users)
The R-Squared of the model is 0.113, implying that the variability in the 
indicators of confidence in averting online risks and usage of security tools accounts 
for 11.3% of the variability in online risks users are concerned about. Also, the null 
hypothesis of no joint effect of the independent variables on concerns about online 
risk was rejected (F = 8.472,p < 0.001). The variables significant at the 0.05 level are:
■ Confidence in averting computer viruses (B = -0.253,p = 0.030). This finding implies 
that users who are more confident that they can avert computer viruses and other 
online risks are more likely to have a smaller number of concerns about risks.
■ Usage of security tools (B = 0.265,p < 0.001). This finding suggests that users who 
employ a larger number of security tools tend to have a larger number of concerns 
about online risks.
Demographics do not matter, meaning that whether users are young, well- 
educated and men or women do not significantly influence the extent to which they 
are concerned about online risks. Also, surprisingly, awareness of risks does not 
necessarily change users’ feelings about specific risks. Interestingly, the awareness and 
evaluation of relevant policy and regulation are similarly not significant for the extent 
to which users feel safe online and protected enough. On the other hand, two different 
and at the same time overlapping factors determine users’ concerns: on one hand, the
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security practices and tools they employ; on the other, the confidence they 
demonstrate which is often affected by the security tools they put in effect.
U sage o f  secu rity  too ls
Likewise, to test the hypothesis that Internet adoption (i.e. Internet use, 
quality of use, concerns about online risks and self-protection) depends on access to 
media technologies and computer use, the perceived role of the Internet in everyday 
life, as well as policy and regulatory predictors, I operationalised the dependent 
variable ‘usage of security tools’ (self-protection) as the number of security tools that 
Internet users employ. These tools might include antivirus software, firewalls, spyware 
removers etc and they were tested on the basis of the following independent variables:
■ demographics: age, education, gender, children in the household;
■ media availability (Internet);122
■ computer use;
■ awareness of online risks;
■ confidence in averting online risks;
■ concerns about online risks;
■ evaluation of the role of the Internet in everyday life (all);
■ evaluation of the role of the Internet in everyday life (users);
■ evaluation of Internet policy and regulation (all);
■ evaluation of Internet policy and regulation (users);
■ perceived accountability of Internet authorities;
■ awareness of Internet policy and regulation;
■ awareness of Internet authorities (all); and
■ awareness of Internet authorities (users).
These independent variables were selected to measure how awareness and 
psychological parameters (e.g. concerns about online risks and confidence in averting 
risks), along with more general media and other indicators (e.g. media availability, 
demographics and computer use) influence people’s self-protection. Also, everyday life 
and policy and regulatory factors were included in the model to test the role of 
society’s culture and decision-making in Internet adoption.
After dropping independent variables in 16 reiterations, the results are as follows 
(Table 7-8):
122 Computer availability was not included to avoid multicollinearity. For more, see the same case in 
footnote 28.
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Table 7-8: Usage of security tools model
V ariable B S.E. B eta t Sig.
(Constant) 4.269 0.536 7.963 0 . 0 0 0
Awareness of online risks -0.156 0 0 UJ -0.331 -4.224 0 . 0 0 0
Concerns about online risks 0.235 0.094 0.190 2.503 0.014
Awareness of Internet authorities (all) -0.685 0.242 -0.219 -2.825 0.005
R -S quared 0.268
F 16.153
P  value 0.000
Base: N=445 (Internet users)
The R-Squared of this model is 0.268, implying that the variability in the 
independent variables accounts for 26.8% of the variability in the number of security 
tools used by users. Also, the null hypothesis of no joint effect of the independent 
variables on the number of security tools used was rejected (F = 16.153,/) < 0.001). The 
variables significant at the 0.05 level are:
• Awareness of online risks (B = -0.156,/) < 0.001). This finding implies that users 
who are aware of a larger number of online risks tend to make use of a significantly 
smaller number of security tools than those who are aware of a smaller number of 
online risks.
• Concerns about online risks (B = 0.235,/) = 0.014). This finding suggests that users 
who have a greater number of concerns tend to use a significantly greater number 
of security tools than those with a smaller number of concerns about online risks.
• Awareness of Internet authorities (all) (B = -0.685,/) = 0.005). Given the coding of 
this variable, this finding implies that users who have heard of Greek authorities 
that monitor the application of laws and policies on the protection of Internet 
users tend to use a significantly higher number of security tools than those who 
have not heard of such authorities.
Hence, there is some support for the hypothesis that self-protection is 
influenced by policy factors such as awareness of Internet authorities. Also, the level of 
awareness of online risks matters, with those who are more aware of risks using fewer 
security tools. Concerns about online risks and self-protection appear interlinked, with 
users who use more tools being more concerned about risks and those who have a 
greater concern about risks using a greater number of security tools.
Also taking into consideration the above results for concerns about online risks, 
it is obvious that there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that access to media 
technologies, such as the Internet, computer use, users’ evaluation of the role of the 
Internet in everyday life and the policy indicators of evaluation and awareness of 
Internet policy and regulation and perceived accountability of Internet authorities, 
influence users’ concerns about online risks or their decision to use security tools (self-
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protection). Socio-demographics like age, gender and education do not influence users’ 
level of concern and self-protection, challenging assumptions about, for instance, older 
people’s stronger fears of online risks. Also, users who are more aware of online risks 
are not more likely to be concerned about them, in the same way that users confident 
of averting online risks are not more likely to use fewer security tools for their 
protection, thus challenging arguments in support of the role of awareness and 
psychological factors in users’ feelings and practices when going online.
7.3.4 Evaluation o f the role o f the Internet in everyday life
So far I have run multiple and logistic regression models for Internet adoption 
and its elements of Internet use, quality of use, online risks and self-protection. Each 
of these elements consists of one or more indicators and was tested with regard to 
different sets of factors. The factors included in each model were selected on the basis 
of the aims of the thesis and the directions of the research literature. The main finding 
from running the models above is that the role of the Internet in everyday life and 
people’s awareness of Internet authorities appear to influence various parameters of 
Internet adoption in Greece, although not Internet use itself. On the other hand, 
other policy and regulatory factors, such as awareness of Internet policy and regulation 
and the perceived accountability of Internet authorities, do not seem to influence, at 
least directly, Internet adoption in Greece.
Nevertheless, Internet adoption is only one aspect of the analytical strategy in 
this chapter as I also tested the factors shaping the role of the Internet in everyday life 
as well as the role of Internet policy and regulation. As regards the Internet’s role in 
everyday life discussed in this section, I run multiple regression models first for the 
total sample and then separately for users and non-users on the grounds of the 
particular questions addressed to each group (e.g. questions concerning non-users’ 
evaluations of the role of the Internet; questions concerning practical issues about the 
Internet’s role in users’ lives).
E valuation  o f  th e  ro le  o f  th e  In te rn e t  in  everyday life (all)
For the total sample I tested the hypothesis that the role of the Internet in 
everyday life depends on access to media technologies and Internet use, as well as 
policy and regulatory predictors such as evaluation and awareness of Internet policy 
and regulation, and awareness and perceived accountability of Internet authorities. 
The dependent variable, ‘evaluation of the role of the Internet in everyday life (all)’, is 
an internally consistent construct123 that provides a thorough account of how Greeks
123 Questionnaire items 21-24 & 26-29). The overall score was computed so that higher values of this 
construct corresponded to a more ‘positive’ perception of the integration of the Internet into everyday 
life (i.e. Q.26-29 were reversed). This construct captured respondents’views on the role of the Internet
196
evaluate the Internet’s role in more than one domain of life. In this linear regression 
model, I included demographics, computer availability,124 as well as policy and 
regulatory indicators, whilst I tested possible differences of evaluations of the role of 
the Internet between computer/Internet users and non-users. These factors were 
selected on the basis of the hypothesis tested as well as the need to consistently 
account for the role of general factors such as demographics.
After dropping independent variables in 10 reiterations, the results are as 
follows (Table 7-9):
T able  7-9: Evaluation of the role of Internet in everyday life model
V ariable B S.E. Beta T Sig.
(Constant) 2.882 0.106 27.130 0.000
Age 15-24 -0.147 0.056 -0.144 -2.618 0.009
Age 25-39 -0.150 0.049 -0.165 -3.065 0.002
Media availability: Computer 0.118 0.051 0.115 2.329 0.020
Awareness of Internet policy and 
regulation 0.045 0.021 0.106 2.162 O.O3I
Evaluation of Internet policy and 
regulation (all) O.III 0.026 0.207 4.230 0.000
R -S quared 0.084
F 7.079
P  value 0.000
Base: N = i o o i  (Internet users & non-users)
The R-Squared of this model is 0.084, suggesting that the variability in the 
independent variables accounts for 8.4% of the variance in Greek people’s evaluation 
of the role of the Internet in everyday life. Also, the null hypothesis of no joint effect 
of the independent variables on people’s evaluation of the Internet was rejected (F = 
7.079,/) < 0.001). The variables significant at the 0.05 level are:
• Age 15-24 (B = -0.147,/) = 0.009), 24‘39 OB = -0.150,/) = 0.002). This finding implies 
that people under 40 years old tend to have a significantly more positive evaluation 
of the role of the Internet in everyday life than those over 40 years.
• Media availability: Computer (B= 0.118,/> = 0.020). This finding implies that people 
with access to a computer are more likely to have more a positive evaluation of the 
role of the Internet in everyday life than those without computer access.
• Evaluation of Internet policy and regulation (all) (B = 0.111,/) < 0.001). This finding 
implies that Greeks who argue that national and EU laws and policies can cope 
with security and privacy risks on the Internet also have a significantly more 
positive evaluation of the role of the Internet in everyday life.
in various aspects of everyday life (e.g. sociability, workplace, traditions, online fraud and privacy, daily 
routines ana activities etc).
124 I tested the correlation between computer and Internet availability. The best fit with no high 
collinearity between independent variables was the model where the variable of Internet availability was 
excluded.
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• Awareness of Internet policy and regulation (B = 0.045, p = 0.031). This finding 
implies that individuals who think that people’s awareness of laws and policies is 
low tend to have a significantly more positive evaluation of the role of the Internet 
in everyday life.
Thus, I found support for the hypothesis that people’s evaluation of the role of 
the Internet in everyday life depends on access to media equipment (computer) and 
policy indicators such as evaluation and awareness of Internet policy and regulation. In 
addition, the demographic of age plays a significant role in people’s evaluations of the 
role of the Internet in everyday life, whereas the existence of children in the household 
and education surprisingly do not influence such an evaluation. The literature usually 
stresses the importance of the presence of children and of the level of education (and 
consequent skills) for the extent to which people integrate the Internet into their lives. 
Likewise, these results do not support the hypothesis that Internet users are more 
likely than non-users to evaluate the Internet positively, nor the influence of perceived 
social accountability and awareness of Internet authorities on such evaluations.
N on-users’ evaluation  o f  th e  ro le  o f  th e  In te rn e t  in  everyday life
A multiple linear regression was also run to model non-users’ evaluation of the 
role of the Internet in everyday life and, specifically, non-users’ evaluations of Internet 
use. The dependent variable is an observed variable and was operationalised as the 
subject’s response to the statement ‘I’m missing out on things because I’m not using 
the Internet and email’. The following independent variables were included in the 
model:125
■ demographics: age, education, gender, children in the household;
■ media availability (Internet);
■ computer use;
■ interest in future use;
■ likelihood of future use;.
■ drop-outs or former users;
■ evaluation of the role of the Internet in everyday life (all);
■ evaluation of Internet policy and regulation (all);
■ perceived accountability of Internet authorities;
■ awareness of Internet policy and regulation; and
■ awareness of Internet authorities (all).
125 The model was cleared up from variables which were not a good fit and caused problems of 
multicollinearity, such as ‘computer availability’ and ‘awareness of Internet authorities’. Also, the 
‘reasons for not using the Internet’ was excluded because it had to be coded as many dummy variables. 
The number of variables included was already at the maximum suggested limit given the sample size so 
including the 11 or 12 extra variables as ‘reasons’ could have caused inaccurate estimations of the 
coefficients of other variables.
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Both general (e.g. demographics, media availability and computer use) and 
specific (e.g. interest in and likelihood of future use) factors were included in the 
model. Non-users’ evaluation of the role of the Internet in everyday life is influenced 
by non-use specific as well as more general characteristics of the study population. 
Also, everyday life and policy factors were included in the model so as to test the role 
of society’s culture and decision-making in non-users’ assessments of the consequences 
of Internet non-use.
After 10 reiterations, the model that fits the data best is as follows (Table 7-10):
T able  7-10: Non-users’ evaluations of the role of the Internet in everyday life
model
V ariable B S.E. Beta T Sig.
(Constant)
Interest in future use
Likelihood of future use
Evaluation of the role of the Internet in
everyday life (all)
Evaluation of Internet policy and regulation (all) 
Perceived accountability of Internet authorities 
Awareness of Internet policy and regulation
0.857 0.966 0.887 0-376 
-0.535 °*257 "0.185 -2.080 0.039 
0.253 0.119 0.186 2.129 °*°35
0.520 0.191 0.190 2.728 0.007
0.199 0.100 0.141 1.998 0.047 
-0.398 0.171 -0.288 -2.329 0.021 







Base: N=556 (Internet non-users)
The R-Squared of the model is 0.232, implying that the variability in the 
independent variables accounts for 23.2% of the variability in non-users’ evaluation of 
the role of Internet use in everyday life. Also, the null hypothesis of no joint effect of 
the independent variables on non-users’ evaluation was rejected (F = 8.359,p < 0.001). 
The variables significant at the 0.05 level are:
• Interest in future use (B = -0.535,P = 0.039). Given the coding of this variable, this 
finding implies that non-users who are interested in future use of the Internet are 
more likely to think they are missing out on things because of non-usage.
• Likelihood of future use (B = 0.253,p = 0.035). This result suggests that non-users 
with a higher possibility of using the Internet in the future are less likely to think 
they are missing out on things because of not using the Internet.
• Evaluation of the role of the Internet in everyday life (all) (B = 0.520,p = 0.007). 
This finding implies that non-users with a positive evaluation of the role of the 
Internet in everyday life are more likely to think they are missing out on things 
because of non-usage.
• Evaluation of Internet policy and regulation (all) (B = 0.199,p = 0.047). This means 
that non-users who consider that national and EU policy and regulation can 
address security and privacy online risks are more likely than those who do not
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evaluate Internet policy and regulation positively to think that they are missing out 
on things by not being users.
• Perceived accountability of Internet authorities (B = -0.398,p = 0.021). Given the 
coding of this variable, this result suggests that non-users with higher confidence 
that authorities take the citizen’s voice on the Internet into account are more 
likely to think they are missing out on things by not using the Internet.
• Awareness of Internet policy and regulation (B = 0.358, p = 0.013). This finding 
implies that non-users who think that people’s awareness of laws and policies is low 
are more likely to think they are missing out on things by not being Internet users.
Hence, non-users’ perception of whether they miss out on things by being non­
users is influenced by policy factors, their interest in and estimate of the possibility of 
future use, as well as their general evaluation of the effects of the Internet on various 
aspects of life. Particularly policy and regulation factors, such as awareness and 
evaluation of policy and regulation as well as the perceived social accountability of 
Internet authorities, matter significantly for non-users’ perceptions of the importance 
of Internet use. On the other hand, younger, male or educated non-users do not 
evaluate the Internet and its usage differently from older, female or non-educated non­
users, challenging popular discourses about the role of demographics in non-users’ 
attitudes to and perceptions of the Internet. Likewise, Internet availability at home 
and computer use do not differentiate such perceptions, questioning the usual 
emphasis on the role of access.
U sers’ evaluation  o f  th e  ro le  o f  th e  In te rn e t  in  everyday life
Finally, I ran a Unear model that assessed the factors influencing users’ 
evaluation of the role of the Internet in everyday life. This model aimed to confirm or 
reject the hypothesis that users’ evaluations depend on patterns of use, breadth of 
online activities, awareness of online risks, concerns about and self-protection against 
risks, as well as policy and regulatory predictors. The dependent variable is observed 
and was operationalised as the response to the question ‘If you couldn’t use the 
Internet at all in any phase of your life how would this affect your daily routines and 
activities?’ The coding of this variable was such that higher values represented a higher 
evaluation of the role of the Internet. The following independent variables were 
included in the model:126
126 The model was cleared up from variables causing multicollinearity, such as ‘confidence in averting 
online risks’, ‘awareness of online risks’ and ‘usage of security tools’ (self-protection). The last two 
variables were predictors of the hypothesis tested here so they are excluded from the report of the 
results. In this respect, it is useful to see how research hypotheses that rely on theory and previous 
results might by challenged when tested empirically.
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■ demographics: age, education, gender, children in the household;
■ media availability (Internet);127
■ computer use;
■ type of Internet connection;
■ history of use;
■ frequency of use;
■ online activities;
■ concerns about online risks;
■ evaluation of the role of the Internet in everyday life (all);
■ evaluation of policy and regulation (all);
■ evaluation of policy and regulation (users);
■ perceived accountability of Internet authorities;
■ awareness of Internet policy and regulation;
■ awareness of Internet authorities (all); and
■ awareness of Internet authorities (users).
These independent variables were included so as to take into account indicators 
related to patterns and breadth of Internet use (e.g. frequency, history, online activities 
etc) along with more general factors (e.g. demographics, media availability and 
computer use) in accounting for the extent to which users consider the Internet to be 
important for their lives. Also, everyday life and policy factors were included in the 
model so as to assess the role of society’s culture and decision-making in non-users’ 
evaluations of the consequences of non-use.
After 14 reiterations, the following model (Table 7-11) fits the data best:
T able 7-11: Users’ evaluations of the role of Internet use in everyday life
V ariable B S.E. B eta T Sig.
(Constant) 2.531 0.447 5.661 0.000
Age 15-24 0.371 0.177 o-i77 2.097 0.038
Education 0.123 0.050 0.206 2.476 0.014
Children in the household -0.020 0.007 -0.220 -3.063 0.003
Frequency of use -0.273 0.070 -0.301 -3.910 0.000
Online activities 0.109 0.054 0.148 1.999 0.048
Concerns about online risks 0.152 0.059 0.187 2.568 O.OII
Awareness of Internet policy and 




Base: N=445 (Internet users)
127 Computer availability was not included to avoid multicollinearity. For more, see the same case in 
footnote 28.
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The R-Squared is 0.290, implying that the variability in the independent 
variables accounts for 29% of the variability in users’ evaluations of the importance of 
Internet use. The null hypothesis of no joint effect of the independent variables on 
users’ evaluation was rejected (F = 8.287,p < 0.001). The variables significant at the 0.05 
level are:
• Age 15-24 (B = 0.371,p  = 0.038). This finding suggests that Internet users aged 15-24 
are more likely than those aged 25+ to think that non-usage would affect their lives.
• Education (B = 0.123, p  = 0.014). This result implies that users with a higher 
education are more likely to think that non-usage would affect their lives.
• Children in the household (B = -0.020, p = 0.003). Given the coding of this variable, 
this finding suggests that users with children in the household are more likely to 
think that non-usage would influence their lives.
• Frequency of use (B = -0.273,/> < 0.001). This result implies that users with more 
frequent use of the Internet are more likely to think that non-usage would affect 
their lives.
• Online activities (B = 0.109,/) = 0.048). This finding suggests that users who engage 
in a larger number of online activities are more likely to think that non-use would 
influence their lives.
• Concerns about online risks (B = 0.152,/) = 0.011). This result implies that those
who reported a larger number of concerns about online risks are more likely to 
think that non-usage of the Internet would affect their lives.
• Awareness of Internet policy and regulation (B = -o .i 67, p=o.03i). This result
suggests that users who think that people’s awareness of laws and policies on the 
Internet is low are less likely to think that non-use would affect their lives.
Hence, I found some support for the hypothesis that patterns of use (i.e. 
frequency of use), breadth of online activities, concerns about online risks and policy 
indicators, such as awareness of Internet policy and regulation, influence users’ 
evaluations of the role of the Internet in everyday life. On the other hand, I did not 
find evidence in support of the hypothesis that the policy indicators of evaluation of 
Internet policy and regulation, awareness of Internet authorities and perceived 
accountability of Internet authorities influence users’ evaluations of the role of the 
Internet in everyday life. Besides the tested hypothesis, demographics significantly 
influence users’ evaluation, whereas home access to the Internet as well as the type of 
Internet connection do not have an influence, thus taking the debate about certain 
aspects of digital divides beyond issues of access and infrastructure.
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7.5.5 Evaluation ofInternet policy and regulation
The above analysis shows not only that the discussion about the Internet’s role 
in everyday life must move beyond issues of access and infrastructure but also that 
awareness and evaluation of Internet policy and regulation as well as other policy 
indicators influence people’s perceptions of the role of the Internet in everyday life. In 
this section, I present linear regression models for the factors that influence Greek 
people’s evaluations of Internet policy and regulation, first for the general population 
and then specifically for Internet users.
E valuation  o f  In te rn e t  policy and  reg u la tio n  (all)
In order to test the factors influencing Greek people’s evaluations of Internet 
policy and regulation, I created the dependent variable ‘evaluation of Internet policy 
and regulation (all)’ as a construct of four questions. This construct measures users’ and 
non-users’ assessment of the ability of national and EU policies and regulations to cope 
with privacy and security risks online. The hypothesis here is that the role of policy 
and regulation (perceived efficiency of Internet policy and regulation) depends on 
Internet use, evaluation of the role of Internet in everyday life, as well as policy 
predictors such as awareness of Internet policy and regulation, and perceived 
accountability and awareness of Internet authorities. The following independent 
variables were included in the model:128
■ demographics: age, education, gender, children in the household;
■ media availability (computer and Internet);
■ Internet use;
■ evaluation of the role of the Internet in everyday life (all);
■ perceived accountability of Internet authorities;
■ awareness of Internet policy and regulation; and
■ awareness of Internet authorities (all).
These predictors allowed me to not only test the fitness of the model relative to 
the hypothesis but also to measure the role of general indicators such as demographics 
and media availability for both users and non-users. After 10 reiterations, the model 
that fits the data best is as follows (Table 7-12):
128 ‘Computer use’ was not included as it was almost constant and would have caused multicollinearity.
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Table 7-12: Evaluation of Internet policy and regulation model
V ariable B S.E. B eta t Slg.
(Constant) 1.361 0.323 4.209 0 . 0 0 0
Age 40-64 -0.233 0.084 -0.136 -2.764 0.006
Awareness of Internet policy and 
regulation -0.175 0.065 -0.220 -2.691 0.007
Evaluation of the role of the Internet 0.380in everyday life (all) 0.092 0.204 4.140 0 . 0 0 0
Perceived accountability of Internet 
authorities 0.264 0.076 0.285 3.498 0 .0 0 1
R -S quared 0.087
F 9.248
P  value 0.000
Base: N = i o o i  (Internet users & non-users)
The R-Squared is 0.087, suggesting that the variability in the independent 
variables accounts for 8.7% of the variance in Greek people’s evaluations of Internet 
policy and regulation. Also, the null hypothesis of no joint effect of the independent 
variables on such evaluation was rejected (F = 9.248, p < 0.001). The variables 
significant at the 0.05 level are:
• Age 40-64 (B = -0.233,p  = 0.006). This finding implies that people aged 40-64 are 
less likely than those over +65 years to think that national and EU laws and policies 
can cope with security and privacy risks on the Internet.
• Evaluation of the role of the Internet in everyday life (all) (B = 0.380,/) < 0.001). 
This finding implies that individuals with a more positive evaluation of the role of 
the Internet in everyday life are more likely to think that national and EU laws and 
policies can cope with security and privacy risks on the Internet.
• Awareness of Internet policy and regulation (B = -0.175, p = 0.007). This result 
suggests that individuals who think that people’s awareness of policy and regulation 
on the Internet is low are less likely to think that national and EU laws and policies 
can cope with security and privacy risks online.
• Perceived accountability of Internet authorities (B = 0.264,/) = 0.001). This result 
suggests that people who think that Internet authorities take the citizen’s voice on 
the Internet into account are more likely to think that national and EU laws and 
policies can cope with security and privacy risks online.
These results show that the perceived efficiency of national and EU policies and 
regulations on the Internet depends on the evaluation of the Internet’s role in 
everyday life, as well as the perceived accountability of Internet authorities and 
awareness of Internet policy and regulation. Also, the demographic of age is a 
significant predictor of people’s evaluations. On the other hand, I failed to find 
evidence that Internet users evaluate Internet policy and regulation more positively
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than non-users, or that awareness of Internet authorities influences how people 
evaluate Internet policy and regulation.
U sers’ evaluation  o f  In te rn e t policy and  regu la tion
As regards users’ evaluations of Internet policy and regulation, a linear 
regression model tested the hypothesis that users’ perceived efficiency of Internet 
policy and regulation depends on their evaluation of the role of the Internet in 
everyday life, as well as policy predictors such as awareness of Internet policy and 
regulation, and perceived accountability and awareness of Internet authorities. The 
dependent variable ‘evaluation of Internet policy and regulation (users)’ is a construct 
of two questions that traces users’ evaluations of whether national policies and 
regulations actually protect them against security and privacy risks on the Internet. 
The following independent variables were included in the model:129
■ demographics: age, education, gender, children in the household;
■ media availability (computer and Internet);
■ evaluation of the role of the Internet in everyday life (all);
■ evaluation of the role of the Internet in everyday life (users);
■ perceived accountability of Internet authorities;
■ awareness of Internet policy and regulation;
■ awareness of Internet authorities (all); and
■ awareness of Internet authorities (users).
These predictors allowed me to not only test the model’s fitness in relation to 
the hypothesis but also to measure the role of general indicators such as demographics 
and media availability for users. After 10 reiterations, the model that fits the data best 
is as follows (Table 7-13):
T able  7-13: Users’ evaluations of Internet policy and regulation model
V ariable B S.E. B eta t Sig.
(Constant) 2.003 0.429 4.669 0 . 0 0 0
Age 15-24 1.244 0.425 0.654 2.930 0.004
Age 25-39 
Age 40-64
Children in the household



























Base: N=445 (Internet users)
129 ‘Computer use’ was not included as it was almost constant and would have caused multicollinearity.
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The R-Squared of this model is 0.091, suggesting that the variability in the 
independent variables accounts for 9.1% of the variance in users’ evaluations of 
Internet policy and regulation. Also, the null hypothesis of no joint effect of the 
independent variables on users’ evaluation of policy and regulation was rejected (F = 
3.566p = 0.004). The significant variables are:
• Age 15-24 (B = 1.244, P = 0.004), 25‘39 CB = 0.936, p  = 0.029) and 40-64 (B = 0.978, p  = 
0.025). This finding suggests that users under 65 years are more likely to be 
significantly more satisfied with the way national policy and regulation protect 
their online security and privacy.
• Children in the household (B = -0.014,p = 0.035). This finding implies that users 
who live in households with children are less likely to be satisfied with national 
policies and regulations on the Internet, probably because they are more worried 
about security and privacy risks that children may encounter online.
• Awareness of Internet policy and regulation (B = -0.119,/) = 0.082). Although the p- 
value is higher than .05, the analysis indicates that awareness of Internet policy and 
regulation is still important and has some explanatory power for the model.130 This 
suggests that users who think that people’s awareness of laws and policies is low are 
less likely to be satisfied with national policies and regulations on the Internet.
Hence, I found some support for the hypothesis that users’perceived efficiency 
of policy and regulation on the Internet depends on policy factors such as awareness of 
policy and regulation. On the other hand, I failed to find evidence to support the 
hypothesis that the evaluation of the role of Internet in everyday life as well as other 
policy factors, such as perceived accountability and awareness of Internet authorities, 
influence users’ evaluations of Internet policy and regulation. Nonetheless, the 
demographic of age has an influence, while the existence of children in the household 
seems to raise more concerns about privacy and security risks on the Internet, making 
users less satisfied with the ways national laws and policies address such risks.
In summary, the findings in this section suggest that the factor of Internet use 
does not significantly influence people’s evaluations of Internet policy and regulation. 
On the other hand, other policy factors, mostly touching upon awareness and social 
accountability matters, influence people’s evaluations of policy and regulation. Also, 
people’s attitudes to the Internet in the context of everyday life influence their 
evaluations of policy and regulation, although not specifically users’ views of how 
national policies and regulations address possible risks when they use the Internet.
130 Depending on the level of confidence, the inclusion of this variable as a predictor in the model means 
that the study takes more risk on concluding the significance of this factor for the whole study 
population (i.e. an 8.2% probability, or chance, that what I found in the sample is not true for the 
population). However, the ‘goodness of fit’ is satisfactory and the overall testing of the model indicates 
this variable is still quite significant.
206
Last, some demographics (i.e. age and children in the household) seem to have an 
influence on people’s evaluations of Internet policy and regulation, although 
demographics do not appear to matter overall.
7.4 Concluding remarks: Internet adoption, everyday life and 
decision-making
The above multivariate analysis tested all the survey hypotheses and provided 
the following insights for each hypothesis:
H ypothesis 1: Internet adoption (Internet use, quality of use, concerns about 
online risks and self-protection) depends on the predictors of access to media 
technologies and computer use, the perceived role of the Internet in everyday life, as 
well as policy and regulatory predictors such as evaluation and awareness of Internet 
policy and regulation, and awareness and perceived accountability of Internet 
authorities.
The findings that partly support this hypothesis are:
a. The decision of ordinary people to use the Internet does not depend directly on 
their evaluation of the role of the Internet in everyday life or on policy indicators, 
such as evaluation and awareness of Internet policy and regulation as well as 
perceived accountability and awareness of Internet authorities. On the contrary, 
the likelihood of being a user depends on Internet availability, computer use and 
demographics only.
b. On the other hand, quality of use (e.g. frequency of use, online activities and type 
of Internet connection) is to some extent affected by users’ evaluations of the role 
of the Internet in various domains of everyday life and by their awareness of 
Internet authorities. Computer use, evaluation and awareness of Internet policy 
and regulation, and perceived accountability of Internet authorities do not 
significantly influence the quality of Internet use. Also, the various parameters of 
quality of use appear to be interlinked and interdependent.
c. Finally, parameters of Internet adoption concerning online risks and self­
protection partly depend on policy factors, with computer use and users’ 
evaluations of the role of the Internet in everyday life not influencing concerns 
about online risks and self-protection. Thus, self-protection is influenced by users’ 
awareness of Internet authorities, whereas concerns about online risks depend only 
on the usage of security tools (self-protection) and users’ confidence in averting 
online risks.
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In summary, ordinary people’s perceived role of the Internet in everyday life 
and their awareness of Internet authorities appear to be significant factors influencing 
parameters of Internet adoption in Greece, but not Internet use in itself.
H ypothesis 2: The role of the Internet in everyday life depends on the 
predictors of access to media technologies and Internet use, as well as Internet policy 
and regulation, and awareness and perceived accountability of Internet authorities.
The findings partly supporting this hypothesis are:
a. In general, ordinary people’s assessments of the Internet’s role in everyday life 
depends on their evaluation and awareness of Internet policy and regulation. Also, 
the demographic of age and computer availability appear to be influential factors. 
On the other hand, I failed to find evidence that Internet users assess the role of 
the Internet more positively than non-users, or that ordinary people’s awareness 
and perceived accountability of Internet authorities are significant for their 
assessment of the role of the Internet in everyday life.
b. As regards the group of non-users in particular, although this group was not 
addressed through a separate hypothesis, one can confirm the role of policy factors 
in how this group evaluates the importance of Internet use. More specifically, non­
users’ awareness and evaluation of policy and regulation, as well as their perceptions 
of the social accountability of Internet authorities, influence the ways they evaluate 
Internet use. Non-users’ assessment of Internet use is also influenced by their 
attitudes to future use and by perceived likelihood of use, as well as by their 
assessment of the Internet’s effects on various aspects of everyday life.
H ypothesis 3: The role of the Internet in users’ everyday lives depends on the 
predictors of patterns of use (history of use, frequency of use and type of Internet 
connection), breadth of online activities, awareness of online risks, concerns about and 
self-protection against such risks, as well as policy and regulatory predictors such as 
evaluation and awareness of Internet policy and regulation, and awareness and 
perceived accountability of Internet authorities.
The findings partly supporting this hypothesis are:
The policy factor of awareness of Internet policy and regulation, patterns of 
Internet use, such as frequency of use and breadth of online activities, as well as users’ 
concerns about online risks are important for their evaluation of the role of the 
Internet in everyday life. On the other hand, I did not find evidence to support the 
hypothesis that the policy indicators of evaluation of Internet policy and regulation, 
awareness of Internet authorities and perceived accountability of Internet authorities 
influence users’ evaluations of the role of the Internet in everyday life.
In summarising hypotheses 2 and 3, Greek people’s’ evaluations of the 
Internet’s role in everyday life is influenced by policy factors and to some extent by
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demographics and media accessibility. Although Internet use does not seem to direcdy 
influence people’s evaluations of the role of the Internet in everyday life, users are 
influenced by other usage-related factors, evaluating the Internet more positively 
overall than non-users.
H ypothesis 4: The role of policy and regulation (perceived efficiency of 
Internet policy and regulation) depends on the predictors of Internet use and the 
perceived role of the Internet in everyday life, as well as policy and regulatory 
predictors such as awareness of Internet policy and regulation, and perceived 
accountability and awareness of Internet authorities.
The findings that partly support this hypothesis are:
Ordinary people’s perceived efficiency of Internet policy and regulation 
depends on their evaluations of the role of the Internet in everyday life, as well as other 
policy factors such as people’s perceived accountability of Internet authorities and 
awareness of Internet policy and regulation. Also, the demographic of age is a 
significant predictor of people’s perceptions. On the other hand, I failed to find 
evidence that Internet use is a significant predictor of people’s perceived efficiency of 
Internet policy and regulation, although I found that users in the sample evaluated 
Internet policy and regulation and particularly EU policy and regulation more 
positively than non-users.
H ypothesis 5: The role of policy and regulation (perceived efficiency of 
Internet policy and regulation) from a user perspective depends on the predictors of 
the perceived role of the Internet in everyday life, as well as policy and regulatory 
predictors such as awareness of Internet policy and regulation, and perceived 
accountability and awareness of Internet authorities.
The findings partly supporting this hypothesis are:
Users’ perceived efficiency of Internet policy and regulation depends on the 
demographics of age and children in the household and on users’ awareness of Internet 
policy and regulation. On the other hand, I failed to find evidence to support the 
hypothesis that the evaluation of the role of Internet in everyday life as well as other 
policy-related parameters, such as perceived accountability and awareness of Internet 
authorities, influence users’ evaluations of Internet policy and regulation.
In summarising hypotheses 4 and 5, ordinary people’s evaluations of the role of 
Internet policy and regulation depend to some extent on their evaluations of the role 
of the Internet in everyday life, as well as other policy indicators. Also, demographics 
and especially age are significant. On the other hand, users’ perceptions of the role of 
policy and regulation do not depend on their evaluation of the role of the Internet in 
everyday life, whereas other policy indicators appear to be partly significant.
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These survey findings answer, from the point of view of ordinary people, the 
operationalised research questions that introduced the overall survey analysis in 
Chapter 6 (p. 152). In summary, the survey answered these research questions as 
follows:
1. Which cultural and everyday life settings of Greek people influence digjital divides in Greece 
and in what ways?
The survey found that ordinary people in Greece have positive views of the 
Internet, but express concerns about the role of the Internet in specific areas of social 
life and activity. It indicated the existence of a ‘dismissive culture’ in Greece, with non­
users being non-interested in and having no need to use the Internet. Also, it found 
that non-users’ perceptions about whether they miss out on things because of not 
being Internet users is influenced by their interest in and estimate of the possibility of 
future use, as well as by their general evaluation of the effects of the Internet on 
various domains of everyday life. Although users’ decisions to use the Internet do not 
depend directly on how they perceive and evaluate the role of the Internet in everyday 
life, quality of use is affected to some extent by such an evaluation, while the various 
parameters of quality of use appear interlinked and interdependent.
2. What is the role of policy- and regulation-making in Greece in the course of the country’s 
information society and with regard to digjital divides?
The survey found a low level of satisfaction of Greek people with Internet 
policy and regulation. EU Internet policy and regulation is considered more efficient 
than national policy and regulation, with users in the sample being more positive 
regarding EU policy and regulation than non-users. Also, the majority of ordinary 
people perceive the social accountability of EU and national Internet authorities as 
low, with users having only a slightly more positive view of authorities’ social 
accountability. In terms of awareness, the majority of users and non-users are not 
aware of the Greek authorities that monitor the application of policies and regulations, 
with users being more likely to be aware of such authorities. Although Internet use 
does not depend directly on policy and regulatory indicators, parameters of Internet 
adoption, such as frequency of use and usage of security tools, depend on awareness of 
Internet authorities with most users arguing about the low level of awareness of 
authorities which they could contact.
3. How does the dynamic between society’s culture and decision-making influence digjtal divides 
in Greece? To what extent and in what direction?
Although the models produced for explaining Greek people’s perceptions of the 
role of the Internet in everyday life hold more explanatory power than those produced 
for explaining people’s evaluations of Internet policy and regulation (see R-squared 
values), cultural forces in everyday life and policy factors seem to be somewhat
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interwoven as they influence digital divides. On one hand, policy and regulation 
significantly influence ordinary people’s assessments of the role and effects of the 
Internet in everyday life, as well as non-users’ evaluations of Internet use, although not 
specifically their decision not to use the Internet. Also, policy indicators such as 
awareness of Internet policy and regulation influence users’ assessment of the impact 
that non-use could have on their everyday lives. On the other hand, ordinary people’s 
perceived efficiency of national and EU Internet policies and regulations is influenced 
by their evaluation of the role of the Internet in everyday life as well as by other policy 
factors such as perceived accountability of Internet authorities and awareness of 
Internet policy and regulation. As regards users in particular, they do not seem to 
shape their perceptions of the efficiency of Internet policy and regulation on the 
grounds of their evaluation of the Internet in everyday life (e.g. the impact that non­
use could have on their everyday lives).
In the next chapter focus-group interviews with ordinary people examine these 
quantitative results further, aiming to contextualise, complement and cross-validate 
the complex web of factors that determine users’ and non-users’ attitudes to and 
practices on the Internet. Then, in Chapter 9 the quantitative patterns are discussed in 
comparison to other findings in published research literature and linked back to 
theory. Also in that chapter research limitations concerning the quantitative approach 
to digital divides in Greece are brought to the fore.
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8 . Focus groups: Qualitative exploration of the survey findings
and elite actors’ discourses
8.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter presents the third and last phase of the empirical research, focus 
group interviews with a sub-sample of surveyed users and non-users of the Internet. 
Section 8.2 reminds us of the operationalised research questions examined in this 
phase and the linkages to the two previous phases. Sections 8.3-8.7 discuss the main 
interview findings. The findings are classified by the themes the focus groups 
discussed, while remarking on the interview discourses wherever appropriate. Section 
8.8 presents the focus groups’ reflections on the survey findings and elite actors’ 
discourses, comparing and cross-validating all the findings. This chapter concludes, in 
Section 8.9, with a summary of answers to the operationalised questions. I t does not 
discuss the focus groups with respect to other research and theory in the field. Chapter 
9 discusses the findings of all three research phases in light of other similar research 
and elaborates how these findings provide insights into key concepts and theories in 
the field.
8.2 Introduction
In this final phase of data collection, I organised focus groups with a sub-sample 
of surveyed Internet users and non-users to enrich and cross-validate the data obtained 
in the first two phases. On one hand, the focus groups complemented and qualitatively 
enriched the survey findings, also cross-checking the findings concerning the same 
issues. In this phase, I also reflected on the findings of the in-depth elite actors’ 
interviews. One section of the focus group discussions was dedicated to the elite 
actors’ discourses, cross-validating the insights provided in the first phase and tackling 
the same issues from the perspective of ordinary people (for the focus group topic 
guides, see Appendix 4-8; for an introduction of complementarity and cross-validation 
of the findings, see Chapter 4, pp. 84-5).
More specifically, the focus groups explored the following operationalised 
research questions (for the operationalisation of research questions, see Chapter 4, 
Table 4-1):
1. W hich cultural and everyday life settings of Greek people influence digital divides 
in Greece and in what ways?
2. W hat is the role of policy- and regulation-making in Greece in the course of the 
country’s information society and with regard to digital divides?
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3. How does the dynamic between society’s culture and decision-making influence 
digital divides in Greece? To what extent and in what direction?
After Chapters 6 and 7 quantitatively explored these questions and the grounds 
were set by the elite actors’ interviews in Chapter 5, at this point these questions were 
approached qualitatively from the point of view of ordinary people.131 Sections 8.3-87 
present the topics tackled in the focus groups and the insights of ordinary people into 
the above questions.
8.3 Media use
The interviews began with general questions about media use and patterns of 
use, in particular tracing the position of computer and Internet technologies in people’ 
s lives.
8.3.1 Internet users' media use: patterns o f use and attitudes to the media
As summarised in Appendix 8 (Table A. 8-1), all users use one or more media 
types on a daily basis. Younger Internet users identified forces that make them use a 
wider range of media and engage in more media activities. The convergence of media 
was mentioned as a matter that complicates the distinction between media platforms, 
while different purposes of use fit in with different media types.
P a tte rn s  and  pu rposes o f  m edia use
In the interviews with groups of users it became obvious that age results in 
conditions and life circumstances that matter for media usage. Young users, such as 
Michalis (17 years, male student) in group 2 and Petros (19 years, male, military service) 
in group 1 engage more with new media technologies for entertainment and 
communication activities and less with traditional mass media and activities related to 
‘seeking information’:
Michalis: ...ok, I don’t watch much TV and don’t listen much to the radio...nor read the papers 
much...but yes, I use my mobile a lot, particularly for texting...emmmm...and computers for 
playing games, listening music, watching DVDs, chatting, surfing....for everything, in other 
words., .(laughs).
On the other hand, old people such as Ioanna (72 years, female pensioner) in 
group 1 only use the Internet when they have to (professional or family reasons), whilst 
they exercise a narrow scope of online and offline media activities:
131 The elite actors paved the way by examining all the operationalised research questions. Then, only 
three questions that could provide more insights and be explored from the point of view of ordinary 
people were examined in the survey and focus groups. For more, see Chapter 4, Table 4-1.
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...people of my age veiy hardly use computers and I wouldn’t be using a computer either if 
things were different. I’m a pensioner, I’m used to spending time in front of the TV but also to 
reading newspapers, listening radio and I love...I really love talking on the phone. However, I 
was persuaded to start using the Internet when my son moved to the USA, to work as a 
university teacher.
The other interviewees in both users groups prioritise work activities first and 
information searching second, particularly when using a computer and the Internet. 
One indicative example is Stefanos (32 years, male), an investment analyst ingroup 1:
Ok, I must say that I spend most of my time at work. Because of that, TV, telephone and the 
computer are what I use most. You know, TV to be informed about financial news, telephone 
to communicate with colleagues and the Internet to check how stock markets are doing.
Media usage is associated to some degree with relaxation and non-work 
purposes of use, while Eirini (32 years, female accountant) and Kwnstantina (55 years, 
female administrator) in group 2 pointed to the distinction between media types and 
purposes of media use: traditional mass media are arguably used more for information 
and entertainment purposes, while computers and the Internet are used more for work 
purposes. Only those who are advanced Internet users use the Internet in multiple 
everyday life activities and for a wide range of purposes:
Eirini: I use TV, radio and mobile phone eveiyday, whereas a computer, the Internet and...these 
are the new technologies I’m using...they are only available at my workplace, as I don’t use them 
at home and when I nave free time.
Kwnstantina: ...I agree with Eirini. I like TV, radio and telephone more than those 
incomprehensible and quickly changing technologies...like computers, the Internet, and all 
small gadgets the names of wnich I can’t recall now...
Finally, interviewees such as Antonios (44 years, male self-employed) in group 2 
pointed to media convergence. Antonios indicated how the Internet can, at least 
partly, substitute and replace traditional media such as TV and radio, problematising 
the distinction between media platforms:
...I do not use TV or radio so much...now with my computer I mostly use DVDs and download 
music I like from the Internet. You see, I belong to P2P networks which allow me to share all 
types of visual and audio content that I like...
A ttitu d es  to  and  evaluation o f  m edia
Internet users acknowledged the important role specific media types play in 
specific domains of daily activity, such as work, communication and entertainment.
As regards the Internet, users have different views and use the Internet for 
various purposes. Stefanos (32 years, male investment analyst) and Apostolos (44 years, 
male civil servant) in group 1 have quite different views, with the former using the 
Internet broadly and willingly and the latter arguing that he was forced to become a 
user.
Stefanos: I use a computer and the Internet for surfing and watching DVDs, but this is not 
frequent.
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Apostolos: I’m not saying that I don’t have to use computers and the Internet at work...I have 
to... I had to be trained for that...difficult to avoid, you see Gaughs)...the rest of my time I read 
news and watch TV...or listen to music and other programmes I like on the radio.
Nevertheless, Internet usage is influenced by everyday and attitude factors, as 
shown later in the analysis.
8.3.2 Internet non-users' media use:patterns o f use and attitudes to media
Internet non-users’ patterns of media use are similar to users’ patterns. As 
shown in Appendix 8 (Table A.8-2), non-users use one or more media on a daily basis. 
They use different types of media for different purposes, while daily routines and 
settings of life determine their attitudes to the media.
P a tte rn s  and  pu rposes o f  m edia  use
Three non-users (group 4) use a computer. For these non-users, computer use is 
highly related to work as they use a computer when they are forced to or realise that it 
is important at work. Regarding other media, in both groups of non-users it became 
obvious that different people use different media for various purposes in their daily 
lives. Nevertheless, media play overall a very important role in non-users’ lives and are 
used on a daily basis.
A ttitu d es  to  and  evaluation  o f  m edia
Non-users have different attitudes to various media on the grounds of their 
routines and depending on their time schedules and hobbies. An indicative example is 
Maria, a 45-year-old housewife in group 3, who spends most of her time at home. Maria 
says she watches TV quite a lot, considering TV relaxing and ‘good company’:
Interviewer: Have all of you got a mobile?
Maria: No, not me (hesitation)...you see, I stay at home most of the time to bring up my 
children. I don’t work, so don’t need it....everyone can find me on the landline...besides, it’s 
expensive for me...
Interviewer: So, do you use any other media?
Maria: Of course....my landline to contact relatives and friends from time to time, and 
particularly TV....it relaxes me... I’m tired at the end of the day and TV gives me the chance to 
rest and relax...
(a few moments of silence)
Maria: ...the TV is on most of the time...it’s good company...
Those who use a wider range of media and emphasise the role of the media in 
daily activities are those who express a higher degree of appreciation for their 
contribution to the improvement of various aspects of life. On the other hand, those 
who use a narrow range of media, either because of life circumstances or personal 
choice, are less positive regarding the role of media in their everyday lives. An
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indicative example is Anna (38 years, female teacher) in group 4, who demonised the 
role of some media, being very selective about her exposure to media messages:
Don’t you think that media have over-occupied our time and lives in general? I don’t know why 
people used to live better in the past when they were not exposed to all these media messages... 
The good thing is that personally I do not have to use any media for my work... thus, I can 
select good media programmes and the right way to use media technologies. I’m saying this 
because most media programmes, on TV in particular, are rubbish and provide a distorted 
picture of the world.
8.4 Internet use
After the common set of questions about media usage, the discussion 
concerning the Internet specifically moved in different directions for users and non­
users. At this point, I attempted to follow-up and go deeper into the survey findings.
8.4.1 Users and the Internet:patterns ofuse, attitudes and role in everyday life
As summarised in Appendix 8 (Table A.8-3), only users who appreciate the role 
of Internet in their everyday lives and have chosen to use it willingly engage in a wide 
range of and advanced online activities. Internet use and the quality or breadth of 
usage as well as users’ attitudes to the Internet appear to be closely linked with the 
reasons users employ the Internet to deal with personal life circumstances.
T he In te rn e t and  how  is u n d e rs to o d
Users’ understanding of the Internet depends on their online activities and 
experiences. Less advanced users have less elaborated views of the Internet than those 
engaging in a wider range of online activities. Indicative of the role of online 
experiences and activities in users’ understandings are the following views in group 2:
Eirini (32 years, female accountant): ...possibly because I don’t have enough knowledge...I mean,
I use specific sites...for me, in any case, it’s a space where I can search for stuff and information, 
and I can find some of the information I’m looking for...
Anastasia (27 years, female teacher): ...yes, but we all know that this is not the only way to see 
the Internet...for instance, I’m using chat rooms, virtual rooms where people meet, discuss, 
create new networks...
Pantelis (25 years, male postgraduate student): ...I’m also chatting ...also, blogging offers a lot to 
community-building...
Antonios (44 years, male self-employed): ...plus, you can find software to use outside the 
Internet.
P a tte rn s  o f  In te rn e t  use: links to  life c ircum stances
Users mostly employ computers and the Internet for work purposes. Myriam 
(27 years, female postgraduate student) in group 1 confirmed Internet and computer
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use for such purposes. She notes that media convergence is deeply rooted in the 
Internet, challenging rigid media distinctions:
Why do we have to distinguish? I mean...if you have a computer, you have the Internet, radio,
TV, electronic newspapers, DVD...I don’t know what else...
Apart from users who use the Internet willingly, Ioanna (72 years, female 
pensioner) and Apostolos (44 years, male civil servant) in group 1 presented Internet 
use not as a personal choice but as a decision imposed by family or work 
circumstances. This influences practical issues concerning the quality, length and 
breadth of usage:
Apostolos: ...I had to learn how to use computer for work; I was forced to do so...It’s 
not something I like though and this is why I never work on the computer at home.
Ioanna: ....it took me a lot o f time to learn the basics...emails, searching for 
information and using...how is it called? ...oh, yes, Skype, where we hear his [son] voice 
and see his face. I must admit that these are my only uses, as it’s still hard for me to get 
used to such machines... I have agreed with my son to  communicate at specific times 
with him and these are the only times I use my computer.
The feeling of being forced to was articulated by users who use the Internet for 
work and family purposes only. This goes hand-in-hand with the age of the 
interviewees as the middle aged and elderly, such as Kwnstantina (55 years, female 
administrator) ingroup 2, Ioanna (72 years, female pensioner) ingroup 1 and Apostolos 
(44 years, male civil servant) in group 1, use the Internet because of life circumstances 
(e.g. family or work changes), limiting their use to what they consider required 
activities. They also complained about difficulties with use, as well as a lack of 
understanding of and interest in the Internet. The role of age came up explicitly when 
users characterised mass media the ‘media of my generation’, implying that the 
Internet is for youngsters:
Kwnstantina: Look, I started using computers and the Internet very recently...because my 
company changed the administration system and, as an administrator, I had to learn to use 
computers. I have started to use such technologies now, but I’m still having difficulties and 
couldn’t think of using them for reasons other than work!
Interviewer: Whereas you use technologies such as radio, TV, telephone...everyday?
Kwnstantina: Yes, that is what I’m used to; these are the media of my generation.
Life circumstances and instances of resistance to technology came to the fore as 
possible reasons why users, such as Agapi (35 years, female decorator) in group 1, feel 
‘forced’ to use the Internet. At this point, the notion of‘choice’ turns from the idea of 
‘no choice to use the Internet’ into ‘no choice not to use the Internet’:132
Sometimes, I’m frustrated that I cannot avoid it {the Internet}. My case is similar to and 
different at the same time from Ioanna’s in the sense I was forced to start using the Internet 
not for family but for work reasons. When I fist started working as a decorator I had training, 
knowledge, information from conferences, workshops and publications in my area... However, I
132 Petros (19 years, male, military service) in group 1 raised the role of life circumstances from another 
perspective. He explained how military service imposes restrictions on Internet activities and the time 
spent online.
quickly found myself lagging behind new developments... I realised that in order to survive I 
should get familiar with the Internet.
Life circumstances and everyday activities become particularly important if one 
looks at the gap of online experiences and breadth of usage between users. For 
instance, in group 2, Pantelis (25 years, male postgraduate student), a well-educated 
computer scientist, and Kwnstantina (55 years, female administrator), a woman who 
had to learn how to use computers in her 50s, are two users engaging in different 
online activities. This is because they use the Internet in different everyday 
frameworks, consequently articulating contrasting views about the medium and its 
services:
Pantelis: I’m using the Internet as a professional, dealing with Internet content and software 
production. As a user though, I think I’m involved in most of the activities that a user can be 
involved in.
Kwnstantina: Ooo...my god! This sounds too much...sorry, you are professional, ok, but how can 
you really develop all these activities in your spare time? Imagine that I only use the Internet in 
the workplace for emailing and information searching and that this takes so much time...
Interestingly, each category of users is surprised by the other side, with 
fanatical Internet users being critical and reserved users being defensive:
Interviewer: There are those who use it only or mostly in the workplace I think...
Agapi (35 years, female decorator, group 1): Yes, that is me! I think I do more things... I even 
chat via MSN (laughs). No, seriously, I communicate a lot, I exchange emails, I search a lot, I 
download a lot and I also create my own web space...but all this for work...
Stefanos (32 years, male investment analyst, group 1): ...hasn’t that made you become more 
curious about and interested in the things you can find and do online?
Agapi: No, not at all!
Stefanos: Surprising...I cannot think of spending a day without checking my emails, surfing, 
playing games, reading online news, downloading music and films or chatting on Skype.
As for fears about Internet risks, concerns about risks and means of protection 
vary among users, depending on their expertise, knowledge, awareness and sense of 
responsibility. Eirini (32 years, female accountant) in group 2, who only uses the 
Internet at work and does not have knowledge or interest regarding security issues, is 
an indicative example of how awareness and a sense of personal responsibility 
determine users’ concerns and self-protection:
...I have a computer at work. I don’t have one at home, so I’m not responsible for security, and, 
honestly, I don’t know much about it....emmm...I’m not sure whether there are any security 
tools installed on the computer I use...and I hadn’t even thought about possible risks...
On the other hand, those with a wider scope of online activities are less 
concerned about online risks and more confident that the security tools they employ 
can protect them sufficiently. Words of the most advanced user in group 2 are 
indicative here:
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Antonios (44 years, male self-employed): I use all necessary security tools, I update them very 
often, I add new tools as necessary and try to be always informed regarding security and sources 
of attack... so far, at least, I haven’t been attacked by a virus and haven’t got my work or 
equipment corrupted.
In both groups of users there were the advanced and skilled and those with 
limited efficacy and breadth of usage. Those with advanced skills challenged popular 
discourses and made specific arguments concerning online risks and security; those 
with a limited breadth of usage drew on ‘media panics’ discourses and relied on 
abstract references to what is ‘real’, implying that ‘online’ can be identified with 
‘unreal’:
Eirini (32 years, female accountant, group 2):... everyday we hear about things that happen on 
the Internet...no specific example comes to my mind now...if I talk about myself...why should I 
waste my time in front of a screen to do things that I can do in a more ‘real’ way?
Pantelis (25 years, male postgraduate student, group 2):... (interrupts) You are wrong...thereare 
certain things you do online which you cannot do otherwise, or if you do them offline then you 
will have to spend more money, more time, or both.
W h a t ab o u t being  deprived  o f  th e  In te rn e t  in  th e  fu tu re?
The purposes of Internet use and whether use constitutes a personal choice or a 
decision imposed by life circumstances determine users’ views of the possibility of 
being deprived of the Internet in the future. Even if all users agree on the benefits of 
Internet usage, those using the Internet unwillingly, such as Agapi in group 1, argued 
they would not mind if they had to stop using it:
Stefanos (32 years, male investment analyst): Yes... I would have to change work (laughs) 
...besides, not to forget my online hobbies, the information I get and the new people I meet 
online.
Agapi (35 years, female decorator): I must agree with Stefanos on the importance of the Internet 
for professions like his and mine... However, if I was deprived of the Internet in the future, I 
don t think it would mean anything for my life.
Those who use the Internet for work purposes only recognised that non-use in 
the future would influence their work and only that. In this respect, the words of Eirini 
(32 years, female accountant) in group 2 are indicative:
I know it sounds weird, as I use the Internet at work...but it’s not personal usage, nor a 
choice...so, it would change my work conditions but no other aspect of my life.
Im p o rtan ce  o f  In te rn e t use fo r  everyday life
It is obvious from the above that everyday activities and life circumstances 
significantly determine people’s decisions to use the Internet and their online 
experiences. For those who say the Internet is needed for their everyday activities (e.g. 
work), but is not something they have willingly chosen, the Internet influences other 
media use as well as time schedules and rhythms of life:
Agapi (35 years, female decorator, group 1): I have less time now...less time to see a film, to 
watch a documentary or movie on TV, less time or no time to read magazines and papers...even 
less time to phone friends... I suppose, this is the price to pay for professional success, right? 
(laughs).
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Age influences the domains of everyday life in which the Internet plays a role. 
Younger users appreciated the Internet with regard to non-work purposes of use, 
emphasising the new ways the Internet offers for communication and entertainment. 
On the other hand, older users, who do not use the Internet in many domains of the 
everyday and are not fanatical users, were quite defensive and tried to explain why they 
feel like that:
Myriam (27 years, female postgraduate student, group 1): I personally like it very 
much...especially when downloading cool stuff, as everything is free (laughs). Also, when being 
in touch with friends who have gone away for study or work... the Internet allows me to keep in 
touch ...something which would be difficult and expensive otherwise (laughs).
Petros (19 years, male military service, group 1): Yes, I agree with Myriam...when I have the 
chance to take a break off from camp...the Internet is away to say: ‘hello people, I’m back to 
life!’ (laughs).
Agapi (35 years, female decorator, group 1): I suspect I’m the only one who feels like being 
forced... It’s funny, people say that the more you don’t want something the more it happens 
(laughs).
Ioanna (72 years, female pensioner, group 1): At least you use it for work, it’s useful...besides you 
are educated and have time {in terms of age] to learn everything. I’m struggling and I use it for 
my son.
The Internet’s role in users’ lives is determined by the purposes of use and the 
reasons people use the Internet. Users ingroup 1 see the Internet as important mostly 
for work, whereas only Stefanos (32 years, male investment analyst) argued the Internet 
plays an important role in most of his daily activities. Stefanos’ words implied a 
criticism of those who argued the Internet is not important in daily life, whereas 
Ioanna (72 years, female pensioner), the least experienced user in the group, created 
some distance, positioning herself outside the group:
Stefanos: It is amazing how people keep the Internet outside their lives... As soon as I started 
using it... I started learning, doing things and spending increasingly more time online... It has 
now become an integral part of my work, communication, information and...my 
entertainment...
Ioanna: I’m amazed! Thank you for inviting me to this meeting, as I would otherwise think that 
my son is the only one who considers the Internet important (laughs).
8.4.2 Non-users and the Internet: reasons for nonuse, attitudes and impact on everyday 
life
As summarised in Appendix 8 (Table A.8-4), the notion of‘need’ and how non­
users prioritise things in life constitute the driving forces of non-usage and the 
likelihood of and desire for future usage. In this sense, indications of resistance to the 
Internet should be seen in an everyday life context and in association with people’s 
values and life priorities.
T he In te rn e t and  how  is u n d ers to o d
In contrast to users, non-users did not evaluate nor characterise the Internet. 
They defined it on the grounds of the reasons the Internet can be used for and the
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tools it provides. For instance, Ioannis (25 years, male civil engineer) in group 4 
described the Internet on the basis of what users can do online:
The Internet is a huge space where people can trace information, go over a huge number of 
sites, play games, download music and movies, communicate with people...ana many other 
things. Right?
R easons fo r  non-use  and  a ttitu d e s  to  th e  In te rn e t
As regards the reasons for non-use, the concept of ‘need’ (lack of need) 
dominated most non-users’ discourses. The concept of‘need’ is to be seen in a rich and 
diverse everyday context as the interviewees talked about ‘need’ with reference to their 
individual everyday activities and particularly their work activities:
Antonia (33 years, female self-employed, group 3): It’s the same for me...I work a lot, I’m self- 
employed and I don’t need the Internet for work... I prefer to spend my time with the family, 
or going out.
Maria (45 years, female housewife, group 3): ...because of a lack of time. I don’t work outside 
home, but being a housewife is tough...besides, I don’t see why I should use the Internet. I 
mean, I don’t have any reason to do so. These things are for the young or those that need the 
Internet at work...It’s not for housewives...I think....
The main reason non-users do not use the Internet is what they considered a 
lack of need, while in many instances they argued they did not have to learn to use it 
for work. Although the notion of‘need’ is approached here purely on the grounds of 
subjectivity and in accordance with the interviewees’ understanding of need in the 
context of their thinking and living, it surely relates to the choices non-users have in 
life and whether they are not subject to the ‘forced use’ that some users are. 
Nevertheless, non-users had positive views about the Internet and its growing role in 
people’s lives, although they felt they are not in a position to fully evaluate it:
Ioannis (25 years, male civil engineer, group 4): ...in the future eveiyone will be expected to use 
the Internet. Undoubtedly, the Internet is a technology we cannot ignore as it is becoming 
increasingly important for most things in life. I sometimes wonder whether it’s wrong that I 
don’t use it, but it’s just that I haven’t had the chance in the family and school to learn how to 
use it.
Also, the argument of non-users that they have never had the chance to get 
Internet training and education made them talk about the Internet as if it is 
completely dissociated from their daily lives and activities. Some non-users went 
further, pointing to the importance of keeping the usual order of life by resisting 
technologies such as the Internet. The interview texts involved references to the 
Internet as a ‘burden’, as well as more practical issues of concern, such as parents’ 
worries about the impact of the Internet on children:
Petros (39 years, male waiter, group 4): I don’t see why I should put one more burden on my 
shoulders... I mean, these things are for young people, for children who learn at school, not for 
us...unless you need it at work...
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Anna (38 years, female teacher, group 4): I don’t have the knowledge or expertise to use the 
Internet, but I could easily get some training so as to start using it... I don’t need it and I don’t 
want to be subject to all new technological wonders that mislead people. This is something I 
would like to teach my children about, but I don’t think they will be in a position to resist.
Im p ac t o f  non-use  o n  everyday life
The perceived impact of non-use on everyday life differed among non-users. 
First, there were those who felt they did not need or did not want to use the Internet, 
considering that non-usage does not have an important impact on their lives: 
TJmmm...not really, I don’t think that my life would change if I were using the 
Internet...’ (Maria, 45 years, female housewife, group 3). Second, some non-users are 
interested in the Internet and would like to use it in the future, emphasising the 
negative impact of non-use on people’s lives: ‘Why are you saying this? Even for you 
{Maria}, I think the Internet could somehow change everyone’s lives...’ (Andreas, 50 
years, male doctor, group 3). Last, there were those who adopted a neutral position and 
considered that the Internet could possibly benefit them, although they were 
somewhat uncertain.
The abovementioned last category of non-users expressed reservations about 
adopting the Internet, raising issues of awareness and fears about online risks. One 
indicative example is Evangelia (29 years, female shop owner) in group 4 who thinks 
that her work could benefit from the Internet, while pointing to her concerns about 
online fraud on the basis of what she ‘hears’ about online risks:
Although I don’t know much about the Internet, I can see the benefits that Ioannis mentioned. 
Now that I’m thinking about my shop, on the Internet I could find more supplies and at better 
prices, right? ...I could also find new trends and ideas about how to renew my shop... 
However... I wouldn’t risk going online and buying things without having someone to advise me.
I’m saying this because we often hear about people who buy things and lose money by using 
credit cards online.
It is interesting that non-users with children considered that the impact of non­
use on their lives passes through their children and their children’s usage of the 
Internet in the future. The impact on children’s lives is perceived as an integral part of 
parents’ own lives as parents felt they should keep control of their children’s activities 
by familiarising themselves with the Internet:
Anna (38 years, female teacher, group 4): The Internet is not important for my work and I don’t 
need it for other activities either ...I’m quite informed and I have seen how it works and what 
things you can do through it, as my daughters will, unavoidably, use it at school and home.
In te re s t in  and  likelihood  o f  fu tu re  use
Regarding the likelihood of future use, non-users took into account the 
parameter of‘need’ which they framed subjectively and in their individual contexts of 
life. The sense of ‘need’ varies from person to person on the basis of subjective 
evaluations and choices or life circumstances, as shown in the following dialogue in 
group 3:
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Interviewer: ...how likely are you to use the Internet, if at all?
Antonia (33 years, female self-employed): ...If something changes dramatically in my life...you 
know, work....ummmm...I don’t know what else....
Maria (45 years, female housewife): (interrupts) If I hadn’t had all these family 
responsibilities...maybe....at some point I was thinking of attending Internet seminars, EU- 
funded seminars...that could be a benefit, some money out of trying to learn something new 
(laughs)...but I couldn’t manage...three children...big responsibility...
Non-users who intend to use the Internet in the future or not do so in the 
framework of their daily activities and particularly on the grounds of their work or 
study activities. Thus, not only use but also likelihood of use in the future must be seen 
in an everyday context, pointing to possible reasons for non-use:
Andreas (50 years, male doctor, group 3): I’m intending to do so...I know I had to use it earlier, 
as it’s very important for my work... you can find online a lot about new developments in 
medicine.
Dimitrios: Ok, I have my studies... It’s my first year at the university and I was told that I will 
have to start using the Internet shortly...emails...such kind of things...but I will wait until I’m 
asked to do so.
It is obvious that likelihood of future use goes hand-in-hand with non-users’ 
desire for use and their attitudes to the Internet overall. Non-users with positive views 
of the Internet and its role as a medium of information and communication are those 
most likely to use it in the future. On the other hand, those with a negative opinion 
about or inadequate familiarity with the Internet are not likely to become users. This 
dialogue between non-users in group 4 is indicative:
Evangelia (29 years, female shop owner): I don’t think I’m very likely to use it, not only because 
of the concerns I mentioned before but also because I don’t have to use it and... I can anyway 
do my work in the way I’m used to. I cannot plan to take courses, to install a connection and to 
get into all this complicated process.
Ioannis (25 years, male civil engineer): I understand Evangelia’s point. This is similar to my 
thinking. However, I’ve lately started to consider the possibility of using the Internet. This is 
mostly because the majority of my colleagues use it and have benefited a lot...
Further, non-users’ desire to use the Internet in the future reflects different 
needs and evaluation of needs, as well as divergent understandings of the Internet and 
its value. The following dialogue in group 3 points to non-users’ different priorities in 
life and consequent understandings and evaluations of the Internet:
Interviewer: ...you mean that you won’t be using the Internet for anything else but for work 
purposes?
Andreas (50 years, male doctor): Yes, I don’t have the time and things like chatting are not for 
me....
Interviewer: What do you mean by ‘It’s not for me’?
Andreas: You see, I’m a busy person, with a family and better things to do than surfing or 
chatting...
Dimitrios (18 years, male student): (interrupts) ...for me, chatting, playinggames...you know, all 
these ‘stupid’ things could be very ‘cool’, they could relax me and...you know, it could be fun, a 
lot of fun...
Konstantinos (62 years, male plumber): ...chatting, gaming...these are for youth, not for us.
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In these discourses, age becomes a barrier to future use for middle-aged and 
elderly, influencing their interest in and the likelihood of future use (e.g. 
Kwnstantinos). Also, in this dialogue contrasting views of Internet activities are 
articulated, depending on how non-users prioritise things in life and what they 
consider appropriate or not.
8. $ Public discourses on the culture o f  Greek society: reflections on
the elite actors9 discourses
After the general questions about Internet usage and people’s evaluations of the 
Internet, users and non-users were asked the same set of questions about public 
discourses on the cultural traits of Greek society (Appendix 8, Table A.8-5). These 
questions aimed to provide feedback on the elite actors’ discourses and to reflect on 
ordinary people’s views of such discourses relative to what they argued earlier in the 
discussion.
8.5.1 Technophobic, non-technocratic and traditional Greek society
The interviewees problematised popular discourses that present Greek society 
as non-technocratic and technophobic.
The users did not dismiss but problematised the existence of technophobia in 
Greek society. They brought to the fore the role of 'those who decide', as well as the 
Greek mentality and lifestyle, which they called ‘Greekness’, backing public discourses 
that argue about the role of technophobia in the low Internet diffusion in Greece. 
They also pointed to the role of pragmatic factors such as the lack of education, 
training, information and infrastructure in Greece. The following dialogue in group 1 is 
indicative in this respect:
Myriam (27 years, female student): I can accept that people may be afraid of the Internet...but 
why? It’s not just because they are stubborn...is it? I think that a lack of education and 
information makes them suspicious... If you don’t have a computer at home, you are excluded, 
as my university doesn’t provide students even with the basic infrastructure.
Stefanos (32 years, male investment analyst): I don’t disagree with you [Myriam] but... ok, some
Eeople are unwilling or afraid and some others are not given opportunities. But this takes us ack to why this is the case in our country. Ok, ordinary people are Victims’...but those who 
decide...who are those people...and why? Doesn’t this relate to our mentality, lifestyle and our 
very ‘Greekness’?
Even if users partly admitted that Greek society is dismissive of new 
technologies and traditional in general, they emphasised the role of policy, education 
and other systemic conditions in people’s decisions to use the Internet. Pantelis (25
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years, male student) in group 2 pointed to systemic parameters as forces that, in his 
view, drive only a minority of Greek people to adopt the Internet:
...we shouldn’t underestimate people... those who work on new technologies do really well...of 
course, there are not the best possible conditions and the appropriate infrastructure and policy 
support... How many may want to use the Internet but don’t know where to start from and how 
to afford it...?
Issues concerning the dismissive and self-centred culture of Greek society 
raised, for some users, the particular link between politics and society, being in tune 
not only with relevant literature but also with the elite actors’ arguments. Antonios (44 
years, male self-employed) in group 2 said that politics is responsible for the change 
and improvement of society’s culture and practices, while he pointed to the close 
bonds between the culture of society and politics in Greece:
We are not the easiest and most positive people in the world. That does not mean that politics 
are fine...the opposite, as politics, I think, reflect what society is...and yes, politics is responsible 
because it does not change society.
Also, users such as Agapi (35 years, female decorator) in group 1 challenged 
popular discourses about the traits of Greek society, asking why people should 
consider the Internet a 'must' and a ‘necessity’. Agapi stated that she is in favour of 
more traditional ways of work and communication. She uses the Internet for work 
purposes only and is not a great supporter of technology in general:
I don’t see why it’s a bad thing not to use the Internet, especially when it’s not a need. Why are 
we backward-looking when we want to keep our relations and work as they were in the past? Is 
it a bad thing to maintain traditions? ...We try so desperately to prove that we are Europeans 
and not lagging behind, that we are as civilised and westernised as other countries...
Kwnstantina (55 years, female teacher) in group 2 raised the notion o f‘utility5, 
trying to challenge the existence of techno-phobia in Greek society. ‘Utility’ seems to 
be, from an everyday life perspective, of critical importance for the ways users evaluate 
the Internet’s role and relevant popular discourses:
...Why should I spend time and energy using something more than it’s needed? All right, the 
Internet may be useful or even necessary in other people’s lives...fair enough...but I’m 55 years 
old and I was suddenly asked to use the Internet in my work...
As regards non-users, although both users and non-users raised information, 
education and awareness as parameters that problematise the technophobic and 
traditional character of Greek society, non-users offered arguments which did not 
provide a clearly positive or negative answer to the relevant question. Non-users 
referred to technophobia in Greek society, pointing to online risks, media propaganda, 
family over-protectionism and societal reaction to new technologies. Also, they noted 
the role of a lack of awareness and incentives in their decision not to use the Internet 
and in the only apparent, as they say, dismissive attitudes of people to the Internet. 
Ioannis (25 years, male civil engineer, group 4) pointed out the contrasting attitudes of
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Greek society to different technologies, a view we also meet in the literature with 
regard to mobile telephony and the Internet:
In general...I think we are quite reactive to anything that changes our habits and lifestyle. On 
the other hand, we immediately adopt trends that come from abroad as long as they do not 
require effort and are fashionable. About the Internet....I think that some of us said that we 
don’t have the knowledge and incentives to use it...
Nonmsers have different views of the cultural characteristics of Greek society 
depending on their individual circumstances and contexts of life. In group 3, Maria (45 
years, female housewife) and Dionysia (36 years, saleswoman), two female non-users in 
their mid^os, expressed concerns about online risks, arguing that such risks may 
influence children. On the other hand, Dimitrios (18 years, male student), ayoung non­
user in group 3 who receives some pressure from his family, argued that such concerns 
are enforced by the media and the over-protective character of the Greek family:
Maria: (interrupts) ...every time I see my kids obsessed about...how is it called?..surfing?...yes, I 
think surfing...or when they go on English websites... I’m so worried because I don’t knowwhat 
sort of things they come across...
Dionysia: (interrupts) Yeah, it’s what I told you: porn, crimes....you can’t be certain, especially 
when it comes to children...
Dimitrios: (interrupts) ...come on, let’s not exaggerate... I think most of these things are made 
up...by the media or...old generations, parents, are very narrow-minded and scared of everything 
new that we {children} come across...
8.$.2 Ignorance and a lack o f awareness in Greek society
Eager Internet users (e.g. Stefanos and Petros in group 1) argued Greeks are 
unaware of and inactive concerning new technologies, while stressing the role of 
individual responsibility. On the other hand, those who are not great supporters of the 
Internet (e.g. Agapi and Apostolos ingroup 1) questioned individual responsibility and, 
although they admitted there is social ignorance and inactivity, emphasised the role of 
the state and education:
Agapi (35 years, female decorator): We all have so many things to deal with...I don’t know how 
we can be aware and keep up with everything new that is coming up. Yes, there is a lack of 
awareness that makes us inactive...but who is responsible for this?
Stefanos (32, male investment analyst): Sorry Agapi, but why should we always expect everything 
to be given to us? Aren’t we, as individuals, responsible? ...Besides, if the authorities force us to 
keep up with new technologies, there will be a huge public reaction.
Apostolos (44 years, male civil servant): Stefanos, I don’t agree. I mean, how am I expected to 
use such technologies when I haven’t been taught anything about them?
Petros (19 years, male, military service): ...but I see how negative my parents are when I ask 
them to learn to use computers and other gadgets... I’m giving free training and they do not 
take it (laughs).
Similarly to users, non-users expressed diverse views, problematising the issue 
and challenging discourses about social ignorance in Greece. However, most
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acknowledged the need for more information and training, and assigned this 
responsibility to the media, education and the state:
Interviewer: Some of you mentioned that people should be more informed. Who is in charge of 
that?
Andreas (50 years, male doctor, group 3): Schools, the media, the state...who is responsible for 
the Internet in Greece? Also, for professionals like me, professional associations...
Non-users who expressed reservations about the Internet attempted to 
challenge the problematic of social ignorance. They argued that training and education 
do not necessarily drive people to change their views about the Internet. The words of 
Anna (38 years, female teacher) in group 4, who is particularly negative regarding the 
Internet, are indicative:
I’m not saying that we are informed, but that this is not necessarily a problem as more 
information would not necessarily change our decision not to use the Internet.
#.5.3 Social inactivity
When non-users discussed the existence of non-technocratism and 
traditionalism in Greek society, some challenged discourses about Greek people’s 
inactivity. Part of this argument was ‘identity’, as understood on the grounds of the 
notion of‘Greekness’, as well as busy everyday schedules and traditions that go against 
the rapid changes that technology brings about:
Dionysia (36 years, female saleswoman, group 3): (interrupts) ...again, why inactive? We have so 
many other things and responsibilities in our lives...
Antonia (33 years, female self-employed, group 3): (interrupts) ...yeah, yeah...all these labels...we 
are not like other people, let’s say we are unique, we have our own identity...is that a bad thing?
It may be a good thing as well...
On the other hand, non-users who are considering to start using the Internet in 
the future, such as Ioannis (25 years, male civil engineer) in group 4, partly 
acknowledged the existence of social inactivity and individualism in Greece. However, 
even these non-users stressed the role of a lack of information and awareness and the 
state’s responsibility in this respect:
I think the biggest problem is that the authorities in charge do not do anything to help us, 
ordinary people^ become more aware...more into things...
8.6 Internet regulation andpolicy
The second part of the interviews explored people’s views of the role of 
Internet regulation and policy in their own practices as Internet users and non-users. 
The questions posed to users and non-users differed somewhat since the challenges
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Internet regulation and policy encounter in response to users’ and non-users’ needs 
also differ.
8.6.1 Users’ awareness and evaluation o f Internet regulation andpolicy
The discussion with users revolved around issues of awareness of and 
satisfaction with Internet regulation and policy. As summarised in Appendix 8 (Table 
A.8-6), the same questions were posed separately for regulation and policy.
H ow  In te rn e t  regu la tion  and  policy a re  u n d e rs to o d
The discussion began with introductory questions about how users understand 
Internet regulation and policy. Those who participated in the discussion most were 
advanced Internet users. The less advanced users remained silent most of the time, 
though they were encouraged to participate.
Some users understood the term ‘regulation’ quite well, although there was a 
tone of uncertainty in their voice: ‘Isn’t all laws...legislation concerning the Internet 
and its use?’ (Stefanos, 32 years, male investment analyst, group 1). If uncertainty 
characterised users who are familiar with the Internet, those with a limited scope of 
Internet use either stated a lack of knowledge or remained silent: ‘Ok, it’s obvious 
from the word itself...It’s about rules and laws, but I don’t know which rules and laws 
they are’ (Eirini, 32 years, female accountant, group 2):
As regards Internet policy, only one user, Stefanos (32 years, male investment 
analyst) in group 1, said what Internet policy is. Two other users in group 1 agreed with 
Stefanos, as he was the sawiest and most fervent user of the group: ‘I will take the risk 
first (laughs). Policy is something more general...it has to do with how people get 
informed, are taught, how they are given equipment and infrastructure to use the 
Internet... Is that right?’ (Stefanos). The same picture appeared ingroup 2, where only 
the advanced users said what Internet policy is.
N ational and  EU  In te rn e t  regu la tion  and  policy
Although two interviewees in group 1 expressed an opinion about the 
differences between national and EU Internet regulation, there was a strong feeling of 
uncertainty and confusion in their words. Stefanos’ words in group 1 show he lacked 
confidence about national regulation and its efficiency:
...you can never be certain about Greece Gaughs). Even if we have the same laws as the rest of 
Europe, you cannot be sure that they are respected and followed...the Greek state is always an 
exception when it’s about applying the law Gaughs).
A lack of trust in and confidence about the Greek state was even stronger in
group 2, where the most advanced users stated they lack information about national
regulation in comparison to EU regulations. Also, they argued they would not be
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surprised if Greece lags behind as Greek authorities do not apply, in their opinion, any 
rules in time and in the way they are supposed to. Users in group 2 debated individual 
(societal) and political liability regarding the failure of timely and hill implementation 
of rules and regulations in the country, with only Michalis (17 years, male student) 
arguing that this is not only political but also individual responsibility:
I really don’t know...but I wouldn’t be surprised if we lag behind...in Greece nothing happens in 
time...but is this related to the state only? I mean, who is the state? What does society do?
As regards Internet policy, although most users said they are not informed 
about national policies in comparison to EU policies in the field, they expressed 
suspicions about where EU funding goes to in Greece, questioning the national 
policies in effect. Thus, it became obvious that people mistrust the Greek state and 
the way it manages money and public interest overall. However, in the interviews this 
feeling of mistrust did not rely on any specific argument or evidence, showing a 
generally negative attitude to the country’s decision-makers’ practices:133
Stefanos (32 years, male investment analyst, group 1): Besides, isn’t the EU giving us money to 
develop in tnis area too? If we take into account the news about the small amount of money 
that is used properly, I wouldn’t be surprised if the country was behind in policies as well...
Only Antonios (44 years, male self-employed) in group 2 provided specific 
examples to support his view about national policy in comparison to EU Internet 
policy. He argued that education, the media system and lack of awareness-raising 
initiatives have contributed to policy delays in the Greek information society:
Greek education only initiated modules on new technologies in the last couple of years and 
these are, as far as I know, somehow theoretical ... Also, we can look at the role of the 
media...the media do not forget to remind us of all the bad things that can happen, 
propagandising against the Internet in particular... also, have you ever seen an authority 
systematically implementing any programme for citizens’ awareness of new technologies?
Im p o rtan ce  o f  regu la tion  and  policy fo r  In te rn e t  use
All users in group 1, but Petros (19 years, male), the youngest user, claimed that 
regulation is very important for users’ security. In response to Petros, users such as 
Agapi (35 years, female decorator) offered arguments which are close to the ‘media 
panics’ discourses. Also, users raised the tone of their voice, associating Internet 
regulation with their own experiences, as shown later in the analysis:
Petros: Don’t take me wrong...I understand these things, but the Internet is meant to be a 
space of freedom and free expression. We don’t need police on the Internet!
Agapi: Of course we need police...if anyone could do anything on the Internet...it would have 
been a jungle that no one would like... those who steal money, abuse children and commit crimes 
online...
Apart from age differences, the importance of Internet regulation relates to 
usage experiences and reasons for Internet use. Kwnstantina (55 years, female
133 Only Myriam (27 years, student) in group 1 argued about individual responsibility: ‘I see people around 
me who are indifferent, being those who decide about who will govern. I mean, we nave become 
pessimistic, only accusing others’.
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administrator), who only uses the Internet because she has to, and Pantelis (25 years, 
male computer scientist), who studies this field, held contrasting views about the 
importance of regulation. Such contrasting views also raise awareness of regulation as 
an important parameter:
Kwnstantina: ...for me, regulation has played no role in my decision to use the Internet...that 
was a clearly practical decision...besides I nave no clue what the Internet regulation is (laughs).
Pantelis: (interrupts) ...yes, but we cannot generalise...even if people do not know much about 
regulation....yeah, I think it’s important when thinking how it may influence your rights and 
security.
As regards Internet policy, most users argued that policy is important. The 
reasons they gave for that differed though, as they drew on their experiences and the 
Internet’s role in their own lives to argue about the importance of policy. For instance, 
Pantelis in group 2, a computer scientist and professional in the field, explained 
people’s mistrust in policy by bringing up the slow IT market development in the 
country. Although his professional familiarity with information technologies goes 
beyond the average expertise of Greek users, his remark allows a more complex picture 
of policy, market and societal development to arise, indicating interdependencies 
between these factors:
As a professional...I mean, what are the policies to facilitate the provision of equipment, the 
establishment of infrastructure and the production of services...as today there is Literally no IT 
market in our country.
W h ere  In te rn e t  regu la tion  is needed
Everyone in group 2 emphasised the importance of regulation for users’ 
security, stressing the restrictive role of Internet regulation. Only the youngest user, 
Michalis (17 years, male student), viewed regulation as a means to overcome barriers of 
access to online content and services, thus presenting the liberating potential of 
regulation:
...personally, I would like all companies and people having a site to provide free access to 
users...my impression is that an increasing number of sites have become commercial and that 
should stop ...and don’t tell me that authorities cannot do something about that...
W h ere  au th o ritie s  w ere  needed
Users reported that they have asked for various authorities’ help for many 
different reasons, depending on the problem they faced. Most instances relate to 
protection against unwanted and harmful online content, whereas only Petros (19 
years, male, military service), the youngest in group 1, said he has not asked for any 
help.
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Although some users referred to a lack of awareness, as well as to the 
insufficiency and inefficiency of regulation, satisfaction levels with the help provided 
by the authorities varied amongst users, being case-dependent:
Stefanos (32 years, male investment analyst): You said you have your own website...
Agapi (35 years, female decorator): Yes...
Stefanos: This is a case where you decide to make yourself really visible and the truth is that no 
law or authority can protect you 100%.
W h ere  people  go i f  in  need
Most users complained about Internet policy in the country and seemed not to 
know who to contact if in need. In this respect, Stefanos (32 years, male investment 
analyst), the savvies t user in group 1, pointed to a lack of trust in the country’s political 
authorities:
Stefanos: You said you live in the UK, right?
Interviewer: Yes...?
Stefanos: That is why you have probably forgotten how things work in Greece. Not even groups 
that exert pressure can change politics in the countiy....imagine how powerless we, individuals, 
are.
Ingroup 2, only one interviewee, Pantelis (25 years, male student), participated 
in this discussion, even though he has never asked any political authority for help. I 
would argue that the silence of the other interviewees indicates the existence of a gap 
between the political authorities and the body of Internet users in the country.
M ore  o r  less regu la tion  and  policy needed?
Most users stated they are in favour of regulation without, however, asking for 
more regulation. Only Petros (19 years, male, military service) ingroup 1 asked for less 
regulation, provoking the strong opposition of the other group members:
I get annoyed when I’m blocked from content I would like to use...or when I try to download 
content and I’m asked to provide personal information. I want regulation when I ask for it, not 
when it’s imposed.
Users in group 2 raised the importance of awareness of regulation when they 
discussed whether more or less regulation is needed. A debate arose between those 
arguing that authorities should provide people with more regulation and information 
about regulation, and those stressing the responsibility users have to be informed 
about Internet laws and regulations. At this point, issues related to ‘citizenship’ and 
citizens’ role came to the fore:
Antonios (44 years, male self-employed, group 2): ...let’s not avoid our responsibilities...we are 
not serious users...that is why we don’t try to be informed and don’t take things seriously.
Kwnstantina (55 years, female administrator, group 2): (interrupts): Yes, all right, but you cannot 
ask people to replace authorities... I don’t have the knowledge and, all right, the intention to 
push authorities for more regulation or information about regulation.
231
Regarding Internet policy, users emphasised the quality, efficiency and visibility 
rather than the quantity of Internet policies. This brought up issues concerning the 
ways and extent to which Internet policies are close to users and their needs or 
experiences:
Eirini (32 years, female accountant, group 2): I think this discussion is theoretical...we are 
talking about policies, laws...things which are quite distant from us. I don’t think we really 
understand the meaning of all these nor their role...and, as Kwnstantina mentioned, our 
Internet experiences are not...let’s say...in direct communication with what happens when 
decisions are made.
U sers’ sa tisfac tion  w ith  In te rn e t  regu la tion  and  policy
Users’ satisfaction with Internet regulation depended on individual experiences. 
On the other side, they realised that regulation cannot protect them perfectly, with 
those who are more positive regarding the Internet being less critical of regulation. For 
example, in group 1 Agapi (35 years, female decorator) was less in favour of the Internet 
and less happy with regulation, whereas Stefanos (32 years, male investment analyst) 
defended regulation and argued that individuals should take the risk:
Stefanos: I don’t think it’s a matter of satisfaction...It’s a matter of how much you accept 
possible risks and the measures you take to encounter them.
Agapi: Yes, but, as you saw, in my case there is no way to avoid offensive content posted on my 
website.
Stefanos: There should be a way...by not having a comments link...
The argument that regulation cannot cover all protection areas was linked to 
the presence of regulation in users’ lives and to usage experiences. As Anastasia (27 
years, female teacher) in group 2 pointed out, regulation is not visible to ordinary 
people and, therefore, not much knowledge about regulation is established among 
users:
...when I wanted to buy a book on the Internet, I was asked to provide a lot of information 
concerning my personal hobbies, the books I read... I don’t think there is any authority to 
advise on such issues... I had to cancel the purchase.
Awareness came up as a significant parameter in users’ experiences of online 
risks and their requests for help. Even users with different user profiles, such as 
Michalis (17 years, male student) and Antonios (44 years, male self-employed) ingroup 
2, raised a lack of awareness as a problem that discourages users from asking for help:134
Michalis: Lots of times I have felt uncomfortable with the content and requests I come across 
online, especially those concerning personal info...but I usually avoid sucn sites. So, I haven’t 
asked any authorities for help and haven’t complained as I don’t really know which authority to 
consult.
Antonios: ...what Michalis said is a problem... I mean, how many of us know which authority is 
in charge of what regulation?
134 Eirini (32 years, female accountant) in group 2 has a narrow scope of activities and raised the issue of 
awareness as one reason she does not engage in a wider range of online activities.
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Regarding Internet policy, most users said they are dissatisfied with policy in 
the country. Training, awareness and cost are the main sources of dissatisfaction, while 
infrastructure and public access also play a role. The pessimism that interviewees, such 
as Stefanos (32 years, male investment analyst) in group 1, expressed about the future 
again poses the issue of lack of trust in the state:
I would like to see that no politicians but experts in the field have the money and take all the 
initiatives. I don’t trust the state...as the money is usually wasted, everything moves slowly and 
bureaucracy cancels the nice ideas experts have.
Also, users brought up issues associated closely with their usage experiences 
and needs as sources of dissatisfaction with Internet policy. Thus, Internet policies 
were evaluated depending on users’ circumstances of life and individual needs and 
desires:
Petros (19, male, military service, group 1): I don’t know how things are in schools now, but 
when I was at school two years ago there was no sufficient equipment, there was slow Internet 
and not much time and training for us to work on computers...
Agapi (35, female decorator, group 1): As Petros said, training is a must, not only for students 
but also for other people, especially older generations. I’m saying this because I know how 
difficult it’s to learn outside school and when no friends or relatives can help you.
8.6.2 Non-users’ awareness and evaluation o f Internet regulation andpolicy
A similar set of questions was posed to non-users (Appendix 8, Table A.8-7). 
The questions explored non-users’ evaluations and the perceived role of regulation and 
policy in their decisions not to use the Internet.
H ow  In te rn e t  regu la tion  and policy a re  u n d e rs to o d
Similarly to users, non-users had serious difficulty defining and understanding 
Internet regulation and policy. Only a minority seemed to quite understand Internet 
regulation:
Andreas (50 years, male doctor, group 3): Isn’t it about rules, laws, legislation?
Interviewer: More specifically...?
Andreas: Rules, laws and legislation about the content and services available on the Internet?
Likewise, Internet policy was understood in a broad way and only by a 
minority of non-users:
Evangelia (29 female shop owner, group 4): Isn’t it similar to regulation? (laughs).
Ioannis (25 years, male civil engineer, group 4): Not sure...isn’t about political initiatives? My 
impression is that if we look at the etymology of the two words, politics is basically about 
everything...
N ational and  EU  regu la tion  and  policy
Non-users seemed to lack knowledge of national regulation and policy more 
than users. No non-user was aware of the status of national Internet regulation,
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particularly in comparison to EU regulations. Although they were not informed, 
they assumed that Internet regulation in Greece lags behind the respective 
regulations in Europe. They argued about the ‘inefficiency’ and ‘incompetence’ of 
the Greek state to respond to their needs and articulated a general dismissal of the 
Greek state. Also, they judged official regulation on the basis of their general 
personal feelings about the social accountability of the state in multiple domains of 
social life, without being in the position to support such arguments:
Andreas (50 years, male doctor, group 3): I’m not certain, but the Greek government does not 
do enough, I think...other European countries are far more developed and I assume their 
Internet laws are more efficient than ours.
Konstantinos (62 years, male plumber): How can we know those things? We don’t even use the 
Internet...but I would agree with Andreas about the incompetence of the Greek state...we 
always complain but nothing never happens.-.politicians only look for votes and do nothing for 
us citizens.
From the above, it can be argued that non-users viewed the state and its 
regulations as not sufficiently accountable to society. They offered criticism even if 
they lacked knowledge about Internet regulation. The only exception was Ioannis (25 
years, male civil engineer) in group 4 who problematised the issue and had some 
knowledge about areas where the Greek state has failed to implement EU regulations:
Tough question! What I have heard is that the EU has charged Greece with fines due to its 
delay in implementing EU laws and directives. This concerns regulations in education, public 
funding of organisations, environmental policies...what else? I wouldn’t be surprised if we have 
failed to implement the Internet regulation that other European countries have adopted.
Regarding Internet policy, no non-user was aware of the status of Greek 
Internet policy, particularly in comparison to EU policies. Their discourses were 
similar to those concerning regulation as most admitted they do not know how to 
answer such questions. Nevertheless, a number of them assumed that Internet policies 
in Greece lag behind other countries, saying that this explains the low Internet 
diffusion in the country:
Andreas (50 years, male doctor, group 3): ...all plans and programmes for Internet diffusion in 
our countiy are unavoidably affected by the Greek state’s inefficiency...you said before that 
Greece has one of the lowest Internet diffusion rates...ok? Why is that? The ways the Internet 
and its services are accepted by all of us show precisely the policies and initiatives taken by the 
authorities in charge...
Role o f  regu la tion  and  policy in  non-usage
Concerning the role of Internet regulation and policy, non-users argued that 
Internet regulation has not effected their decision not to use the Internet:
Andreas (50 years, male doctor, group 3): Ok, it’s important to feel safe and to know what you 
can do when online...but for me...no, regulation is not the reason for not using the Internet...
Interviewer: ...some of you mentioned before issues of online crimes, porn etc...
Dionysia (36 years, female saleswoman): Yes, such issues would be important if I needed to use 
the Internet...
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Non-users instead said that other parameters influenced their decision not to 
use the Internet. They mostly argued about a lack of desire and need:
Evangelia (29 years, female shop- owner, group 4): Although I have thought of online dangers, 
this has not been the main reason for not using the Internet... I would say it’s more a lack of 
interest and motivation that made me neglect it.
On the other hand, they considered regulation to be important for users’ online 
security. Only the youngest of group 3, Dimitrios (18 years, male student), did not 
support Internet regulation, arguing that users should be free to do anything they like 
online.
In contrast to regulation, some non-users considered that Internet policy plays 
some role in the decision not to use the Internet. This was argued by those intending 
to use the Internet in the future, such as Andreas (50, male doctor), and those familiar 
with new technologies, such as Dimitrios (18 years, male student), both in group 3.
Interviewer: ...so, you think that policies may influence people’s decision to use the Internet... 
Andreas: ...yes, certainly.
Dimitrios: We’re behind and policy is a reason...we need facilities, infrastructure, services, 
education...
Ingroup 4, non-users asked for ‘better’ Internet policy -  different interviewees 
understood the word ‘better’ differently -  although they did not consider policy the 
principal reason for non-use of the Internet:
Ioannis (23 years, male civil servant): ...issues related to policy have not been the principal reason 
for not using the Internet... On the other hand...if I had been provided with better information 
and more chances to get familiar with the Internet, I could be a user...I’m not sure though...
W h ere  reg u la tio n  and  policy a re  needed
As non-users cannot reflect on Internet regulation and policy through 
experiences of use, they were asked about general areas where regulation and policy 
may be needed.
Although they were uncertain about what Internet regulation consists of and 
how it functions, they acknowledged that it is important for users, being in a way quite 
close to what users themselves argued. Non-users framed the notion of utility of 
regulation on the basis of their own concerns and needs in everyday life and in terms of 
Internet regulation. Anna (38 years, female teacher), Evangelia (29 years, female shop 
owner) and Ioannis (25 years, male civil engineer), all in group 4, recognised the utility 
of regulation in relation to children’s online protection, e-commerce and the reliability 
of online information, respectively:
Anna: ...thinking that my children will start to use the Internet soon...I would like to knowhow 
I can deal with adult content online or online chatting with strangers that could put my 
children at risk.
Evangelia: I agree that protection is very important for users. If I was a user, I would definitely 
like to know now I could make purchases for my shop without risking my money...
235
Ioannis: Yes, safety and security are important, but I think that the Internet is mostly used for 
information searching. I think that accuracy of information should be guaranteed.
Regarding Internet policy, only two non-users in group 3 (i.e. those who 
acknowledged the role of policy in their decision not to use the Internet) identified 
areas where policy can play an important role:135
Andreas (50 years, male doctor, group 3): I think I mentioned some of those I consider 
important...training, information, yeah, education....
Dimitrios (18 years, male student, group 3): ...services, infrastructure...facilities, in general...
Non-users in group 4 pointed to the role of policy in awareness of and access to 
the Internet as well as in young people’s lives. However, there seems to be a contrast 
between the positive role that policy can play and the often negative role it actually has 
in people’s lives. This contrast reveals some of the contradictions between policy 
mission and actual policy practices, as reflected by non-users:
Ioannis: Isn’t policy to do with information, awareness, training, education...what else?
Anna: I would again like to see the broader picture...
Interviewer: What do you mean?
Anna: ...in order for young people to find a job, they have to know computers and the Internet. 
Why is that? ...who determines how much we have to pay for Internet and how likely we are to 
access it?
Evangelia: Is policy something positive or negative? Is it politicians or the market that pushes 
young people to have as many qualifications as possible to get a job?
8.7 Public discourses on Internet regulation andpolicy: reflecting 
on the elite actors9 discourses
In the last part of the interviews, users and non-users were asked to discuss 
public discourses on Internet regulation and policy as had been articulated by the elite 
actors. An overview of the main arguments is provided in Appendix 8, Table A.8-8.
8.J.1 Failure o f Greek authorities to adopt EU Internet regulations andpolicies
Regarding elite actors’ argument about Greece’s failure to implement EU 
Internet regulation, Stefanos (32 years, male investment analyst) in group 1 of users, 
who had already revealed his uncertainty about the Greek state’s performance, at this 
point looked satisfied thinking that the others also consider the Greek state 
inefficient. Even Apostolos (44 years, male civil servant), who had been very quiet 
during the discussion about Internet regulation and policy, now declared his agreement 
with Stefanos’ views. Apostolos is not informed (something he admitted) and the
135 The other group members did not answer this question.
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Internet is not important in his life. He is is critical of how the public sector and 
politics operate in Greece, while himself being a member of the public sector: 
‘...everything in Greece happens at a slower pace than in the rest of developed Europe’ 
(Apostolos).
In group 2 of users, only Pantelis (25 years, male), a computer scientist, accepted 
the elite actors’ argument about delays in Greek Internet regulation, pointing to how 
such delays influence society and the IT market in Greece:
Pantelis: I have the sense that we lag behind other European countries, as neither people nor 
the market keep up with the developments in other countries.
Interviewer: You think that delays in the broader societal context are reflected on policy and 
regulation?
Pantelis: No, I would argue the opposite...policy and regulation delays are reflected in society.
On the other hand, only some non-users discussed the elite actors’ argument 
that Greek authorities have failed to adopt EU regulations and policies. In group 3, 
Andreas (50 years, male doctor) and Dimitrios (18 years, male student) were the most 
familiar with the Internet, leaving open the possibility of using it in the future. Thus, 
they were those who answered questions about Internet regulation and policy, being 
overall very critical of the state and Internet authorities in the country. However, they 
failed to offer concrete arguments in support of their criticisms:
Andreas: ...don’t we constantly hear that Greece lags behind, that Greek governments do not do 
this or that? Why should the Internet be an exception...?
Interviewer: ...do you have something specific in mind?
Dimitrios: ...what do you mean? Ok, I don’t know what exactly the Greek government doesn’t 
do, but I don’t hear what the Greek government does do for new technologies either...
Non-users ingroup 4 articulated the same criticisms, regardless of whether they 
were planning to use the Internet or not. These non-users also attempted to justify 
their negative views of the Greek state and authorities:
Anna (38 years, female teacher): ...if you look at education you will find an example of where our 
country lags behind. Colleagues of mine who teach new technologies told me that kids are not 
provided with the technicalfacilities and the curriculum that kids in other countries are given. 
Education is a critical area of policy-making...
Hence, the majority of non-users kept a distance from policy discourses, 
admitting they are unfamiliar with such matters. Most were not particularly concerned 
with the Internet, while having no intention or desire to use it in the future.
8.J.2 Norrmodemised, delayed, technophobic and bureaucratic public administration?
The interviewees were asked about the elite actors’ argument that the Greek 
public administration lacks modernisation and is bureaucratic and techno-phobic. At 
this point, the individualistic thinking of a significant number of interviewees emerged.
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In group i of users, Apostolos, a male middle-aged civil servant, drew on his 
everyday experiences to argue about the techno-phobic character of the public 
administration, while claiming that change cannot start with him as he would prefer 
not to use the Internet at work. At this point, Stefanos, a male businessman in his early 
30s, challenged Apostolos, making him become quite defensive:
Apostolos: Yes, definitely, and this is unfortunately something I experience everyday.
Stefanos: Yes, but you said you didn’t like it when you were asked to start using a computer at 
work...
Apostolos: Yes, I don’t know why modernisation of the public administration should start with 
me!
Generally speaking, people in Greece have a negative predisposition to public 
administration employees, while themselves pursuing a career in the public sector. In 
the focus groups, users with such predispositions did not specifically refer to 
technology but implied that technology does not play a significant part in the public 
administration, somewhat accepting what the elite actors argued:
Agapi (35 years, female decorator, group 1): ...in our transactions with the public administration 
we come across people’s laziness, rude behaviour and irresponsibility. However, I’m not sure 
what this has to do with the Internet...
Petros (19 years, male military service, group 1): I hate the idea of becoming a civil servant...you 
cannot breath there...no one works, everyone thinks they have authority and never serve 
citizens... about technology... It’s funny just to think about it!
Although all users agreed with the elite actors, they had diverse views of how 
the adoption of new technologies is affected by the public administration. They also 
expressed differing views of whether bureaucracy and techno-phobia should change, 
linking these trends to what they called ‘identity5 and ‘traditions’. At this point, there 
were striking differences between advanced and average Internet users, with the latter 
favouring the maintenance o f‘identity5 and ‘traditions’:
Antonios (44 years, male self-employed, group 2): Look and say: isn’t bureaucracy the main 
characteristic of a giant public sector? Isn’t a lack of technology and expertise a major problem 
when citizens are served by public services? Isn’t negativism the most popular attitude of 
members of the public administration when something new is introduced to them?
Anastasia (27 years, female teacher, group 2): ...we can see these things in society as well...don’t 
tell me that we are not traditional and critical of anything new?
Eirini (32 years, female accountant, group 2): ...we have our own identity and some things 
Anastasia mentioned are veiy deep in our traditions and lifestyle. Can these characteristics 
change? ...shall we desire such a change?
On the other hand, only a minority of non-users commented on elite actors’ 
discourses about the non-technocratic and bureaucratic character of the country’s 
public administration. They did not challenge such discourses and emphasised 
phenomena of inefficiency and injustice that establish, in their views, a highly 
bureaucratic and incompetent public administration:
Andreas (50 years, male doctor, group 3): Bureaucratic for sure. Who could ever doubt about 
that? (laughs).
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Antonia (33 years, self-employed, group 3): (interrupts) ...let’s not pretend...people without 
qualifications are appointed to the public administration...can you expect a higher degree of 
efficiency?
In this respect, non-users argued that both politicians and ordinary people who 
work in the public sector are responsible. On one hand, they charged those involved in 
the public administration for contributing to traditionalism and bureaucracy and, on 
the other, they considered them lucky for being able to work in the public sector. This 
enforces the sense of individualism that the focus group discourses contain.
#.7.3 More socially accountable regulations andpolicies needed?
Users and non-users commented on the elite actors’ discourses about the 
socially accountable character of Internet regulations and policies by mostly drawing 
on other decision-making fields.
Users suggested more socially accountable policies. They interpreted social 
accountability and the directions to take in different ways, depending on their 
attitudes to the Internet and their perceptions about risks and opportunities the 
Internet brings into everyday life:
Pantelis (25 years, male student in computer science, group 2): ...as a professional, I think that 
social policies should go hand-in-hand with market policies. This means more production and 
trade of equipment, better infrastructure and networks...better services, of course...so more 
reasons for people to use the Internet.
Antonios (44 yeas, male self-employed, group 2): ...but social policies are also needed for 
education and training...the state can introduce media programmes that will inform people 
about technology...
Kwnstantina (55 years, female administrator, group 2): ...also, more awareness of risks and ways 
for users to be protected...
Likewise, some non-users argued that more socially accountable policies and 
regulations are needed. However, pessimism was present in non-users’ arguments as 
they argued it is unlikely that more socially accountable regulations and policies will be 
in effect. This concerned a kind of general pessimism which does not necessarily derive 
from how things work in relation to new technologies in the country:
Antonia (33 years, female self-employed, group 3): ...but who cares about people, citizens? I’m 
not talking about the Internet specifically...It’s about everything...
8.7.4 High cost, lack o f infrastructure and nonsatisfactory services
Towards the end of the interviews I addressed public discourses that crosscut 
politics and society and raise practical issues such as cost, Internet infrastructure and 
Internet services.
Only a few users responded to these discourses. They argued that cost is higher
in Greece than in other European countries and that Internet infrastructure and
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services are not as satisfactory as they should be. Similarly, a certain number of non­
users, such as Dimitrios (18 years, male student) in group 3, were aware of or thought 
that cost is higher in Greece than in other European countries.
Dimitrios: Yeah, cost is very important as friends of mine who know how things are abroad told 
me that the cost of a connection in Greece is far more expensive than in developed countries of 
Europe.
For non-users, cost had quite a relative meaning as they considered affordability 
of the Internet on the basis of personal financial status:
Ioannis (25 years, male civil engineer, group 4): ...this is an issue for those who cannot afford the 
Internet, but I cannot say whether this influences people’s decisions to use it...
Non-users’ lack of knowledge about the Internet made them not to comment 
on the elite actors’ argument that in Greece no satisfactory Internet infrastructure and 
networks are available. Even Andreas (50 years, male doctor) in group 3, who attempted 
to comment, expressed uncertainty: ‘I don’t think so...but I’m not certain either...’.
8.8 Qualitative reflections on the survey findings and integration 
with the elite actors9 discourses
In this section, I critically review the focus groups findings. In Section 8.8.1, the 
findings are reviewed relative to the survey findings. Section 8.8.2 presents the ways the 
focus groups responded to the elite actors’ discourses.
8.8.1 Focus groups and qualitative reflections on the survey findings
M edia usage and  th e  p a ra m e te r  o f  age
Internet users and non-users use one or more type of media daily. This was also 
shown in the survey since nearly all survey respondents have a telephone or television 
at home, and a significant number have home access to computer and the Internet. 
This challenges the contribution of access barriers to the low Internet penetration in 
Greece. However, the focus groups went beyond access and usage issues. They 
illustrated that users and non-users appreciate the role of media in various domains of 
everyday life and that their attitudes to and their usage of media depend on 
circumstances and priorities in life. Non-users in particular named and evaluated media 
depending on how they influence their everyday lives.
The focus groups provided answers to why demographics such as age play a role 
in media use. They demonstrated that age cannot be seen as a demographic perse as it 
determines people’s life context, work interests, hobbies and lifestyle in general. Thus,
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age partly accounts for the fact that Internet users prioritise work activities as the 
most important reason for using the Internet. Age can also explain why young Internet 
users emphasise entertainment and communication purposes of media usage, whilst 
elderly and middle-aged non-users consider that the Internet is not meant for them.
In te rn e t  ad o p tio n  and  th e  ro le  o f  everyday cu ltu re  
Internet users: quality ofuse and attitudes to the Internet
The survey found that the majority of Internet users are involved in limited 
online activities, are dial-up users and only a small number are new users. Also, it found 
that the quality of use is affected to some extent by users’ evaluation of the Internet’s 
role in everyday life. The focus groups showed that personal choice and integration of 
the Internet into one or more areas of everyday life influence significantly users’ 
breadth of usage, time spent online, online activities, as well as attitudes to the 
Internet. Regardless of the general acceptance of the Internet’s benefits, those who 
have not integrated it into their everyday lives argued they would not mind if they had 
to stop using it in the future. This explains the survey finding that, although users 
evaluate the Internet more positively than non-users, nearly half of them think that 
non-usage would not affect them significantly.
In addition, the focus groups confirmed the survey finding that the various 
parameters of quality of usage are interlinked. Literate users are developing a wide 
range of Internet activities. However, literacy is a complex notion and, in the focus 
groups, it seemed to relate mostly to users’ profession and lifestyle. On the other hand, 
all demographics but age did not emerge in the focus groups as important 
determinants of Internet literacy and usage patterns. Although the survey showed that 
demographics still mater, parameters such as income, education and gender do not 
directly account for Internet usage and quality of usage. Demographics were presented 
in the focus groups as influencing everyday life conditions and lifestyles, being 
integrated into them.
Moreover, the focus groups enriched the survey findings that the second most 
important place, after ‘home’, where people access the Internet is ‘work’. In the focus 
groups, work appeared to be one of the major forces making people use the Internet. 
In this regard, work activities attract users’ interests about the Internet as only 
advanced and dedicated users go beyond work activities online. On the other hand, 
work plays an important role in how non-users assess the likelihood of using the 
Internet in the future, as work requirements and changes at work seem to influence 
likelihood.
Regarding online risks, the survey found that the majority of users in Greece are 
digitally constrained. Insufficient awareness of online risks, lack of confidence and 
skills in encountering such risks, as well as inadequate self-protection, were some of
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the constraints identified. The survey did not find any causal relationship of online 
risks and self-protection with users’ evaluation of the role of Internet in everyday life. 
On the other hand, the focus groups showed that users’ concerns and self-protection 
are influenced by their expertise, knowledge, awareness and sense of responsibility. 
Literate users (literacy here reflects the level of knowledge, skills and awareness) are 
less concerned about online risks and more active in taking security measures, with 
everyday settings, values and resistant attitudes influencing the degree of their literacy. 
Thus, even if life circumstances do not influence users’ perceptions of online risks and 
self-protection directly, they have an indirect relationship by affecting aspects of 
literacy.
Users9 evaluation o f  the Internet in everyday life
The survey found that demographics, patterns of use and online risks play an 
important role in how users evaluate the Internet in everyday life. An apparently 
different picture was provided in the focus groups since the Internet’s role in users’ 
lives seems to be determined by purposes of use and reasons for using it in the first 
instance. Whilst most use the Internet for work purposes, the focus groups showed 
some use it willingly and others feel ‘forced’. The former engage with a great breadth of 
online activities and integrate the Internet into their lives; the latter point to the lack 
of‘choice’ not to use the Internet, using it only when required. This indicates that the 
parameter of‘resistance’ or ‘dismissal’ is significant not only for usage perse but also for 
the quality and level of adoption. On the other hand, circumstances, priorities and 
values in life are critical parameters for shaping such ‘resistant’ attitudes, and they 
work in two directions: as enablers or forcing factors of Internet usage, on one hand; as 
facilitators or obstructing factors of advanced usage and integration of the Internet 
into everyday activities, on the other.
The purposes of and reasons for Internet usage discussed in the interviews can 
be thought of as being closely associated with patterns of use, fears of online risks and 
demographics that the survey indicated as determinants of users’ evaluation of the 
Internet in everyday life. This is because the reasons people use the Internet 
significantly determine patterns of usage, while different purposes of usage may bring 
about different concerns about risks. Nevertheless, these associations are multi­
directional and vary depending on specific cases of usage.
Non-users and forces driving non-usage
As regards non-users, the survey indicated the existence of a ‘dismissive culture’
in Greece because most non-users are non-interested in and have no need to use the
Internet. Also, the survey found that the decision to use the Internet depends direcdy
on Internet availability, computer use and demographics but not -  at least directly-on
the evaluation of the Internet’s role in everyday life. The focus groups disentangled the
complexity of these findings. On one hand, the interview texts confirmed the survey
242
findings, showing that a lack of need drives non-usage. On the other, when non-users 
talked about a lack of need they mostly referred to work or study domains of the 
everyday, prioritising them the most. At the same time, some brought up lack of 
education, incentives and stimuli as other forces that contribute to non-usage. The 
parameters of‘need’, ‘learning’ and ‘incentives’ must be seen in an everyday life context 
since non-users viewed these parameters in close association with their life context and 
priorities. This is not necessarily opposed to the survey finding about the non­
existence of a direct relationship between everyday life and Internet use; nevertheless, 
one cannot be certain about how such parameters associate with Internet availability, 
computer usage and demographics that the survey found to be significant for people’s 
decisions to use the Internet.
Regarding the likelihood of future use, the survey found that most non-users 
are unlikely to start using the Internet. The focus groups showed that the likelihood of 
and desire for future use are interconnected, while determined by non-users’ sense of 
‘need’ and their evaluation of the Internet as part of their life priorities. Age and life 
circumstances or priorities that age brings along influence the likelihood of and desire 
for future use, with the middle-aged or elderly being unlikely and unwilling to use the 
Internet in the future.
Non-users* evaluation o f  the Internet in everyday life
Regarding non-users’ attitudes to the Internet, the focus groups confirmed the 
survey finding that, regardless of the generally positive views about the Internet, most 
non-users express concerns about the Internet when in the context of their individual 
lives. More specifically, in the focus groups some non-users had generally positive views 
of the Internet, but others argued about a lack of familiarity with the Internet and the 
need to keep the usual everyday order, considering the Internet a ‘burden’ or a possibly 
harmful medium, especially for children’s lives.
Concerning the role of the everyday in non-users’ attitudes to the Internet (i.e. 
the impact of non-usage), the survey found that non-users are influenced by their 
interest in and the possibility of future use, as well as by their general evaluation of the 
Internet’s effects on various aspects of everyday life. The focus groups confirmed that 
awareness of and level of concern about the Internet’s role in various domains of the 
everyday and that possible online risks matter for non-users’ evaluation of the impact 
of non-usage. Parents in particular evaluate the impact of non-usage on the grounds of 
their understanding of the Internet’s role in their children’s lives. This highlights, in 
general, the family-oriented and over-protective character of Greek society.
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U sers’ view s o f  decision-m aking: links to  In te rn e t  adop tion  and  everyday 
life
Evaluation ofnational and EUpolicy and regulation
The survey found that Internet use does not depend directly on policy and 
regulatory indicators, such as awareness of and satisfaction with Internet policy and 
regulation. Although this was partly supported by the fact that users in the focus 
groups had a limited understanding of Internet policy and regulation, Internet 
expertise and integration of the Internet into everyday life seemed to influence users’ 
awareness of Internet policy and regulation. Advanced users defined Internet policy 
and regulation better than those unwilling to use the Internet or with limited Internet 
usage.
Regarding the evaluation of Internet policy and regulation, the survey found 
that people in Greece evaluate EU policy and regulation as more efficient than 
national policy and regulation, with users being more positive regarding EU policy and 
regulation than non-users. The interview discourses enriched these findings and 
showed that users mistrust Greek authorities and their management of the public 
interest. Even though they were not particularly informed of national policy and 
regulation, they expected that EU regulations are more advanced than respective 
regulations in Greece and that the country’s authorities do not take the initiatives that 
other European authorities do.
Role o f  Internet policy and regulation, and level o f  satisfaction
The survey found that the quality of Internet usage is partly affected by policy 
indicators, such as users’ awareness of Internet authorities, while awareness of Internet 
policy and regulation is important for users’ perceived impact that non-use could have 
on their lives. In the focus groups, most users accepted the general importance of 
Internet policy and regulation. Especially users’ experiences of Internet usage and the 
reasons they use the Internet influence the emphasis they give to the role of policy and 
regulation in Internet usage, with less advanced users being less supportive of policies 
and regulations. These insights enrich the survey finding that indicators, such as the 
evaluation of Internet policy and regulation, awareness of Internet authorities and 
perceived accountability of Internet authorities, do not influence users’ evaluations of 
the Internet’s role in everyday life. The focus groups drew a complex picture of how 
policy and regulation are connected with people’s decisions to adopt the Internet: 
policy and regulation should be looked at not only as factors that influence Internet 
usage and diffusion, but also as parameters that can be significantly affected by 
society’s Internet knowledge and expertise.
Regarding the level of satisfaction with Internet policy and regulation, the 
survey found that users have a low degree of satisfaction and that their perceived
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efficiency of Internet policy and regulation depends on their awareness of policy and 
regulation, as well as on the demographics of age and presence of children in the 
household. The focus groups generally confirmed these findings, while they shed light 
on factors to address separately for policy and regulation. Concerning Internet 
regulation, the focus groups showed that users recognise that regulation cannot cover 
everything, while their Internet experiences and awareness of regulation determine 
their level of satisfaction (e.g. fervent supporters of the Internet were less critical of 
regulation). In any case, most users acknowledge the need for more awareness and 
visibility of regulation so as to be able to ask for help and feel more secure when going 
online. Lack of awareness is a source of users’ dissatisfaction with Internet policy as 
well. Users also pointed to other, more tangible, problems with policy, such as lack of 
training and public access to the Internet, high cost and lack of Internet 
infrastructure, arguing that these issues make them not trust state policies. However, 
such tangible issues were approached by users on the grounds of their Internet 
experiences and in the context of their needs and life circumstances.
Where users go when in need: more or less policy and regulation?
In the focus groups, only a small number of users had gone to authorities for 
help. This indicates a lack of awareness of policies and regulations, as well as 
insufficient trust in the country’s authorities. This was also concluded in the survey 
because most respondents argued about a low awareness of authorities, with aspects of 
Internet adoption, such as frequency of use and self-protection, partly depending on 
such policy factors.
In addition, most users in the focus groups said they contact ISPs, pointing to 
possible ways in which the market may substitute policy and regulation. Besides, the 
silence of most users at this point of the discussion indicated their distance from the 
practices of decision-makers in the Greek information society. Thus, when they were 
asked whether they would desire more or less policy and regulation instead of making 
direct suggestions they argued about public awareness of Internet regulation, as well as 
the quality, efficiency and public visibility of decision-making in general. This 
illustrates that users need more information and better communication with the 
authorities, demonstrating they are dissatisfied with the level of social accountability 
of Internet policies and regulations in the country. This enriches the survey finding 
that the social accountability of Internet authorities is low and most people are 
unaware of Greek authorities in the field. Nevertheless, 'citizenship' and the role of 
ordinary people was debated in the focus groups. This saw divergent views between 
advanced users who argued about individual responsibility and less advanced users who 
blamed the country’s authorities for omissions and failures.
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N o n -u sers’ view s o f  decision-m aking: links to  non-usage and  everyday life 
Evaluation ofnational and EU Internetpolicy and regulation
The focus groups showed that, although non-users have limited and abstract 
knowledge of Internet policy and regulation, they expressed strongly negative views of 
national policies and regulations on the Internet.
In the survey, I found that perceptions of efficiency of policies and regulations 
are influenced by people’s evaluations of the Internet’s role in everyday life, as well as 
other policy indicators such as the perceived accountability of Internet authorities and 
awareness of Internet policy and regulation. The focus groups further specified the 
survey findings as they showed that non-users mistrust national policies and 
regulations, basing their criticisms on the performance of national policy and 
regulation in other domains. They also associated the social accountability of policies 
and regulations in the country with their abstract and unjustified argument that 
national policies and regulations lag behind the EU. They talked in particular about the 
‘inefficiency’ and ‘impotence’ of the country’s authorities, using these terms in the 
context of specific everyday settings.
Role o f  Internet policy and regulation in non-usage
The survey found that policy indicators, such as evaluation and awareness of 
policy and regulation and perceived accountability of Internet authorities, influence 
non-users’ assessment of the role of Internet in everyday life and specifically their 
accounts of the impact that non-usage has on their lives, but not specifically the 
decision not to use the Internet. The focus groups provided a more complex picture 
and example of how findings can become richer when complementary data sources are 
employed. More specifically, in the focus groups non-users held contrasting views 
about the role of Internet policy and regulation in their decision not to use the 
Internet. On one hand, they mostly talked about a lack of need and desire to use the 
Internet, while acknowledging the importance of regulation for users’ protection on 
the Internet. On the other hand, many argued for ‘better’ policy, saying that policy can 
somehow influence people’s decisions not to use the Internet. Nevertheless, they 
avoided talking about the role of Internet policy in their own decisions not to use the 
Internet, while they used abstract characterisations to explain how Internet policy may 
have an influence (e.g. ‘better’).
Where Internet policy and regulation are needed
As discussed above, the survey found that policy and regulation influence non­
users’ evaluations of the impact of non-use on their lives. The focus groups looked at 
the association between Internet use and policy or regulation in more depth. Non­
users acknowledged the need for Internet regulation in specific areas of Internet usage, 
resting their assessments on the grounds of what their own needs and priorities would
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be if they were users. On the other hand, diverse views were articulated with regard to 
where policy is needed. There revealed a contradiction between non-users’ normative 
arguments about the positive role that policy should play in boosting Internet usage 
and their views about, as they said, the actually negative impact of policy on people’s 
lives, especially with regard to the establishment of technology-based inequalities 
between people.
8.8.2 Focus groups and a bottom-up approach to the elite actors’ discourses
The last part of the focus groups allowed a bottom-up reflection on the elite 
actors’ discourses. Their views are summarised as follows.
Society’s cu ltu re  and  reflections on  th e  elite  a c to rs ’ d iscourses 
Techno-phobic, non-technocratic and traditional character o f Greek society
In the focus groups, users argued about ‘Greekness’ and pointed to identity, 
mentality and lifestyle characteristics such as dismissiveness and traditionalism. At the 
same time, they argued about the failure of decision-making in the country to establish 
appropriate education, training and infrastructure for the Internet. Thus, they referred 
not only to how decision-making influences society but also how society and decision­
making crosscut one another.
Even if the users pointed to the cultural traits of society, they challenged some 
of the elite actors’ discourses. They reflected on their own everyday life contexts and 
acknowledged the importance of‘utility^ traditions and offline ways of communication 
and work. Therefore, they seemed to be carriers of some of the cultural characteristics 
that the elite actors questioned, positioning such characteristics in an everyday 
context.
This kind of challenge and contextualisation was more obvious in the groups of 
non-users. These groups admitted the dismissive character of Greek society, 
disentangling dismissiveness on the grounds of the particularities of everyday life, 
media propaganda, lack of awareness, over-protectionism of the Greek family and 
concerns about online risks. Thus, they went beyond popular generalisations of the 
idea of ‘Greek distinctiveness’, framing this idea in a life context.
Lack o f  awareness in Greek society
A discrepancy between enthusiastic and reluctant users was observed when 
discourses concerning lack of awareness in Greek society were discussed. Enthusiastic 
users accepted the existence of ignorance and a lack of awareness in Greek society, 
arguing about ‘individual responsibility’. Reluctant users argued about the role of the 
state and public education in informing the public about Internet matters.
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On the other hand, non-users challenged the elite actors’ discourses, examining 
the liability of media, education and state factors for the lack of social awareness and 
knowledge. Indications of resistance to the Internet were identified in the words of 
non-users who questioned whether the efforts for more public awareness should and 
could bring about higher Internet adoption rates in the country.
Hence, ordinary people problematised the elite actors’ discourses. They viewed 
instances of social ignorance as relative and highly dependent on their life worlds and 
other parameters that mediate how people engage with new technologies.
Social inactivity
Closely related to the above arguments were the focus groups’ reflections on the 
elite actors’ discourses about social inactivity and lack of social organisation in Greece. 
Although non-users did not completely deny the existence of inactivity in Greek 
society, they emphasised the state’s liability as well as the conditions that determine 
people’s interests and priorities in life, making particular reference to 'identity', 
everyday schedules and traditions to be maintained.
In the same spirit, most users questioned individual responsibility and viewed 
the notion of citizenship as influenced by state policies as well as by life priorities and 
circumstances. Thus, they brought up everyday life conditions and decision-making 
practices, factors which the elite actors did not consider, as they viewed issues of 
citizenship and social inactivity as coming from and resulting in society.
D ecision-m aking and  reflec tions on  th e  e lite  a c to rs ’ d iscourses 
Failure o f  Greek authorities to adopt EU Internet policies and regulations
Both elite actors and ordinary people judged European policies and regulations 
on the Internet more positively than the respective national policies and regulations. 
Also, users and non-users in the focus groups seemed not to trust the Greek state per 
se.
Whereas elite actors were well informed of regulation in the country, users and 
non-users in the focus groups did not have sufficient knowledge and awareness to 
support their arguments. This can explain why most non-users avoided questions 
concerning policy and regulation, being less familiar with these issues than users.
A non-modemised, delayed, techno-phobic and bureaucratic public 
administration ?
Most users in the focus groups agreed that the public administration in Greece
is highly techno-phobic and bureaucratic, drawing mostly on negative views of the
public about the public administration. On the other hand, they expressed diverse
views about the ways a lack of technocratism and non-modernisation in the public
administration influence the diffusion of new technologies. Also, most users were split
248
between those supporting Greek ‘identity5 and ‘traditions’ and those arguing that 
change is needed. In any case, these views indicate the interdependency between 
society’s culture and politics in Greece, as the public administration influences society 
in several ways, while it is also shaped by it.
The interdependency between the public administration and society became 
more obvious when a small number of non-users blamed the authorities and 
simultaneously considered the people working for the authorities lucky. This reveals 
that the ways ordinary people position themselves in politics often create 
contradictory and inconsistent views of authorities and decision-making practices.
More socially accountable policies and regulations needed?
As shown above, users and non-users have strong feelings of mistrust and 
disappointment about the country’s decision-making and authorities. These feelings 
drove them to offer critiques of how the state and authorities deal with the Internet, 
whereas mainly non-users lack sufficient knowledge about Internet policy and 
regulation.
Nevertheless, such feelings of mistrust go hand-in-hand with users’ and non- 
users’ desire for more socially accountable policies and regulations, thereby confirming 
the elite actors’ claim that greater social accountability is needed. Users and non-users 
specified their understanding of social accountability, referring to specific needs they 
have in life and going beyond the elite actors’ relatively abstract position.
High cost, a lack ofinfrastructure and satisfactory services
Only a small number of users answered questions concerning Internet cost, 
infrastructure and services. They agreed that the cost of services and networks is 
higher in Greece than in other European countries, and there are insufficiently 
developed infrastructure and services in the country. These parameters probably 
matter for parameters of usage (e.g. quality, breadth etc), but not necessarily for usage 
itself. This could be explored further if there had been former users in the focus groups 
who gave feedback on the role of such parameters in their decision to drop out.
On the other hand, non-users stated explicitly they are ignorant of such issues, 
while they maintained that 'cost' is evaluated subjectively on the basis of people’s 
personal financial status. Thus, they challenged the elite actors’ arguments that non­
usage derives from high cost, lack of infrastructure and slow market development in 
the country.
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8.9 Concluding remarks: research questions and the way to a
synthesis
The focus groups offered qualitative insights into the survey findings and 
reflected on the elite actors’ discourses from the point of view of ordinary people, 
thereby providing the space for the triangulation of all the different findings. The 
focus groups departed from a top-down examination (elite actors) and a quantitative 
approach (survey data) to digital divides. The qualitative insights they offered in 
relation to the research questions are summarised as follows:
1. Which cultural and everyday life settings of Greek people influence digital divides in Greece 
and in what ways?
Attitudes to and usage of the media depend on people’s circumstances and 
priorities in life that form subjective and objective parameters of choice. In this 
respect, work circumstances are particularly important as drivers of usage as well as an 
area that media activities relate to. Age is the demographic that matters most since it 
determines people’s work duties, hobbies and lifestyles.
A lack of ‘need’, ‘learning’ and ‘incentives’ are the driving forces of Internet 
non-usage. These parameters are to be seen in an everyday life context because their 
conception is closely associated with people’s everyday lives and priorities in life. Still, 
these parameters are often related to work and conditions in the workplace. Thus, 
although people in Greece have generally positive views of the Internet, non-users 
often consider it a ‘burden’ or a possibly harmful medium in the context of their lives.
From a user perspective, personal choice and integration of the Internet into 
everyday life influence significantly breadth of usage, time spent online, online 
activities, as well as attitudes to the Internet overall. Regardless of the general 
acceptance of the benefits of the Internet, users who have not integrated it into their 
lives argued they would not mind if they had to stop using it. Thus, two categories of 
users were identified in the focus groups: those who use and engage with the Internet 
willingly; and those who feel forced to use it, limiting their usage significantly. This 
indicates that the parameter of ‘resistance’ or ‘dismissal’ is significant not only for 
usage perse but also for the quality and level of usage. On the other hand, ‘resistant’ 
attitudes to the Internet are justified by users on the basis of circumstances, priorities 
and values in life, which work in two directions: as enablers or forcing factors of 
Internet usage, on one hand, and as facilitators or obstructing factors of advanced 
usage and integration of the Internet into everyday activities, on the other.
2. What is the role ofpolicy- and regulation-making in Greece in the course of the country’s 
information society and with regard to digital divides?
Non-users have particularly narrow knowledge of Internet policy and
regulation. They hold strongly negative views of national policies and regulations,
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talking about the ‘inefficiency’ and ‘impotence’ of the country’s authorities in the 
context of their everyday lives. However, they have contrasting views about the role of 
Internet policy and regulation in their decision not to use the Internet. On one hand, 
they argue that regulation has no role in that decision and refer mostly to a lack of 
need and desire for Internet use, although they acknowledge the importance of 
regulation for users’ protection. On the other, a significant number of non-users are in 
favour of ‘better’ policy, saying that Internet policy can influence to some degree 
people’s decisions not to use the Internet.
Users do not grasp the idea of Internet policy and regulation concretely 
enough, with those who use the Internet willingly having a better understanding than 
those who engage less with the Internet. Users mistrust national regulations and the 
Greek authorities’ management of the public interest, although the majority of them 
accept the general importance of Internet policy and regulation. Only a small number 
of users have contacted policy and regulatory authorities for help, indicating a lack of 
awareness of policies and regulations as well as insufficient trust in the authorities. 
They are in favour of public awareness of Internet regulation and argue for the 
improved quality, efficiency and public visibility of decision-making on the Internet. 
However, the debate about citizens’ responsibility resulted in divergent views, with 
advanced users arguing about individual responsibility and less advanced users blaming 
the authorities for omissions and failures.
3. How does the dynamic between society's culture and decision-making influence digital divides 
in Greece? To what extent and in what direction?
Users and non-users highlight certain aspects of the dynamic between society’s 
culture and decision-making. The less advanced users are the less they support 
regulation, and the more important the Internet is for users’ lives the more emphasis 
they place on the role of policy in usage. Users argue about tangible problems in 
decision-making that lead them not to trust state policies on the Internet, while they 
approach these problems on the grounds of their experiences on the Internet as well as 
in the context of their needs and life circumstances. Although most agree that the 
public administration in Greece is techno-phobic and bureaucratic, they are split 
between those in support of Greek ‘identity’ and ‘traditions’ and those who argue that 
change is required. This indicates that the public administration influences society, 
while also being shaped by it.
On the other side, non-users acknowledge the need for Internet regulation in 
specific instances of Internet usage, but assess that role on the grounds of their needs 
and life priorities if they were users. The interdependency between the public 
administration and civil society became particularly obvious when a small number of 
non-users in the focus groups accused the authorities in charge, but considered the 
people working for them as being lucky.
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Ordinary people mistrust policy and regulation and this goes hand-in-hand with 
their desire for more socially accountable policies and regulations. Ordinary people 
specify how they understand social accountability by referring to specific needs they 
have in life. Also, users understand social accountability on the grounds of their 
attitudes to the Internet and their perceptions of Internet risks and opportunities, 
while non-users are very pessimistic about the prospects of social accountability in 
policies and regulations.
In Chapter 9, a synthetic discussion of the findings I obtained in all three 
phases of the research is presented. Chapter 9 discusses the contribution each phase 
makes to understanding digital divides in Greece and to research in the field. Further, 
it elaborates on how the findings answer the research questions and the space they 
provide for the development of alternative understandings of key concepts and 
theories.
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9- Conclusion: Research and theoretical contribution of the 
work, limitations and prospects for future research
9 .J .  Chapter overview
How do society’s culture and Internet policy and regulation influence digital 
divides in Greece? The thesis has examined this question and this chapter concludes by 
summarising the main findings. This chapter also discusses the work’s research and 
theoretical contribution, limitations of the research and possible avenues for future 
work. From a practical viewpoint, it offers policy recommendations to address digital 
divides in Greece. Section 9.2 compares my findings with other research in the field. 
Section 9.3 brings the findings together to overview the answers to the operationalised 
research questions examined in the previous four chapters. Section 9.4 presents how 
the work approached well-established conceptual frameworks in the field and evaluates 
the work’s contribution to developing key concepts and ideas on digital divides. Finally, 
Section 9.5 summarises the answers to the principal research questions, points out 
limitations of the work, highlights some policy recommendations and indicates possible 
ways to research certain aspects of this PhD project in the future.
9 .2 .  D igital divides in Greece and elsewhere: the thesis9 research 
contribution
To evaluate the extent to which the thesis informs other research in the field, 
this section compares the thesis’ findings with insights of other empirical research. 
This comparison draws on research I briefly introduced in the discussion of digital 
divides in Chapter 2 and in case-focused discussion in Chapter 3.
9.2.1 Elite actors’ interviews: researching stakeholders views ofdistaldivides in Greece 
and elsewhere
First, I compare the findings from the elite actors’ interviews (Chapter 5) with 
research into stakeholders’ views of digital divides outside Greece.
Com parative fram ework and lim itations
The comparative framework consists of research in the UK and Estonia. In the 
UK, I consider the British Telecom study (2004) that reports on 10 interviews with 
experts in the field (Chapter 2, p. 33-4). The UK is, like Greece, a long-standing EU
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member state but does far better than Greece in most economic, social and 
technological indicators, whereas Greece is struggling to catch up. Since digital divides 
in the UK are addressed relatively successfully, questions reaching beyond structural 
and material resources arise. In Estonia, I consider findings from interviews with 
stakeholders in that country’s information society (Kalkun and Kalvet, 2002) (Chapter 
2, p. 31). Estonia is very different from and, at the same time, a similar case to Greece 
and the UK. Estonia is a new EU member state and has similar socio-economic traits 
to Greece, whilst its information society performs much better than Greece’s and 
closer to the pace of development in the UK.
This comparative framework can provide useful insights into the main factors 
influencing digital divisions in different contexts, possibly involving different factors 
from those of Greece. However, neither the Estonian nor British study considered the 
views of politicians and regulators, thus lacking insights into the role of decision­
making in digital divides. In any case, this is a small comparative attempt and does not 
reach wide-reaching and generalisable comparative conclusions concerning digital 
divides from a top-down perspective.
E lite  ac to rs  conceptualise , exp lain  and p red ic t digital divides: com m ons ense 
fac to rs  a t  th e  ep icen tre
Conceptualising digital divides beyond access parameters
Experts in the UK (British Telecom, 2004) point to the evolving character of 
digital divides and argue that access is now less than an issue, although still significant 
for special interest groups (e.g. elderly, the disabled etc). They argue that, on the 
contrary, engagement with technology is increasingly important, approaching 
engagement from a utility and purpose perspective. These arguments are quite close to 
what the Greek elite actors argued, although the Greek experts mostly emphasised the 
role of cultural and policy forces in the ways people in Greece access technology and 
engage with it.
Drivers o f  digital divides:practical matters, but decision-making left out?
Regarding the reasons for digital exclusion, the British experts argued that 
digital exclusion is not as tangible and fundamental a problem in Britons’ lives as other 
problems (e.g. unemployment, poverty etc). Similar conclusions were reached by the 
Estonian stakeholders (Kalkun and Kalvet, 2002), who argued that alack of motivation 
due to low living standards is one of the three main barriers to inclusion in the country. 
Such accounts highlight the role of pragmatic factors, but do not clearly view digital 
divides as embedded in and closely interconnected with other aspects of social 
inequality and division. Also, elite actors in the UK and Estonia do not specifically 
indicate that formal decision-making practices play a role in people’s lack of interest in 
and action against digital exclusion.
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On the contrary, my elite actors accounted for the causes of digital divides by 
sketching a complex web of forces in society and authorities’ practices. Also, 
affordability and other pragmatic factors seem to play a relatively minimal role in 
digital divides in Greece since, for instance, Greece has higher living standards but 
lower Internet penetration rates than Estonia (54% in Estonia and 22% in Greece, 
according to 2008 Eurobarometer data). Thus, the elite actors in Greece mostly 
highlight the role of traditions in Greek society, and practical issues concerning 
inadequate related policy-making. Even if the socio-cultural element does come up in 
the Estonian interviews, this only related to the preference of Estonians to 
communicate with the public administration through traditional offline means. In a 
way, cultural forces in Estonia seem to lie in society alone, leaving policy and regulation 
beyond exploration and being of smaller importance than society’s culture in Greece.
The Estonian study argues that the country’s non-users lack skills and are 
unwilling to obtain new skills as they dismiss lifelong learning. The fact that the 
English language dominates the Internet, the learning efforts required to become 
familiar with the Internet, hardware cost and accidentally harmful online behaviour all 
discourage people in Estonia from acquiring Internet skills. In addition, Estonians 
become discouraged by not having the Internet at home as they are negative regarding 
use of the Internet from public access points. Although the same sense of 
unwillingness was identified by the elite actors in Greece, a sense that was called 
‘techno-phobia’, this was not understood as arising from practical matters of learning, 
language, hardware cost and a lack of private Internet access. My interviewees 
understood techno-phobia as a feeling of fear that technology generates in traditionally 
thinking Greek society and which is enforced by inadequate social awareness and 
socially non-accountable policy and regulation. In this sense, the Estonian study brings 
up conventional issues of access and learning, whereas my interviews examined the role 
of decision-making not in determining society’s values and attitudes but in reflecting, 
extending and reinforcing, to some extent, such attitudes and values.
Digital divides and future: A legacy ofdystopian and utopian predictions
Emphasis on conventional forces of divides seems to drive some researchers to 
offer contradictory predictions about the future of digital divides. The UK experts 
articulated two opposite predictions: first, an optimistic prediction, thinking that 
design will become user-friendly and that the oldest digitally disadvantaged cohort will 
be replaced by more engaged age groups; second, a pessimistic prediction based, 
among others, on market and cost issues. Thus, the UK experts emphasised the role 
that ‘converged, standardised, affordable and user friendly interactive technologies’can 
play in the shrinking of digital divides in the future (British Telecom, 2004:18). In my 
interviews, cost and market issues were touched on, but the focus went beyond design 
and skills as empirical evidence in Greece and elsewhere has shown that ‘difficulty in
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use’ and ‘high cost’ concerns are increasingly less important reasons for non-adoption 
of Internet technologies.
R eflections on  lite ra tu re  in  th e  field
Research into digital divides seems to drive the discussion of the concept of 
‘divide’ forward. The studies compared in this section are in tune with the tendency of 
recent literature to move the discussion beyond access and usage issues and to instead 
emphasise matters of technology engagement and integration. This also occurred in 
my interviews as elite actors in Greece pointed to the Internet’s importance as a tool 
or medium of everyday activity.
Regarding the drivers of divides, research in other countries seems to still 
emphasise conventional drivers, with particular emphasis on affordability, learning, 
language and access issues. Although these issues were also partly touched on in my 
interviews, they were seen as being of secondary importance, thus responding to the 
growing need to extend the examination beyond pragmatic matters. The focus on 
conventional drivers of divides carries with it the burden of the ongoing batde between 
dystopian and utopian accounts of the future of divides. Such accounts hold no value 
for this thesis since I argue that the complex picture of drivers of digital divides makes 
the future of the phenomenon not easy to predict.
Findings and  resea rch  c o n trib u tio n  o f  th e  thes is
Before accounting for the thesis’ research contribution, it is important to note 
the different focus and issues of interest various studies examine in different contexts. 
This divergence and/or diversity can be explained by the particularities of country 
contexts and by the different research objectives of each study.
Limitations are present in most research that reports on elite actors’ 
perspectives of digital divides. Political and regulatory authorities are often excluded 
from research due to the scepticism of researchers about the objectivity and credibility 
of those who are often thought of as being distant from society and liable for omissions 
and drawbacks in the information society. Thus, some aspects of my research can 
hardly be seen within the spectrum of other research in the field, entailing certain 
lessons for future research and for the originality of the present research.
My interviews with elite actors examined the significance of frequently 
intangible elements of social and political reality to explain digital divides and estimate 
their future course. Whereas elite actors in other countries account for digital divides 
largely by referring to learning and affordability issues, my research positions society’s 
culture and decision-making at the centre of elite actors’ discourses, in particular 
allowing policy-makers and regulators to develop a self-reflexive account of decision­
making in the Greek information society.
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9.2.2 Survey o f ordinary people: quantitative patterns o f ordinary people's adoption o f
and attitudes to the Internet
In order to evaluate the survey’s contribution (Chapters 6 and 7) to the 
quantitative study of hardly quantifiable factors, such as society’s culture and decision­
making, I review its findings from a comparative perspective.
C om parative  fram ew ork  and  lim ita tions
Although a huge volume of survey research exists in this field, I only seek to 
draw on some examples of other surveys so as to point to national/contextual 
variations along with possible methodological and research issues of interest. Thus, I 
selected surveys with a certain thematic proximity to my work, while they present 
regional or contextual insights of interest to the thesis.
First, I discuss the Eurobarometer (EB) E-Communications Household 2008 
survey (Chapter 3, pp. 64-5) that positions Greece in the European context, allowing 
the comparison of my survey findings to those obtained at the EU level. Second, the 
case of the UK and the OxIS survey (Chapter 2, p. 35-6) provide space for a more 
focused discussion of national differences relative to the North-South divide argument 
in related research. Third, I look at cases outside Europe, such as from America and 
Australia, and examine Pew Internet surveys (see Chapter 2, p. 36) and the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (see Chapter 2, p. 30) survey since these surveys explore ICT use in 
two developed countries that appear to be very different from Greece.
In te rn e t  use  and  reasons fo r non-use: everyday life and  decision-m aking 
aside?
Greece and the *others*: Greece lagging behind
The EB survey (EC, 2008a: 54) reports that 42% of households in the EU-27 
had Internet access at home in 2007, with Greece (19%) being the old member state 
with the lowest Internet access and only being higher than the new members Slovakia 
(18%), Bulgaria (14%) and Romania (12%). Although this percentage is lower than what 
I found in my survey,136 the figures for 2008 confirm the slow change of Internet 
penetration in Greece over the last few years. In 2008, EU-27 Internet access was 49% 
(+7), whereas in Greece there was a smaller increase than the EU-27 average from 19% 
in 2007 to 22% in 2008 (+3). This placed Greece at the very bottom of the EU-27 
Internet access list, together with Bulgaria (22%) (ibid).
136 As explained in Chapter 6, this is due to the urban scope of my survey. Although my statistics do not 
typify Greece as a whole, I refer to ‘Greece’ in general. I do not repeatedly remind the reader of the 
regional scope of the survey, except where this regional limitation is important for the discussion.
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The slow change in Greece is also illustrated when comparing with countries 
which have reached a plateau in Internet penetration, like the UK and USA. The UK 
has experienced a rapid increase of Internet access, with 66% of Britons accessing the 
Internet in 2007 (Dutton and Helsper, 2007). Even though I looked at urban Greece, I 
found that household Internet access is 44.4%, which is significantly lower than in 
Britain. Also, Internet use in Britain was 67% in 2007, while just 44.5% of individuals 
residing in urban Greece use the Internet (this is still higher than the percentage 
national surveys report, namely in the 20%-'$$% range). Outside Europe, in 2006 the 
Pew Internet survey (Madden, 2006) found that Internet penetration in the USA is 
about 73%, namely twice as much as most surveys report for Greece and far higher 
than what I found (44.5%). Penetration in the USA is close to penetration in the EU- 
27 and even closer to that in Britain. On the other hand, in 2005 there was a significant 
increase in the Internet population in the USA (Rainie, et al., 2005), whereas in 
countries such as the UK (Dutton and Helsper, 2007) and Greece there has been a 
slowdown in numbers of new users in the last few years.
Finally, although Australia is a country of a different size and socio-cultural 
texture than European countries, figures reported by the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (2006) are much higher than what I found in Greece and far closer to 
numbers for the EU and UK, confirming that Greece is lagging behind.
Non-use and factors beyond access and training
As far as non-use is concerned, the main reasons for Internet non-usage in 
Britain (Dutton and Helsper, 2007) relate to literacy (e.g. training, knowledge etc) and 
access (e.g. lack of computer availability). A lack of interest is quite an important factor 
in the UK as well, while my survey found that the big majority of non-users in Greece 
do not use the Internet because they lack need (63%) and interest (43%). On the other 
hand, in Australia the chief reasons for a lack of home Internet access is ‘no use for the 
Internet’ (24%), ‘lack of interest in the Internet’ (23%) and ‘costs are too high’ (19%) 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2006). It appears that a lack of interest also plays some 
role in the decisions of Australian households not to have home Internet, but this is 
much lower than the respective figure in Greece (43%).
These two non-Greek studies seem quite different from the Greek case as the 
findings in the thesis in particular probe for policies that go beyond access and training 
provision in order to address issues related to people’s interests in everyday life.
Internet adoption and everyday life: conceptual lags and research gaps
As regards the role of everyday life in Internet adoption, the OxIS 2007 
concluded that the Internet has become an ‘infrastructure of everyday life’ (Dutton 
and Helsper, 8). More specifically, 70% of users in Britain stated the Internet is 
important or very important to their lives (ibid: 45), while even more users in the USA
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(88%) said the same in the ‘Internet and Daily Life’ survey (Fallows, 2004). In my 
survey, 64.5% of Greek users think the Internet is a necessary tool in their daily lives, 
implying that the importance of the Internet for users in Greece is slightly lower than 
in Britain and the USA. On the other hand, 64% of users in Britain and the USA said 
that losing access to or stopping Internet use would cause problems in their daily lives. 
In my survey, 8% less users (56%) think that deprivation of use would influence their 
lives. Thus and regardless of the strikingly lower Internet penetration rates in Greece 
compared to Britain and the USA, these results show that general attitudes to the 
Internet in an everyday life context do not necessarily differ dramatically in countries 
with varying Internet adoption rates. Nevertheless, one can argue that integration of 
the Internet into everyday life is still insufficient as many users have not brought the 
Internet into their lives.
A more recent Pew Internet study (Horrigan and Rainie, 2006) reports on the 
Internet’s integration into people’s lives by examining its role in people’s major 
moments of life. This survey is more focused than the Pew 2004 study above and looks 
at the Internet’s role in eight everyday occasions only. Each individual has different 
priorities in life and, therefore, the perception of a moment or decision, such as the 
decision of‘buying a car’, as ‘major’ varies not only from person to person but also from 
culture to culture. Even so, the survey concludes that for most the Internet has not 
played a big role in any major moment of life. My survey does not address such 
questions, but illustrates that whereas users in Greece hold generally positive views of 
the Internet, such views become less positive when specific aspects of everyday life are 
addressed (e.g. sociability, work, values etc). When comparing with findings in Britain, 
Greek users appreciate the Internet’s role in specific areas of living less than Britons. 
For instance, 8o%~90% of users in Britain do not believe the Internet influences how 
they spend their leisure time with others, whereas in Greece 41% of users believe the 
Internet threatens people’s sociability.
Going beyond general statements about the Internet’s significance, the survey
illustrated that online activities and purposes of use depend on and to some extent
reflect whether users integrate the Internet into one or more domains of their lives. In
the USA, the large majority of users are engaged in information-seeking (92%),
communication (85%), everyday transactions (75%) and entertainment activities (69%)
on the Internet (Fallows, 2004), In Australia, although the Australian Bureau of
Statistics (2006) does not offer specific enough purposes of Internet use, it is striking
that 48% of Australians access the Internet for educational purposes and 12% for
voluntary or community purposes. These online activities seem to be essentially absent
in Greece, as national research has not traced them. On the other hand, in Greece
work activities are more popular than in Australia since 48% of Greek users use the
Internet at work compared to 31% in Australia. Overall, I found that users in Greece
have a narrower scope of activities than users in countries like the USA and Australia:
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most are information-seekers (89%) and communicate with others via email (62%), 
whilst there is little searching for services and online interaction activities. Also, more 
users in developed countries than in Greece use the Internet for education, everyday 
transactions and social/community participation, pointing to the Internet’s relatively 
deeper integration into their everyday lives.
Do Internet policy and regulation matter?
Regarding the role of Internet policy and regulation, OxIS 2007 explored 
people’s views of Internet regulation through a relatively limited and fragmentary 
scope of research (Dutton and Helsper, 2007). OxIS asks about ‘government 
regulation’ (ibid: 32), omitting to ask about non-governmental regulations (i.e. Ofcom), 
EU regulation and self-regulation. Also, it did not connect the role of regulation with 
indicators or other factors of Internet adoption. In my survey, I posed questions about 
policy and regulation to users and non-users while I also measured people’s opinions, 
satisfaction and awareness levels, correlating them to demographics and other 
indicators (see Chapter 7).
OxIS (ibid) finds that 51% of users and 31% of non-users desire government 
regulation, hypothetically relating this finding to Internet risks. On the contrary, I 
explored people’s satisfaction with and awareness of policy and regulation from more 
than one perspective, concluding that non-users are less satisfied with and aware of 
policy and regulation overall. These low figures of satisfaction with and awareness of 
Internet policy and regulation seem to matter significantly for non-users’ limited 
appreciation of the role Internet use could play in their everyday lives, as tested and 
illustrated in Chapter 7. At the same time, I found that people’s perceived efficiency of 
national and EU policy and regulation in addressing privacy and security risks online 
also depends on perceptions of the Internet’s role in specific activities and domains of 
everyday life. What I have concluded is that policy and regulation must be explored 
from more than one perspective (e.g. efficiency, awareness and social accountability of 
national and non-national policies and regulations) as they matter when seeking to 
disentangle people’s attitudes to and practices on the Internet, while they are 
interrelated with everyday life traits and culture.
R eflections on  lite ra tu re  in  th e  field
Greece lags behind the rest of Europe, the UK, the USA and Australia in 
Internet and broadband penetration, being closer to countries with lower socio­
economic development.
As regards related literature, the comparative discussion in this section 
illustrates the particularity of the Greek case, at the same time problematising popular 
understandings of the terms ‘global’ and ‘European’. Especially the EU is often 
misleadingly perceived as a unified socio-economic and political entity that drives
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policy and research discourses to employ and rely on the conceptual vehicle of the 
‘European information society*.
Most survey research focuses on Internet use and patterns of use, confirming 
my argument at various points of the thesis about the absence of research into 
contextual, everyday and policy or regulatory forces of digital divides. Especially the 
above Australian survey completely ignores contextual parameters of digital divides in 
that country. This is precisely the gap that my survey aimed to fill in. On the European 
and global map, there are regional distinctions which cannot be explained on the 
grounds of socio-economic and technological factors. My survey goes beyond such 
factors, positioning the Internet in an everyday and policy framework.
Findings and  re sea rch  co n trib u tio n  o f  th e  thesis
The comparative discussion in this section illustrates that findings differ not 
only due to the different national contexts examined or various objectives pursued in 
research but also because of the conceptual and research approach taken to explore 
related concepts and issues.
I argue that the Internet’s integration into people’s lives cannot be claimed, as 
in OxIS (p.8), only because the majority of people have Internet access at home. 
Careful examination of people’s attitudes to the Internet and its role in people’s lives is 
needed. In this sense, it is relatively surprising that OxIS poses the same questions 
about attitudes to users and non-users, whereas some of these questions clearly refer to 
usage matters that only users could have views about (e.g. ‘there is too much immoral 
material on the Internet’, in Dutton and Helsper, 2007: 27).
The examination of everyday life in the Pew studies presents similar problems 
of conceptualisation and framing. I argue that everyday life should also be looked at 
from a non-user perspective. The everyday cannot be viewed only as the ‘recipient’ or 
‘reflection’ of people’s decision to use the Internet. It has to be examined as a driving 
force of people’s decisions to use the Internet, as well as a space where offline and 
online activities intertwine, influencing Internet experiences and the quality of life as a 
whole. Hence, I have attempted to trace the Internet’s role in everyday life as well as 
the role of everyday life in Internet use and quality of use. Conclusions, such as that by 
Pew that the Internet is ‘an emerging phenomenon, not a mature one’ 
(Haythomthwaite and Wellman, 2002: 31 quoted in Fallows, 2004: 1) must be 
illustrated more convincingly in research.
This suggestion is valid in relation to policy and regulatory indicators as well. 
No matter how hard it might be to operationalise such indicators for quantitative 
research, my approach provides a research example of how policy and regulation can be 
approached in conjunction with societal indicators and from more than one 
perspective.
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5?.2.3 Focus groups: qualitative examination o f ordinary people's insights into digital
divides
In this section, I assess the focus groups’ contribution (Chapter 8) to the 
exploration of the forces of digital divides by comparing the findings to qualitative 
research in and outside Europe.
C om parative  fram ew ork  and  lim ita tions
As before, I selected studies for comparison on the basis of theme- and 
context-related criteria. I selected five focus groups studies, which may not allow the 
articulation of any grand or thorough conclusions, but do provide some insights into 
the research contribution of this research.
First, I select an early study (Haddon, 1999a) that looks at ordinary people’s use 
and perceptions of the Internet in five European countries: Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway and the UK (Chapter 2, p. 38). The oldness of the study and its 
comparative scope enable me to challenge the assumption that the Internet would be 
more propagated in Greece of 2007 than in other European countries of the late 
1990s. Second, I look at ICT exclusion of single parents and young elderly in the UK 
(Haddon, 2000) (Chapter 2, p. 35), continuing the examination of the UK case in line 
with the discussion in the previous two comparative sections. Last, I look at cases 
outside Europe: American and African. In the USA, I look at ethnographic interviews 
of 70 Internet users and non-users in 20 family groups (Clark et al., 2004) (Chapter 2, 
p. 37), which sketch the everyday micrographics of digital divides and, even indirectly, 
the role of policy-making from the point of view of ordinary people. I also look at a 
more recent US study (Kvasny 2006) (Chapter 2, p. 36), which explores the role of 
culture in the digital exclusion of urban populations and employs a sample resembling 
the sample I used in the focus groups. I complete the analysis with the case of 
Southern Africa (region of South Africa) and a study on the role of decision-making 
(Khumalo and Sibanda, 2006) (Chapter 2, p. 37). Although this study involves 
methodological flaws (e.g. excessively structured topic guides etc), its conclusions help 
me understand how the Greek case of divides may have similarities to apparently very 
different cases.
O rd inary  people’s a ttitu d e s  to  th e  In te rn e t  and  driv ing forces
Does society’s culture influence ordinary people’s attitudes to the Internet?
The early five-country study (Haddon, 1999a) found that in the late 1990s the 
Internet had not revolutionised but had a stable position in people’s lives, with all five 
countries having common patterns of Internet adoption. However, in countries where 
the Internet was integrated into people’s lives (e.g. Norway) people perceived it in a 
mundane way, whereas in countries where people were less familiar with it emotional
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perceptions were espoused. The latter category encompasses Greece since in the focus 
groups enthusiastic users tended to idealise the Internet and most non-users 
demonised it.
On the other hand, the study on the ICT exclusion of single parents and young 
elderly in the UK paid more attention to the practical difficulties people encounter 
when using ICTs. Haddon (2000) found that, even if access is ensured, the quality of 
usage of ICTs is influenced by economic constraints that diminish not only the 
functionality of ICT services but also the social and cultural capital that users enjoy. 
He argued that life circumstances matter for the adoption of new technologies, paying, 
however, attention to financial and access-related matters rather than the role of 
existing social and cultural capital in how people take advantage of ICTs.
Outside Europe, an American study (Kvasny, 2006) argued that ‘culture is 
useful for understanding how groups conceptualise, use, and react to ICT’ (ibid: 166). 
This study went beyond cost and access issues, and argued that low-income individuals 
in urban areas embrace ICTs, considering them empowering tools in life. Clark et al. 
(2004) provide stronger evidence about the role of society’s culture in the USA. They 
bring up the primary role of personal choice and responsibility, with ordinary people 
arguing that technological determinism, educational benefits from use and experiences 
of social, economic and technological disparity are less significant matters. Even 
economically deprived Americans point to economic disadvantage and differential 
access to economic and cultural capital as matters that do not suffice to blame, for 
instance, political authorities. On the other hand, society’s culture seems to be even 
more important for cases like Southern Africa, as Khumalo and Sibanda (2006) 
explored the disadvantaged position of women in rural areas and found that strong and 
very different cultural elements from those in the USA determine digital exclusion in 
Southern Africa. They found that dominant mindsets and gendered ideologies lie 
behind inequalities. This African study implies that socially and politically maintained 
cultures can explain the exclusion of women in rural areas of the country, although it 
does not dig deeper into this issue.
The findings in the USA strongly contest those for the UK with respect to the 
drivers of ICT and Internet non-use. The UK and the USA are two developed 
countries of the West where the information society is doing quite well, but 
divergence still occurs with respect to the research emphasis placed on the role of 
society’s culture, how this culture is conceptualised, and the varying effects of specific 
drivers of divides. The findings for the USA also contrast, quite expectedly, with those 
I reported for Greece and the findings reported by Khumalo and Sibanda for Southern 
Africa in relation to the traits of society’s culture and how culture influences people’s 
attitudes to the Internet.
Although I do not dismiss the findings of non-Greek research, I argue that 
ICTs are carriers of symbolic and social capital in a way that the length, breadth and
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quality of their usage depend on how they are positioned in people’s lives and in 
relation to people’s aspired social and cultural capital. This was shown in my focus 
groups where users and non-users evaluated the Internet differently, depending on 
their priorities and circumstances of life, and the Internet responses to them. The 
cultural capital produced by ICTs is appreciated on the grounds of the cultural 
identity(ies) of the context(s) where ICTs are appropriated. For instance, whereas the 
five-country study did not identify negative attitudes to the Internet that could drive 
people to stop using it, several users in my focus groups wished they could drop out.137 
Also, whereas Kvasny found that people in the USA consider that digital inclusion can 
fight social exclusion, several users in my focus groups did not observe an improvement 
in their lives since they became Internet users.
Ordinary people and reasons fo r  non-use
As regards non-use, the five-country study (Haddon, 1999a) argued about a ‘lack 
of need’, while it looked at busy daily schedules as a concern that people have when 
going online. Likewise, in the qualitative study of ICT exclusion in the UK (Haddon, 
2000), single parents and young elderly argued they do not need new ICTs, although 
both groups faced practical and other restrictions to usage. For instance, past 
biographies influenced the young elderly and made them feel incompetent to use new 
ICTs and have a non-consumerist logic that drove them away from gadgets. In my 
focus groups, non-users’ ‘lack of need’ was coupled with concerns about the Internet’s 
role as a ‘burden’ and a possibly harmful medium. Beyond arguments of‘no need’ and 
‘self-exclusion’, Kvasny (2006) finds that life circumstances, such as start-up time and 
costs, can pose barriers to ICT usage in the USA, making people feel disadvantaged 
and excluded. Although these specific barriers did not emerge strongly in my focus 
groups, I found that everyday life cultures, habits and customs play a major role in 
people’s decisions to use the Internet.
Instances of self-exclusion appear in Greece and in countries like the UK, but 
the particular everyday life parameters and cultural traits that influence people’s 
decisions to use ICTs differ significantly in the two countries. For example, everyday 
habits, values, traditions and life priorities influence people’s attitudes to ICTs more in 
Greece and less in the UK. Most people in Greece are dismissive of anything not 
considered beneficial and easy to integrate without any radical change in the rhythms 
and customs of life. Also, whereas the five-country study in 1999 does not conclude a 
radical rejection or uncritical acceptance of the Internet, in 2007 less balanced and 
more extreme attitudes to the Internet prevailed among ordinary people in Greece.
137 The five-countiy study and my focus groups found that work generates interest in the Internet and 
that some use the Internet and have Internet access for work purposes only.
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Does decision-making matter fo r  non-use and quality ofuse?
In the ethnographic interviews in the USA (Clark et al., 2004) people of either 
a high or low income articulated a discourse of individualism. They argued that 
ownership, access and usage of the Internet are the responsibility of the individual and 
not political authorities, thus articulating a narrative of self-reliance and priority 
criteria to talk about their skills and capabilities in using the Internet. Although a 
similar sense of priority criteria also exists in Greece, my focus groups drew a complex 
picture of the ways decision-making and people’s decisions to adopt the Internet 
interconnect.
In contrast to the findings of Clark et al., (ibid), users and non-users in my focus 
groups found themselves distant from market players and decision-makers, without 
giving in uncritically to the decisions and practices of the latter. Even the small 
number of Greek Internet users who were content with upcoming trends in the 
information society did not directly support the corporate logic that treats citizens as 
consumers, thus justifying their decisions in the context of experiences in their micro- 
world. Most users in Greece acknowledged the need for more awareness and visibility 
of policy and regulation, and they viewed a lack of Internet training and public 
Internet access, as well as the high cost and lack of Internet infrastructure, as problems 
that stem from policy and regulation in Greece.
In this sense, my findings are closer to the findings reported by Khumalo and 
Sibanda (2004) for Southern Africa. Khumalo and Sibanda found that, although 
women evaluate ICTs positively, those in rural areas feel disempowered, discriminated 
and neglected, as the traditional culture of the country excludes them from decision­
making. This African study finding shows that countries with very different socio­
economic and policy standards may be similar in cultural respects as the element of 
traditionalism is present in both Southern Africa and Greece, while the 
communication channel between policy and citizens is problematic in both countries. 
On the other hand, ‘individual responsibility’ is present in the Greek discourses only to 
some degree and is not as widespread as in the USA. Greek users accept the existence 
of ignorance and lack of awareness in Greek society and argue about ‘individual 
responsibility’ without, however, implying that policy and regulation are then freed of 
responsibility.
R eflections on  lite ra tu re  in  th e  field
In conclusion, one can argue that most qualitative studies look, from the point 
of view of ordinary people, to some extent at cultural parameters and even less at the 
role of policy and regulation.
Although the conclusions of different studies for various contexts differ in one 
way or another, they do highlight that people’s perceptions of and attitudes to the
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Internet take place in an everyday life context. Circumstances and needs in everyday 
life seem to be important in general and in different contexts, highlighting the 
importance of contextualising digital divides and examining the interlinkages between 
digital and social exclusion. However, the linkages between digital and social inclusion 
are still often presented in a quite linear and normative way, bringing forward the 
criticisms I offered in Chapter 2 regarding the literature. Also, some research still 
considers conventional issues of access, cost and exclusion to be sufficient for mapping 
out and interpreting people’s attitudes to the Internet. Although ethnographic 
approaches to digital divides are gaining more weight on the research agenda, they 
often lack sufficiently deep accounts for the general population and beyond concrete 
issues of research interest.
The focus groups I conducted aimed to provide a relatively complete picture of 
socio-cultural and decision-making drivers of digital divides, digging deeper into the 
cultural specificities of individual and collective living. Hence, they provided case- 
specific insights that may contribute to a rethinking of the gaps observed in the 
research literature. These gaps concern the lack of thoroughness and depth in 
examining ordinary people’s views of digital divides, and the insufficient research 
accounts of the interdependencies between society’s culture and decision-making 
practices when examining digital divides.
Findings and  re sea rch  co n trib u tio n  o f  th e  th esis
In the focus groups socio-cultural and identity factors strongly emerged, but 
they do not seem to be that important in other research. For instance, the five-country 
study (Haddon, 1999a) reached conclusions which were valid in all countries, with only 
minor and culture-specific differences in usage and perceptions of the Internet being 
present at the national level. This can be explained by the research and methodological 
orientation of the study and its time-premature nature or possibly because the cultural 
element is actually stronger in Greece.
These observations indicate the inclination of Greek users to stop using the 
Internet. Whereas non-users in Greece have rejected the Internet due to a lack of 
‘need’, ‘learning’ and ‘incentives’, a significant number of users feel ‘forced’ to use the 
Internet and are negative regarding it due to circumstances, priorities and values in 
life. This is quite a unique finding as no other research from the bulk of studies I 
reviewed points to negative attitudes of users. Also, positive accounts of the role of 
digital inclusion in overcoming other kinds of exclusion, like in Kvasny’s study in the 
USA, are not strongly supported in my focus groups. These positive accounts can be 
partly explained methodologically since, in Kvasny, the participants were individuals 
who had willingly decided to undergo ICT training.
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9-2-4 Digital divides in Greece and elsewhere: conclusion and research contribution o f
the thesis
As discussed in Chapter 2, research since the 1990s shows that people often 
have negative feelings about certain technologies. Early studies illustrated that people 
resist digital or cable TV for aesthetic reasons and for the fear of technology 
dominating their everyday lives (Silverstone and Haddon, 1996a), while life 
circumstances have been studied as possible reasons for resistance to new media 
technologies (Haddon and Silverstone, 1995). Later studies raised the existence of 
‘digitally dismissive’ parts of the population in different geographical and cultural 
contexts, and in an everyday life framework (UK Online, 2007:13; Horriganet al., 2003; 
Hartmann, 2005:144-5; Rommes, 2003; Kingsley and Anderson, 1998).
However, insufficient studies examine concrete and historically traced socio­
cultural traits as drivers of resistance to new technologies in national and cross-national 
contexts. For instance, Wyatt et al. (2002) conclude about resistance to the Internet 
without going into any depth about the driving forces in an everyday context. Even the 
European P-903 survey in 2000, which argues that non-users’ indifference about the 
Internet can be taken as a passive form of resistance (Mante-Meijer et al., 2001), does 
not disentangle the parameters underpinning this sense of indifference. On the 
contrary, the thesis reaches conclusions about the underlying causes of people’s 
resistance to Internet technologies at the national level of study. It empirically explores 
and extends the argument that contextual indicators are to be taken into consideration 
for a systematic account of the forces that influence digital divides and people’s 
engagement with technology (Selwyn, 2004a). In a way, it explores arguments that 
social and cultural capital (ibid) along with the political agenda in the field (Selwyn, 
2005) determine people’s decisions not to use and/or to engage with technologies like 
the Internet.
Hence, the thesis explains aspects of digital divides in Greece that relate to 
Internet adoption (e.g. Internet use, quality of use, online risks, self-protection on the 
Internet etc), providing an account of the dialogue between decision-making and 
society’s culture in the country. It attempts to bridge the research gap between society 
and decision-making and to provide an alternative account of decision-making as highly 
interdependent on ordinary people’s everyday life and culture, presenting the Greek 
case as a case in its own right and a case that can provide useful insights for other 
research in the field.
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p.j Role o f  society’s culture and decision-makingin the Greek case
o f  digital divides: recapitulation and synthesis o f  empirical 
findings
How does the thesis’ research contribution feed the research questions posed at 
the beginning? The principal questions were introduced in Chapter i (p. 10), broken 
down into a series of research questions in Chapter 2 (p. 61) and operationalised in 
Chapter 4 (Table 4-1). Only the first principal research question, ‘ What are the general 
characteristics of the Greek information society?\ was not operationalised because it 
introduced the research. This question was examined in the elite actors’ interviews 
only as the elite actors provided an overview of the Greek information society.
This section recapitulates and provides a synthesis of the findings for each 
operationalised research question. The answers to the principal research questions are 
summarised in the concluding section of the chapter.
9-3-1 What are the general characteristics o f the Greek information society?
Introducing the research, the interviews with elite actors mapped out the most 
prominent characteristics of the Greek information society. They highlighted a wide 
range of issues but, for the purpose of this summarising discussion, I focus on the key 
thematic patterns and arguments of the interviews.
The elite actors approached the Greek information society from a socio­
cultural and decision-making perspective. They underlined the overarching role of 
culture in the Greek information society and highlighted the role of‘techno-phobia’ in 
society and the public administration as the main force of the low Internet adoption in 
Greece. Thus, they confirmed to a degree the conceptual framework of the thesis and 
the distinctiveness of the Greek case vis-a-vis other countries, as also shown in Section 
9.2.1. They suggested more socially-accountable policies and awareness-raising 
initiatives, while pointing out the critical role sufficient regulation could play in 
boosting the Internet, thus criticising Greece’s delays in implementing EU regulation.
As regards commonsense drivers, they argued that pragmatic factors such as 
infrastructure, Internet services, cost, social action and institutional organisation 
influence Internet adoption although they are interconnected with society’s culture 
and decision-making in the country. Also, they noted other factors that interact 
variously with society and decision-making and which complete the picture of the 
complexity of digital divides in the country: market liberalisation and development, 
media propaganda, and IT education. These forces were discussed as structures lying 
in between decision-making and society, with the elite actors problematising their role 
in digital divides. These arguments contributed to the thesis’ knowledge base as such
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structural factors and their ambiguous role were not highlighted in its conceptual 
framework.
9.3.2 How far does society's culture influence digital divides in Greece?
After mapping out the general traits of the Greek information society, I 
collected data that provided more concrete evidence of the socio-cultural forces 
shaping the country’s digital divides. This domain was explored in all three phases of 
research to answer the research question ‘what are the cultural and everyday life settings of 
ordinary people in Greece ofrelevance to and importance for the course ofthe Greek information 
society?.
In the first phase, the operationalised question ‘what are the cultural 
characteristics of Greek society of past and current times?’ was explored from the 
point of view of elite actors. Most of them argued about the existence of a cultural 
identity that drives Greece to maintain a traditional lifestyle and dissociates it from 
the increasingly powerful world of new technologies. They considered that this cultural 
identity consists of a non-technocratic and techno-phobic culture in society, social 
ignorance, and the Greek lifestyle in general. Their arguments touched upon 
citizenship issues as they argued that Greek people behave more like individuals and 
less like citizens. Although they brought the cultural element to the front more than 
stakeholders in other countries (see Section 9.2.1), they often held divergent views, 
using, for instance, contrasting evidence about technologies that Greek people accept 
enthusiastically (e.g. mobile telephony) to dismiss the argument of ‘Greek 
distinctiveness’.
Concerning the particular cultural elements of the Greek information society, 
the elite actors answered the operationalised question: ‘more specifically, how do the 
cultural characteristics of Greek society take shape in the Greek information society?’. 
Regardless of the different institutional and professional interests that the elite actors 
represented, they underlined the role of ‘techno-phobic’ and ‘non-technocratic’ 
culture, and argued that this culture is dominant in Greek society. Whereas 
‘technophobia’ is a loaded term and was used persistently in my elite actors’ interviews, 
studies of stakeholders’ views in other countries point relatively mildly to ‘excluded’ or 
‘self-excluded’ people (see Section 9.2.1). Nonetheless, different elite actors in Greece 
placed different weight on the forces driving ‘techno-phobia’, with social ignorance and 
lack of familiarity, high cost of Internet services, and low quality of Internet services 
and infrastructure being some of those forces.
Then, a more focused analysis was pursued, with elite actors and ordinary 
people discussing how the above socio-cultural characteristics and concrete everyday 
settings of life in Greece influence digital divides. At this point, I explored the
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operationalised question: ‘which cultural and everyday life settings of Greek people 
influence digital divides in Greece and in what ways?’.
First, the elite actors argued that low awareness, society’s negative attitudes to 
the Internet, lack of social action and institutional organisation along with a lack of 
familiarity with new technologies are cultural traits which matter for digital divides and 
are rooted in the historically established techno-phobic culture of Greek society. In a 
way, they sketched the cultural and everyday life settings that influence digital divides 
in Greece, confirming historical accounts of Greek society and specifying culture in a 
way that is hardly encountered in other research literature (see Section 9.2.1).
In the second and third phases of the research, ordinary people were asked 
about their views of the role of the cultural elements the elite actors had pointed out. 
The survey showed that, although ordinary people in Greece have generally positive 
views of the Internet, they are concerned about its role in specific domains of social 
life. More importantly, a ‘dismissive culture’ seems to prevail among non-users since 
they are not interested in the Internet and are highly unlikely to start using the 
Internet in the future. Users, on the other hand, appeared to suffer from limited 
Internet literacy, while nearly half of them thought that the prospect of non-use would 
not affect their lives significantly; a finding that makes the Greek case quite distinctive 
(see survey comparisons in Section 9.2.2). Hence, the survey highlighted the role of 
everyday life and resistance culture, partly confirming the hypothesis that the 
Internet’s role in users’ everyday lives influences Internet adoption, albeit no direct 
and one-way associations between everyday life and Internet use were found. In the 
third phase, the focus groups showed that indicators, such as demographics, cannot be 
seen out of context as people’s views of and attitudes to media depend on 
circumstances and priorities in life. The focus groups identified users who use the 
Internet willingly and those who use it because they are forced, with the former 
integrating the Internet into their everyday lives more than the latter. ‘Resistant’ or 
not attitudes to the Internet were justified by users in the focus groups on the grounds 
of specific circumstances, priorities and values in life, differentiating the Greek case 
from other countries where users integrate the Internet into their lives (see Section 
9.2.3). On the other hand, the focus groups confirmed the survey findings and partly 
the elite actors’ arguments about non-usage as non-users seemed to lack the need, 
incentives and knowledge to start using the Internet. ‘Need’, ‘learning’ and ‘incentives’ 
were seen in an everyday life context since the way non-users viewed these parameters 
was associated with their everyday lives and life priorities. Hence, the focus groups 
confirmed that everyday and cultural parameters matter more for non-users in Greece 
than for non-users in other countries, with access barriers to usage and issues of 
‘exclusion’ not being that prominent in Greece (see Section 9.2.3).
However, do ordinary people consider their everyday cultures highly ‘techno­
phobic’, as the elite actors argued, or heavily ‘dismissive’, as the survey showed? On one 
hand, users in the focus groups argued about ‘Greekness’ and pointed to identity, 
mentality and lifestyle characteristics such as dismissiveness and traditionalism. On the 
other, they attempted to deconstruct and contextualise the elite actors’ discourses, 
arguing about the importance of ‘utility’, ‘traditions’ and ‘offline ways of 
communication and work’. Thus, they bore some of the cultural traits the elite actors 
questioned, although positioning these characteristics in an everyday context. The 
focus groups partly challenged the elite actors’ discourses and enriched the survey 
findings, allowing a reflection on and interpretation of ordinary people’s views, 
something which is not seen very often in other research (see Section 9.2.3).
9.5.3 How far do Internetpolicy and regulation influence digital divides in Greece?
After exploring the socio-cultural traits of the Greek information society, I 
obtained some empirical insight into decision-making in the country. All three phases 
of empirical research explored the research question ‘how is decision-making shaped in 
Greece and which are its key features of importance for the country's information society?\
First, the elite actors overviewed policy- and regulation-making in Greece and 
answered the operationalised question: Svhat is the general picture and key features of 
policy- and regulation-making in Greece?’. They argued that poor co-operation, 
bureaucracy, a lack of modernisation and techno-phobia dominate the Greek public 
sector and country’s decision-making. Some elite actors, especially those operating as a 
communication channel between citizens and authorities, argued that the alternatives 
of self-regulation and co-regulation are hindered in Greece due to a lack of social 
organisation and political inactivity on one hand, and because of a conflict of interests 
on the other.
Second, the elite actors specifically accounted for the way(s) policy and 
regulation take shape in the Greek information society, answering the operationalised 
question: ‘more specifically, how does policy- and regulation-making take shape in the 
Greek information society?’. Most elite actors argued that ordinary people cannot 
participate in decision-making due to a lack of social organisation, a techno-phobic 
culture and a lack of citizenship. They supported a top-down direction of decision­
making, with official authorities being the driving forces, while only a few elite actors 
mentioned public consultations as the way for change to come from grassroots. On the 
other hand, they stressed that socially accountable policy and regulation should be in 
place for the traditional and non-technocratic character of Greek society to change.
Third, all three phases of research explored the operationalised question: Svhat 
is the role of policy- and regulation-making in Greece in the course of the country’s
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information society and with regard to digital divides?’. In the elite actors’ interviews, 
politicians, regulators and researchers argued about political liability for the ‘techno­
phobia’ and ‘non-technocratic’ culture in society, being critical of practices and 
mindsets of decision-making in the country. They emphasised regulatory delays, the 
existence of a non-technocratic and inefficient public administration, the lack of 
appropriate regulatory initiatives and inadequate social accountability. These findings 
are opposed to research literature in other countries where stakeholders highlight 
practical drivers of divides but policy and regulation factors are left out of 
consideration (see Section 9.2.1).
Then, the survey I conducted posed many questions about policy and regulation 
to both users and non-users, measuring their opinions, satisfaction and awareness 
levels. This contrasts with the relatively limited examination of policy and regulation 
by survey research in other countries (see Section 9.2.2). The survey found that people 
in Greece consider EU Internet policy and regulation more efficient than national 
policy and regulation, supporting, though from a different perspective, the elite actors’ 
critical views of national decision-making. The survey illustrated that most ordinary 
people evaluate the social accountability of EU and national Internet authorities as 
low, with the majority of users and even more non-users being unaware of Greek 
authorities that monitor policies and regulations for users’ protection. Also, ordinary 
people in Greece argue that awareness of Internet policy and regulation is low, with 
users being less likely to think so. The survey confirmed the elite actors’ argument 
about a lack of social accountability in national policy and regulation, and found low 
satisfaction of users with national policy and regulation, low awareness of Internet 
policy and regulation and low awareness of authorities users can contact when at risk. 
Hence, ordinary people send the message that greater social accountability and 
visibility of policy and regulation are needed in Greece.
Last, the focus groups illustrated that users and mainly non-users have a limited
understanding of what Internet policy and regulation are, with advanced Internet users
defining Internet policy and regulation better than ‘forced’ users or those with limited
Internet experiences. Users acknowledged the need for more awareness and visibility
of policy and regulation, pointing to tangible problems that Internet policy and
decision-making do not address successfully, such as a lack of training and public
access, high cost and lack of infrastructure. These tangible issues bring up what the
elite actors identified as forces lying in between decision-making and society, although
the users approached these forces in the context of their individual experiences, needs
and life circumstances. In tune with the survey findings, ordinary people in the focus
groups expressed their distrust of national regulations and overall political
management of the public interest in Greece. Non-users talked about the ‘inefficiency’
and ‘impotence’ of the country’s authorities, using these terms in the context of their
everyday lives. Also, they acknowledged the need for Internet regulation, but assessed
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this need on the grounds of their own requirements and priorities in life if they were 
users. Thus, the focus groups illustrated that the evaluation of Internet policy and 
regulation depends on social accountability and awareness parameters, as well as on 
needs, circumstances and choices in everyday life. Finally, the discussion concerning 
'citizenship' and the role of ordinary people in decision-making involved relatively 
divergent views of advanced users who argued about individual responsibility, and less 
advanced users who blamed the country’s authorities for omissions and failures. This 
debate problematises the elite actors’ argument about a lack of citizenship in Greece 
and the top-down direction that policy- and regulation-making must take. Hence, 
although self-reliance and priority criteria also seem to exist in Greece, my focus 
groups painted a complex picture of the ways decision-making and people’s decisions 
to adopt the Internet interconnect. This picture brings Greece closer to the case of 
Southern Africa where people (women) feel excluded from decision-making, rather 
than the USA where individualism and self-reliance prevail (see Section 9.2.3).
9.3.4 How do society's culture and Internetpolicy and regulation intersect in influencing
digital divides in Greece?
After exploring the socio-cultural and decision-making traits of the Greek 
information society, I shed some light on the dynamic between society’s culture and 
decision-making. All three phases of research examined this domain and answered the 
research question: ‘how does the dynamic between society's culture and decision-making take 
place in the Greece information society and as far as digital divides are concernedf.
First, the elite actors answered the operationalised question: ‘what are the key 
parameters of the dynamic between society’s culture and decision-making in digital 
divides in Greece?’ The elite actors developed the argument that ordinary people’s 
techno-phobic and resistant culture is linked to decision-making practices. They 
argued that the interactions between society and decision-making in multiple domains 
of activity result in a complex web of societal and political factors that drive digital 
divides in the country. The links between society’s culture and decision-making and 
the influence of the latter on digital divides were, however, approached differently by 
different elite actors as they treated these forces on the grounds of their professional 
interests in the information society.
Then, the elite actors and ordinary people offered a more focused account of 
the interconnections between decision-making and society’s culture by exploring the 
operationalised question: ‘how does the dynamic between society’s culture and 
decision-making influence digital divides in Greece? To what extent and in what 
direction?’ Although the elite actors failed to map out the specificities of everyday life 
that cause people’s resistance to the Internet, they argued that the ‘resistance’ and
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‘techno-phobia’ of Greek society are reflected in the public administration, influencing 
the rhetoric and practices of decision-making. Whereas stakeholders in other 
countries account for digital divides by largely referring to learning and affordability 
issues, my elite actors to some extent developed a self-reflexive account of decision­
making in the Greek information society (see Section 9.2.1). Nevertheless, they argued 
that the solution to digital divides could derive from decision-making initiatives and 
not from ordinary people. Although they argued that additional forces, such as market 
development and continuous education, are important for understanding digital 
divides, they viewed change as stemming from policy and regulation and not from the 
dynamics of social activity and the mobilisation of ordinary people’s citizenship.
From a bottom-up perspective, the survey showed that ordinary people’s 
perceived efficiency of Internet policies and regulations depends on their evaluation of 
the Internet’s role in specific domains of everyday life as well as on other policy 
indicators, such as perceived social accountability of Internet authorities and 
awareness of Internet policy and regulation. These findings suggest that policy and 
regulation should not be viewed on their own, like in research in other countries (see 
Section 9.2.2), and they invite research to understand the cultural and practical 
specificities of everyday life that influence people’s perceptions and evaluations of 
policy and regulation. On the other hand, the survey found that policy and regulatory 
indicators influence Greek people’s assessments of the Internet’s role in everyday life, 
except for their decision to use the Internet or not.
Going deeper into the survey findings, the focus groups showed that users’ and 
non-users’ mistrust of and disappointment with decision-making, and their desire for 
more socially accountable policies and regulations on the Internet, derive from and 
refer back to their needs in everyday life, thus going beyond the elite actors’ general 
references to social accountability. Although non-users argued that regulation has 
played no role in their decision not to use the Internet and they did not specify how 
policy may influence such a decision, they acknowledged the importance of regulation 
for the protection of users and argued for ‘better’ policy. Also, people in the focus 
groups viewed societal issues such as social ignorance and awareness as relative and 
highly dependent not only on individual life worlds but also on other forces, such as 
the state that mediates the ways in which people deal with new technologies. Most 
users questioned individual responsibility and viewed the notion of citizenship as 
influenced by state policies as well as by priorities and circumstances in life. They 
pointed to the interdependency between society’s culture and formal decision-making, 
indicating that the public administration influences society in several ways, while also 
being shaped by it. Further, non-users challenged elite actors’ argument about a lack of 
citizenship and social inactivity, arguing that the state is liable for social inactivity and 
highlighting the importance of identity, everyday schedules and traditions. Hence, the 
focus groups underlined the complex and dynamic relationship between society’s
culture and decision-making in Greece not only by highlighting traditionalism, such as 
in the research in Southern Africa (see Section 9.2.3), but also by viewing this 
relationship as highly interactive and on the gourds of people’s needs, desires, 
perceptions and attitudes.
9.4 Conceptualising society’s culture anddecision-makingfor the
study ofdigital divides: theoretical contribution o f  the thesis
The conceptual framework of the thesis constituted the basis for the empirical 
examination of the above research questions and is presented in Chapter 2. In this 
section, I consider how the thesis complements, adds to, critiques or even contrasts 
the concepts and theories discussed in Chapter 2. 1 also present how the thesis informs 
the literature on the Greek case discussed in Chapter 3. This review of the thesis’ 
theoretical contribution mostly relies on the obtained empirical evidence and is 
coupled with the critical approach I have taken throughout the work to specific 
theoretical arguments.
9.4.1 Concepts and theories in digital divides literature
The thesis has moved beyond access and usage matters in exploring the ‘why’ 
and ‘how’ of digital divisions in Greece. It has also placed the complex indicators of 
quality of use (Selwyn, 2004a) and variations in usage (Livingstone and Helsper, 2007) 
in context so as to explore them systematically. The thesis supports a theorisation of 
digital divides that emphasises the critical role of socio-cultural and decision-making 
dynamics in structuring Internet adoption qualitatively and quantitatively. According 
to this theorisation, a complex set of societal cultures with their gaps and disparities, as 
well as policy and regulatory mindsets and practices are in a constant dialogue with 
technology, influencing digital inclusion and participation. However, this theorisation 
does not provide an exhaustive study framework and its validity might vary from case- 
study to case-study.
D igital divides fro m  an  everyday life pe rspec tive
In attempting to build up a conceptual framework that approaches technology from a 
socio-cultural perspective, I first discussed literature that looks at everyday life and its role in 
digital divides (Chapter 2, Section 2.4.2).
In that discussion, I argued that Schutz’s ‘lifeworld’ is a useful concept for the thesis. 
Although Schutz does not deal with outside social relations and hierarchies, his ‘lifeworld’ 
concept guided my research beyond micro-scale or family-centred conceptualisations o f  the
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everyday and framed my decision to examine the role o f agency (e.g. users and non-users) in 
shaping the everyday as well as shared meanings and knowledge about issues o f interest (e.g. 
Internet adoption). However, it is unclear whether Schutz’s ‘lifeworld’ allows the researcher to 
capture the collective or systemic ‘lifeworld’ in existence. The thesis attempted to empower 
the agent(s) by approaching them empirically not only as individuals but also as members o f a 
broader system o f everyday living. In this sense, I aimed to go beyond Schutz’s individual 
‘lifeworlds’, perceiving the latter as situated in a broader ‘lifeworld’ system where interactions 
between individual ‘lifeworlds’ and systemic ‘lifeworld’ conditions take place.
On the other hand, the evolving nature o f the everyday, as argued by Schutz’s and de 
Certeau’s idea that the everyday is both oppressive and subversive (1984), questions how one 
fixes the framework o f the everyday at a particular moment in time. I theoretically and 
empirically dismiss such concerns since the evolving nature o f the everyday follows the natural 
course o f human life and history, whilst my empirical work pointed directly to the flaw o f  
viewing individual ‘lifeworlds’ as dissociated from the broader systemic ‘lifeworld’. The 
Schutzian phenomenology attributes human agency with autonomy from structural conditions 
and limitations, failing to account for outside forces at work. My empirical work shows that 
such arguments fall short o f balancing the interplay between structure and agency, considering 
the multifaceted role o f technology in users’ everyday lifeworlds and identifying the 
multidimensional influence o f  external social and power relations. Alternatively, the findings I 
obtained lead in the direction o f theorising everyday life as being systemically contextualised 
and historically traced, without dismissing its time evolution. In a way, such a theorisation 
facilitates research viewing digital divides as an element and condition o f  individual and 
systemic lifeworld(s) that can be explored by scrutinising the interactions between individual 
and systemic agent(s) in a continuum o f time change and evolution.
Drawing, more specifically, on the insights obtained from the empirical part o f the 
research, one can sufficiently support the need to distinguish between individual and systemic 
lifeworlds and disentangle their interactions. This need can be supported on the basis o f the 
empirically demonstrated dialogue o f  everyday life with policy and regulation and in relation to 
digital divides in Greece. Everyday life was understood in the thesis as embracing and 
explaining, to some extent, people’s resistance to technology, jointly constituting the socio­
cultural framework o f the research. At the same time, people’s everyday lives were presented as 
consisting o f  individual habits, priorities, values and life activities (an individual lifeworld), 
while being either complemented by or juxtaposed with external messages, systemic values and 
norms as well as collective activities (a systemic lifeworld). The thesis recognised that the 
interactions between individual and systemic lifeworlds are far from linear and thus not easy to 
disentangle since individual lifeworlds are regarded as being situated within the broader 
systemic lifeworld, with multi-directional relationships taking place among individual 
lifeworlds and between them and the systemic lifeworld. In this complex field o f lifeworlds, 
both individual and systemic conditions seem to have jointly shaped, for instance, Greek 
people’s reflections on the role o f  everyday life in their decision to adopt the Internet or not. 
This is so since no independence can be assumed in how individual lifeworlds are shaped and 
developed while the systemic lifeworld would lack any essence if  not populated by individual 
lifeworlds. In this sense, the decision to use the Internet can be taken to rely to a different
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extent on individual or systemic parameters, while in the case o f  Greece this decision seems to 
have been significantly influenced by historically inherited ‘conditions’ o f  life which have 
shaped the systemic lifeworld in the country and have influenced people’s individual lifeworlds 
until today. For instance, the focus groups showed there are people who prioritise their 
individual needs, articulating relatively independently o f  external factors views o f  the Internet 
and how it is to be used. On the other hand, the interviewees showed that individual needs 
might often be contrasted with systemic norms and requirements, leading to use or non-use o f  
the Internet. Finally, other interviewees showed a complete lack o f  individual thinking, 
reproducing historically survived and systemically reinforced discourses about ‘Greekness’ and 
the role o f ‘identity’ and ‘traditions’.
In general, this framing o f everyday life and the interactions between individual and 
systemic lifeworlds are critically important for one to see where policy and regulation are 
situated and how they intersect with society’s culture and everyday culture in particular. Policy 
and regulation can broadly be seen as constituents and shaping factors o f  the systemic 
lifeworld. At the same time, policy and regulation are affected by other systemic conditions as 
well as by the potential power o f the accumulation o f  individual lifeworlds, while having a more 
or less important effect on people’s individual lifeworlds. However, given that individual and 
systemic lifeworlds cannot be seen separately, it is striking to examine how and in what 
direction policy and regulation influence the shaping o f the systemic lifeworld, thus variously 
interacting with individual lifeworlds. Likewise, it is important to examine how the sum o f  
individual lifeworlds may influence, to a more or less significant extent, what is understood as 
systemic evolution and change. Through a complex network o f relationships and interactions 
o f individual and systemic lifeworlds and by seeing policy and regulation as lying within the 
structures o f  systemic lifeworld, one can approach the highly interactive dialogue between 
everyday life and policy and regulation to understand and explain digital divides.
As regards the Greek case in particular, the findings reported in the thesis confirm that 
Internet policy and regulation are part o f what can be thought o f  as a systemic lifeworld. Along 
these terms, policy and regulation have been influenced by other, either historically inherited 
or newly emerging, elements o f the system, constituting a factor o f systemic change and 
maintenance at the same time. Thus, ordinary people think o f and familiarise themselves with 
policy and regulation in the context o f their individual lifeworlds and in constant interaction 
with other elements o f  the systemic lifeworld. In the context o f Greece, people consider policy 
and regulation non-responsive to individual lifeworlds, while admitting the critical importance 
o f policy and regulation for the conditions o f  individual lifeworlds and thus for the extent to 
which the Internet can become an integral part o f  people’s everyday lives. At the same time, 
elite actors see policy and regulation as part o f the systemic lifeworld and consider that certain 
elements o f individual lifeworlds are reflected in the systemic lifeworld in a way that often 
maintains existing structures and prevents further change and evolution. This complex 
approach to policy and regulation in relation to people’s lifeworlds can only be explained by 
taking into consideration the interchange and linkages between systemic and individual 
lifeworld and their role in phenomena such as digital divides. In the case o f Greece, these 
linkages were defined as mentioned above, but they vary from context to context, with 
historical ‘conditions’ o f life, for instance, being less or more important in different contexts.
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Nevertheless, the proposition o f understanding everyday life as consisting o f individual and 
systemic lifeworlds and developing or evolving on the basis o f  the interactions between these 
two types o f  lifeworld and at multiple levels o f analysis is useful for works looking at digital 
divides in other national or cultural contexts but from an everyday life perspective.
Concluding the reflections on everyday life literature, the attempt o f the EMTEL 
network to research everyday life in connection with policy-making and beyond the 
domestication tradition holds some importance for the thesis. This has been one o f  the first 
serious research attempts to look at everyday life in a broader policy framework and has paved 
the way for the literature to argue that people’s attitudes vary in different everyday life settings 
and entail implications for how policy responds to people’s adoption o f and engagement with 
ICTs (Preston, 2003b; Preston, 2005). However, this attempt has been theoretically quite 
weak and empirically relatively deliberate, not fully illustrating the deeply dynamic role o f  
everyday life and policy-making in digital divides. EMTEL adopted a cause-solution scheme 
when discussing the role o f  everyday life and policy in ICT adoption, assigning the role o f  
‘cause’ to the everyday and that o f  ‘solution’ to policy. On the other hand, the thesis has 
illustrated that ICT adoption should be explored by looking at the interactions between 
everyday life and decision-making since both constitute part o f  the ‘lifeworld’, co-influencing 
the shaping o f  the conditions o f digital inclusion or exclusion.
D igita l divides fro m  a  res is tan ce  perspec tive
In attempting to build up a conceptual framework that approaches technology from a 
socio-cultural perspective, I also reviewed literature that examines resistance to technology 
and its role in digital divides (Chapter 2, Section 2.4.3).
Many works report on resistance to technology (Breakwell, 1987; Hirschheim and 
Newman, 1988; Northcott, et al., 1985; W illcocks and Mason, 1987). However, most o f  them  
concern particular parts o f the population (e.g. children) or specific areas o f living (e.g. the 
workplace) and do not quite touch on the different types o f  new technologies that Bauer’s 
work does. Thus, I reviewed Bauer’s work and particularly his argument that resistance can 
constitute a form o f opposition and a challenging action rather than a diversion from the ‘best 
way’. Although his work has conceptually fed the thesis, I question such a positive view o f  
resistant culture and invite the researcher to place resistance culture in context before any 
normative judgments are articulated.
My research began with a normative approach to resistance, as resistance was initially 
approached in relation to the historical context o f Greece (Chapter 3). The account o f this 
context and the critical discussion o f  the historical traits o f dismissiveness and resistance in 
Greece led the thesis to a normative judgement o f  the role o f resistance in the Greek case o f  
digital divides. This initially normative judgement stemmed from the negative tone the thesis 
gave to the notion o f resistance as well as the relatively one-sided or monolithic account it 
espoused with regard to resistance nuances and effects. In this sense, the starting point for 
examining the Greek case was not fully freed o f normative or value-loaded predispositions. 
However, the thesis aimed to disentangle the particularities o f the concept o f resistance by 
operationalising resistance in empirical terms and finding out what the causes, role and effects 
o f resistance might be in relation to digital divides in particular. Thus, the data collected in the
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empirical part o f the research and the findings obtained illustrated that a far more colourful 
and complex picture can be drawn with respect to the notion o f resistance, its nuances, driving 
forces and effects.
More specifically, the case-focused review in Chapter 3 demonstrated that historical 
legacies have created an individualistic and resistant culture in Greek society which prevents 
the dissemination o f innovations and o f technological innovations in particular. This, along 
with the historical and current picture o f  policy and regulatory practices in the country, it 
created quite a gloomy picture which led the research to initially support a critical view o f  such 
socio-cultural and political traits. This critical stance was essentially maintained in the elite 
actors’ interviews, with the elite actors arguing about techno-phobia in Greek society and 
social ignorance. Besides market and other pragmatic constraints on the Greek information 
society, the elite actors argued about the existence o f a highly resistant and techno-phobic 
society in the country which goes hand-in-hand with social ignorance and is reflected in policy  
and regulation-making, with the latter further reinforcing society’s culture. Regardless o f  
arguments o f political liability and the elite actors’ realistic look at the conditions and traits o f  
the Greek information society’s evolution, they took a critical approach to society’s resistant 
culture. This is because ‘resistance’ was taken to be negative and not easy to explain in rational 
terms and on the basis o f  commonsense exclusion and other factors that prevent people from 
using the Internet (e.g. online risks and related evidence).
On the other hand, the survey tested this historically argued existence o f a resistant 
culture in Greek society that was also supported by the elite actors. The survey confirmed 
Greek society’s dismissive attitude to the Internet, while it indicated that resistance can be 
explained rationally and on the basis o f practical reasons or it can be presented as a complex 
set o f attitudes which cannot be explained on the basis o f  any reasonable argument. Even more 
importantly, the survey illustrated that the way Greek people evaluate the Internet depends on 
how they evaluate and the extent to which they are aware o f Internet policies and regulations. 
Besides the fact that this finding points to the responsibility o f policy and regulation for the 
extent to which ordinary people are negative towards the Internet, it also calls one to place 
resistance in a more complex framework where other systemic factors also matter.
Particularly the insights obtained in the focus groups illustrate the critical role policy 
and regulation play in how ordinary people in Greece understand and evaluate technologies 
like the Internet. The focus group participants admitted they are unaware o f how the Internet 
works and how it could be useful to their everyday lives, while pointing to the role o f  policies, 
information mechanisms and protection regulatory tools in the field. Besides the specific 
conclusions reached for the case o f  Greece, these findings generally problematise normative 
accounts o f  resistance, indicating that resistance is to be seen in a broader everyday life 
framework and on the grounds o f the continuous dialogue between individual and systemic 
lifeworlds. On the other hand, there were those in the focus groups - more typical examples o f  
resistant individuals -  who directly admitted their preference for the established order o f  life 
and their lack o f interest in becoming informed about new innovations or technologies which 
might improve their lives. This group o f people argued about the need to retain the identity of 
‘Greekness’ and the established traditions, without justifying in rational terms their decision 
not to adopt the Internet or to remain hesitant and unenthusiastic Internet users. This group
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o f  ordinary people can be thought o f  as an example that can take us back to what the historical 
analysis o f the Greek context showed and what the elite actors argued, justifying, albeit to a 
limited degree, a critical and even normative judgement o f resistance.
Nevertheless, the survey and especially the focus groups showed that resistance 
generally contains, as a notion and a barrier to Internet adoption, a range o f nuances and can 
take multiple forms which do not allow research to simplistically reject it as an irrational 
attitude or to uncritically support it as a test bench for technology design, as Bauer argues. As 
regards Bauer’s argument in particular, it should be considered that a significant number of the 
people examined in the thesis seemed to adopt resistant attitudes to the Internet without 
actually having tested this technology. That is to say that no safe judgement can be put forward 
about the causes, purposes and effects o f resistance. Also, the weight to be placed on each o f  
these parameters and whether resistance is more or less present in people’s decisions to use the 
Internet or not are matters that this case-focused research cannot safely answer for those 
looking for generally applicable approaches to resistance. However, scholars in the field should 
take into consideration the thesis’ approach to resistance as historically informed, rationally 
evaluated or uncritically adopted and thus always to be studied relative to other forces at work. 
In addition, the thesis leaves open the possibility o f how scholars are to face and treat 
resistance, as it can be a useful indicator for policy-makers, regulators and technology designers 
to take into account or a barrier to inclusion which is to be overcome through appropriate 
policy, regulatory and market strategies.
Hence, the critical exploration o f Bauer’s call to distinguish ‘resistance’, ‘avoidance 
behaviour’ or ‘ignorance’ allows the thesis to critically view the nature and effects o f resistant 
culture, as well as to understand resistance not only as behaviour (e.g. use or non-use) but also 
as a complicated sum o f  attitudes to technological artefacts. Therefore, instead o f adopting 
Bauer’s argument that the terms ‘technophobia’ and ‘cyberphobia’ are the epitome o f ‘the 
clinical eye on resistance to new technology’, I suggest that these terms be placed in context 
before being dismissed or approved. Bauer’s argument that terms such as ‘technophobia’ 
overlook the specificities o f the environment within which resistance takes place is not always 
the case as the analytical and research means through which one studies ‘technophobia’ is what 
places emphasis on the context o f resistance or not. Also, although Bauer’s argument that 
resistance signalises the mismatch o f expectations between technology users and designers can 
be true, we cannot free society o f  all charges, blaming designers only. In a way, Bauer adopts a 
techno-deterministic account to understand resistant culture as, even if  design matches 
perfectly people’s expectations, people require motives to test design and these motives very 
often go beyond technology design.
In concluding this section, one can argue that whether ICTs are or are not culturally 
neutral (Sawyer and Eschenfelder, 2002) should be understood in context and in a value-neutral 
way. As far as resistant culture is concerned, I propose that the researcher looks at it by 
examining the multiple forces lying behind it, but without judging its normative character. In 
the same terms, the causes, nuances and effects o f resistance on digital divides should remain 
subject to open and in-context examination, and regardless o f  the case-specific conclusions 
that research like this may reach.
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Digital divides from a decision-making perspective
Lastly, I attempted to build up a conceptual framework that approaches 
technology from a decision-making perspective (Chapter 2, see Section 2.5). This has 
been a challenging task as I did not look at any specific aspect of policy and regulation. 
On one hand, this decision enabled me to address a wide range of decision-making 
issues in the discussion of digital divides On the other, it made me vulnerable to 
criticism concerning the broadness of the research. In order to compensate for the 
lack of focus, I drew on one conceptual perspective, the sociological perspective, to 
examine policy and regulation.
Beginning with regulation, I was concerned with how regulation stands in the 
citizen vs. consumer debate in the information society and the related regulatory 
failures. The literature has accounted for the failures of regulation to distinguish 
citizens from consumers and thus to respond appropriately to ordinary people’s needs 
and desires. Likewise, policy literature has argued that policy-making in the 
information society is not socially accountable and that more user-driven, content- 
concerned and culture-sensitive policies are needed, in the EU information society for 
instance. As regards digital divides, there has been an increasingly popular discussion of 
people’s capabilities and ‘digital entitlements’, with scholars arguing that social needs 
and cultural differences do not inform media policy, as the latter serves a powerful and 
uncontrollable market.
Although the thesis does not provide solutions or normative suggestions on 
how regulation and policy should treat digital divides, it does contribute to the debate. 
It contributes by illustrating that a sociological approach to the role of regulation and 
policy in digital divides cannot be restricted to considering the ways decision-makers 
respond or should respond to societal needs. A sociological approach should also look 
at how regulation and policy are influenced by societal and cultural traits and norms so 
that the specificities of decision-making are explored beyond a descriptive analysis of 
related failures and successes. Hence, the thesis gives some support to international 
literature that criticises and approaches decision-making from a sociological 
perspective (Calabrese, 1997; Mattelart, 2003; Stelzer, 2001; May, 2002; Silverstone, 
2004), but extends the discussion by highlighting the underlying socio-cultural and 
other forces which may shape decision-making.
Although CARE, research and arguments that cultural studies can be a useful 
analytical device in examining the dialogue between people’s worldviews and decision­
making practices (Lodge, et al., 2008) constitute progress, they are subject to two 
criticisms: first, they do not account for how cultural views influence actual decision­
making since they only raise the ways such views are represented by decision-makers; 
second, even if such arguments constitute progress, they do not involve the study of 
digital divides. The thesis addresses these two elements that are absent from the work
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of CARR, allowing alternative conceptualisations of decision-making in general and in 
the information society in particular.
9.4.2 Concepts and theories for the study o f the Greek case ofdivides
The history of the Greek context in the last two centuries and recent evidence 
of key traits and trends in the Greek information society shaped the conceptual 
framework of the Greek case of divides (Chapter 3). Also, the general conceptual 
framework of the thesis (Chapter 2) contains concepts and arguments that enable a 
better understanding and explanation of the Greek case of divides.
The historical analysis in Chapter 3 pointed to clientelistic relationships and 
patronage networks in the Greek political arena under the domination of the state and 
the establishment of weak and non-autonomous working class organisations. Such 
patronage networks arguably created a weak and passive civil society, with the latter 
being marked by strongly personalistic relationships with the country’s authorities. 
This picture was partly supported by the elite actors’ interviews as stakeholders in the 
country confirm that civil society in Greece is passive and individualistic, lacking 
‘citizenship’ and being incapable of driving change. However, the elite actors presented 
the state not as influencing society but as being influenced by society’s culture. They 
also argued that the state must be more socially accountable and, at the same time, 
more determined in changing passivity and ignorance in Greek society. On the other 
hand, ordinary people pointed out the distance between the state and society in 
Greece. They argued in favour of more socially accountable state policies, highlighting 
parameters that form the picture of an apparently highly passive and ignorant society 
in the country, such as everyday life circumstances, traditions, a lack of incentives and 
lack of learning.
As regards the role of decision-making in development of the Greek 
information society, the historical analysis in Chapter 3 noted that the dominance of 
clientelistic and incorporative decision-making in Greece has influenced technological 
development negatively. The bargain between voters and political parties has made the 
state subject to successive and frequent governmental changes. This uncertainty has 
resulted in a lack of professionalism, meritocracy, productivity and stability in the 
public sector, thus intensifying the ineffectiveness of the gigantic and unstable public 
administration. The elite actors touched upon a few of these historical characteristics, 
while emphasising the dominant mindsets and cultures in the public sector rather than 
the structure and size of the public administration. Thus, they confirmed historical 
arguments concerning bureaucracy, centralisation, a lack of long-term vision and lack 
of co-ordination in the country’s public sector, while they added the view that the non- 
technocratic, socially distant and static culture in this sector deters development of the 
Greek information society. These critiques concerning the incorporation of backward
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cultures into the Greek public sector somewhat problematise literature that criticises 
policymaking in the information society mainly because it serves market interests and 
ignores society’s culture (e.g. Mansell’s critical analysis, 2002).
Regarding society’s culture, the historical analysis showed that Greek civil 
society has faced a tremendous difficulty in adopting new ways of living. This has made 
it difficult for Greek people to integrate new technologies into their everyday lives. 
The elite actors confirmed these arguments since they feverishly supported the 
existence of techno-phobia and resistance to new technologies in Greek society. On 
the other hand, ordinary people dismissed the existence of technophobia in the 
country, at least as this was blatantly put by elite actors, while they justified Internet 
non-adoption by placing their attitudes to technology in an everyday life context, 
where identity, habits, needs, desires and interests all matter. Also, the historical 
analysis in Chapter 3 presents patriotism and romanticism as dominant traits of Greek 
society due to the existence of a national identity before any economic, political and 
cultural institutions were established in the country. It was argued that patriotism and 
romanticism resulted in the formation of the ambivalent national identity of 
‘Greekness’, which is marked by feelings of superiority and distrust vis-a-vis national 
institutions. Ordinary people in the focus groups supported this argument as their 
references to everyday life circumstances and priorities were often coupled with 
arguments in support of identity and ‘Greekness’. At the same time, they mistrust the 
country’s authorities, behaving more like individuals, while they expect that state 
authorities will respond more adequately to their identity and everyday needs. In a 
way, this empirical evidence presents Greece as a quite striking case in the 
international literature. Although literature argues about the embeddedness of 
technology in socio-cultural contexts (see Ch. 2, Section 2.4.1), it touches more on 
circumstances in the everyday, as well as on utility and design issues, and less on 
historical legacies and identity factors that maintain cultures and traditions of 
resistance among people in specific contexts.
In summary, I argue that the thesis enriches the historical accounts of the 
Greek context, because: first, it introduces arguments about dominant mindsets and 
internal processes in decision-making before accounting for the size and quality of 
decision-making practices in the country; and, second, it introduces everyday life 
parameters as critical for the disentanglement of identity and culture in Greek society. 
The following news in Greece earlier in 2008 reflects some of these remarks: after a 
scandal concerning Internet blogging (blackmailing of politicians by bloggers) and the 
implications for democracy on the Internet in Greece, the media reacted strongly. 
Thus, the government decided to regulate to save itself from media criticism, whereas 
the main opposition party went against this merely for populist reasons and by 
applying a freedom of expression rhetoric that could attract more voters. Citizens, on
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the other hand, were split supporting the party they vote for and identify themselves 
with.
9.5 Concluding remarks, limitations and avenues fo r  new 
research
In concluding the thesis, I summarise the answers to the four principal research 
questions I posed at the beginning.
1. What are the general characteristics of the Greek information society?
The elite actors provided an overview of the Greek information society. 
Arguments about ‘Greek distinctiveness’ mainly point to the role of culture, with 
‘techno-phobia’ in society and the public administration being highlighted as the main 
force explaining low Internet adoption in Greece. Also, issues concerning insufficient 
infrastructure, a lack of satisfactory online services, the high cost of Internet services 
and networks, as well as a lack of social action and institutional organisation illustrate 
the complex role of society, culture and decision-making in the Greek information 
society. In addition, factors like market liberalisation and development, media 
propaganda and IT education were seen by the elite actors as playing a negative role in 
the Greek information society, thus problematising the influence of the structures 
lying in between society and decision-making on digital divides.
2. How far does society's culture influence digital divides in Greece?
Society’s culture explains digital divides in Greece in more than one direction. 
Everyday life culture and resistance to emerging phenomena and to new technologies 
in particular play a significant role in how ordinary people in Greece understand, 
evaluate and adopt Internet technologies. Everyday life and resistance in Greek society 
are often camouflaged by identity and patriotism forces, while being supported by well- 
established traditions and more tangible restraints of people’s Internet literacy, such as 
a lack of practical incentives for Internet adoption and insufficient learning. Thus, 
specific aspects of everyday life and resistant culture in Greek society operate at the 
level of social perceptions and practices, influencing people’s psychological 
predisposition to Internet technologies as well as the breadth and quality of Internet 
adoption.
3. How far do Internetpolicy and regulation influence digital divides in Greece? 
Mindsets and practices in policy and regulation are another important indicator
to account for digital divides in Greece. Although policy and regulation were looked at
separately in my work and regardless of their clearly different role and scope of
activities, elite actors and ordinary people positioned policy and regulation in the same
context, reaching conclusions which are more or less valid for both domains. More
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specifically, decision-making in Greece influences digital divides in both practical and 
perceptual terms. On one hand, it prevents the even and widespread diffusion of 
Internet technologies in the country by failing to establish the educational, market and 
technological conditions required in order for all people to be provided with the same 
opportunities for Internet adoption. On the other, decision-makers in Greece have 
failed to keep up with European authorities and to detach themselves from past 
legacies, being influenced by non-technocratic, bureaucratic and socially non- 
accountable mindsets and cultures. Thus, decision-making in Greece has failed to not 
only influence everyday conditions and society’s culture but also to draw a clear picture 
of goals and visions that would make it less vulnerable to external pressures and 
individualistic interests.
4. How do society's culture and Internet policy and regulation intersect in influencingdigital
divides in Greece?
Although the literature treats decision-making and society’s culture as two 
different research fields, the thesis identified interactions between decision-making 
and society’s culture, articulating a more synthetic and overarching account of digital 
divides. On one side, decision-makers develop a dialogue with ordinary people which is 
marked by internal contradictions and inconsistencies. Decision-makers appropriate 
society’s culture in a way that serves their narrow professional interests and does not 
address societal requests for accountability and visibility in policing and regulating the 
Internet. At the same time, decision-making is often subject to the demands of 
populist voices in society, espousing backward practices in the information society and 
failing to offer educational, technological and market provisions as a response to 
populism. More importantly, policy and regulation constitute part of a broader system 
and in Greece not only have they failed to drive change in society but they have also 
been influenced by the societal traits of traditionalism and techno-phobia that deter 
Internet adoption. On the other side, I found that ordinary people in Greece dismiss 
technologies, blaming policy and regulation, whilst they appropriate decision-making 
mechanisms that serve their individual interests. While people require political change, 
as well as more visible and accountable policies and regulations, they often turn down 
policies that put their lifestyles and traditions at risk. At the same time, they distrust 
national policy and regulatory bodies in Greece, questioning as outsiders the backward 
policies in the information society but being in favour of such policies when they are 
members of the country’s public sector.
These interactions between decision-making and society’s culture in the Greek 
information society, as reported by stakeholders and ordinary people, allow one to 
understand not only the underlying reasons behind digital divides in Greece but also 
the deeply socio-political nature of divides, thus furthering the discourses on
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conventional access and usage. This is the most important contribution of the thesis, 
raising implications for the European information society and the study of its divides.
I will not dedicate more space here to discussing answers to the principal 
research questions since a more detailed account was provided in Section 9.3. In the 
remainder of this section I briefly present the thesis’ significance and limitations, along 
with possible avenues for future research.
The thesis is significant for policy and research in the field. First, it provides 
policy and regulatory bodies, as well as other bodies in the field (e.g. civic 
organisations, market players etc) with some feedback on the causes of digital divides. 
Although it does not directly suggest any solutions, as research often does, it highlights 
the role policy-makers and regulators play in the information society by looking at 
their contribution not only in fighting digital divides but also reinforcing and 
regenerating long-standing drivers of such divides. Thus, the findings here point to 
specific directions that decision-makers in Greece can take so as to shrink digital 
divides. These directions have two levels: first, the level of internal processes and 
mechanisms that apply to the country’s public sector; second, the level of society and 
the needs of Greek society for the adoption of Internet technologies. The thesis 
recommends that these two levels be approached from a practice-based and value- 
loaded point of view as the country’s policy-makers must understand the ideologies, 
values and mindsets dominating both levels as well as the practices and attitudes of all 
actors involved. Even more significantly, decision-makers will have to make some 
decisions about the values and practices they espouse so as to be in a position to 
address the interdependencies between society and politics and untie this Gordian 
knot. Before they attempt to advance society as a whole, decision-making bodies in the 
country should dissociate themselves from past legacies and become independent of 
long-standing elements of social pressure and the culture of resistance in order to 
change their own internal culture and mechanisms of operation. As obvious as this 
might sound, internal and public reaction and the fear of losing authority have made 
decision-makers not be as decisive and progressive as they should be to efficiently 
tackle digital and other divides in the country. Thus, apart from securing Internet 
access for all and providing affordable Internet services, satisfactory infrastructure and 
sufficient Internet training, decision-makers must emphasise the modernisation and 
improvement of the public administration’s performance, increasing social 
accountability mechanisms in decision-making and supporting social awareness, 
learning and participation.
From a cross-national point of view, the thesis did not intend to conduct a 
comparative study and therefore its relevance to other contexts or countries may vary. 
Nevertheless, the empirical insights obtained here suggest possible implications and 
challenges for the rhetoric of a synchronised European information society. As noted
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in previous chapters, scholars and practitioners have criticised the vision of a single and 
evenly developed European information society. However, very little empirical 
evidence shows both the asynchronous development of the information society in 
different European regions as well as the forces driving such development and the 
attention that authorities must thus pay to these forces. This is where the thesis can 
become useful as it analyses the forces of digital divides in a well-established EU 
member state, Greece, providing insights for the investigation of the drivers of the 
different paces of information society development in other European countries.
From a research perspective (see Section 9.2), the thesis aimed to provide a 
research account of the Greek case of digital divides and to inform other research in 
the field. Other researchers may be interested in the findings here from an analytical 
(e.g. concepts to elaborate, criticise or adopt) or comparative (e.g. Greece as a case to 
compare) perspective. Also, the thesis fills a vacuum in national research because there 
has literally been no empirical work on the particularities of the Greek context and the 
ways these particularities influence digital inclusion in the country. Although it may 
sound overtly ambitious, the thesis attempts to reach beyond national studies where 
technological indicators are examined narrowly and the question of the ‘why’ of 
Internet adoption only describes the current situation and does not identify the 
reasons underlying adoption.
Also, by virtue of the work’s theoretical contribution, as presented in Section 
9.4, the thesis adds to and critiques some popular theorisations in the field, proposing 
alternative conceptualisations of digital divides and highlighting the interrelationships 
between the actors involved. This could provide the grounds for research to become 
better informed about other routes for critically reviewing well-established and 
powerful theoretical schemes in the field. Of course, I do not claim any significant 
addition to the conceptual equipment employed by key scholars in the field. My 
theoretical approach instead calls for an understanding of the complexity of 
interactions between concepts and notions that are often employed in digital divide 
research.
The thesis’ limitations involve the conceptual and empirical tools I employed in 
the research. More specifically, the core of the thesis has been a difficult task that 
transgresses conventional accounts of digital divides. Although I cannot judge the 
success of pursuing this task, the latter may be challenged by more broadly accepted 
accounts of divides and by the argument that top-down approaches to digital divides 
cannot be mixed with bottom-up perspectives. Regardless of the popular discourses 
about the need for social accountability of policy and regulation and the role that 
ordinary people should and could play in decision-making, these two areas are 
conventionally studied separately, with researchers asking different questions and 
setting different objectives for each. In this sense, the thesis has attempted to break
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ground, running the risk of getting socio-cultural concepts mixed up with policy 
discourses and ideologies. Also, the thesis has been limited by the decision to tackle 
concepts and trends in the area of policy and regulation without focusing on specific 
policy and regulatory issues. Although this decision allowed me to illustrate the broad 
and variable role of policy and regulation in digital divides, I have compromised the 
focus and detail of the discussion of this role. This limitation has been noted bypeople 
who have reviewed my work at different stages, while I have tried to justify my 
decision throughout and on the grounds of the thesis’ research objectives.
In addition, the scope of the fieldwork I carried out was relatively limited for 
largely practical reasons. For instance, the survey’s scope was regional (the urban region 
of Attika) and, although this area contains half the Greek population, the selected 
sample was not, in principle, representative of the national population. Likewise, I 
interviewed four focus groups (23 individuals), something that does not necessarily 
question the number of focus groups perse but rather the thoroughness of the analysis 
and the extent to which I traced all patterns of discourses in the study population. 
Nevertheless, the mixed three-stage methodology I applied allowed the collection of 
insights regarding the complex issue of digital divides from more than one perspective, 
while comparing and cross-validating the multiple data collected throughout the 
empirical work. This may be regarded as a contribution to relevant research in the field 
since it illustrates that mixed methodology and the treatment of multiple-source data 
from a complementarity and triangulation perspective are preferable, especially in 
comparison with a one-staged and single methodological approach. Although mixed 
methodology runs the risk of obtaining multiple data allowing incompatible and 
inconsistent conclusions to be reached, the thesis complemented each type of data 
with another and made an initial attempt to triangulate all three different data types.
The last limitation might involve my Greek nationality and personal 
experiences during my long stay in Greece, which have given me quite a subjective 
picture of the prevalent cultural and policy or regulatory traits of the Greek context. 
This may have even unintentionally directed the work’s key objectives and the 
parameters I have examined throughout. It is indicative that, at times of self­
reflection, I considered the process I adopted to decide which aspects of the Greek 
context to look at and concluded that it was not as thorough and exhaustive as it could 
have been. In other words, the selection of which indicators to consider as part of 
understanding the Greek case of divides has been quite intuitive, even though the 
significance of these indicators was ultimately illustrated in theoretical and empirical 
terms.
Regarding avenues for future research, some aspects of the thesis deserve 
further investigation, while the whole study could inspire new research projects. An 
immediate priority is the publication of journal articles that draw on various aspects of
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the thesis and publication of the whole thesis in book format. Also, I aim to present 
the work at major conferences involving media and communications, communicating 
the work’s substance to larger audiences in the field. These dissemination initiatives 
will allow me to reflect on my own work and to consider possibly understudied aspects 
of it or new research ideas and proposals that might still arise from the work already 
carried out.
Specifically, going beyond the national scope of the thesis one could point to 
the significance of future research that looks at citizenship and issues of political 
exclusion in communications more generally. Especially in the EU context, the vision 
and rhetoric of the European information society highlight the question of citizenship 
and inclusion. Citizens’ inclusion in decision-making in the European information 
society is treated as the medium through which policies will be successful as well as the 
substance of success, opposing neo-liberal ideological schemes that support a market- 
oriented information society. Thus, one way to extend the research insights here is to 
explore whether and the extent to which EU policy and regulation for the information 
society enable the participation of civil society in decision-making. By investigating 
civil society’s role in EU policy and regulation and how this influences the democratic 
character and efficiency of policy and regulation in relation to the past and present 
course of citizenship in Europe, significant conclusions could be drawn about the 
foundations of the European information society and phenomena of exclusion and 
disparity within it.
At an empirical level, the results of the thesis provide insights into how the 
national contexts in which digital divides take place differ, with divisions and gaps in 
the information society evolving, acquiring new meanings and requiring further study 
of the nuances behind questions of technology access and usage. Although the 
research’s focus is on the Greek case of divides, the empirically founded conclusions 
could provide useful insights into how issues concerning digital divides may apply 
similarly or differently to other case studies. Thus, another area for future research 
would be an examination of the results for the Greek case of divides from a 
comparative perspective and particularly in relation to other country cases. These 
might be countries that belong to either the same ‘semi-periphery’ paradigm as Greece 
(e.g. Ireland, Portugal) or the developed West (e.g. the UK), and where digital divides 
are encountered more successfully, raising questions beyond structural and material 
resources and inequality.
Nevertheless, these possibilities for future research maybe considered further, 
while the completion of the thesis does not mean the closure of this area of study. On 
the contrary, the end of this journey signals the opening of new areas of and interests 
for research. How the thesis determines future research will be influenced by how it is
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4 -1 Elite actors’ interviews: consent form
Digital divides in Greece: role o f  society’s culture and decision-making from a 
top-down and bottom~up perspective. Implications for the European
Information Society
By agreeing to take part in the interview I demonstrate that I have read the attached 
document detailing the ‘Digital divides in Greece: the role of society’s culture and 
decision-making from a top-down and bottom-up perspective. Implications for the 
European information society’ project and that I am happy to put forward my views as 
invited by the researcher.
I am aware that my interview will be audio-recorded for the purposes of accuracy and 
will later be transcribed. I also understand that I will have an opportunity to review my 
transcript and correct any inaccuracies if necessary.
I understand that the information that I make available will be handled confidentially. 
In addition, I understand that the transcripts will only be handled by the researcher, 
who will abide by high standards of confidentiality.
I understand that the final findings of this research will be reported or published for 
purely academic reasons.





4 ~2 Elite actors' interviews: topic guides
a. Scoping interviews
i. Greek information society in comparison to the information society in the EU
ii. ICTs and Internet indicators in Greece: a general evaluation
iii. How Greek society responds to digital technologies in general
iv. Governmental initiatives and policy-making on the Internet in Greece
v. Regulatory processes and the role of public consultations in Greece
vi. Evaluation of the implementation of EU telecoms laws in Greece and 
identification of possible forces hindering the implementation process
vii. Future challenges and prospects for the Greek information society
b. Bottommp interviews
i. Social attitudes to and concerns about the Internet in Greece
ii. How ordinary people in Greece evaluate current Internet policy and regulation 
schemes Gevel of awareness as a critical parameter)
iii. Whether and the extent to which Internet policy and regulation in Greece 
respond to social needs and concerns
iv. Possible areas where further policy provisions and regulatory measures on the 
Internet are needed
c. Interviews led by theory
i. Evaluation of Greek policies against illegal, harmful and unwanted online content
ii. Concerns regarding harmful online content and the ways the society of Greek 
users deal with security risks on the Internet
iii. The extent to which self-regulation is effective in Greece and its potential to 
replace public control and restrictions over the Internet
iv. Evaluation of the workability of self-regulation practices in Greece from a 
comparative perspective
v. Issues and social concerns that Internet policy and regulation in Greece must 
tackle in the future
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4~3 Pre-interview letter
t h e  LONDON SCHOOL 
o f  EC O N O M IC S a n o  
POLITICAL SCIENCE ■
April 2006 January 2007 
Name & address of household 
Dear Mrs...
During April one of our interviewers will be calling your home in connection with a 
survey of Athens residents on their views about the Internet in Greece.
Your name and number were selected at random from the local population database 
held by ESYE in combination with matching from the regional telephone directory. 
W e are writing this letter because some people prefer being informed in advance about 
a request for an interview. W hen our interviewer calls he or she will request to speak 
to the member of your household who had the most recent birthday (or who will have 
the next birthday), that could be either you or another member of your household. 
This is done to ensure that all opinions are represented in the survey.
The interview should only last about ten minutes. Naturally, all of your responses, or 
those of another member of your household, will be confidential and your 
participation is strictly voluntary.
Your participation is greatly appreciated since this is a very important study. If  you 




Department of Media and Communications 
London School of Economics 
e p.tsatsou@lse.ac.uk 
t 6939660208
* The main body text of the pre-interview letter was taken from Frey, J.H  (1989) (2nd
edn.) Survey Research By Telephone. Newbury Park, London, New Delhi: Sage
Publications
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4~4 Refusal conversion introduction*
‘Hello. This is (interviewer’s full name) calling from...
Earlier this week you (or someone in your household) declined to be interviewed in a 
survey of Internet issues. In order for our study to be scientifically correct it is 
necessary to interview people we select in the sample and call first. We really need 
your opinion and not someone else’s. Thus, it would be better for our survey if you are 
interviewed. This questionnaire will take only ten minutes and your responses are 
confidential. Okay?
IF ‘yes’, PROCEED WITH THE FIRST QUESTION OF THE 
QUESTIONNAIRE SHEET 
IF S/HE STILL REFUSES:
‘If you like, we can discuss the purpose of this study and any questions or concerns you 
might have with regard to this interview’
IF STILL S/HE REFUSES, YOU TERMINATE THE CALL AS FOLLOWS:
‘Sorry to have bothered you. Goodbye’
* The main body text of the refusal conversion introduction was taken from Frey, J.H
(1989) (2nd edn.) Survey Research By Telephone. Newbury Park, London, New Delhi: Sage
Publications
4 ~S Call-back introduction*
‘Hello. May I speak to ?
This is (interviewer’s full name) calling from... I am calling to conduct the interview 
with you that we had scheduled for (time) today/tonight.
This is a survey of Athens residents on their views of the Internet. Your responses will 
be confidential and the interview will take approximately ten minutes. Okay?’
IF ‘yes’, PROCEED WITH THE FIRST QUESTION OF THE 
QUESTIONNAIRE SHEET 
IF S/HE REFUSES:
‘In order for our study to be scientifically correct it is necessary to interview people we 
select in the sample and call first. We really need your opinion and not someone else’s. 
Thus, it would be better for our survey if you are interviewed. This questionnaire will 
take only ten minutes and your responses are confidential. Okay?’
IF ‘yes’, PROCEED WITH THE FIRST QUESTION OF THE 
QUESTIONNAIRE SHEET 
IF STILL S/HE REFUSES:
‘If you like, we can discuss the purpose of this study and any questions or concerns you 
might have with regard to this interview’
IF STILL S/HE REFUSES, YOU TERMINATE THE CALL AS FOLLOWS:
‘Sorry to have bothered you. Goodbye’
* The main body text of the call back introduction was taken from Frey, J.H  (1989) (2nd
edn.) Survey Research By Telephone. Newbury Park, London, New Delhi: Sage
Publications
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4~6 Questionnaire Introduction (instructions to the interviewer in capital)
‘Hello. This is (interviewer’s name) calling from.... that is conducting a survey which 
aims to find out what Greeks think about the Internet.
Is this the_______________________  residence?’
IF WRONG NUMBER, TERMINATE THE CALL BY SAYING ‘sorry to have 
bothered you’.
IF RIGHT NUMBER, CONTINUE AS FOLLOWS
‘Early this month a letter describing the survey was sent to your household explaining 
the study. Did you receive it?’
IF YES, PROCEED WITH REMAINDER OF INTRODUCTION 
IF NO, ‘I am sorry it did not reach you. The letter was to inform you of this call and 
the nature of the stud/  AND PROCEED WITH REMAINDER OF 
INTRODUCTION
‘Your number was selected randomly from ESYE’s Athens population list and in 
combination with the matching of numbers from a local telephony directory. The 
survey is part of Miss Panayiota Tsatsou’s doctoral research at the University of 
London School of Economics in the UK and aspires to investigate Greek citizens’ 
perceptions of the Internet and patterns of use or non-use, also reporting on citizens’ 
evaluation of the role of Internet policies and regulation.
I need to stress the importance of participation as this survey aims to make an 
important contribution to the careful examination of how the Internet is positioned 
within Greek society and in comparison to other countries in Europe, underlining, in 
particular, the possible implications for policy- and regulation-making 
In order to give every person aged over 15 a chance to be interviewed for this study, I 
need to speak with the person in your household who is 15 years of age or older and 
who will have the next birthday (or who had the most recent birthday). Are you that 
person?’
IF ‘yes’, PROCEED WITH REMAINDER OF INTRODUCTION 
IF ‘no’, YOU SAY ‘may I speak with that person?’ AND WHEN YOU IDENTIFY 
THE ELIGIBLE RESPONDENT, REPEAT THE PREVIOUS INTRODUCTION 
AND THEN PROCEED WITH REMAINDER OF INTRODUCTION
‘The interview should take approximately ten minutes of your time.
Please feel free to ask questions at any time and you may withhold your response to 
any item if you wish. Confidentiality and anonymity are also ensured.
Okay?’
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IF THE ANSWER IS ‘yes’, YOU ASK QUESTION i.
IF THE ANSWER IS ‘no’, YOU TRY TO CONVINCE THE INTERVIEWEE BY 
SAYING THE FOLLOWING
‘Your participation is particularly important for us, while another 1,000 people like 
you have also been invited to participate. The interview will only take a few minutes of 
your time and in this way you will have the opportunity to make an important 
contribution to a serious academic survey of critical socio-political importance for the 
country.
Shall we start now with the first question?’
IF ‘yes’, YOU START WITH QUESTION i.
IF ‘no’, YOU CARRY ON AS FOLLOWS
“We respect your wish but we would like to ask for your consent to contact you again 
at a fixed time’
IF THE INTERVIEWEE GIVES HIS/HER CONSENT TO BE CONTACTED 
AT A FIXED TIME, YOU PLAN A SECOND CONTACT AS AGREED WITH 
THE INTERVIEWEE AND YOU FINISH THE PHONE CALL AS FOLLOWS. 
‘Thank you very much in advance. Goodbye’. CALL-BACKS SHOULD BE 
INTRODUCED AS IN THE RELEVANT ‘CALL-BACK INTRODUCTION’ 
SHEET
IF THE INTERVIEWEE DOESNT GIVE HIS/HER CONSENT TO BE 
CONTACTED AT A FIXED TIME, YOU TERMINATE THE CALL SAYING 
‘sorry to have bothered you. Goodbye’ AND YOU PLAN A SECOND AND LAST 
CALL FOR ANOTHER TIME LATER IN THE WEEK. IN THE SECOND 
CALL ATTEMPT YOU FOLLOW THE INTRODUCTION GIVEN TO THE 
RELEVANT ‘REFUSAL CONVERSION INTRODUCTION’ SHEET
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Questionnaire (including instructions to interviewers)
D IG IT A L  D IV ID E S  IN  GREECE  
SURVEY
L o n d o n  S c h o o l  o f  E c o n o m ic s  
D e p a r t m e n t  o f  M e d i a  a n d  C o m m u n ic a t io n s
2 0 0 6 - 7
Panayiota Tsatsou, PhD  Candidate 
Media@LSE, H oughton Street 
London, W C 2A  2AE, UK
Instructions to the interviewer(s):
1. Only citizens aged over 15 years are eligible to respond.
2. If no one answers the call, ANOTHER 5-6 TELEPHONE CONTACTS AT 
DIFFERENT TIMES/DAYS SHOULD BE ATTEMPTED.
3. Read each question carefully and all answer categories and CHOOSE ONLY 
ONE ANSWER unless you are instructed differently next to each question.
4. You NEVER READ OUT the answer category 99 ‘Don’t know/Refused’. You 
only choose this category when the respondent doesn’t know the answer to the 
question or s/he refuses to answer at all.
5. If the answer 99 Don’t know/Refusecf is given, you choose it and you ALWAYS 
carry on with the next one question until you finish the questionnaire.
6. You STOP the interview if the answer 99 Don’t know/Refused’ is given for 
QUESTION 5. So, if the respondent persistently refuses to say whether s/he 
uses the Internet or not) you cannot continue the interview.
7. In general, you need to make a lot of effort so that respondents give the answer 
99 know/Refused’ as rarely as possible.
8. If questions have MORE THAN 5 ANSWER ALTERNATIVES, you READ 
THE ALTERNATIVES AGAIN IF NECESSARY.
9. YOU NEVER SKIP ANY QUESTION UNLESS YOU ARE TOLD TO DO 
SO by instructions given next to a particular question.
10. All INSTRUCTIONS you need to follow are IN CAPITALS and they can be 
found where they are relevant. They are not to be read out to the respondents. 
They are only for your assistance.
11. You start the interview from: ‘INTRODUCTION’ and you finish the interview 
at: ‘FINISH HERE’.
3U
INTRODUCTION (see A p p e n d ix  4 .5 )
Section A: General Questions E V E R Y B O D Y  A N S W E R S  
S E C T I O N  A
‘First, I would like to ask a general question about media forms available within your 
household. So...’
Q D oes y o u r househo ld  have...?




4 Video game console
5 Computer
6 Internet
7 Nothing of the above
8 Other _________ TO SPECIFY
99 Don’t know/Refused
g H ow  o ften  do  you w atch  telev ision  p rog ram m es on  average?
DONT READ OUT THE ANSWER ALTERNATIVES
1 Several times a day
2 About once a day
3 3-5 days a week
4 1-2 days a week
5 Every few weeks
6 Every few months
7 Less often
99 Don’t know/Refused
E] H ow  o ften  do  you  read  new spapers o n  average?
DONT READ OUT THE ANSWER ALTERNATIVES
1 Several times a day
2 About once a day
3 3-5 days a week
4 1-2 days a week
5 Every few weeks
6 Every few months
7 Less often
99 Don’t know/Refused
Q D o you ever u se  a  co m p u te r a t  y o u r w orkplace, a t  school, a t hom e,
o r  anyw here else?





g D o you  ever go on line to  access th e  In te rn e t  o r  W o rld  W ide  W eb
o r  to  send  and  receive email?
DONT READ OUT THE ANSWER ALTERNATIVES
1 Yes - >  CONTINUE ONLY WITH SECTIONS B, D, E, F, G
2 No—► CONTINUE ONLY WITH F SECTIONS C, D, F, G 
99 Don’t know/Refused ► STOP THE INTERVIEW AT THIS
POINT
Section B. Computer and Internet Use
ONLY INTERNET USERS ANSWER SECTION B. (CODE i FOR 
QUESTION 5)
‘I would now like to ask you some more specific questions about the ways you use 
the Internet. First of all....’
Q W h ere  do you  go online from ?
DONT READ OUT THE ANSWER ALTERNATIVES -  PROMPT 
FOR MORE ANSWERS AS APPROPRIATE
1 Home
2 Work
3 From a library
4 At a community centre
5 At an Internet cafe
6 At school
7 By using a cell phone or other device
8 O ther____________  TO SPECIFY
99 Don’t know/Refused
D oes th e  co m p u te r you use  a t  hom e connect to  th e  In te rn e t  
through...?
ONLY THOSE WHO ANSWERED 1 FOR Q.6) ANSWER THIS 
QUESTION
1. Dial-up telephone line ► GO TO QUESTION 7.A
2. High-speed ► GO TO QUESTION 8
3. DSL-enabled phone line ^  GO TO QUESTION 8
4. Cable modem ► GO TO QUESTION 8
5. Wireless connection: land-based or satellite ^  GO TO 
QUESTION 8
6. T-i or fibre optic connection ► GOTO QUESTION 8
7 O ther_________ TO SPECIFY — >  GO TO QUESTION 8
99 Don’t know/Refused -----^  GO TO QUESTION 8
3U
B E  W ould  you like to  have a  fa s te r , ‘b roadband ’ connec tion  a t  any 
place you  use  th e  In te rn e t, o r  isn 't  th a t  som eth ing  you’re  
in te re s te d  in?




Q W h en  d id  you f irs t s ta r t  going online?
1 Within the last six months —► GO TO QUESTION 9
2 A year ago  ^  GO TO QUESTION 9
3 Two or three years ago or —► GO TO QUESTION 9
4 More than three years ago —► GO TO QUESTION 8.A
99 Don’t know/Refused —► GO TO QUESTION 9
NUMBER OF YEARS
0  I n  general, how  o ften  do you  go online?
DONT READ OUT THE ANSWER ALTERNATIVES
1 Several times a day
2 About once a day
3 3-5 days a week
4 1-2 days a week
5 Every few weeks
6 Every few months
7 Less often
99 Don’t know/Refused
EE N ex t...P lease  te ll m e i f  you ever do  any o f  th e  follow ing w h en  you
go online
PROMPT FOR MORE ANSWERS AS APPROPRIATE
1 Send or read email
2 Get information online
3 Play games online
4 Chat with people (e.g. chat rooms, MSN, Skype etc)
5 Buy a product online, such as books, music, toys or clothing
6 Look for work
7 Contact public services and administration
8 O ther___________  TO SPECIFY
99 Don’t know/Refused
QQ I  am  going to  read  you som e In te rn e t  te rm s  you m ay o r  m ay n o t
be  fam iliar w ith . As I  read  each one, p lease  te ll m e i f  you have a  
good idea w h a t th e  te rm  m eans, i f  you  a re n ’t  really  su re  w h a t i t  
m eans o r  i f  you have never h ea rd  or it.























EE O verall, how  con fiden t a re  you th a t  you can  keep  th ings like 
co m p u te r v iru ses, In te rn e t  cookies, spyw are, adw are, In te rn e t  
ph ish ing  and  spam  em ails o f f  y ou r hom e co m p u te r w hen  you  w an t 
to? A re you  very  confiden t, som ew hat confiden t, n o t too  confident, 
o r  n o t a t  all confident?
DONT READ OUT THE ANSWER ALTERNATIVES




3. Not too confident
4. Not at all confident 
99 Don’t know/Refused
m  D o you w o rry  ah o u t any o f  th e  follow ing w hen  you  use  th e  In te rn e t?
PROMPT FOR MORE ANSWERS AS APPROPRIATE






7 O ther----------------- TO SPECIFY
8 Don’t worry about anything 
99 Don’t know/Refused
EH H ave you ever u sed  any too ls o r  technologies fo r  y o u r p ro tec tio n
on  th e  In te rn e t, sucn  as an ti-v irus, firew all, spyw are/adw are 
rem over, an ti-ph ish ing  softw are  and  spam -killer?
DONT READ OUT THE ANSWER ALTERNATIVES
ONLY THOSE WHO GO ONLINE FROM HOME (1 FOR Q.6)
ANSWER THIS QUESTION
1 Yes ----► GO TO QUESTION 14.A
2 No ► GO TO QUESTION 15
99 Don’t know/Refused ► GO TO QUESTION 21
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W hich  o f  th e  follow ing too ls o r  technologies fo r  y o u r p ro te c tio n  
o n  th e  In te rn e t  have you  used  a t  least once?







7 O ther___________  TO SPECIFY
99 Don’t know/Refused
IE W hy  have you n ev er u sed  such  too ls o r  technologies?
PROMPT FOR MORE ANSWERS AS APPROPRIATE
1 You don’t know what they are for
2 You don’t know how to install them on the computer
3 You don’t know how to use them
4 You are not convinced that they work
5 You are not concerned about security when going online
6 They are too expensive
7 O ther____________ TO SPECIFY
99 Don’t know/Refused
Section C. Non-Internet Use
ONLY NON-INTERNET USERS ANSWER SECTION C. (CODE 2 FOR 
QUESTION 5)
‘I would now like to askyou some more specific questions about the fact that you 
don’t use the Internet. First of all....’
TO W h a t a re  t h e  r e a s o n s  y o u  don’t  u se  th e  In te rn e t  o r  email?
PROMPT FOR MORE ANSWERS AS APPROPRIATE
1. You are not interested
2. You don’t need it
3. You don’t have access
4. It’s too difficult/frustrating
5. It’s too expensive
6. You don’t have the time
7. You are worried about your security on the Internet
8. You are worried about the impact on everyday life/work/human
relationships
9. O ther________  TO SPECIFY
99 Don’t know/Refused
EE W ould  you like to  s ta r t  using  th e  In te rn e t  and  em ail, o r  isn ’t  th a t
som eth ing  you’re  in te re s te d  in?
DONT READ OUT THE ANSWER ALTERNATIVES
1 Yes, interested




22 H ow  likely do you th in k  it  is , i f  a t  all, th a t  you  w ill s ta r t  u sing  th e
In te rn e t  o r  em ail som eday?






[E  W h a t do you  th in k  ab o u t th e  s ta te m e n t th a t  peop le  som etim es say
ab o u t th e  In te rn e t: ‘I ’m  m issing o u t on  th ings because I  am  n o t 
using  th e  In te rn e t  an d  em ail’? D o you...
1 Strongly agree
2 Agree
3 Neither agree nor disagree
4 Disagree
5 Strongly disagree 
99 Don’t know/Refused
QQ D id you ever a t  som e p o in t use  th e  In te rn e t  o r  em ail, b u t  have since 
s topped  fo r  som e reason?
DONT READ OUT THE ANSWER ALTERNATIVES
1 Yes ___ ^  GO TO QUESTION 20.A
2 No — ► GO TO QUESTION 21
99 Don’t know/Refused— GO TO QUESTION 21
20. A W h a t a re  th e  reasons you  stopp ed  using  th e  In te rn e t  o r  email?
PROMPT FOR MORE ANSWERS AS APPROPRIATE
1 You are not interested
2 You don't need it .
3 You don’t have/lost access
4 It’s too difficult/frustrating
5 It’s too expensive
6 You don’t nave the time
7 You are worried about your security on the Internet
8 You are worried about the impact on everyday life/work/human
relationships
9 Problems with your Internet connection, such as: shut down, too 
slow, no longer free, frequent busy signal etc.
10 O ther--------------  TO SPECIFY
99 Don’t know/Refused
Section D. Perceptions o f the Internet
EVERYBODY ANSWERS SECTION D ‘EXCEPT FOR Q.25 THAT ONLY 
INTERNET USERS ANSWER
‘Now, I am mainly going to read some statements about the Internet and I would 
like you to tell me what you think about them. So....’
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Q  W h a t do you th in k  ab o u t th e  s ta tem en t: ‘T he In te rn e t  is a  significant 
technology  th a t  changes positively  o u r  lives’? D o you...
1 Strongly agree
2 Agree




£2 W h a t do you th in k  a b o u t th e  s ta tem en t: ‘T he In te rn e t  is a  necessary  
to o l fo r  people’s everyday life’? D o you...
1 Strongly agree
2 Agree




m  T h in k  ab o u t th e  ro u tin e  w ays people  in te ra c t o r  com m unicate  w ith  
one a n o th e r  in  th e ir  everyday lives, like keeping* in  touch  w ith  friends 
and  fam ily, o r  sending  g ree tings, ca rd s o r  inv ita tions. H ow  do you 
th in k  th a t  th e  In te rn e t  m ay a ffec t th e se  k inds o f  activities?
1 Very positively
2 Positively




m  O verall, how  m uch  o f  a  ro le  does th e  In te rn e t  play in  th e  w ay people 
go ab o u t th e ir  daily ro u tin es  and  activ ities?
1 A major role
2 A relatively major role
3 A minor role
4 No role at all
99 Don’t know/Refused
I f  you  couldn’t  u se  th e  In te rn e t  a t  a ll in  any  phase  o f  y ou r life, how  
m uch  w ould th is  a ffect y o u r daily ro u tin e s  and  activities?




4 Not at all
99 Don’t know/Refused
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22 W hat do you th in k  ab o u t th e  s ta tem en t: ‘T he  In te rn e t  is a  danger
fo r  th e  secu rity  o f  u se rs  in  te rm s  o f  online frau d  and  v io la tion  o f  
privacy’? D o you...
1 Strongly agree
2 Agree




EE W h at do you  th in k  ab o u t th e  s ta tem en t: ‘T he  In te rn e t  is a  danger
fo r o u r p e rso n al re la tionsh ips w ith  o th e r  people  and  o u r social 
life’? D o you...
1 Strongly agree
2 Agree
3 Neither agree nor disagree
4 Disagree
5 Strongly disagree 
99 Don’t know/Refused
W h at do you  th in k  abou t th e  s ta tem en t: ‘T he  In te rn e t  is a 
technology th a t  m igh t rep lace  th e  individual w o rk e r in  th e  
w orkp lace’? D o you...
1 Strongly agree
2 Agree
3 Neither agree nor disagree
4 Disagree
5 Strongly disagree 
99 Don’t know/Refused
Bjj] W h at do you th in k  ab o u t th e  s ta tem en t: ‘T he  In te rn e t  is a 
technology th a t  m ight jeopard ise  th e  m oral values and  trad itio n s  
o f  society’? D o you...
1 Strongly agree
2 Agree




Section E: Evaluation/awareness o f Policy and Regulation
ONLY INTERNET USERS ANSWER SECTION E. (CODE i FOR 
QUESTION 5)
‘I would now like to move to another topic and ask you a few questions about the 
ways regulation can protect you from risks you may encounter when you use the 
Internet. So....’
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ES H ow  do you  feel ab o u t th e  w ay th e  policies and  law s in  th e  co u n try
p ro te c t  u se rs ’ secu rity  o n  th e  In te rn e t?  A re  you...
1 Very satisfied
2 Satisfied




H ow  do you  feel ab o u t th e  w ay in  w hich  th e  policies and  law s in  th e  
co u n try  p ro te c t  u se rs ’ privacy on  th e  In te rn e t?  A re  you...
1 Very satisfied
2 Satisfied




D o you  know  w hich  a u th o rity  to  co n tac t i f  you face som e p ro b lem  
using  th e  In te rn e t, such  as d ifficu lty  w ith  use?
DON’T READ OUT THE ANSWER ALTERNATIVES
32. A
33 - A
1 Yes _ >  GO TO QUESTION 32.A
2 No  ^  GO TO QUESTION 33
3 Not sure/it depends —► GO TO QUESTION 33
99 Don’t know/Refused —►GO TO QUESTION 33
W h a t is th a t  au thority?
____________TO SPECIFY
Do you  know  w hich  au th o rity  to  co n tac t i f  you face som e secu rity  
r isk  o n  th e  In te rn e t?
DONT READ OUT THE ANSWER ALTERNATIVES
1 Yes  ►GO TO QUESTION 33.A
2 No ___ ^  GO TO QUESTION 34
3 Not sure/it depends -----► GO TO QUESTION 34
99 Don’t know/Refused ► GO TO QUESTION 34
W h at is th a t  au thority?
TO SPECIFY
m  D o you  know  w hich au th o rity  to  co n tac t i f  you face som e privacy
risk  o n  th e  In te rn e t?
DONT READ OUT THE ANSWER ALTERNATIVES
1. Yes -► GO TO QUESTION 34.A
2. No GO TO QUESTION 35
3. Not sure/it depends  ^  GO TO QUESTION 35
4. Don’t know/Refused  ► GO TO QUESTION 33
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3 4 - A W h a t is th a t  au tho rity?
TO SPECIFY
Section F. Evaluation/awareness o f Policy and Regulation
EVERYBODY ANSWERS SECTION F
‘Now, I am going to read some statements and I would like you to tell me what you 
think about them. So....’
EE W h a t do  you  th in k  ab o u t th e  sta tem en t: ‘th e  n a tio n a l law s and  
policies o n  th e  In te rn e t  can  cope w ith  secu rity  r isk s  o n  th e  
In te rn e t’? D o you...
1 Strongly agree
2 Agree




W h a t do  you  th in k  ab o u t th e  s ta tem en t: ‘th e  na tiona l law s and  
policies on  th e  In te rn e t  can  cope w ith  privacy risk s  o n  th e  
In te rn e t’? D o you...
1 Strongly agree
2 Agree




W h at do you th in k  ab o u t th e  sta tem en t: ‘E U  law s and  policies on  








W h at do you th in k  ab o u t th e  s ta tem en t: ‘E U  law s and  policies on  




3 Neither agree nor disagree
4 Disagree
5 Strongly disagree 
99 Don’t know/Refused
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W h a t do you  th in k  ab o u t th e  s ta tem en t: ‘na tional reg u la to ry  and  
policy au th o ritie s  o n  th e  In te rn e t  don’t  tak e  c itizen’s voice on  the  
In te rn e t  in to  accoun t’?
1 Strongly agree
2 Agree
3 Neither agree nor disagree
4 Disagree
5 Strongly disagree 
99 Don’t know/Refused
W h a t do you th in k  ab o u t th e  s ta tem en t: ‘EU reg u la to ry  and  policy 
a u th o ritie s  on  th e  In te rn e t  don’t  tak e  c itizen’s voice o n  th e  
In te rn e t  in to  accoun t’? D o you...
1 Strongly agree
2 Agree




m  W h a t do you th in k  ab o u t th e  s ta tem en t: ‘peop le’s aw areness o f  
law s and  policies o n  th e  In te rn e t  is low ’? D o you...
i. Strongly agree
2 Agree




m  H ow ever, befo re  to d ay  have y o u  h eard  a b o u t G reek  au th o ritie s
m on ito ring  th e  application  o f  law s and  policies on  th e  p ro tec tio n  
o f  In te rn e t  users?




Section G. Demographics E V E R Y B O D Y  A N S W E R S
S E C T I O N  G
‘Finally, I would like to finish this interview by asking some questions about yourself 
for statistical purposes’
W h at is y ou r sex?





W h a t is y o u r age?






W h a t is th e  la s t  g rade  o r  class you com pleted  a t  school?
DONT READ OUT THE ANSWER ALTERNATIVES
1 None, or grades 1-8
2 High school incomplete (grades 9-11)
3 High school graduate
4 Business, Technical, or vocational school AFTER high school
5 Some college, no 4-year degree
6 College graduate (B.S., B.A., or other 4-year degree)
7 Postgraduate training/professional school after college (Master's 
Degree/PhD., Law or Medical school)
99 Don’t know/Refused
A re you m arried?




D o you have any children?
DONT READ OUT THE ANSWER ALTERNATIVES
1 Y es---► GO TO QUESTION 48
2 No -----► GO TO QUESTION 49
99 Don’t know/Refused ----► GO TO QUESTION 49
H ow  m any children?
________  TO SPECIFY
L ast year, 2005, w h a t w as your fam ily incom e fro m  all sources, 
b e fo re  taxes?
DONT READ OUT THE ANSWER ALTERNATIVES
1 Less than €10,000
2 €10,000 to under €20,000
3 €20,000 to under €30,000
4 €30,000 to under €40,000
5 €40,000 to under €50,000
6 €50,000 to under €75,000
7 €75,000 to under €100,000
8 €100,000 or more 
99 Don't know/Refused
 I ‘Are you willing to be re-contacted and interviewed in person at a later stage
of the research if necessary?’ TICK THE BOX ONLY IF THE RESPONDENT 
ACCEPTS TO BE INTERVIEWED IN PERSON
‘Thank you for taking the time to answer these questions. Your assistance in 
providing this information is very much appreciated. If there is anything else you 
would like to tell us about this survey, you are more than welcome to do that’
F IN IS H  H E R E
4 ~8 Focus groups: thematic guides 
a. Semi-structured guide for groups o f  Internet users:
o M edia use
i. W hich media, how often, purposes o f use, attitudes to the role and importance o f  
different types o f media
o Internet use
1. The Internet and the ways in which it is understood
2. Patterns o f  use (how often; activities; purposes o f use; reasons for use; concerns during 
use; ways to deal with concerns etc)
3. W hat if  deprived o f use in the future
4. Importance o f use in daily activities and various aspects o f everyday life
5. W hat users think about the following views o f elite actors with regard to how Greek 
society treats new technologies and the Internet in particular: technophobia; 
ignorance and lack o f  awareness; social inactivity; non-technocratic and traditional 
character o f Greek society
o Internet regulation andpolicy
1. H ow is Internet regulation understood; differences between national and EU 
regulation; importance o f  regulation for use; areas where regulation is needed; 
instances where regulatory authorities’ help was needed; who people contact if  in need; 
whether more or less regulation is needed; areas o f satisfaction/dissatisfaction with 
Internet regulation
2. H ow is Internet policy understood and its differences from regulation; differences 
between national and EU policy; importance o f  policy for use; areas where policy is 
needed; instances where policy authorities’ help was needed; where people address 
themselves if  in need; whether more or less policy is needed; areas o f  
satisfaction/dissatisfaction with Internet policy
3. W hat do non-users think about the following views o f elite actors with regard to the 
role o f  regulation and policy in the take up o f  new technologies and the Internet in 
Greece: Greek authorities fail to adopt EU regulations and policies on the Internet; 
Greek public administration is bureaucratic, non-modernised, delayed and techno­
phobic; more socially accountable and human-centred regulations and policies are 
needed; high cost o f services and networks; lack o f infrastructure and satisfactory 
services
b. Semi-structured guide for non-user groups:
o M edia use
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i. W hich media, how often, purposes o f use and attitudes to the role and importance o f  
different types o f media
o Non-Internet use
1. The Internet and the ways in which it is understood
2. Reasons for non-use and attitudes to the Internet
3. Impact o f non-use on various aspects o f everyday life
4. Possibility o f future use and changes that future use would bring about
5. W hat non-users think about the following views o f  elite actors with regard to how  
Greek society treats new technologies and the Internet in particular: technophobia; 
ignorance and lack o f awareness; social inactivity; non-technocratic and traditional 
character o f Greek society
o Internet regulation andpolicy
1. H ow is Internet regulation understood; differences between national and EU 
regulation; importance o f  regulation for use; areas where regulation is needed; role o f  
regulation in people’s decision not to use the Internet
2. H ow is Internet policy understood; differences between national and EU policy; 
importance o f policy for use; areas where policy is needed; role o f policy in people’s 
decisions not to use the Internet
3. W hat they think about the following views o f elite actors with regard to the role o f  
regulation and policy in the take up o f new technologies and the Internet in Greece: 
Greek authorities fail to adopt EU regulations and policies on the Internet; Greek 
public administration is bureaucratic, non-modernised, delayed and techno-phobic; 
more socially accountable and human-centred regulations and policies are needed; high 
cost o f  services and networks; lack o f infrastructure and satisfactory services
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Appendix 5
T h e m e s  a n d  a rg u m e n ts  (co d es)
HU: interviews with key actors




5-1. The Information society in Greece 
Created: 08/08/05 18:24:49 (Super)
Codes (34): {Distinctiveness of the Greek case] {Cultural distinctiveness of Greek 
society explaining the low Internet diffusion] {Denial of Greek distinctiveness} {Denial 
of the role of privacy and security risks on the Internet] {Difficulty in implementation 
of the information society and regulation in Greece] {Evidence of the unimportance of 
privacy and security risks: mobile telephony] {Greek information society, policy and 
regulatory environment] {Greek lifestyle explaining the low Internet diffusion] {High 
cost in relation to pursued value] {Hign cost of the Internet in Greece] {High Internet 
penetration in Greece - an argument of exception] {Importance of integrating the 
Internet into citizens’ daily lives} {Internet as not being part of Greek people's 
everyday lives] {Internet services not corresponding to citizens' expectations] {Lack of 
appropriate institutional framework & sufficient resources] {Lack of economy of IT 
production in Greece] {Lack of infrastructure and/or satisfactory online services] {Lack 
of IT expertise] {Lack of IT training and education] {Low development of the 
information society (Internet) in Greece] {Low pursued value of the Internet in 
Greece] {Low quality of Internet use] {Lower cost of the Internet in other EU 
countries] {Mobile telephony in juxtaposition to low Internet diffusion] {Need for 
appropriate conditions in the Greek information society] {Need for more progress and 
time] {Negative role of the geographical structure and position of Greece] {Negative 
role of the high cost of Internet services & networks in Greece] {Optimism regarding 
the future of the Internet] {Partial admittance of the distinctiveness of the Greek casd 
{Pessimism about the future of the Internet and the information society] {Internet
firivacy and security issues of critical importance] {Progress achieved] {Role of simple anguage and non-technocratic terminology]
Quotation(s): 177
5-2 Cultural drivers in the Greek information society
Created: 08/08/05 J8:45:3i (Super)
Codes (18): {Lack of awareness in Greek society (social ignorance)} {Lack of familiarity 
with the Internet] {Lack of familiarity with the Internet and in contrast with mobile 
telephony] {Lack of social action ana institutional organisation] {Low awareness in 
comparison to the EU and other countries] {Need to raise awareness] {Need to 
understand the great potential and uses of broadband] {Non-technocratic culture 
(negativism & indifference) of Greek society] {Optimism regarding the potential role 
of citizens/users in the information society] {Pessimism regarding the potential role of 
users in regulation-making] {Social dimension of the information society and 
regulation-making] {Social resistance to change] {Support of the receptive character of
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Greek society} [Techno-phobia] [Techno-phobia as the result of online fraud and 
media propaganda} [Techno-phobia in society} [Techno-phobic culture in society as 
gradually changing due to policy initiatives} [Techno-phobic culture in Greek society 
as gradually changing}
Quotation(s): 98
5-3 E U  regulation drivers in the Greek information society
Created: 08/08/05 00:13:44 (Super)
Codes (18): [Flexible EU policy for the information society} [Applause for EU policy 
and regulation on the Internet} [Compatibility of the national visions with the EU 
policies in effect} [Delays of the political and regulatory authorities in Greece} 
’Difficulty in the implementation of the information society and regulation in Greece} 
’EU legal action against Greece} [Lack of legal framework for the Internet and 
broadband} [Limited power of regulation} [Mixture of national and EU policies} [Need 
for proper economic and regulatory conditions in Greece} [Negative role of the lack of 
a revised and completed regulatory framework in Greece} [Optimism about the future 
of the adoption of EU regulation] [Options for states to select the EU policies that 
suit them] [Policy initiatives in relation to the EU: recognition of nationality] 
[Progress in the adoption of EU regulation} [Regulatory supervision by the EC} 
[Significance of (EU) regulation and its full implementation} [The socially beneficial 
character of EU regulation}
Quotation(s): 90
5-4 Policy and regulation drivers in Greece
Created: 08/08/05 18:35:39 (Super)
Codes (37): [Aim of policy initiatives: close to citizens' everyday life} [Bureaucracy] 
[Correction of past policy mistakes} [Deltys of the political and regulatoty authorities 
in Greece] [Efforts for more extroversion] [Ex post evaluation of policies] [Example of 
current social policies: regional programmes in action] [Horizontal programme on the 
information society} [Importance of socially-accountable policies in the information 
society} [Introverted and backward governmental policies in Greece] [Lack of legal 
framework for the Internet and broadband} [Lack of modernisation in the public 
administration} [Lack of necessary regulations on security and privacy protection of 
Internet users in Greece] [Lack of policy co-operation with users’ associations} 
[Limited power of regulation} [More time is needed for socialising policies} [Need for 
more policy effort and change} [Need for more social policies] [Need for proper 
economic and regulatory conditions in Greece} [Negative role of the lack of a revised 
and completed regulatory framework in Greece} [Non-cooperation in the public 
sector} [Non-technocratic culture (negativism & indifference) of Greek politicsHNon- 
technocratic culture (negativism & indifference) of the public administration} 
[Participatory policy-making in the information society} [Past a-social policies} [Past 
mistake: local particularities not taken into account} [Policies must adjust to everyday 
life and be comprehensible] [Policy initiatives driven bv social needs and concerns] 
[Policy, regulation and other initiatives} [Political liability} [Political and regulatory 
delays] [Political and regulatory sufficiency: exceptional argument } [Public 
consultations} [Risk of a vicious circle} [Self-regulation still lagging behind} [Techno­
phobia in the public administration} [Non awareness of political authorities}
Quotation(s): 191
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5"5 Other forces at work
Created: 08/08/05 18:49:40 (Super)
Codes (7): {Importance of education] {Importance of the market for policy and 
regulation] {Lack of market competition in Greece/not a single European market] 
{Lack of market development related to high cost and/or low ICT penetration] {Lack 
of responsibility and etnical action in the market - state control and other actors still 
important] {Lack of IT training and education] {Negative role of media propaganda]
Quotation(s): 40
5-6 Critical reflections
Created: 08/08/05 18:53:07 (Super)
Codes (9): {Careful approach to the question/neutral answer] {Contradiction] 
{Difficulty in using socially-oriented language] {Dismissal of survey findings] 
{Optimism] {Political language used in explaining the Greek information society] 
{Political language used in how/whether Greece adopts EU regulation] {Political 
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85.3 48.5 9.0 1.5 1 2 .0 * * 1.9 1.1 0.4 0.4
61.0 60.6 58.5 36.4 80.0** 83.3 100 100 33-3
80.6 46.9 9.4 3-9 4.4** 0.6 0 0 1.1
39.0 39-4 41.5 63.6
20.0** 16.7 0 0 66.7
857 8.3** 277** 7-5** 21.7** 0.8 0.8 0.8 2-5*
27.4 47** 82.5** 75.0**
65.0** 16.7 33-3 100 100*
83.6 60.7** ' 3.0** I.O** 6.5** 1.0 1.0 0 0*
45.2 57.0** 15.0** 16.7** 32.5** 33-3 66.7 0 0*
80.0 68.3** 0.8** 0.8** 0.8** 2-5 0 0 0*
25.8 38.3** 2.5** 8.3** 2.5** 50.0 0 0 0*
100 0** 0** 0** 0** 0 0 0 0*





0.5* 0** 0** 0 2.5** 16.7** 33.3** 0 0
85.0* 2.6** 32.5** 2-5 15.4**
0** 0** 0 0
9.1* 0.5** 31.0** 9.1 15.0**
0** 0** 0 0
81.0* 36.0** 8.0** 3.0 II.O**
0** 0**
1 3
21.7* 16.8** 19.0** 27.3 27.5** 0** 0** 100 100












90.0* 60.0** 12.0** 2.0
0** 0** 0** 0 0
12.1* 14.0** 14.3** 9.1
0** 0** 0** 0 0
*00 51.0** 4.0** 3-3 8 .6 * * 0.7** 0.7**
0 0















































Postg within 0** 0** 0 0





Place 11.8* 15.9** 7.1** 9.1









87.9 37-5** 12.5 0
0









Income 87.7 66.3** 2-5
0 2-5 i -3 0 0 0
under within 0 0 0 0
29,99
9






0 0 0 0 0 0 0





50,00 within 100 0** 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 to Income





100,0 within 100 0** 0 0 0 0 0 0 000 or Income
more within 0.3 0** 0 0 0 0 0 0 0euros Place
Chil Yes within 0 0 0 0





Place 317 42.7** 2.5** 8.3* 5.0**










O 95.0** 100 100 100 IOO
Base: N=Internet users (445). *=significant at p<o.o5, **=significant at p<o.oi
Pearson’s Chi-Square (significant correlations): home by education= 18.022(a), df= 7; work by age= 
114.064(a), df= 3; work by education= 62.390(a), df= 7; work by income= 26.115(a), df= 5; work by children 
in household= 20.439(a), df= 2; library by age= 14.532(20, df= 3; library by children in household = 8.432(a), 
df= 2; Internet cafe by gender= 7.566(b), df= 1; Internet cafe by age= 35.511(a), df= 3; Internet cafe by 
education= 18.486(a), df= 7; Internet cafe by children in household= 15.754(a), df= 2; school by age= 
70.214(a), df= 3; school by education= 32.251(a), df= 7; school by children in household= 18.735(a), df= 2; cell 
phone by education: 44.539(a), df=7; friend’s house by education: 50.573(a); df=7; from school by age : 
8.274(a), df=3
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T ab le  A.6-2-A. D oes th e  co m p u te r you  use  a t  hom e connect to  th e  In te rn e t  
through ...?  (% )
I n t e r n e t  c o n n e c t io n
D ia l
-up














T o t a l 46 5-5 44.6 1.1 1.4 100
M ale Within Gender 41.9 6.6 48.0 0.9 1.8 0.9 100
Gend Within connection 55.6 71.4 65.7 50.0 66.7 40 .0 60.9
er Fem ale Within Gender 52.1 4.1 39.0 1.4 I-4 2.1 100
Within connection 44.4 28.6 34-3 50.0 33-3 60.0 39.1
Age 15-24 Within Age 44.1 2.9 48.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 100
Within connection 26.5 15.8 29.3 25.0 40 .0 33-3 27-5
25-39 Within Age 46.7 6.6 44-3 1.2 1.2 0 100
Within connection 45-9 57-9 44-3 50.0 40 .0 0 45.0
40-64 Within Age 46.9 5-2 41.7 1.0 1.0 4.2 100
Within connection 26.5 26.3 24.0 25.O 20.0 66.7 25.9
65+ Within Age 33-3 0 66.7 O 0 0 100
Within connection 1.2 0 2.4 O 0 0 1.6
N o n e , or Within Education 50.0 0 50.0 O 0 0 100
Educa grades 1- Within connection 0.6 0 0.6 O 0 0 0.5tion 8
H igh Within Education 52.9 5-9 35-3 O 0 5-9 100
school Within connection
incom pl 10.5 10.0 7-2 O 0 33-3 9.1
ete
H igh Within Education 50.6 4-9 40.7 1.2 25 0 100
school Within connection
graduate 23.8 20.0 19.9 25.O 40.0 0 21.7
Business Within Education 38.9 8.3 47.2 2.8 0 2.8 100
or Within connection
vocation 8.1 15.0 10.2 25.O 0 16.7 9-7
al school
Some Within Education 46.7 8.9 44.4 0 0 0 100
college, Within connection
no 4- 12.0 Q 0 A TJ Tyear u^.u u 1X.1
degree
College Within Education 40.6 5-5 48.4 1.6 23 1.6 100
graduate Within connection 30.2 35.0 37-3 50.0 60.0 33-3 34-3
Postgrad Within Education 53-3 0 44.4 0 0 2.2 100
uate within connection t n A A , T
training U Ia.U U U 10.7 1Z.1
Inco Less within Income 5x-7** 0** 41.4** O** 6.9** 0** IO O
me than within connection
10 ,000 8.8** 0** 7.2** O** 40.0** 0** 7.8
euros
10 ,000 within Income 45.1** 1.4** 47-9** 1.4** 1.4** 2.8** IO O
to  under within connection
29.999 18.7** 5.3** 20.5** 25.O** 20.0** 40.0** 19.2
euros
3 0 ,0 0 0 within Income 43.8** 6.3** 37-5** 6.3** 6.3** 0** IO O
to  under within connection
49.999 4.1** 5-3** 3.6** 25.O** 20.0** 0** 4-3
euros
5 0 ,0 0 0 within Income 50.0** 50.0** 0** O** O** 0** IO O
to  under within connection
99.999 0.6** 5.3** 0** O** O** 0** 0.5
euros
1 0 0 ,0 0 0 within Income 0** 100** 0** O** O** 0** IO O
or more within connection 0** 5.3** 0** O** O** 0** 0.3euros
Child Y es within Children 49.2 4.2 41.5 0.8 0.8 3-4 IO O
ren in within connection 33-9 25.0 29.5 25.0 20.0 66.7 V-7
house N o within Children 43.6 6.0 46.8 1.2 1.6 0.8 100
hold w ithin  connection 63.7 75.0 70.5 75.0 80 .0 33-3 67.2
Base: N=372 (Internet users with access from home).
Pearson’s Chi-Square (significant correlations): Internet connection by income= 49.188(a), df= 25, 
**=significant at p<o.oi.
T ab le  A .6-2-B. W ould  you  like to  have a  fa s te r, ‘b roadband ’ connection  
anyw here  th a t  you  u se  th e  In te rn e t  from , o r  isn 't  th a t  som eth ing  you’re  
in te re s te d  in? (% )
D e s ir e  f o r
b r o a d b a n d
D K /R
Y es N o efu sed T o ta l
T o t a l 57.8 39-6 2 . 6 IOO
G en d er Male within Gender 61.1 34-7 4.2 IOO
within Desire for broadband 58.6 49-3 80.0 55.6
Female within Gender 53-9 44-7 i -3 IOO
within Desire for broadband 41.4 50.7 20.0 44.4
A g e 5-24 within Age







































None, or within Education 0.0 IOO 0.0 IOO
















































within Desire for broadband
within Education
within Desire for broadband
within Education

























In c o m e Less than within Income 73-3 20.0 6.7 IOO



























50,000 to within Income 0.0 IOO 0.0 IOO
under 99,999 
euros
within Desire for broadband 0.0 i-5 0.0 0.6
C h ild ren
in
Yes within Children in 
household 55-2 43.1 i-7 100
h o u se h o l
d No
within Desire for broadband 










within Desire for broadband 65.7 61.2 75.0 64.1
Base: N=i72 (Internet users with access from home via dialmp). 
Pearson’s Chi-Square, = non-significant at pco.oi
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T ab le  A.6-3. W h en  did  you f irs t  s ta r t  going online? (% ) _____
T im e th ey  f ir s t  s ta r te d  going online
Last 6 






2 or 3 
years 
ago







































































































































































































































































































































Base: N=445 (Internet users). *=significant at p<o.05, **=significant at p<o.oi 
Pearson’s Chi-Square (significant correlations): time by age= 25.237(a), df= 
51.038(a), df= 28;
12; time by education=
338
Table A.6-4. In general, how often do you go online? (%)































































































































































































































































































































































































































6.5 10.6 7-7 25.0 7-4
58.0 19.8 13.6 4.9 1.2 1.2 1.2 O 
O
23.2 16.8 14.3 8.5 25.0 IOO IOO
18.
2
6 0 .0 15-0
15-
0 5.0 5.0 O 
O
















27.3 25-5 30.8 33*3 33*3 IOO IOO 32.I



















































































s Chi-Square (significant correlations): frequency by gender= 24.641(a), df= 12, **=significant at
340
Table A.6-5. Next...Please tell me if  you ever do any o f the following when














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0.3 1.1 1.2* 0.2
Yes



















*0 00 * 82.6** 73.8 72-5 57-5* 9.0* 100 IOO 85.7 66.7 66.7
ties
Base: N=445 (Internet users). *=significant at p<o.o5, **=significant at p<o.oi
Pearson’s Chi-Square (significant correlations): information online by gender= 7.885(b), df= 1; email by 
education= 21.591(a), df= 7; information online by education= 23.029(a), df= 7; playgames by educations 
58.252(a), df= 7; chat by education= 18.349(a), df= 7; buy products online by educations 19.854(a), df= 7; 
look for work by education= 14.447(a), df= 7; contact public administration by education= 24.8.43(a), df= 
7; play games by children in households 14.304(a), df= 2; chat by children in households 13.730(a), df= 2; 
contact public administration by children in household= 6.073(a), df= 2; visit sites with music by children 
in households 11.296(a), df= 2; email by age= 1,3.251(a), df= 3; play games by age= 57.479(a), df= 3; chat by 
age= 37.186(a), df= 3; public administration by age= 18.448(a), df= 3; public administration by income= 
14.009(a), df= 5;
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T ab le  A .6 -6 . 1 am  going to  read  you som e In te rn e t  te rm s  you  m ay o r  m ay 
n o t be  fam iliar w ith . As I  read  each  one, p lease  te ll m e... (M ean)
(3 point scale from i=Yes, have good idea what term means to 3=Never heard term)
V irus C ook ies Spyw are A dw are P h ish in g S pam
T o ta l I .O I 1 .69 1.90 2.18 2.29 1.87


























































E d u ca tio n
lev e l































































100.000 or more 
euros
1 .00  
1.02
1 .00



























C h ild ren  in  















Base: N=445 (Internet users). *=significant at ©<0.05, **=significant at p<o.oi
Pearson’s Chi-Square (significant correlations): virus by education= 84.105(a), df= 21; virus by children in 
household= 36.921(20, df= 6; Internet cookies by gender= 23.839(a), df= 3; Internet cookies by age= 
21.288(a), df= 9; Internet cookies by education= 48.683(a), df= 21; spyware by gender= 29.962(a), df= 3; 
spyware by age= 10.531(a), df= 9; spyware by education= 54.108(a), df= 21; spyware by children in 
household= 17.426(a), df= 6; adware by gender = 28.647(a), df= 3; adware by children in household= 
18.879(a), df= 6; Internet phishing by genderr= 20.034(a), df= 3; Internet phishing by age= 46.861(a), df= 9; 
Internet phishing by education= 36.178(a), df= 21; Internet phishing by income= z < .3 8 6 (a ) , df= 15; Internet 
phishing by children in household= 16.120(a), df= 6; spam by gender= 10.276(a), df= 3; spam by age= 
22.462(a), df= 9; spam by education= 42.776(a), df= 21;
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T able  A.6~7“ A. D o you w o rry  ab o u t any o f  th e  follow ing w hen  you use  th e  
In te rn e t?
<%)


















































































































































Edu or Educat 
catio grades ion 



































































































































Incom 75.0 9.4 15.6 9.1 12.5 9.1 9.4 IO O
e
Less
than Within 6.8 5-9 9.1 11.5 16.0 5-9 5-4 7-2
10,000 Risks
Within10,000 T ’ Incomrn
85.0 12.5 13.6 7-5 10.0 12.3 i -3 i i . i IO O
£
under




78.9 5-3 26.3 53 15.8 5-3 IO O
under
49,999 Within 4.2 2.0 9.1 3.8 59 1.8 4-3
Risks
_____ within
I  ’ Incom to IO O 50.0 IO O
under e . , .  _  within99,999 Risks 0.8 2.0 0.7
100,00
0 or Within





dren Within 0 /  * n
in  Childr 86.1* 11.9 12.5 8.4 7.0 13.9 1.4 9.1 IO O
hous en
ehol




Childr 77-4 11.4 12.8 4-7 I O . I 1.0 14.1 I O O
en
Within 64.6* 66.7 67.9 53-8 60.0 58.8 IO O 73-7 66.7
Risks
Base: N=445 (Internet users). *=significant at pco.oj, **=significant at p<o.oi 
*** Other = Internet diallers; Personal information violation; Mobile & credit card fraud 
Pearson’s Chi-Square (significant correlations): virus by gender= 4.723(b), df= 1; spyware by gender= 
8.926(b), df= 1; adware by age= 11.776(a), df= 3; Internet phishing by age= 11.765(a), df= 3; virus by 
children in household= 6.827(a), df= 2;
3 4 6
T able  A .6-7-B O verall, how  confiden t a re  you th a t  you can  keep  th ings like 
co m p u te r v iruses, In te rn e t cookies, spyware, adw are, In te rn e t phishing and 
spam  em ails o ff  y o u r hom e co m p u te r w hen  you w an t to? (M ean)
(scale 1-4: ‘not confident at all’ -  Very confident’)
M ean
















None, or grades 1-8 
High school incomplete 
High school graduate 
Business or vocational 
school













10.000 to under 29,999
30.000 to under 49,999
50.000 to under 99,999











Base: N=372 (Internet users who go online from home).
Pearson’s Chi-Square (significant correlations): confidence by gender= 19.263(a), df= 4; confidence by 
education= 55.963(20, df= 28, **= significant at p<o.oi.
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T able  A .6-8-A  W hich  o f  th e  follow ing too ls  o r  technolog ies fo r your 
p ro tec tio n  o n  th e  In te rn e t  have you used  a t  lea s t once? (% )__________ ___














T o ta l 90.0 34-9 19.S 17.4 10.6 *4*7 187.4
Gende
Male within
Gender 90.2 40.0** 22.9 20.0 13.2 16.5 100.0
r within
Tools 64.7 73-9** 74.6 73.2 79-4 72-3 64.5
Female within
Gender 89.4 25.7** 14.2 13-3 6.2 11.5 100.0
within
Tools 35-3 26.1** 25.4 26.8 20.6 2 7 .7 35-5
Age 15-24 within
Age 89.5 32.2 20.7 16.1 7.0 14.0
within
Tools 26.9 25.2 28.6 25.0 17.6 25-5
25-39 within
Age 90.3 36.1 19.4 16.6 13.1 16.6
within
Tools 45-5 46.8 44.4 42.9 55-9 51.1
40-64 within
Age 90.1 38.3 21.0 22.2 11.1 13.6
within










































































Education 86.0 32.6 100.0 20.9 100.0
training within













Income 88.1** 31.0 28.8 27.1 15-5 19.0 100.0




within 80.0* 28.630,000 Income * 21.4 13-3 21.4 100.0





50,000 Income * 50.0 100.0
to under within Ik 4c
99,999 Tools 0.3** 0.9 0.9
100,000 within
or more Income 100.0 100.0
euros within 0.9 0.3
Tools
Childr Yes within 93.1 15.0 14.0 *en in Children 3i7 9.0 7-9 100.0
househ within 28.8 23.8 31.8old Tools 32.9 25-5 27.3 17.4*
No within
Children 88.8 36.1 21.8 18.5 10.7 17.2* 100.0
within
Tools 66.8 70.3 74.6 72.7 69.7
*tJ-0
00 67.6
Base: N= 318 (users from home having used programmes for Internet security). *=significant at p<0.05, 
**=significant at p<o.oi
Pearson’s Chi-Square (significant correlations): firewall by gender= 6.589(b), df= 1; anti-virus by 
income= 16.523(a), df= 5; spam-killer by children in household= 6.846(a), df= 2;
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Table A.6-8-B Why haveyou never used such tools or technologies?” (%)
R e a so n s  fo r  n o t  u s in g  to o ls /  
Internet p r o te c t



















































































Age 40.0 40.0 20.0 13.3 6 .7 6.7 13.3 100.0
within
Reason 42.9 31.6 21.4 28.6 50.0 33-3 50.0 31.3
25-39 within
Age 27-3 38.1 28.6 19.0 4-5 4-5 9.1 100.0
within
Reason 42.9 42.1 42.9 57-i 50.0 33-3 50.0 45.8
40-64 within
Age 18.2 45-5 45-5 9.1 9.1 100.0
within
Reason 14.3 26.3 35-7 14.3 33-3 22.9
High within
Educa school Educat 50.0 38.5 25.0 7-7 8.3 8.3 8.3 100.0
tion incom ion
plete within
Reason 42.9 25.0 20.0 12.5 50.0 50.0 25.0 25-5
High within
school Educat 18.2 63.6 54-5 9.1 9.1 9.1 100.0
gradua ion
te within
Reason 14.3 35.0 40.0 12.5 50.0 25.0 23.4
Busine within
ss or Educat 40.0 40.0 40.0 20.0 100.0
vocati ion
onal within
school Reason 14.3 10.0 13.3 12.5 10.6
Some within
college Educat 25.0 80.0 25.0 20.0 100.0
> no 4- ion
year within O _
Reason 7-i 20.0 6.7 25.0 8.5
Colleg within
e Educat 14.3 14.3 21.4 35*7 7-7 7-i 100.0
gradua ion
te within
Reason 14.3 10.0 20.0 62.5 50.0 25.0 29.8
Postgr within





e Incom 33*3 33-3 33-3 33-3 100.0
Less e
than within
10,000 Reason 7*i 5-3 14.3 50.0 6.3
10,00 within








14.3 15.8 13.3 42.9 100 25.0 22.9
30,00 Incom 100 100.0
0 to e
under within 6.7 2.149,999 Reason
Childr­ Yes within










28.6 42.1 53-3 12.5 31-3
Childr 31.3 32.3 21.9 21.9 6.3 9.4 12.5 100.0
en
within
Reason 71.4 52.6 46.7 87.5 100 100 100 66.7
Base: N= 48 (users from home who have not used programmes for Internet security). 
=non-significant at p<o.o5
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T a b le  A . 6 -9  W h a t  a re  th e  r e a so n s  y o u  d o n ’t  u s e  th e  I n te r n e t  o r  em ail?  
<%)
Reasons for not using thi; Internet
It's
I too I
I’m I don't diffic It's don't I
not don't have ult/fr too have don’t
intere need acces ustrat expen the know Othe
sted it s ing sive time much Total
Total 43-2 63-4 12.5 5-7 3*6 6.9 2.5 2.3 140.1
Male Within 6.1 - *Gen Gender 40.4 59.1 11.7 S ’ 7 7.8 3.0 3-i 100.
der within
Reason 38.8 38.6 39.1 43.8 65* 47-4 50.0 100 41.4
Female Within 66.3 S 3 A 6.1Gender 45.1 12.9 2.1* 2.1 1.9 100.
within
Reason 61.3 61.4 60.9 56.3 35* 52.6 50.0 100 58.6
Age 15-24 Within
Age
20.8** 43-3* 37-7** 13.2** 9.6 3.8* 100
within
Reason 4.6** 6.8* 28.6** 36.8** 13.2 40.0* 9-5
25-39 Within
Age 33 3** 64.8*
20.0** 2.9 3.8** 9.6 1 3.9* 100
within
Reason 1 4 .6 * * 19.3*
30.0** 9.4 21.1** 26.3 7-i 100* 18.9
40-64 Within
Age
49.2** 63.2* 9.5** 7-4 2.9** 7.0 2.9 2.0* 100
within
Reason
49.6** 43-3* 32.9** 56.3 3 6.8** 44-7 50.0 100* 43.6
65+ Within
Age 48.1** 69.2* 3.8** 7-i 0.6** 3.8 3.8 0.6* 100
within
Reason 31.3** 30.6* 34-4 5-3** 15.8 42.9 20* 28.0
None, Within
Edu or Educati 62.3** 77 8.2 6.6 1.6 I*7 17 100
cati grades i- on
on f within 15.8** 5-3Reason 13.3* 7.2 12.9 2-7 77 11
High Within
school Educati 52.6** 58.2* 9.6 8.1 3-7 7-4 i -5 1 S 100
incompl on
ete within 18.8 26.3Reason 29.5** 22.1* 35*5 2 7 15.4 33-3 24.3
High Within
school Educati 39-6** 65.5* 14.3 4.1 2.6 6.1 3-i 3.0 100
graduate on
within
Reason 32.4** 36.5* 40.6 25.8 26.3 32.4 46.2 100 35-3
Business Within
or Educati 3 2 .4 * * 66.2* 19.2 4.1 8.2 9.6 1.4 1.4 100
vocation on
al within IO.O** * 9-7 31.6 18.9 77 50 13.1school Reason 13.9* 20.3
Some Within
college, Educati 35-7** 50* 14.3 21.4 7-i 14.2 100
no 4- on
year within
Reason 2.1** 2* 2.9 8.1 77 36.7 2-S
College Within
graduate Educati 36.2** 56.9* 10.3 5-3 3-5 S ’2 1.8 3-4 IOO
on
within
Reason 8.7** 9.3* 8.7 9-7 10.5 8.1 77 36.7 IO.4
Postgra Within
duate Educati 16.7* 16.7 33*3 16.7 16.7 IOO
training on






Income 56.9 64.6* 13.8 7-7 7.8 1.6 1.6 i -5 IOO
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10 ,000 within
Reason 15.4 11.9* 12.9 15.6 25.0 2.6 7-7 16.7 11'7

























3 0 ,0 0 0
Within
Income 30.8 IOO* 15.4 7-7 IOO
to under 
49,999


























35-9* 56.6 24.3** 3-9 8.5** 5-9 i -3 3-9 IOO
22.8* 24.4 53.6** 18.8 65** 23.7 14.3 IOO 27.4
Base: N= 556 (non-users). *=significant at p<o.o5, **=significant at p<o.oi
***Other: ‘other’, ‘I am worried about the impact on everyday life/work/human relationships’ & ‘I am 
worried about my security on the Internet’
Pearson’s Chi-Square (significant correlations): too expensive by gender= 4.777(b), df= 1; not interested 
by age= 20.082(a), df= 3; no need by age= 9.878(a), df= 3; no access by age= 48.760(a), df= 3; too expensive 
by age= 19.261(a), df= 3; other by age= 8.621(a), df= 3; not interested by education= 24.963(a), df= 7; no 
need by education= 15.048(a), df= 7; no need by income= 9.639(a), df= 4; not interested by children in 
household= 5.999(a), df= 2; not access by children in household= 28.051(a), df= 2; too expensive by 
children in household= 14.730(a), df= 2.
353
T able  A.6-10. D id  you ever a t  som e po in t u se  th e  In te rn e t  o r  em ail, b u t 
have since stopped  fo r  som e reason? (% )
U sage  o f  th e  In te r n e t  




T o ta l 9 .2 8 9 .6 1.2 IOO
G en d er Male W ithin Gender 








Female W ithin Gender 















within Usage in the past 
within Age
within Usage in the past 
within Age
within Usage in the past 
within Age











































within Usage in the past 
within Education 
within Usage in the past
within Education 
within Usage in the past
within Education 






































within Usage in the past
within Education 
within Usage in the past 
within Education 






























within Usage in the past 
within Income 
within Usage in the past
within Income 
within Usage in the past
within Income 

























Yes within Children in 
household
 ^j** 93.6** 1.3** IOO**
h o u seh o l
d N o
within Usage in the past 








within Usage in the past 60.8** 24.5** 27.5**
Base: N= 556 (non-users). *=significant at p<o.o5, **=significant at p < o .o i
Pearson’s Chi-Square (significant correlations): usage in the past bygender= 11.650(a), df= 2; usage in the 
past by age= 64.844(a), af= 6; usage in the past by educations 37.016(a), df= 14; usage in the past by 
children in households 53.579(a), dr= 4.
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T a b le  A .6 -1 1 -A  W o u ld  y o u  lik e  to  s ta r t  u s in g  th e  I n te r n e t  a n d  em a il, o r  isn 't  
th a t  s o m e th in g  y o u ’r e  m te r e s te d  in?
(2 point scale from i=,yes> interested to  2= no, not interested’)
M e a n
T o ta l H • 00 04








E d u c a t io n  le v e l
None, or grades 1-8 1.94**
High school incomplete (grades 9-11) 1.89**
High school graduate 1.79**
Business, Technical, or vocational
school 1.76 *
Some college, no 4-year degree 1.65**
College graduate 1.78**
Postgraduate training 1 73**
I n c o m e
Less than 10,000 1.84
10,000 to under 29,999 1.76
30,000 to under 49,999 1.83
50,000 to under 99,999 2.00
C h ild r e n  in  th e  h o u se h o ld
Yes 1.88**
No 1.67**
Base: N= 556 (non-users), "^significant at p<o.05, **=significant at p < o .o i
Pearson’s Chi-Square (significant correlations): interest in future use by age= 87.376(a), df= 6; interest in  
future use by education= 29.733(a), df= 14; interest in future use by children in household= 36.887(a), df= 
45
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T a b le  A .6 -1 1 -B  H o w  lik e ly  d o  y o u  th in k  i t  is ,  i f  a t  a ll, th a t  y o u  w ill  s ta r t  u s in g  
th e  I n te r n e t  o r  e m a il som ed ay?
(4 point scale from in defin itely  not* to  4=‘definitely’)
M e a n
T o ta l 1.71








E d u c a tio n
None, or grades 1-8 1.13**
High school incomplete 1.45**
High school graduate 1.84**
Business, Technical, or vocational
school 2.20
Some college, no 4-year degree 2.09**
College graduate 1.90**
Postgraduate training 1.94**
I n c o m e
Less than 10,000 1.69
10,000 to under 29,999 i-75
30,000 to under 49,999 1.93
50,000 to under 99,999 1.00
C h ild r e n  in  h o u se h o ld
Yes M3**
No 2.19**
Base: N: non-users (556). *=significant at p<o.05, "“"^significant at p < o .o i
Pearson’s Chi-Square (significant correlations): likelihood by gender= 9.342(a), df= 3; likelihood by 
age= 147.649(a), af= 9; likelihood by education= 90.610(a), df= 21; likelihood by children in 
household= 65.205(a), df= 6;
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Table A.6-12 What do you think about the statement
D em o g ra p h ics
In ter n














Male Yes 4.06 3-77 3.63 2.96 2.9 2.93
N o 3-51 3.06 3-97 3-57 3.0* 3.50**
Female Yes 4.09 3-57 3-75 3.12 2.79 3.0
N o 3-35 3.08 4.16 3-75 3.21* 3.84**
A ge
Yes 4.05* 3 81** 3-57 2.86 UJ 0 O
s * 2.86
15-24 N o 37** 3.03** 3.81** 3.1" 3.02** 3.04**
Yes 4.11* 3.54** 3.63 3.08 2.75* 2.95
25-39 N o 3.50** 2.92** 3.92** 3.4** 3.12** 3.48**
Yes 4.06* 3.85** 3.88 3-i5 2.87* 3.04
40-64 N o 337** 3 i** 4.12** 3-75** 3.01** 3.86**
Yes 3.46* 2.77** 3.23 2.15 2.38* 3-54
65+ N o 3.32** 3.16** 4.2.7** 4.02** 3.37** 3.84**
E d u cation
None, or grades 1-8 Yes 3-33** 4.0** 4 -33** 3-33** 2.0** 2.67**
N o 2.83** 2.9** 4 -41** 4.21** 3.2** 3.88**
High school Yes 3.83** 3.59** 3.86** 3.1** 3.I5** 3.19**
incomplete N o 3-31** 3.06** 4.16** 3.95** 3.19** 3-79**
High school Yes 4.11** 3.72** 3-79** 3.21** 2.98** 3-0 4 **
graduate N o 3-57** 3.13** 4.0 6** 3-54** 3.22** 3-59**
Business or Yes 3-91** 3-74** 3-55** 3.08** 2.95** 3.16**
vocational school N o 3 4 1 ** 2.98** 3.85** 3-47** 2.89** 3.58**
Some college, no 4- Yes 4.01** 3.58** 3.66** 2.82** 2.7I** 2.8 6**
year degree N o 3.61** 3.18** 4.49** 3.98" 3.46** 4.21**
College graduate Yes 4.15** 3.64** 3.62** 3.07** 2-77** 2.93**
N o 3.62** 3.16** 3.92** 3.39** 2.89** 3-7**
Postgraduate Yes 4 -24** 3-93** 3 55** 2.64** 2.73** 2.6**
training N o 3.61** 3-24 ** 3.42** 2-79** 2.-73** 3.72**
In co m e
Yes 4.01 3.65 3.56 2.87 2.63* 2.83
Less than 10,000 N o 3-39 2.97 4.08 3.68** 3-23* 3.89
10,000 to under Yes 4.16 3.58 3.76 3.06 2.62* 2.80
29,999 N o 3-53 3.19 3-95 3-57** 3.2* 3.63
30,000 to under Yes 4.1 4.04 3-51 3.26 3.05* 3.28
49,999 N o 3.66 3.16 4.0 4.0** 3-55* 3.28
50,000 to under Yes 4.0 3.0 4-5 2-5 1.5* 1.50
99,999 N o 3.0 1.0 5.0 5.0** 3.0* 4.00
100,000 or more Yes 5.0 4.0 1.0 3.0 I.O* 1.0
C h ildren  in  h o u seh o ld
Yes Yes 3-99” 3.68** 3-79” 3.19” 2.80 3-05**
N o 3-41** 3.12** 4.14** 378** 3.19** 3-75**
N o Yes 4.12** 3-7** 3.61** 2.94** 2.89 2.92**
1 ____  VT 11__ _________
N o
____ \ ___VT
3.48** 2.98** 3.93** 3.4**__  * _ 2-97** 3-55**
**=significant at p<o.oi
Pearson’s C h i- S q u a r e  (significant correlations);
Internet users: Q.21 by age= 25.352(a), df= 15; Q.21 by education= 162.352(a), df= 35; Q.21 by children in 
household= 53.595(a), df= 10; Q.22 by age= 37.306(a), df= 15; Q.22 by education= 147.779(a), df= 35; Q.22 by 
children in household= 46.978(a), df= 10; Q.26 by education= 81.645(a), df= 35; Q.26 by children in 
household= 31.337(a), df= 10; Q.27 by education= 78.314(a), df= 35; Q.27 by children in household= 30.917(a), 
df= 10; Q.28 by age= 27.006(a), df= 15; Q.28 by education= 65.049(a), df= 35; Q.28 by income= 38.844(a), df= 
25; Q.29 by education= 81.104(a), df= 35; Q.29 by children in household= 29.141(a), df= 102 
Internet non-users: Q.21 by age= 47.097(a), df= 15; Q.21 by education= 109.832(a), df= 35; Q.21 by 
children inhousehold= 89.383(a), df= 10; Q.22 by age= 46.451(a), df= 15; Q.22 by education= 103.149(a), df= 
35; Q.22 by children in household= 65.785(a), df= 10; Q.26 by age= 51.378(a), df= 15; Q.26 by educations 
114.882(a), df= 35; Q.26 by children in households 70.410(a), af= 10; Q.27 by age= 101.945(a), af= 15; Q.27 by 
educations 143.268(a), df= 35; Q.27 by income= 39.822(a), df= 20; Q.27 by children in household= 76.050(a), 
df= 10; Q.28 by gender= 11.420(a), df= 5; Q.28 by age= 68.933(a), df= 15; Q.28 by educations 125.405(a), df= 
35; Q.28 by incomes 33.097(a), df= 20; Q.28 by children in households 39.767(a), df= 10; Q.29 by gender= 
16.776(a), dfs 5; Q.29 by ages 86.763(a), df= 15; Q.29 by educations 93.973(a), df= 35; Q.28 by cnildren in 






























































None, or grades 1-8
High school incomplete
High school graduate
Business or vocational 
school






























































10.000 to under 29,999
30.000 to under 49,999






















100,000 or more Yes 3.0 3.0 4.0*
















Base: N=556 (for non-users) or N=445 (for users) -  filter: Internet use. *=significant at p<0.05, 
**=significant at p<o.oi. ***Only Internet users
Pearsons Chi-Square (significant correlations):
Internet users: Q.23 by education= 64.320(a), df= 35; Q.23 by children in household= 20.862(a), df= 10; 
Q.24 by education= 102.508(a), df= 28; Q.24 by children in households 24.722(a), dfs 8; Q.25 by educations 
91.145(a), df= 28; Q.25 by income= 35.811(a), df= 20; Q.25 by children in households 33.923, df= 8; 
Internet non-users: Q.23 bygender= 20.791(a), df= 5; Q.23 by age= 71.905(a), df= 15; Q.23 by educations 
122.918(a), df= 35; Q.23 by children in households 53.201(a), df= 10; Q.24 by gender= 10.767(a), df= 4; Q.24 
by age= 36.897(a), df= 12; Q.24 by educations 103.070(a), df= 28; Q.24 by incomes 31.325(a), df= 16; Q.24 by 
children in households 62.606(a), df= 8.
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T able A.6-14 Level o f  ag reem en t w ith  th e  s ta tem en t: VI  fm  m issing o u t on  
th ings because  I  am  n o t using th e  In te rn e t  and  email*
(scale 1-5: i=‘strongly disagree’, 2=’disagree’, 3=neither agree nor disagree’, 4=’agree’, 5= strongly agree)
















None, or grades 1-8 
High school incomplete 
High school graduate 
Business or vocational school 












10.000 to under 29,999
30.000 to under 49,999










Base: N=556 (non-users). *=significant at p<o.05, **=significant at p<o.oi
Pearson’s Chi-Square (significant correlations): missing out by gender= 23.414(a), df= 5; missing out by 
age= 65.454(a), df= 15; missing out by education= 113.030(a), df= 35; missing out by income= 42.548(a), d 1= 
20; missing out by children in household= 58.630(a), df= 10.
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Table A.6-15. What do you think about the statement...? (Mean)
D em o g ra p h ics










G en d er
Male Yes 2.57 2.72 3.19 3-I7
N o 2.76* 2.89 2.98 2.97**
Female Yes 2-55 2.76 3.05 3.26
N o 2.74* 2.81 3.07 3.16**
A ge
Yes 2.72 2.82* 3.29* 3.32
15-24 N o 2.93** 2.6** 2.73** 3.02**
Yes 2.49 2.63* 3.12* 3 i3
25-39 N o 2.71** 2.8** 3.24** 3.16**
Yes 2.57 2.85* 3.02* 3-i7
40-64 N o 2.59** 2 81** 2.91** 2.96**
Yes M 2.0* 2.5* 3-5
65+ N o 3.12** 3.11** 3.26** 3.26**
E d u ca tio n
None, or grades 1-8 Yes 2.0 2.0 3-o 4.0
N o 2.91** 3.05** 3.25** 3.03**
High school Yes 2.96 3.03 3.21 3-35
incomplete N o 2.83** 3.06** 2.9** 3.25**
High school graduate Yes 2.69 2.79 3.07 3-35
N o 2.9** 2.98** 3.11** 3.11**
Business or vocational Yes 2.5 2.78 3.31 3.18
school N o 2.23** 2.47** 2.91** 2.88**
Some college, no 4- Yes 2.48 2.64 2.93 2.88
year degree N o 2.39** 2.46** 3.00** 2.26**
College graduate Yes 2.44 2.63 3-i7 3.18
N o 2.71** 2.38** 2.93** 3.06**
Postgraduate training Yes 2.53 2.7 3.12 3.13
N o 4.21** 4.21** 4.42** 4.21**
In co m e
Yes 2.44 2.39 3.2* 2.84*
Less than 10,000 N o 2.85** 2.96** 3.01** 3.25**
10,000 to under Yes 2.15 2.58 3.03* 3.15*
29,999 N o 2.7** 2.91** 2.91** 2.92**
30,000 to under Yes 3.12 2.72 3.09* 3-47*
49,999 N o 2.7** 2.51** 2.75** 2.62**
50,000 to under Yes 2-5 2.0 5.0* 2.0*
99,999 N o I.O** I.O** 3.0** 1.0**
100,000 or more Yes 3.0 1.0 1.0* 5.0*
C h ild ren  in
h o u seh o ld
Yes Yes 2.43 2.64 2.78** 3-i
N o 2.74* 2.89* 3.05 3.07
N o Yes 2.61 2.77 3.27** 3-25
N o 2.78* 2.73* 2.98 3.09
Base: N=556 (for non-users) or N=445 (for users) -  filter: Internet use. *=significant at pco.oj, 
"^significant at p<o.oi
Pearson’s Chi-Square (significant correlations);
Internet users: Q.36 by age= 26.409(a), df= 15; Q.37 by age= 26.960(a), df= 15; Q.37 by income= 40.015(a), 
df= 25; Q.37 by children in nousehold= 31.138(a), df= 10; Q.38 by income= 42.293(a), df= 25;
Internet non-users: Q.35 by gender= 14.122(a), df= 5; Q.35 by age= 58.803(a), df= 15; Q.35 by education= 
135.962(a), df= 35; Q.35 by income= 83.798(a), df= 20; Q.35 by children in household= 19.687(a), df= 10; Q.36 
by age= 41.887(a), df= 15; Q.36 by education= 110.282(a), df= 35; Q.36 by income= 54.946(a), df= 20; Q.36 by 
children in household= 19.164(a), df= 10; Q.37 by age= 51.965(a), df= 15; Q.37 by education= 100.482(a), df= 
35; Q.37 by income= 78.047(a), df= 20; Q.38 by genaer= 16.277(a), df= 5; Q.38 by age= 42.609(a), df= 15; Q.38 
by education= 106.202(a), df= 35; Q.38 by income= 88.047(a), df= 20;
360
T able A.6-16. H ow  do you feel abou t th e  w ay in  w hich  th e  law  in  th e  country  
p ro tec ts ... (M ean)
(scale 1-5: Very dissatisfied’ -  Very satisfied’)
U sers’ security  on  th e  
In te rn e t?  A re you ... ?
(Q .3 0 )
u se rs ’ privacy on  th e  
In te rn e t?  A re you...
(Q .31)






















None, or grades 1-8 
High school 
incomplete 
High school graduate 
Business or 
vocational school 




















10.000 to under 
29,999
30.000 to under 
49)999





















Base: N=445 (for users). *=significant at p<o.o5, **=significant at p<o.oi
Pearson’s Chi-Square (significant correlations): Q.30 by age= 32.279(a), df= 15; Q.30 by children in 
household= 19.474(a), df= 10; Q.31 by children in househola= 25.824(a), df= 10;
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Table A.6-17. Awareness o f authorities: “Do you know where, which
authority, to address yourself if  you face...” (%)
...som e p ro b lem  
in  using  th e  
In te rn e t, such  
as a  d ifficu lty  in  
use? (Q.32)
...som e 
secu rity  r isk  
o n  th e  
In te rn e t?  
(Q-33)
...som e 
privacy risk  
on  th e  








T o ta l 24.4 64.8 4.2 17.9 73-6


















































































































27.1** 70.8♦* 2.1** 29.2** 70.8** 29.2 68.8 2.1
Income***
Less than 10,000
10.000 to under 
29,999
30.000 to under 
49)999



































100,000 or more *






















Base: N=445 (for Internet users). *=significant at p<o.05, **=significant at pco.oi. *** Row %  
Pearson’s Chi-Square (significant correlations): Q.32 by education= 47.379(a), df= 21; Q.32 by income= 
27.257(a), df= 15; Q.33 by gender= 9.132a, df= 3; Q.33 by education= 45.880, df= 21; Q.34 by income= 
41.496(a), df= 15;
362
Table A.6-18. What do you think about the statement...? (Demographics)
D em ographics

















































None, or grades 1-8
High school incomplete
High school graduate
Business or vocational 
school
















































10.000 to under 29,999
30.000 to under 49,999











































(1) Base: N=556 (for non-users) or N=445 (for users) -  filter: Internet use. *=significant at p<o.o5, 
■“^significant at p<o.oi
Pearson’s Chi-Square (significant correlations):
Internet users: Q.39 by age= 32.681, df= 15; Q.39 by income= 52.415, df= 25; Q.40 by age= 36.933, df= 
15-
Internet non-users: Q.39 by age= 50.762, df= 15; Q.39 by education= 78.848, df= 35; Q.39 by 
income= 81.848, df= 20; Q.39 by children in household= 20.611, df= 10; Q.40 by gender= 14.645, df= 5; 
Q.40 by age= 52.554, df= 15; Q.40 by education= 78.919, df= 35; Q.40 by income= 91.236 df= 20.
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T able A.6-19. W h a t do you th in k  ab o u t th e  s ta tem en t: “peop le’s 
aw areness o f  law s and  policies on  th e  In te rn e t  is low ”? D o you...
(5 point scale from i=‘strongly disagree’ to 5=‘strongly agree’)















None, or grades 1-8 
High school incomplete 
High school graduate 
Business or vocational school 





10.000 to under 29,999
30.000 to under 49,999
50.000 to under 99,999
100.000 or more
C hild ren  in  household
Yes
No





































































(1) Base: N=556 (for non-users) or N=445 (for users) -  filter: Internet use. **=significant at pco.oi
Pearson’s Chi-Square (significant correlations);
Internet users: Q.41 by age= 36.933(a), df= 15;
Internet non-users: Q.41 by age= 52.554(b), df= 15;
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T able  A .6-20. H ow ever, befo re  today  have you  h eard  o r  n o t ab o u t G reek  
au th o ritie s  m on ito ring  th e  app lica tion  o f  law s and  policies o n  th e  
p ro tec tio n  o f  u se rs  o n  th e  In te rn e t?___________________
TO TA L: YES
23.6








































None, or grades 1-8 
High school incomplete 
High school graduate 
Business or vocational school 





































10.000 to under 29.999








50.000 to under 99.999 YesNo
50.0
IOO**
100.000 or more Yes IOO









(1) Base: N=556 (for non-users) or N=445 (for users) -  filter: Internet use. *=significant at p<o.c>5, 
**=significant at p<o.oi
Pearson’s Chi-Square (significant correlations);
Internet users: Q.42 by gender= 11.451(40, df= 2; Q.42 by education= 56.648(a), df= 14;
Internet non-users: Q.42 by age= 21.797(b), df= 6; Q.42 by education= 76.360(b), df= 14; Q.42 by 










Table A .8-I Media use: Internet user perspective
U sers














Mostly for studies 








Radio, Computer & 
Internet Everyday
Internet & 
computer for work. 







































TV, Radio, Mobile, 
Computer,










media due to 
convergence
Eirini


































view: all types 
of media have 


























Table A.8-2 Media use: Internet non-user perspective
N on-users
■ u n — — 1
Questions W hich media
How






M obile texting, 
gaming for 
entertainm ent, 
com puter for 
tvping
He likes mobiles 
and video games, 
but uses computer 









TV: central role in 
her life; telephone: 
im portant for 
communication only
Konstantinos










TV  is his favourite 
medium; other 
media do not seem 







not much TV Everyday
Newspapers & 
radio for news. 
Phone/mobile for 
communication. 
Com puter for 
work-related use
Against TV, arguing 
that it is offers 







TV tor news and 
relaxation. Mobile 
phone for work 
and
communication. 
Com puter for 
work






TV  for relaxation. 
Mobile phone for 
communication. 
Com puter for 
work
Very im portant for 
work,
communication and 
information; hard to 








M obile phone for 
communication 
with family. TV  
for news and 
comedy 
programmes
Critical to  the 
media; good and bad 
media; reference to 









for news and 
information. 
Com puter for 





sports. TV  for 
sports and news
M edia is a habit that 
pleases him, but not 
of critical 










Table A.8-3 Internet use: user perspective
U sers

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Not in the 
near future, as 














use and lack 
of time Not No
No: because 






















intends to use 
it for work- 
related 
purposes
Yes for work- 
related





No need & 
online risks No
Probably not, 










No chance to 
learn; no need 
for work, thus 
no incentives
Possible loss 









Yes for work- 
related




































impact only if 
her children 
use it
No, but her 
daughters may 
use it
No, she does 
not desire it
Petros







since no need No











an eye on his 
children's use No















Table A .8-5 Public discourses on Greek society





lack o f awareness Social inactivity
Stefanos
Yes; problematises the issue; 
role of decision-makers, 
'mentality', lifestyle & 
'Greekness'










Not certain; problematises 




Yes; problematises the issue; 










Not certain; problematises 
the issue; deconstructs the 
discourse and asks why the 









Ioanna It depends It depends
Petros
Old people: yes; Young 
people: no
Yes and argues about
individual
responsibility




Yes, partly; problematises 











Not certain; problematises 
the issue; deconstructs the 
discourse and asks why the 
Internet is a 'necessity' Yes, partly
Pantelis
Problematises the issue; role 










Yes, to some extent; 
problematises the issue; 
relates technophobia to lack 
of awareness
Yes and raises the 
issue of
generations/age
Yes, and raises 
the issue of 
generation/gap
Kwnstantina
Not certain; problematises 
the issue; deconstructs the 
discourse and asks why she 
should use the Internet 
outside work since she does 
not need to do so
Yes, but differentiates 




Yes; problematises the issue; 
deconstructs the discourse; 
'Greekness' and importance 










Problematises the issue; old 
generation techno-phobic 
due to media propaganda, 
over-protectionist family 
relations & ignorance
Yes, especially as far 
as old generations are 




Problematises the issue; 
online risks for [her] 







issue; old people 
like to keep their 
traditions, against 




No; problematises the issue; 
people are not informed; 
information, awareness & 
education needed
Yes; school, media & 
the state responsible
Yes, but it is not 
that the whole 
society is inactive. 
Lack of awareness 
is the driving 
force
Problematises the issue; 
online risks for children on 
the Internet
Problematises the 
issue; too many 
things to deal 
with in everyday 
life
Ioannis
Yes; problematises the issue; 
role of lack of knowledge 
and incentives
Yes, training and 
education needed
problematises the 
issue stressing the 
individualistic 
character of 
Greek society and 
the Greek state's 
inactivity
Evangelia
Problematises the issue; 
more knowledge, 
information and incentives 
needed









Problematises the issue; 
importance of identity, 
traditions and values
Yes, but lack of 
information not a 
problem for those 
who do not want to 
use the Internet
Problematises the 




Yes, but awareness 
and education not 
sufficient to change 
people's decisions
Yes, for things 
people are not 
interested in
Menios
Problematises the issue; 
different needs and habits, 
as well as less knowledge of 
people in Greece
Problematises the 
issue; issues of 






Table A .8-6 Internet regulation and policy: user perspective
Them
Users
Internet regulation and policy  








and EU R 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A .8-7 Internet regulation and policy: non-user perspective
Non-users
Q u e s tio n s
Internet R & 
P understood
National and EU 
R & P
Role o f R & P i n  the 
decision o f non-use
w here  R & P  are 
needed
Antonia
R: Does not 
know, does not 
deal with politics, 
but blames 
politicians; P: 
Does not know; 
she thinks this is 
a question for 
users
R: Important if she 
had to use the 
Internet; P: 
Problematises the 
issue, arguing that 
these issues are for 
those need to use the 
Internet and not all 
need to use the 
Internet





P: Important role; 
Lack of social 
accountability of 
policy, making young 
people to learn 
everything on their 
own
R: Important to 
restrict those 
who make money 
on the Internet; 
users should not 






R: Does not 
know, but blames 
politicians; P: 
Does not know
R: No role in her 
decision of non-use; 
P: No role; this issue 
does not concern her, 
since she is not a user
R: Important for 
children's safety, 
but afraid that 




R: Does not 
know, but blames 
the Greek state; 
P: Does not 
know, but tends 
to agree with 
Andreas
R: No role in his 
decision of non-use
Andreas













R: Not certain; 
assumes that laws 
in other 
countries are 
better than in 
Greece; P: No 
certain; assumes 
that policies in 
other countries 





R: No role in his 
decision of non-use; 
P: Important role, as 
he lacks guidance & 
information
R: Important for 








those who want 
to use the 
Internet
Dionysia
P: Does not 
know, but tends 
to agree with 
Andreas
R: Important if she 
had to use the 
Internet; she doesn't 
know what regulation 
is; P: No role; this 
issue does not 
concern her, since she 
is not a user














R: Does not 
know about the 








Assumes that, as 
Greece lags 




R: No role, as he 
never thought of 
regulation before; P: 
Probably no role, but 
not absolutely certain 
in case he had been 
provided with more 
information about the 
Internet




the accuracy of 
the information 
available online 






P: Similar to 
regulation
R: No role, not the 
main reason; main 
reason is the lack of 
motivation and 
interest; P: No role, 
but it would be good 
if she had been 
provided with more 
education about the 
Internet
R: Important for 
users' protection; 
emphasis to 
online fraud and 
issues relating to 
online purchases 
P: Problematises 
the role of 
policy; important 
for the facilities 
and education 













R + P: Does not 
know about the 
Internet, but she 
challenges the 
Greek state's 
efficiency and the 
applicability of 
laws and policies 
in the country
R: No role, as she has 
pre-decided not to use 
the Internet; P: No 
role, but important in 
case her children use 
the Internet in the 
future






need for use and 
cost of use
Petros
R: Agrees with 
Menios; this is 
something users can 
say more about; P: 
No role as the 
Internet is not of any 
interest to him
Menios





R: No, as he would 
not use the Internet 
even if he knew more 
about regulation; P: 
No role as the 










R: Does not 
know about the 








Assumes that, as 
Greece lags 




R: No role, as he 
never thought of 
regulation before; P: 
Probably no role, but 
not absolutely certain 
in case he had been 
provided with more 
information about the 
Internet




the accuracy of 
the information 
available online 






Table A .8-8 Public discourses on Internet regulation and policy
U sers ( i st + 2nd group) N on-users (3rd + 4th group)
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